Operation Ten-gō

Operation Ten-gō / Battle of Bō-no-Misaki

Part of: World War II , Pacific War

A 6 km high explosive cloud marks the place where the Yamato exploded.

date	April 7, 1945
place	200 km south-west of Kagoshima
output	American victory

Parties to the conflict
United States	Japan
Commander
Marc Andrew Mitscher , Joseph J. Clark , Frederick C. Sherman , Arthur W. Radford	Itō Seiichi †, Aruga Kōsaku †
Troop strength
11 aircraft carriers 8 battleships 9 light cruisers 52 destroyers	1 battleship 1 light cruiser 8 destroyers
losses
12 dead 10 aircraft	3700 dead 1 battleship 1 light cruiser 4 destroyers

Overview - Pacific War

Operation Ten-gō ( Japanese 天 号 作 戦 Ten-gō sakusen , actually 天 一号 作 戦 Ten-ichi-gō sakusen ) was the last major offensive operation of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Pacific War and World War II .

In April 1945, the Japanese High Command used a large part of its scarce resources for a relief attack by its Navy against US landing forces near Okinawa . The battleship Yamato and a small fleet of escort ships were discovered shortly after US reconnaissance aircraft left the port and were finally sunk by air strikes, so that the operation was canceled without having achieved the intended relief of the Japanese army fighting on Okinawa.

The sinking of the fleet demonstrated the absolute air supremacy of the Americans in the late course of the war, even in the immediate vicinity of the Japanese home islands. It was a final confirmation that the age of the battleship was over and that aircraft carriers were now dominating the seas. However, the lack of any air security for the Japanese naval association also tragically illustrated the willingness of the Japanese leadership to sacrifice people and material on a large scale in largely senseless military actions in order to slow down the US advance.

background

At the beginning of 1945, the remnants of the Japanese fleet had withdrawn to their ports on the Japanese home islands after the heavy battles of 1943 and 1944 . Because of the scarce fuel reserves and the lack of pilots, neither the few aircraft carriers nor the remaining battleships and cruisers were able to carry out major operations. The only larger warships left were the Navy's flagship , the battleship Yamato , four older battleships , three aircraft carriers (excluding aircraft) and half a dozen cruisers . Japan had lost sea control in its own coastal waters to US submarines , so that movements with surface ships outside the ports became almost impossible and the transport of raw materials from the areas still occupied by Japan on the Asian continent to Japan collapsed.

The climax of the Allied island hopping (island hopping ) was the invasion of the islands, which according to the Japanese understanding belonged to the homeland. US troops landed on Saipan in June 1944 and captured Iwo Jima in March 1945 . For lack of other options, Japanese strategists developed the Shimpū Tokkōtai or kamikaze tactics . Volunteers received fast-track training to become pilots and rushed their planes onto US ships in order to destroy them with bombs or explosives.

The Japanese high command also worked out plans for a decisive battle in four possible locations:

• Operation Heaven No. 1 ( 天 一号 作 戦 Ten-ichi-gō sakusen ) for the Okinawa region
• Operation Heaven No. 2 ( 天 二号 作 戦 Ten-ni-gō sakusen ) for the Taiwan region
• Operation Heaven No. 3 ( 天 三号 作 戦 Ten-san-gō sakusen ) for the region around the South China coast
• Operation Heaven No. 4 ( 天 四号 作 戦 Ten-shi-gō sakusen ) for the French Indochina and Hainan region

Since the end of March 1945 the American naval units began bombing the island of Okinawa , Operation Ten-gō is usually the first of the four operations.

At a briefing, the representatives of the Japanese army command told Tennō Hirohito that massive kamikaze missions would be launched against the invasion fleet to defend the island. The Tennō is said to have asked Admiral Oikawa what the Navy was doing in this matter. According to several historians, this simple question should have been decisive in planning a suicide mission for the Japanese Navy, which had actually already been defeated. As part of this mission, those responsible were prepared in an act of desperation to sacrifice their flagship and several thousand sailors in order not to lose face .

The plan developed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Admiral Toyoda Soemu , together with his staff provided that the Navy's flagship , the Yamato , should fight its way to Okinawa with a few security ships. There she was supposed to run up on the beach and bombard the US invasion fleet, which consisted of more than 1200 ships, until her ammunition supply was used up. The surviving sailors should then join the Japanese army in defensive combat. No or at most only a few aircraft of the Japanese Air Force were supposed to protect the fleet, as the few experienced Japanese fighter pilots were assigned to escort the squadrons of the kamikaze pilots . The simultaneous attack from sea and from the air, it was hoped, would force the Americans to split up their forces and give the kamikaze pilots enough time to sink or at least eliminate the US aircraft carriers. The operational plan was initially rejected by the Japanese staff officers who were supposed to carry it out because of the low chances of success. Only the reference to the wish of the Tennō, and thus of the entire Japanese people, that the Navy should do everything possible to prevent the invasion of Okinawa, convinced them to support the plan.

Since the operational plan did not provide for a return of the Yamato to Japan, the order was issued to refuel the ship's fuel bunkers only with enough fuel for the direct route to Okinawa. 2,000 tons of heavy oil were released from the Japanese reserve of only 40,000 tons to fill the ships' bunkers. The administration of the fuel depot in Tokuyama (today: Shūnan ) voluntarily released 6,000 tons more oil to the fleet than the original order intended. Sick crew members, midshipmen and other unneeded personnel were withdrawn from the ships, sometimes under protests, and brought ashore.

Battle of Bō-no-Misaki ( 坊 ノ 岬 沖 海 戦 Bō no Misaki Oki Kaisen )

The course of the Japanese fleet and the route of the US aircraft

The Japanese fleet left Tokuyama on April 6, 1945 at around 4 p.m. Admiral Itō Seiichi , on board the Yamato , was in command of the naval formation consisting of Yamato , the light cruiser Yahagi and eight destroyers ( Asashimo , Isokaze , Kasumi , Fuyuzuki , Hamakaze , Hatsushimo , Suzutsuki , Yukikaze ).

In the evening the Japanese sailors were served an extraordinarily tasty meal and, otherwise unusual, alcohol was served. The attack plan was not hidden from the Allied radio reconnaissance and just a few hours later the radars of patrolling US submarines recognized the Japanese ships moving south along the coast of Kyūshū . They informed their superiors of the contact, and the next morning several Catalina- type reconnaissance flying boats disembarked to search for the Japanese fleet. The Japanese fleet, whose ships had now taken an anti-aircraft formation, was soon discovered and shadowed. Attempts by the Yamato to shoot the reconnaissance aircraft with a type 3 incendiary cluster munition ( 三 式 焼 散 弾 san-shiki shōsandan ) developed for air defense with their main guns failed.

TBF Avenger torpedo bombers in April 1945 aboard the USS Hornet (CV-12)

Air bombs explode next to the stopped Yahagi

The Yamato is just missed by an aerial bomb. Despite visible damage, it still runs at high speed.

Around ten o'clock in the morning about 400 fighter planes took off in several waves from 11 aircraft carriers of the US American Task Force 58 under the command of Vice Admiral Mitscher to attack the Japanese fleet. In addition to the considerable combat power of the TF 58, Admiral Spruance assembled six other battleships and several cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral Deyo to form a combat group to intercept the Japanese unit should the air raids fail.

The US squadrons consisting of F6F Hellcat , a few F4 Wildcat - fighter planes , SB2C-Helldiver - dive bombers and TBM Avenger - torpedo bombers , required about two hours flying time from the position of their fleet at Okinawa to the Japanese Association. In the absence of a threat from Japanese fighters, the US groups were able to plan their attack without interference and maneuver themselves into perfect positions before their first attack began at 12:30 p.m.

While the fighters directly attacked the anti-aircraft guns on the ships in order to weaken the defensive strength of the unit, the pilots of the torpedo bombers and those of the dive bombers concentrated on the Yamato and the light cruiser Yahagi . The majority of the attacks by torpedo bombers were carried out from port side , because it was hoped that the unilateral water ingress would capsize the attacked ships more quickly . The Japanese fleet, for its part, increased its speed to 25 knots and began evasive maneuvers to make the aircraft's attacks more difficult.

As early as 12:45 p.m., only twelve minutes after the start of the attack, the Yahagi was hit by several torpedoes, one of which destroyed the engine room and another damaged the screws and the rudder, so that the ship was unable to maneuver and fell behind the other ships. The Yamato received only one torpedo hit and two hits from armor-piercing aerial bombs, which did not noticeably reduce speed and defensive readiness. However, between the main gun turret aft and the adjacent 155 mm gun turret of the middle artillery , one of the bombs had penetrated the deck and started a fire between the two ammunition chambers below the turrets, which could not be extinguished for the next hour and a half. Three of the accompanying destroyers, Isokaze , Hamakaze and Suzutsuki , were also hit. The Hamakaze sank , the Isokaze later had to be abandoned, and the Suzutsuki fell back badly damaged.

The attack by the second wave of US planes began at 1:20 p.m. and was almost entirely focused on the Yamato . She received at least eight torpedo hits and 15 hits from heavy bombs within a short period of time. The bombs destroyed the ship's fire control system so that the anti-aircraft guns could only be aimed manually and were far less effective in working together in selecting targets. One bomb tore apart two 25 mm guns, penetrated the deck and exploded in the readiness room of the port damage control team; another detonated in the officers' mess where the emergency hospital had been set up. The water that penetrated through various cracks in the port side soon made a balance of the occurred flip side needed. Several sections in the lower deck were then deliberately flooded, and others were put under water by a torpedo hit on the starboard side , with several hundred sailors drowning in the compartments, but the list was significantly reduced so that the ship could continue its course at a slower speed. The already incapable of maneuvering Yahagi was hit by several bombs and began to sink. At 14:05, the order was given to leave the ship. The destroyer Asashimo , which had fallen behind the Japanese formation due to machine problems , was sunk with its entire crew.

The Yamato is still burning between the turrets aft, has a recognizable list to port and is barely moving .

The third wave of attack by the carrier aircraft was concentrated on the Yamato . After further torpedo and bomb hits, the ship's engine power fell to a minimum, and the list again reached over 20 °. At around 2:20 p.m., the order was given over the loudspeaker to leave the ship.

At 2:23 p.m. the Yamato capsized and a heavy explosion tore the ship apart. After the sinking of the Japanese flagship, the US air strikes were largely stopped. The remaining Japanese destroyers began rescuing the survivors. The senior officer, Taisa Yoshida, on the destroyer Fuyutsuki informed headquarters of the casualties and requested new orders. At around 4:22 p.m., the surviving crew members of the still floating destroyer Kasumi were rescued and the wreck was sunk with their own torpedoes. The sailors of the sinking Isokaze were also saved. At 5:50 p.m. the order from headquarters to abort the operation was received by the remnants of the Japanese fleet. The Americans had lost ten aircraft to the anti-aircraft fire, dozen more were damaged, some irreparably, and had to be abandoned on their return. American rescue planes recovered at least one of their downed pilots shortly after the battle. On the morning of April 8, three of the four remaining Japanese destroyers reached Sasebo . The destroyer Suzutsuki , the bow of which had been torn off by a torpedo, did not arrive on its own until the afternoon, steering over the stern. The Japanese leadership kept the sinking of the fleet a secret for almost a month before informing the sailors' relatives.

Aftermath

The end of Operation Ten-gō also ended the offensive activities of the Japanese surface ships in World War II . Most of the ships still available were destroyed from the air at their berths or fell victim to mines and submarines . The kamikaze attacks by the Japanese army aviators against the US fleet were carried out as planned on April 7, but failed. Only five US ships, including the aircraft carrier USS Hancock , were damaged while around 100 Japanese planes were lost.

The fate of the fleet and especially the sinking of the Yamato soon found its way into the culture of Japan . The population has always referred to themselves as the Yamato people , so that the sinking of the ship of the same name had to act like a warning sign for the Japanese people and their efforts in the war and is still sometimes stylized as a sacrifice . The sinking of the Japanese fleet played no particular role for the US Navy. It was only noted that the threat posed by another Japanese battleship had been eliminated.

literature

• Feifer, George: Operation Heaven Number One. The Battle of Okinawa: The Blood and the Bomb. The Lyons Press, Guilford CT 2001, ISBN 1-58574-215-5 .
• Hara, Tameichi: The Last Sortie. Japanese Destroyer Captain. Ballantine Books, New York NY et al. 1961.
• Ōi, Atsushi: Kaijo Goeisen. Asahi Sonorama, Tokyo 1992, ISBN 4-05-901040-5 .
• Skulski, Janusz: The Battleship Yamato. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD 1989, ISBN 0-87021-019-X .
• Spurr, Russell: A Glorious Way to Die. The Kamikaze Mission of the Battleship Yamato, April 1945. Newmarket Press, New York NY 1995, ISBN 1-55704-248-9 .
• Yoshida, Mitsuru; Richard H. Minear: Requiem for Battleship Yamato. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD 1999, ISBN 1-55750-544-6 .

Individual evidence

1. ^ Yoshida, Minear, Requiem for Battleship Yamato , 118
2. ↑ aircraft carrier: Junyo , Amagi and Katsuragi ; Battleships: Nagato , Haruna , Ise and Hyuga
3. ↑ 沖 縄 戦 関係 資料 閲 覧 室 天 号 作 戦 - 沖 縄 方面 航空 作 戦 2－ (Material on the war before Okinawa: Operation Ten-gō - air military operation in the Okinawa area). Japan Science Support Foundation, 2003, archived from the original on August 13, 2007 ; Retrieved March 28, 2010 (Japanese). 
4. ↑ Spurr, A glorious way to die , pp. 96 ff.
5. ^ Feifer, The Battle of Okinawa , 7
6. ^ Spurr, A glorious way to die , pp. 110-113
7. ^ Yoshida, Minear, Requiem for Battleship Yamato , 62.
8. ↑ Spurr, A glorious way to pages 163–164
9. ↑ Spurr, A glorious way to die page 167 ff.
10. ↑ Spurr, A glorious way to die , Sekihan, Okashiratsuki, page 125 ff.
11. ↑ Richard P. Hallion: Air Warfare and Maritime Operations (PDF download), Air Power Studies Center Paper 45, June 1996th
12. ↑ Hara, The Last Sortie. Japanese Destroyer Captain , page 277
13. ^ ^{A b} Elmar B. Potter, Chester W. Nimitz, Jürgen Rohwer: Seemacht . Bernard & Graefe Verlag, ISBN 3-7637-5112-2 , page 893
14. ↑ http://navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Final_Sortie.htm Provisions TF 58 engl.
15. ^ Spurr, A glorious way to die , pp. 254-255
16. ^ Yoshida, Minear, Requiem for Battleship Yamato , 66.
17. ^ Yoshida, Minear, Requiem for Battleship Yamato , 78
18. ↑ Hara, The Last Sortie. Japanese Destroyer Captain , p. 298
19. ^ Spurr, A glorious way to die , p. 293
20. ↑ Literally Great Assistance ; corresponds to the rank of sea ​​captain .
21. ↑ Spurr, A glorious way to die , 305
22. ^ Spurr, A glorious way to die , pp. 301-302
23. ↑ Spurr, A glorious way to die , 314
24. ↑ Spurr, A glorious way to die , 313
25. ↑ Hara, The Last Sortie. Japanese Destroyer Captain , page 304.
26. ^ Yoshida, Minear, Requiem for Battleship Yamato , p. XVII
27. ^ Sinking the Supership NOVA Science TV Documentation

Web links

• Chronology of the history of the Yamato and the final battle (Engl.)
• The Last Operation of Battleship Yamato (japan.)
• Timings in the search for the wreck of the Yamato and its representation in popular culture (Engl.)

Japanese name: As is common in Japan, the family name comes before the first name in this article . Thus Itō is the family name, Seiichi the first name.

This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on April 17, 2008 .