Company winter storm
Operation Winter Storm was the code name for the Second World War failed relief attack of Army Group Don with about 50,000 troops and 250 tanks against about three times superior forces in the course of the battle of Stalingrad trapped 6th Army . Liberate (12-December 23 1942).
background
The German and allied troops in the battle of Stalingrad were surrounded in the wake of the Russian Operation Uranus . The high command of the 4th Panzer Army had to withdraw on November 21st. In response to an order from the Fiihrer, it gave command of all its German units to the 6th Army. In a disorderly escape the 4th Panzer Army withdrew behind the Don , where the bridgehead could be held until December 13th. The High Command of the 6th Army (AOK 6), initially in Golubinskaya 15 km north of Kalach , relocated to Nizhne-Tschirskaja, from where General of the Armored Troop Paulus flew into the pocket the next day, November 22, 1942.
Preparations
General of the artillery grabbed Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach , commanding general of the LI. Army Corps took the initiative and worked out a plan for the breakout with his General Staff. The commanders of the other corps in the pocket and AOK 6 fully shared his views. The date was set for November 25th and, with the consent of Army Group B, the necessary regrouping was ordered. The outbreak was to take place in three stages, with the troops being gradually relocated from the north of the pocket to the south, before an armored wedge then pierced the enemy lines and cleared the way to the south for the following infantry. The preparations went so far that the only thing missing was permission from the Army High Command . 130 tanks and 17,000 men were ready for the first wave, 40,000 soldiers for the second.
Hitler had already given orders on November 22nd to hold the kettle. In a conversation with the representative of the General Staff of the Army, General of the Infantry Kurt Zeitzler , Hitler was persuaded to approve the outbreak. He was assured that the withdrawn front and Army Group A could be kept in their positions. Army Group B believed that the order to break out could arrive every hour. When the order was still not given on November 24th at 10:45 am, the Army Group prepared to hand it over without authorization. In this situation, AOK 6 received the order from the Army Group to hold out until further notice. The cause of Hitler's attitude was the promise made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force , Hermann Göring , to be able to supply the 6th Army from the air.
On November 25th, General Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was placed under the command of the newly formed Don Army Group with the task of restoring the connection to the fortress of Stalingrad by attacking the 4th Panzer Army . The Army Groups A and B should keep their positions. Manstein considered this task impracticable: He pleaded for a joint relief attack by Army Groups Don and A with the simultaneous outbreak of 6th Army and a withdrawal of the front on Donets and Mius . But Manstein was unable to assert himself with his view at the Führer Headquarters (FHQ). Hitler insisted on holding positions in both the Caucasus and Stalingrad.
So Manstein divided his army group in preparation for the relief attack into two parts: the Hollidt army division with the front at Tschir in the north and Don in the east and the Hoth army group in the south on the other side of the Don. Originally both parts of Army Group were supposed to attack Don; but since the units intended for the Hollidt army division did not arrive and the development of the situation on the Tschir did not allow the advance, it remained in its position. The army group under Colonel General Hoth received the order on December 1st to carry out the Wintergewitter operation . At this point, however, it was not yet fully operational: the subordinate Romanian troops were inadequately equipped and had already been decimated and demoralized in the previous battles. Of the Germans, only the 6th Panzer Division has been operational so far . The arrival of the 17th Panzer Division was still completely uncertain and the 23rd Panzer Division arrived very slowly. In addition, the newly established 15th Air Force Field Division had to end its basic training in the rear area under high pressure.
The date of the attack, initially set for December 8th, could not be kept under these circumstances. The German leadership also waited for a cold spell with ground frost to make better progress. This occurred from December 10th.
The relief attack
Since the development of the situation for the 6th Army forbade a longer delay, Hoth decided to attack on December 12th without waiting for the arrival of the 17th Panzer Division . The German side was optimistic; All in all, the military strategists considered it impossible to hold a cauldron against an advancing relief army.
The LVII. Panzer Corps (General of the Panzer Troop Kirchner ) attacked from the Kotelnikowo area and reached the bank of the Aksai by evening , where all preparations were made for the transition the next day. On December 13th, the corps advanced on the high ground of Werchne Kumski, where it encountered strong resistance from the Soviet 2nd Guard Army under General Malinowski . On December 15th, the 6th Panzer Division reported the loss of 23 tanks and eight field howitzers . The advance of around 60 km reached by this time resulted in considerable material and personnel losses.
After the 17th Panzer Division (Lieutenant General von Senger and Etterlin ) arrived on the battlefield on December 17th, the Soviet resistance was broken on the 19th and the southern bank of the Myshkova River was captured. On the night of December 20, the 6th Panzer Division (Lieutenant General Raus ) occupied the only bridge over the river in one stroke and set up a bridgehead on the north bank. The tops of the army group had thus come within 55 km of the containment ring around Stalingrad and could already see the flares of the southern front of the basin across the barren steppe. From December 20th to 22nd, the 23rd Panzer Division (General Vormann ) fought to expand the bridgehead. However, the situation forbade any further advance: not only was the connection to the bridgehead broken several times, but the situation behind the troops on the south side of the Myshkova was anything but resolved; the Soviet leadership had begun to throw all available troops into the flanks of the relief army.
In addition, the Red Army now also attacked Hollidt's Army Detachment and pushed its bridgehead at Nizhny-Tschirskaya. The Akimowski and Lutschenski bridges on the Don were already in the hands of the Soviets. This meant that there was a risk that the Hoth Army Group would be bypassed on the western bank of the Don and another cauldron could develop. Since the necessary supplies for the Stalingrad boiler were only insufficiently flown in, it was clear that the air force would not be able to supply another boiler. All that remained was the loss-making retreat that saved at least the units of the relief army that were still fit for combat.
Termination of the attack
In the cauldron, all preparations for the eruption had been made for the second time, which was to take place on the keyword "Thunderbolt": tank and troop units were mainly in the south, all superfluous equipment and the material to be left behind were destroyed, the bolt positions and bunkers on the northern edge of the Kessel has been abandoned. At that time, AOK 6 estimated that due to the general decline in strength of the troops and the lack of fuel and ammunition, it was only capable of an eruption to a depth of 15 km. It should therefore be waited before the outbreak until the Army Group Hoth would have come within 18 km. On December 21st, Hitler gave permission for the 6th Army to attack, provided Stalingrad was held. On the same day, the FHQ requested the army's fuel documents, and it turned out that the fuel only allowed the tanks to penetrate a maximum of 30 km. Thereupon Hitler withdrew his permission again in order to avoid that the heavy material would have to be left behind in the steppe.
Despite the position in the rear of the bridgehead and the approach of further motorized enemy forces, Colonel General Hoth decided to continue the attack. However, on December 17 and 18, the Red Army had already managed to break into the Italian 8th Army on the south wing of Army Group B to a depth of at least 45 km and tore up the front over a width of 150 km. The northern flank of Army Group Don and, subsequently, the entire Army Group South was threatened to the utmost. Therefore, on December 23, General Field Marshal von Manstein gave the Hoth Army Group the order to stop the attack and go over to the defense. The 6th Panzer Division was then to be handed over to the threatened area by Gruppe Hoth. Hoth was of the opinion that his regrouping, which had taken place in the meantime, would guarantee an advance from the bridgehead and that an approximation of 25 km would have to be sufficient for the 6th Army to break out. The 4th Panzer Army was ready to take all its might to the decisive battle on December 24th and to push through, disregarding back and flank protection. The order to surrender the Panzer Division and hold the room, however, remained. The Wintergewitter company was thus closed .
Aftermath
Shortly after the requested Panzer Division was surrendered on December 24, the Red Army went on the attack. Opposite the 1st Guards Rifle Corps, 11th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 7th and 13th Soviet Panzer Corps, the front of the Hoth Army Group could no longer be held. At the last minute, on December 26, she received permission to go back to her original position. This line had to be given up under the onslaught of the Red Army soldiers on the night of December 29th. The front arch on Tschir and Don held, but it was only a matter of time before it would be pushed in too. The relief from Stalingrad had become hopeless. Army Group Don held its position only for the purpose of keeping the way clear for Army Group A, which stood between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea .
So one hoped in von Manstein's staff that Paulus would act independently to overcome the 80 km to the German lines on the Don on his own. Since this was contrary to the Führer's order, Paul could not be officially informed of this. Relief aid was no longer to be expected from Army Group Don: They were already secretly preparing their further retreat to Taganrog . Army Group A, which was still in the area north of the Caucasus, also had enough trouble organizing its retreat across the Don before the Red Army cut it off with its attack on Rostov . Nevertheless, the 6th Army had been informed by the FHQ that they would be detained by the (dispersed) 17th Army (Army Group A). The emissary sent by Manstein to AOK 6 on December 27th described the need to break out immediately, but Paulus refused any unauthorized action because of Hitler's promise to adequately supply the 6th Army and to shock it in good time. The 6th Army fought until late January / early February 1943.
literature
- Rüdiger von Manstein (Ed.): Soldier in the 20th century. Military-political gleanings. 3. Edition. Bernard and Graefe, Bonn 1994, ISBN 3-7637-5214-5 .
- Janusz Piekałkiewicz: Stalingrad , Heyne Verlag, Munich 1993.
- Heinz Schröter: Stalingrad ... down to the last cartridge. Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1993, ISBN 3-548-22972-7 .
- Peter Young: The great atlas for World War II. Munich 1973, ISBN 3-517-00473-1 .
- Antony Beevor : Stalingrad. Munich 1999, ISBN 3-442-15101-5 .