Russo-Swedish War (1741–1743)
The Russo-Swedish War (also known as the "War of Hats" ) from 1741 to 1743 was an attempt by the Swedish Hats Party to reverse the country's defeat in the Northern War (1700–1721) against Russia and at least partially restore its position as a great power . The conflict ended with Sweden's defeat and major territorial cedings to Russia.
prehistory
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In the Great Northern War (1700–1721) Sweden had lost all Baltic possessions and thus its supremacy in the Baltic region. In the following years the political system was consolidated into a parliamentary monarchy. While King Frederick of Sweden (1676–1751) had little power, two parties faced each other in parliament. On the one hand there were the Mössorna (hats) , which were more pro-Russia and primarily pursued economic interests. Opposite them were the Hattarne (hats) , which mostly represented the higher nobility and were strongly oriented towards France as a traditional ally.
In 1738 the hats succeeded in asserting themselves in the Estates Day . The Swedish policy was now directed against Russia, which was allied with Austria and therefore an enemy of France. King Louis XV of France assured the Swedes of its support in regaining the old great power position in order to create a potential counterweight to Russia. France and Sweden signed a subsidy agreement in autumn 1738 and started negotiations with the Ottoman Empire , which was currently at war with Russia (→ Russian-Austrian Turkish War (1736–1739) ). Sweden concluded an alliance treaty with this state in 1739. However, since the Ottomans had made peace with Russia shortly before, Sweden was unable to engage the tsarist empire in a two-front war as hoped.
In the years 1740/41 France became the determining factor in Swedish foreign policy. As early as 1740, the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire , Charles VI. died and his daughter Maria Theresa had succeeded him in the Austrian hereditary lands. Shortly thereafter, the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) broke out, in which the monarch faced a Prussian-Saxon-Bavarian coalition. France wanted to use this opportunity to decisively weaken the hereditary enemy Austria, and therefore supported the claims of the German princes financially and militarily. Now it was a matter of preventing Russia, which was allied with Austria, from rushing to Maria Theresa to help. To that end, it was supposed to be involved in a war with Sweden. Such a war would then be supported by a coup d'état of the illegitimate daughter of Peter the Great Elizabeth (1709–1762), which was also planned with French support. It was envisaged that Elisabeth would soon make a peace with Sweden that would benefit the hats .
course
The Swedish parliament then declared war on Russia on August 8, 1741. For the limited purpose of the war and the supposed Russian weakness, the small Swedish army of around 20,000 men seemed quite sufficient. But just a few weeks later, on September 3, the army suffered its first heavy defeat in the battle of Villmanstrand (Finnish: Lappeenranta ).
On November 25, 1741, Elizabeth's coup took place. The new tsarina actually leaned toward peace in order to first consolidate her domestic political position. But despite the defeat at Villmanstrand, the Swedish demands remained too high for the Tsarina to accept without further ado. Thereupon they ordered the initiation of a counter-offensive. In 1742 Russian troops under General Peter Graf von Lacy (1678-1751) marched into southern Finland and took Hamina , Porvoo and Hämeenlinna without major resistance . In August Lacy succeeded in encircling the approximately 17,000-strong Swedish main army near Helsinki and forcing it to surrender.
The following year the Swedish government came under greater pressure. Peasant revolts broke out in Dalekarlien , which soon assumed threatening proportions. At the same time the Russian army marched on Turku (Åbo). In this untenable situation, the Swedish government had no choice but to seek a quick peace settlement. The negotiations that led to the conclusion of the Åbo Peace on August 7th began in the summer .
consequences
The Swedish ambitions had failed. Instead of coming closer to its own superpower position, the country itself had to cede the southern Finnish areas up to the Kymijoki River with the fortress of Olofsborg and the cities of Villmanstrand and Fredrikshamn to Russia. Tsarina Elisabeth also ensured that Adolf Friedrich von Gottorf (1710–1771) had to be elected heir to the throne by the Swedish parliament. With this monarch from a friendly noble family (a relative of the later Tsar Peter III. ) She hoped to gain more influence on Swedish politics later. When King Frederick of Sweden finally died in 1751, the Duke of Gottdorf took office.
Still, King Frederick II of Prussia suspected that Sweden would continue to try to regain Estonia and Livonia (the territories lost in 1721) and seek an alliance with Prussia in return. Friedrich saw this as an opportunity to ask for Swedish-Pomeranian as a price , but advised against a hasty war against Russia in view of the low chances of success.
"If the favorable circumstance came that Russia was about to go to war [with Turkey] and Sweden used this to reclaim Livonia, could Prussia not promise her assistance against the cession of Swedish Pomerania? The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that in order to attack Russia in Livonia and Estonia one would necessarily have to have superiority at sea. However, the Swedish fleet is weak and we don't have a warship. The siege of Reval, Narva and the other seaside towns would be impossible [...] assuming that Prussia succeeded in conquering Livonia, it is almost obvious that Sweden could not penetrate through Finland because the Russians have there fortresses that are impregnable due to their location. Thus, after much bloodshed, there would be a peace in which everything would have to be given back and everyone would keep as much as he owned before the war began. "
literature
- Klaus-Richard Böhme: Sweden's participation in the Seven Years War - domestic and foreign policy requirements and repercussions . In: Bernhard Kroener (Ed.): Europe in the age of Frederick the Great - economy, society, wars . (= Contributions to Military History, Vol. 26), Munich 1989, pp. 193–212.
- Walther Mediger: Russia's way to Europe . Georg Westermann Verlag, 1952.
- Bernhard von Poten (ed.): Hand dictionary of the entire military sciences . (9 vols.), Leipzig 1877-1880.
Individual evidence
- ^ Friedrich von Oppeln-Bronikowski: Friedrich the Great - The Political Testament of 1752 , pages 85 and 87f. Reclam, Stuttgart 1974