Battle of Storkyro

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Battle of Storkyro
date March 2, 1714
place Napue, Isokyrö (Storkyro), Ostrobothnia , Finland
output Russian victory
Parties to the conflict

Sweden 1650Sweden Sweden

Russia Tsarism 1699Tsarist Russia Russia

Commander

Sweden 1650Sweden Carl Gustaf Armfeldt

Russia Tsarism 1699Tsarist Russia Mikhail Golitsyn

Troop strength
4500 men 9000 men
9 cannons
losses

about 1,600 dead and
900 wounded

around 400 dead
1500 wounded

The Battle of Storkyro was a battle of the Finnish campaign of 1713-1714 in the Great Northern War , which took place on March 2, 1714 Gregorian calendar near the village of Napue in Ostrobothnia between a Swedish and Russian army. The Swedish army, made up almost entirely of Finnish soldiers, was defeated by a numerically superior Russian army. As a result, all of Finland fell under Russian rule until the end of the war.

prehistory

In 1703 Russian forces reached the inner parts of the Gulf of Finland and founded the city of Saint Petersburg . Since the main Swedish army was employed in Poland, only remnant troops remained to defend the Baltic territories. After the Battle of Poltava , Russia conquered the last Swedish fortresses in Livonia , Estonia and Ingermanland .

When Charles XII. Denied peace negotiations, Denmark and Russia agreed on plans to threaten Stockholm. Two routes of attack were agreed. One should go through southern Sweden, the other through Finland and the Aland Islands . The Danish attack on the southern route was repulsed at the Battle of Helsingborg in 1710 , but the Russian attack on Finland succeeded.

The Russian attack on Finland did not go as planned, however, as Peter I was distracted during the war against the Ottoman Empire . This meant that the planned attacks on Åbo had to be postponed. The first Russian attacks consisted of raids and reconnaissance operations with the aim of occupying southeastern Finland. Furthermore, the Finnish countries were to be devastated in order not to offer Swedish forces a basis for operations on their part against Russian-controlled land around Saint Petersburg.

A major Russian military campaign began in 1713 after logistical problems prevented an attack the previous year. Peter I reached Helsinki in May and during the summer all of southern Finland fell into Russian hands. The Swedish forces under the command of General Georg Lybecker withdrew inland. Before Peter I returned to Russia, he commissioned Fyodor Matveyevich Apraxin , the commander in chief of the Russian Navy, to attack the Swedish army during the winter.

General Carl Gustaf Armfeldt was given command of the Swedish troops in August 1713. He was faced with a hopeless task. Lybecker left him a neglected, starving and needy army. Exploration was not possible as the cavalry was too weak to carry out this type of task. When the Russian general Mikhail Golitsyn marched on Ostrobothnia in February 1714 , Armfeldt placed his forces in a defensive position near the village of Napo, east of Vasa . A council of war was held on February 16, during which Armfeldt decided to stay and venture into battle.

Course of the battle

The Storkyro battlefield

The Russians reached Napo from the east, along the frozen Kyrönjoki . When they came in sight but outside the range of the Swedish forces, the right wing of the cavalry and infantry turned north. Instead of forming and attacking the Russian soldiers parallel to the Swedish forces, Golitsyn decided to attack the Swedes on the left flank. A local farmer led the Russian army across the frozen swampy forest north of the river. In this way the Russian army was given a very advantageous position to attack the Swedish left flank. The Russian movements were observed by Armfeldt and his officers. Cossacks and dragoons reached their positions in the morning, while the main forces were raised in the afternoon.

When the battle was imminent, Armfeldt rode in front of the Swedish battle line and summoned the soldiers to fight for the king and the fatherland. Armfeldt realized something went wrong when only a small cavalry unit pushed along the frozen river while the rest of the Russian force disappeared northward. He realized the consequences of these events too late and ordered the Swedish line to reposition themselves northward to respond to this threat. He then ordered a preemptive attack. The Swedish right wing achieved great initial success and messed up the Russian left wing. The infantry fired their muskets and then proceeded to bayonet attack. The Russian left flank had not yet fully positioned itself and was thus in serious distress. Due to the great numerical superiority of the Russians, however, they were able to stabilize their lines. The Russian right flank was better organized and repulsed the Swedish attack.

Russian dragoons and Cossacks circled the Swedish cavalry and cut them off from the rest of the army. The Swedish left wing slowly collapsed in heavy defensive battles. Armfeldt tried to shock his circled left flank, but Golitsyn now concentrated his forces against the Swedish center and the right flank. The Swedish infantry completely collapsed and fled the battlefield in a panic.

consequences

The battle ended with the destruction of the Swedish army in Finland with the loss of nearly 2,500 men. Many soldiers froze to death the following night. The Russian losses were also considerable: 2,000 men fell or were wounded.

Strategically, the victory at Storkyro allowed the Russians to take control of all of Finland for years to come. Sweden was too weak to drive the Russians out of Finland. The simultaneous victory of the Russians in the naval battle of Hanko enabled the fleet to support the army's land operations. This was important because the overland supply of food for the Russian army could not be guaranteed.

Individual evidence

  1. Ericson, Lars: Svenska slagfalt , Wahlström & Widstrand, 2003, p. 327
  2. Ericson, Lars: Svenska slagfalt , Wahlström & Widstrand, 2003, p. 327
  3. ^ Kuvaja, Christer: Karolinska krigare 1660–1721 , Schildts Förlags AB, Helsingfors 2008, p. 220
  4. ^ Kuvaja, Christer: Karolinska krigare 1660–1721 , Schildts Förlags AB, Helsingfors 2008, p. 220