Russian campaign of Charles XII.

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Russian campaign of Charles XII.
The Battle of Poltava, drawn by Pierre-Denis Martin (1663–1742), 1726
The Battle of Poltava, drawn by Pierre-Denis Martin (1663–1742) , 1726
date 1708 to 1709
place Belarus , Ukraine ( Russian Tsarism )
output russian victory
consequences Charles XII's exile, turn of the war, destruction of the main Swedish army
Parties to the conflict

SwedenSweden (naval war flag) Sweden

Russia Tsarism 1699Tsarist Russia Russia Zaporozhian Cossacks
Flag of the Cossack Hetmanat.svg

Commander

SwedenSweden (naval war flag) Charles XII.
Ivan Masepa

Russia Tsarism 1699Tsarist Russia Peter I.
Ivan Skoropadskyi

Troop strength
97,000 men (1708) 192,000 men (1708)
losses

In the decisive battles :
5690 killed,
7367 wounded,
15,676 prisoners,
13,759 frozen

In the decisive battles :
10,464 killed,
15,502 wounded,
many thousands frozen to death

The Russian campaign of Charles XII. from January 28th (greg.) 1708 to July 21st (greg.) 1709 in the Great Northern War , the failed attempt of the Swedish King Charles XII. To conquer Moscow and dictate peace to Russia . Instead, the Swedes lost the decisive battle at Poltava in Ukraine and the further initiative in the war, which Sweden finally lost completely by 1721.

prehistory

Depiction of the campaigns during the first phase of the war from the outbreak of war in 1700 to the end of the war as a result of the Battle of Poltava in July 1709
Charles XII. receives John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough in Saxony, to discuss further Swedish operations in Europe

With the peace of Altranstädt it was Karl XII. after six long years of war, he succeeded in persuading August II to renounce the Polish throne. However, the success was marred by the fact that the Swedish Baltic provinces were now majority in Russian ownership. In addition, a Russian army marched into western Poland in 1706 and held it (see blockade of Grodno ). During his march to Saxony , Karl had promised the worried great Western European powers not to interfere with his army in the War of the Spanish Succession , but to turn to the East again. Tsar Peter, the last opponent of Charles, was therefore to be eliminated by a direct campaign on his capital Moscow . Russia's international reputation had sunk to a low point after the Peace of Altranstädt. The English ambassador Whitworth reported from Moscow on the Russian efforts to fortify the city. Western European politicians believed that it would only be a matter of time before Russia surrendered.

The main goals of Charles after the Peace of Altranstädt were to liberate the occupied territories in the Swedish Baltic Sea provinces and to make a lasting peace that secured Sweden's position as a great power. He also wanted to dethrone Peter and dictate peace in Moscow. Therefore, in February, June and August 1707 in Altranstädt, he turned down several offers of peace by the Tsar because he considered them to be a deception. In fact, Russia was ready for peace and would have been content with Ingrianland . Attempts to win the courts in Vienna , London or Berlin for a mediation went without a noticeable response, because they were not interested in ending the war in the north because Sweden was feared to interfere with France in the War of the Spanish Succession. So Russia was forced to continue the war.

The Russian army command made preparations as early as the beginning of 1706 in the event of a Swedish invasion of Russia. On January 22, 1706, the Russian generals in Grodno discussed the options for action in such a case. In coordination with Peter, the opponent developed a strategy of exhaustion, which provided for long avoidance of a fight, devastating the country on the way of retreat and depriving the enemy of the basis of supply. From then on, this pattern formed the basis of Russian defense strategy. In the fortresses, the garrisons were strengthened and supplies for a long defense were stored. Such precautions concerned a 200-kilometer-wide strip along the Russian western border.

Charles XII. hoped to achieve his war aims without turning the Swedish Baltic provinces into a battlefield. For this reason, an advance on St. Petersburg was ruled out from the start. Instead, Karl wanted to maneuver the Russian army out of Poland to avoid further devastation of the country, which was now allied with Sweden. From the Russian border the Swedish army was then to advance directly towards Moscow, while at the same time the allied Ottomans carried out an attack on the Russian southern border.

Troop strength

In 1708 77,000 Swedes stood ready for the invasion of Russia, 33,000 of them directly as part of the main army under the command of Charles XII. stood at Grodno . 22,000 Swedes were under the command of Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt in Swedish Livonia , 14,000 men belonged to the Finnish Army under Georg Lybecker and 8,000 Swedes remained for security in Poland under Ernst Detlof von Krassow . In addition there are 20,000 Poles under Stanisław I who were supposed to cover the Poles.

The total strength of the troops available for the defense of the Swedes on the Russian side was 192,000 men. 121,000 of them belonged to the Russian army , 57,000 of which were under the command of Peter I as part of the actual main army and were stationed between Severia and Smolensk . 24,500 Russians were stationed in Ingermanland under the command of Fyodor Matwejewitsch Apraxin . 16,000 men were at Dorpat in Livonia under the command of Christian Felix Bauer . 12,000 Russians were under the command of Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn near Kiev and 11,000 men were in front of Moscow . Another 12,000 men were deployed in the suppression of the Bulawin uprising and were only deployed at the end of the campaign against the Swedes. In addition there were 35,000 to 40,000 Cossacks and 10,000 Kalmyk troops under Ayuki . 23,500 Poles under Adam Mikołaj Sieniawski were ready in Poland. Peter succeeded in building a numerical superiority in all important regions. The tsar could replace losses with recruitment at any time. Charles XII. however, it was cut off from its base. It was difficult to get supplies from Sweden or Poland.

High command of the warring parties

Swedish Army High Command Russian Army High Command
Carl Gustaf Rehnskiöld Alexander Danilowitsch Menshikov
Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt Boris Petrovich Sheremetev
Carl Gustaf Roos Anikita Ivanovich Repnin
Axel Gyllenkrok Ludwig Nikolaus von Hallart
Hugo Johan Hamilton Carl Ewald von Rönne
Axel Sparre Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn (the elder)
Carl Gustaf Creutz Jacob Daniel Bruce
Berndt Otto I. von Stackelberg Christian Felix Bauer

course

Advance of the Swedes into Russia

In September 1707 the long-prepared campaign against Russia began. The main Swedish army consisted of 36,000 experienced and well-rested soldiers, newly dressed and armed with new weapons. The Swedish war chest had grown by several million thalers. The advance should be made by direct route through Smolensk . On the Russian side, it was hoped that Menshikov's army, which was still in Poland, could hold off Charles's advance long enough for Tsar Peter to organize the defense along the Russian border. However, it was not intended to hold Poland. Instead, the retreating Russian Army of Menshikov was supposed to apply the scorched earth policy and thus deprive the advancing Swedish army of the basis of supply. On September 7, 1707 it crossed the Polish border near Steinau an der Oder . Menshikov's army avoided battle and withdrew from western Poland towards the east behind the Vistula. As they retreated, Menshikov burned villages along the way, poisoned wells and destroyed all storage facilities. At the end of October 1707, because of the mud period that began in autumn, Karl had his army held east of Posen , where new recruits increased the Swedish armed forces to a strength of 44,000 men. After the frost had made the roads passable again and the rivers were frozen, the Swedish army crossed the frozen Vistula in the last days of 1707 after a four-month break . Menshikov avoided a confrontation and withdrew further. Instead of following the trail devastated by the Russian army, the Swedes marched through the impassable Masuria , thereby bypassing the prepared defense lines of the Russians.

The direct advance on Moscow fails

Swedish battle plan of the
Battle of Golovchin on July 14, 1708

In mid-January 1708 the Swedish army left Masuria behind and reached Grodno on January 28, 1708 . Tsar Peter, who met Menshikov not far from the city, considered the strength of the Russian army to be too weak to be able to stop the Swedish army there and ordered the further retreat to the Lithuanian-Russian border. The Swedish advance lasted until the beginning of February, until the army of Charles XII. moved to winter storage near the Lithuanian town of Smorgon . During this stay Karl met with General Lewenhaupt. The effects of the Russian tactics were already noticeable in the lack of supplies, which endangered the further advance. Karl and Lewenhaupt agreed that the latter, with the 12,000-strong Livonian army and a supply train, should not join Charles' main army until the middle of the year. The supply shortages forced the Swedish army to move to Radovskoviche near Minsk in mid-March , where the supply situation was less precarious. The army stayed there for an additional three months to prepare for the upcoming campaign. To support the Polish King Stanislaus I. Leszczyński during the absence of Charles, 5,000 men were posted and sent back, so that the army was reduced to 38,000 men. The Swedish army was now divided between Grodno and Radovskoviche, while the 50,000-strong Russian army had formed itself along the line from Polotsk on the Daugava to Mogilew on the Dnieper . In addition to the protection of Moscow by Sheremetev, the Russian army also sought to counter a possible threat to St. Petersburg, which led to a greater division of forces. A proposal by his advisor Carl Piper to direct the advance on St. Petersburg and thus secure the Livonian provinces, Karl rejected and decided to continue the march on Moscow. After the beginning of the summer campaign on June 1st, the Swedish army crossed the Berezina on June 18th . The Russian forces were able to evade an attempt to bypass the Swedes and withdrew behind the next river barrier, the Drut . On June 30, Karl reached the Vabitch, a tributary of the Drut, near the village of Halowchyn. This is where the main line of defense of the Russian army was located and fighting broke out. In the Battle of Golovchin on July 14, 1708, the Swedes defeated the 39,000-strong Russian army under Sheremetev, who was able to withdraw his troops in good order. The victory is classified as the Pyrrhic victory of the Swedes, as many of the 1,000 wounded died due to poor medical care. The battle itself was not decisive, although the Swedes were able to overcome the north-south river barriers and the way to Moscow was open. On July 7th, the Swedes reached Mogilew on the Dnieper, where they stayed for the next four weeks.

In order to await the arrival of General Lewenhaupt with reinforcements from Livonia and the urgently needed supply trains, Karl had the advance of the main Swedish army stopped at Mogilew. Lewenhaupt had actually set out from Riga at the end of June with 13,000 reinforcements and 16 cannons, but bad weather delayed his advance. When the main Swedish army crossed the Dnieper in the first week of August, Levenhaupt's army had still not arrived. Karl now marched south-east to attract the attention of the Russians and protect the supply army from attack. On August 21, the Swedes reached Chemikow on the Sosch River , where they stopped for another week. When Karl directed his advance north again on August 23, the way to Smolensk was clear, as Peter I had left his position at Horki and followed him because of this advance .

Peter I had to let his troops march north again to block the Swedish advance. When the Swedes reached Malatitze , they found a considerable number of Russian army forces blocking the way to Smolensk. In the following battle, the Russians lost and, with 700 dead, had to take again higher losses compared to the 300 dead for the Swedes. A possible battle with the Russian main army did not take place because the Russians withdrew when Karl brought in reinforcements. The meeting at Malatitze was important, however, because the Russians finally demonstrated their increased morale and combat skills there. The tsar's troops had meanwhile reached at least the level of the Saxons, as a Swedish commander noted after the battle:

"The Swedes have to admit to the Muscovites that they have learned their lesson, much better than they did in the battles near Narwa or Fraustadt, and that they are equal, if not superior, to the Saxons in terms of discipline and courage"

- Jeffereyes

The Swedish supply army is destroyed

Depiction of the battle of Lesnaya near the village of Lesnaya

Peter kept his strategy of not engaging in a decisive battle; his army retreated into the woods. On September 4, Karl continued his advance and reached Tatarsk and Starishi . There, however, he had to admit his hopeless situation when the food supply reached a critical point and scouts reported that nothing lay ahead of them but devastated land. The desertions increased, and news of Lewenhaupt supply column were still unavailable. Eventually the Swedish king decided to break off the march on Moscow. His main goal now was to keep his army alive, and so on September 15th he swung south to the regions not yet devastated.

When Karl left Tatarsk in mid-September, Levenhaupt's supply army was still 80 miles away from the main Swedish army. Peter planned to take advantage of the gap between the two armies and put General Sheremetev in command of the main Russian army, which was to follow Charles's army. Together with his closest confidante Menshikov, whom he had made Duke of Ingermanland after the victory of Kalisch, the Tsar himself took command of ten battalions of his most experienced infantry, ten regiments of dragoons and four batteries of mounted artillery, a total of 11,625 men. Lewenhaupt's troops consisted of 7,500 infantry and 5,000 riders who accompanied a supply train with almost 1,000 cars. Lewenhaupt reached the Dnieper on September 18 . The crossing over the river dragged on for a whole week, during which the Russians approached the Swedes in order to finally pursue them. On September 27, the Swedes were caught near Lesnaya village . In the battle of Lesnaya they lost their entire supply train, as well as 607 horsemen, 751 dragoons and 4,449 infantry, of which 3,000 men were captured. Lewenhaupt led the remaining remnants to the Swedish main army ten days later, and so the king received quite different news of his supply train on October 6th than he had hoped.

Far away from this, another Swedish advance could be repulsed by Russian forces at the same time. A Swedish force of 12,000 men was to conquer Ingermanland from Finland and burn down the new Russian city of Saint Petersburg . Due to the strong defense of the city, however, the Swedes had to give up the plan and retreat to Vyborg , losing 3000 men .

Charles XII. moves south to Ukraine

Map of the Battle of Poltava, with French commentary; Military Archives of Sweden, Stockholm
Depiction of the famous battle between the Russian and Swedish armies near Poltava on June 27, 1709

Charles XII's goal of marching from Severien along the road from Kaluga to Moscow as soon as the army's supply situation improved was no longer achievable due to the disaster at Lesnaya. Karl therefore resorted to a new strategy: he had been in contact with the hetman of the Ukrainian Cossacks , Ivan Masepa, for a long time . In autumn 1707 the Bulavin uprising of the Cossacks and peasants broke out in the Don region , which was directed against the tsarist rule and which was rigorously suppressed by Peter I. Masepa had fallen out of favor with the Tsar; he viewed this as Russia's violation of the Pereyaslav Treaty . Since then he has been looking for a way to free Ukraine from Russian embrace. He also promised the King of Sweden that he would support him with an army of 100,000 men if the Swedes advanced into the Ukraine. Charles XII. then marched against the advice of his generals in Ukraine. But the expected reinforcement by the Cossacks did not materialize; The Russians had dispatched an army under General Menshikov, whose troops occupied Masepa's capital Baturyn and killed many of his supporters without reading a bunch, with 6,000 to 7,500 civilian casualties. Masepa was only able to provide a small number of the men promised, initially 3,000 and later 15,000. On November 21, 1708, the pro-Swedish Polish troops under King Stanislaus I. Leszczyński lost against a pro-Russian army in the Battle of Koniecpol in Poland. This was another possibility of support for Charles XII. successfully prevented by Polish units. Karl spent the winter in Ukraine, still confident of achieving his goals for the next year. On December 23, a Russian battalion at Weprik am Psel , which was able to withstand the attackers until January 7, opposed the Swedes. The Swedish king found it difficult to compensate for the heavy losses during the siege and storming of Weprik .

In addition, he could no longer retreat to Poland. Two Russian army corps had already formed behind him and were chasing the King of Sweden. From January to February 1709, minor skirmishes between Russian and Swedish troops took place in Slobozhanschina (northeastern Ukraine). The skirmishes between the Russians and Swedes increased steadily in severity as the campaign continued. Hardly any prisoners were taken. Instead, captured Russians or Swedes were killed by their war opponents. In January 1709 Colonel Albedyll's dragoon regiment was surrounded by 16,000 Russians under the command of General Sheremetev and almost completely destroyed. Few Swedes were left alive. At the beginning of February Charles XII. with eleven cavalry and two infantry regiments from Zenkow and marched towards Krasnokutsk. There it came to the battle at Krasnokutsk which ended with a Swedish victory. After the capture of the city of Krasnokutsk, it and some surrounding villages were looted and burned by the Swedish troops. The Swedish king marched on towards Chuchra and advanced as far as Kalomak, near the Donets . However, the winter of 1708/09, the hardest of the century, was devastating for the Swedes. The millennium winter of 1708/1709 caused sudden winter storms and deep frosts. Thousands of soldiers died in the Swedish army camp, most of them during the winter offensive. In the worst cold night alone, 2000 Swedes are said to have frozen to death. The Russian troops were better prepared for the harsh climate, did not leave their camps and thus suffered fewer cold losses.

The Poltava disaster

The Battle of Poltava
Battle of Poltava, Louis Caravaqe 1717/18
The Victory of Poltava by Alexander Evstafyevich Kotzebue, 1862, Hermitage
Russian troops cross the Vorskla
Assessment of Swedish prisoners after the battle by Tsar Peter and his entourage
The Russian Military Councilor of Peter I by E. Lyubimov
Triumphant entry of the Russian army after the Battle of Poltava in Moscow

At the beginning of the spring of 1709, fewer than 30,000 men with few cannons, almost half of the Swedish army, were ready for action in Russia. The soldiers recruited in Germany in particular had not coped with the cold. They were supported by the associations of the Zaporozhian Cossacks , who forced Tsar Peter to divide his forces. Despite the tense supply situation, Karl decided to lay siege to the city of Poltava , a supply base with large stocks of gunpowder and other supplies. At the beginning of April 1709 he blocked the city with 8,000 of his soldiers, expecting a quick surrender. However, the Russian garrison under Colonel A. Kelin was supported by Ukrainian Cossacks and the local population and held out for 87 days. After Tsar Peter had defeated the Zaporozhian Cossacks, he and his 60,000-strong army turned to Poltava to relieve the besieged city. They crossed the Worskla River and set up a fortified camp a few kilometers north of the city. When the Russian command learned of the difficult situation of the Swedish army, the tsar gave up his evasive policy. Charles XII., Who died on June 28th . had been wounded during a reconnaissance, decided to forestall the impending attack by attacking the fortified camp. In order to concentrate all forces on this task, Levenhaupt demanded the siege be abandoned, but the king refused and allowed Poltava to be besieged further. In the actual battle, therefore, only 20,000 men were deployed under Field Marshal Rehnskiöld. As there was a lack of gunpowder, the soldiers had to go into battle with bayonets attached and mostly unloaded muskets. Only 4 out of 32 cannons could be used for the attack. So it happened on July 8th, 1709 greg. in Ukraine for the decisive battle at Poltava . A surprise attack should throw the Russians into confusion and disintegration. But after the Swedish attack had only very limited successes, the Russians took part in open battle, in which they inflicted a crushing defeat on the Swedes thanks to their superior strength. Many Swedish officers, including Field Marshal Rehnskiöld, were taken prisoner by the Russians.

Depiction of the situation before the surrender at Perevolochna on July 11, 1709 (Russians = red; Swedes = blue)

After the battle, the returning army, which only consisted of about 15,000 men and 6,000 Cossacks , gathered in the camp near Pushkariwka. After a reorganization and refreshment, the army was to be returned to Poland on a southern line of retreat through Ottoman territory. On the day of the battle, the soldiers marched south along the Worskla. On July 10, the army arrived at Perevolochna at the confluence of the Vorerskla and Dnepr rivers . It was found that there were no bridges or fords there and that the few boats available were not enough to evacuate the entire Swedish army.

The Swedish headquarters now decided that the wounded and an escort from Sweden and Cossacks should cross the Dnepr and move to Ottoman territory. The army, on the other hand, was to march back on the Worskla, swing south to the Crimea and meet the king there again. On the night of June 30th, Jul. / July 11, 1709 greg. the king crossed the river with Ivan Masepa , his companion Kost Hordijenko as well as 900 Swedes and 2,000 Cossacks. The army, now under the command of General Lewenhaupt, prepared to leave for the following morning. At eight o'clock, however, a Russian unit of 6,000 dragoons and 3,000 Kalmyks arrived under the Menshikov, who was still promoted to field marshal on the Poltava battlefield. Lewenhaupt immediately started negotiations and an agreement was reached on a surrender, although the Swedes were numerically almost double the number of the opposing Russian troops. On the morning of June 30th, Jul. / July 11th Greg. at 11 a.m. the Swedish army surrendered with around 14,000 soldiers, 34 guns and 264 flags. Most of the remaining Cossacks fled on horseback to escape punishment as traitors. In total, almost 30,000 Swedes went into Russian captivity after Poltava, including 2,300 officers. Only the most distinguished were allowed to live in Moscow, such as General Lewenhaupt and State Councilor Piper, who never saw their homeland again.

The troops around King Karl reached the Bug on July 17, where the Pasha von Ochakov gave permission to enter the Ottoman Empire . A rearguard of 600 men could no longer make the crossing and was overtaken by 6,000 Russian horsemen north of the Bug and killed. Charles's campaign in Russia thus ended with a catastrophic defeat, which was the decisive turning point in the entire war.

consequences

Meeting of the Epiphany: Friedrich I in Prussia (center), August II (the Strong), Elector of Saxony and temporarily King of Poland (left), Friedrich IV of Denmark (right)
Painting by Samuel Theodor Gericke, to be seen in Caputh Castle

After the defeat at Poltava, the Swedish heartland was largely bared from the protection of its own troops. In addition, the Swedish king was thousands of kilometers away from his kingdom. Under these favorable conditions, the former allies renewed the old alliances. The reports of victory reached all crowned heads in Europe by courier. For the European public, the news from the Poltava battlefield was news that initially aroused incredulous amazement. From then on, power and prestige in Europe passed from Karl to Peter. Russia now appeared as a great power of the future and emerged as a serious opponent of all European powers.

Even before the Battle of Poltava, the Electorate of Saxony had revived its alliance with Denmark on June 28, 1709 in Dresden . At the meeting of the Three Kings in Potsdam and Berlin, August the Strong and the Danish monarch Frederick IV courted the Prussian King Frederick I at the same time as the decision in the Ukraine in July 1709 , who, however, resigned himself due to the burdens of the War of the Spanish Succession and in memory of earlier neutrality agreements with Sweden could not get through to join the alliance.

After the Russian army marched into Poland and Peter I negotiated with his former ally, the Elector of Saxony announced the peace between Altranstädt and Sweden in August . On August 20, 1709, Saxon troops marched into Poland again. The weak Swedish troops under the command of General Krassow withdrew with 9,000 men to Stettin and Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania . The Polish King Stanislaus I. Leszczynski, enthroned by the Swedes, fled to Stockholm via Stettin and Kristianstad . Tsar Peter I had the Swedish troops followed up to Pomerania by a Russian detachment under the command of Menshikov. Poland's role as a belligerent power had diminished ever since the war began. In the following years, the country only had a subordinate function, as August II failed to strengthen the power of the monarchy. The re-establishment of the royal dignity for August could only take place with Russian assistance. This was a symbol of the increasing foreign control and external control of the Polish republic.

On October 7, 1709, the anti-Swedish Saxon-Russian alliance was renewed in the Treaty of Thorn . At Jarosław , the Danish-Russian assistance pact followed on June 10, 1710. After King Charles XII. refused peace negotiations again from his exile in the Ottoman Empire, Denmark and Russia agreed a plan to threaten the Swedish capital Stockholm in order to force their opponents to peace. In the following years, however, there were only joint Allied actions on the theater of war in northern Germany, while the fighting in Finland and in the northern Baltic Sea was largely fought by Russia alone.

After his victory in the Battle of Poltava, Tsar Peter I made a solemn entry into Moscow on December 21, 1709. Numerous victories and Swedish prisoners of war are displayed in front of the population.

Campaign Battles

Swedish-Russian battles during Charles XII's Russian campaign.
battle date Swedish forces Russian forces Swedish losses Russian losses Result
Battle near Grodno February 7, 1708 800 9000 11 killed 56 killed Swedish victory
Battle of Golovchin July 14, 1708 12,500 39,000 265 killed
1,028 wounded
977 killed,
675 wounded
Swedish victory
Battle of Molyatichi September 10, 1708 4000 13,000 260 killed
750 wounded
700 killed
2000 wounded
Swedish victory
Battle of Rajowka September 20, 1708 2400 10,000 100 killed 375 killed Swedish victory
Battle of Lesnaya October 9, 1708 11,500 23,076 6397 killed, wounded and prisoners 1111 killed

2856 wounded

Russian victory
Battle of the Desna November 11, 1708 2000 4000 50 killed
150 wounded
356 killed
1,000 wounded
Swedish victory
Conquest of Baturyn November 13, 1708 8000 25,000 Russian victory
Battle of Koniecpol November 21, 1708 10,000 10,000 380 killed
1,000 wounded
2,000 prisoners
200 killed Anti-Swedish victory
Siege and storming of Weprik January 3, 1709 3000 1500 400 killed
600 wounded
1500 killed, wounded and captured Swedish victory
Battle at Opischnja February 8, 1709 2000 6000 19 killed and wounded 450 killed and wounded Swedish victory
Skirmish near Krasnokutsk February 20, 1709 2500 10,000 132 killed and wounded 1200 killed and wounded Swedish victory
Battle at Sokolki April 23, 1709 6230 5000 290 killed and wounded 60 killed and wounded Russian victory
Battle of Poltava July 8, 1709 16,500 42,100 6900 killed / wounded
2800 prisoners
1345 killed
3290 wounded
Decisive Russian victory

literature

  • Nicholas Dorrell: The Dawn of the Tsarist Empire: Poltava & the Russian Campaigns of 1708–1709. Partizan Press, 2009.
  • Peter Hoffmann: Peter the Great as a military reformer and general. Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2010, ISBN 978-3-631-60114-3 .
  • Angus Konstam: Poltava 1709. Russia Comes of Age. Osprey Publishing, 1994, ISBN 1-85532-416-4 .
  • Robert K. Massie: Peter the Great - His Life and Time. Frankfurt am Main 1987, ISBN 3-596-25632-1 .

Individual evidence

  1. Hans-Joachim Torke: Introduction to the history of Russia. Munich 1997, p. 111.
  2. ^ Angus Konstam: Poltava 1709. Russia Comes of Age. Osprey Publishing, 1994, p. 29.
  3. ^ Nicholas Dorrell: The Dawn of the Tsarist Empire: Poltava & the Russian Campaigns of 1708-1709. Partizan Press, 2009, pp. 52-62.
  4. ^ Nicholas Dorrell: The Dawn of the Tsarist Empire: Poltava & the Russian Campaigns of 1708-1709. Partizan Press, 2009, pp. 52-62.
  5. Pavel Konovaltjuk, Einar Lyth: Vägen till Poltava. Slaget vid Lesnaja 1708. (in Swedish). Svenskt Militärhistorisk Biblioteks Förlag, 2009, p. 39.
  6. ^ A. Gordon: The History of Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia: To which is Prefixed a Short General History of the Country from the Rise of that Monarchy: and an Account of the Author's Life. Volume 1, Aberdeen 1755, pp. 266f.
  7. ^ Nicholas Dorrell: The Dawn of the Tsarist Empire: Poltava & the Russian Campaigns of 1708-1709. Partizan Press, 2009, pp. 52-62.
  8. ^ A b Angus Konstam: Poltava 1709. Russia Comes of Age. Osprey Publishing, 1994, p. 30.
  9. Bengt Liljegren: Karl XII. En biografi. Historiska media, 2000, p. 151.
  10. ^ Angus Konstam: Poltava 1709. Russia Comes of Age. Osprey Publishing, 1994, p. 32.
  11. ^ Angus Konstam: Poltava 1709. Russia Comes of Age. Osprey Publishing, 1994, p. 33.
  12. ^ A b Angus Konstam: Poltava 1709. Russia Comes of Age. Osprey Publishing, 1994, p. 34.
  13. ^ Angus Konstam: Poltava 1709. Russia Comes of Age. Osprey Publishing, 1994, p. 42.
  14. ^ A b Hans-Joachim Torke: Introduction to the history of Russia. Munich 1997, p. 112.
  15. Pavel Konovaltjuk, Einar Lyth: Vägen till Poltava. Slaget vid Lesnaja 1708. Svenskt Militärhistorisk Biblioteks Förlag, 2009, ISBN 978-91-85789-14-6 , pp. 229-235.
  16. ^ Angus Konstam: Poltava 1709. Russia Comes of Age. Osprey Publishing, 1994, p. 42.
  17. ^ Angus Konstam: Poltava 1709. Russia Comes of Age. Osprey Publishing, 1994, p. 52.
  18. C. Павленко: Загибель Батурина. Kiev 2007, ISBN 978-966-518-409-6 , p. 252.
  19. ^ Fryxell: Life story of Karl the Twelfth. Volume 2, 1861, p. 223.
  20. ^ Lundblad: History of Charles the Twelfth King of Sweden. Volume 2, 1840, p. 88.
  21. ^ AD von Drygalski: Poltava. In: Bernhard von Poten : Concise dictionary of the entire military sciences. Volume 8, Leipzig 1879, p. 7.
  22. Robert K. Massie: Peter the Great - His life and his time. Frankfurt am Main 1987, p. 456.
  23. Robert K. Massie: Peter the Great - His life and his time. Frankfurt am Main 1987, p. 458 f.
  24. Robert K. Massie: Peter the Great - His life and his time. Frankfurt am Main 1987, p. 460.
  25. Stewart P. Oakley: War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790. London 1992, p. 110.
  26. Peter Hoffmann: Peter the Great as a military reformer and general. P. 121.
  27. Heinz Duchhardt: Old Reich and European States, 1648–1806. (= Encyclopedia of German History. Volume 4). Munich 1990, p. 75.
  28. ^ Robert Nisbet Bain: Scandinavia. A Political History of Denmark, Norway and Sweden from 1513 to 1900. Cambridge 1905, p. 336.
  29. a b Peter From: Katastrofen vid Poltava. Historiska media, Lund 2007, p. 77f.
  30. Jöran Andersson Nordberg: Ett kort dock tydeligit utdrag utur then öfwer konung Carl den Tolftes lefwerne och konglida dater. 1745, p. 565.
  31. Jöran Andersson Nordberg: Ett kort dock tydeligit utdrag utur then öfwer konung Carl den Tolftes lefwerne och konglida dater. 1745, p. 565.
  32. B. Liljegren: Karl XII: En Biografi. 2000, p. 156.
  33. a b National Cyclopedin
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