Battle of Golovchin

Battle of Golovchin

Part of: Great Northern War

date	July 14, 1708
place	Halowchyn ( Mahiljouskaja Woblasz , 170 km northeast of Minsk ) in the then Grand Duchy of Lithuania
output	Swedish victory

Parties to the conflict
Sweden	Russia
Commander
Charles XII. Carl Gustaf Rehnskiöld	Boris Scheremetew Anikita Iwanowitsch Repnin Heinrich von der Goltz
Troop strength
about 30,000 men	about 28,000 men
losses
265 killed 1,028 wounded	977 killed, 675 wounded

The Battle of Golowtschin ( Russian : Головчин, Belarus .: Halowchyn) (also Battle of Hołowczyn ) was one of the great battles of Charles XII's Russian campaign. in the Great Northern War (1700–1721), in which on July 3 ^. / 4th ^Swedish / 14th July 1708 ^greg. the Swedish army under Charles XII. defeated the outnumbered Russian army .

prehistory

Battle of Golovchin

Location of the battlefield

After Saxony-Poland withdrew from the war against Sweden at the end of 1706, the Swedish King Karl XII started. in the late summer of 1707 a new campaign against the Russian Empire to reach a final decision. So he penetrated on July 16 ^. / 17th ^Swedish / 27th June 1708 ^greg. with almost 70,000 soldiers, including Polish and Saxon soldiers (his main army consisted of twelve infantry , eight dragoons and eight cavalry regiments , a total of 44,000 Swedes) from Poland to Belarus with the aim of reaching Moscow and the Russian Empire to force peace.

On June 26th, ^July / June 27th, ^Sweden / July 7th, 1708 ^greg. the Swedish army crossed the Bjaresina . However, a Russian army opposed it on the Dnieper . In the center of the town Shklowein stood the main Russian power under the generals Sheremetev and Menshikov ; the right wing near the village of Starosschin was under General Allardt's command and the left wing, near Golowtschin, was under General Goltz . The terrain was swampy and the Vabich River made an attack difficult in front of the Russian army.

Swedish battle plan

The Russian forces at Golovchin had the order to hold their position as long as possible and to avoid a decisive battle. The main Russian forces were located near the village of Vailiki, east of Golovchin and along the Vabich (tributary of the Drut ). The bridges of the Wabitsch were militarily secured and manned with artillery. In the south, General Anikita Ivanovich Repnin had set up his forces three kilometers southeast of Glowchin and had them entrenched there. Many of the fortifications, however, were not completed on time due to the lack of pioneers . His powers were also set up along a thin line and very much spread out and thus susceptible to enemy attacks. Between the two camps there was swampy land that could not be fortified. The Russian commanders used no mounted reconnaissance units to investigate the Swedish movements and therefore had little knowledge of the Swedish troops. Communication with one another was also limited.

The Swedes, for their part, had scouted the Russian fortifications along the Wabitsch . At the beginning of June 30, the Swedish regiments of the avant-garde of the main army began to position themselves on the heights west of Golovchin. Karl and his generals discovered the gap between the fortifications and worked out a plan of attack. They planned to cross the marshland between the two Russian army units to split the Russian forces. In order to maintain the surprise effect, the attack should take place at night. King Charles XII. initially had only his avant-garde of five infantry and four cavalry regiments with him. The bulk of the army did not arrive in the Swedish camp until the day of the battle and were too exhausted after the forced marches to take part in a battle. Therefore, the Swedish king attacked the Russian position with the avant-garde made up of only 12,500 soldiers.

Course of the battle

Battle illustration

At midnight on July 4th, the Swedes began to quietly move towards the Wabitsch. The infantry carried bundles of brushwood with them to be able to lay them out on the swampy ground. Then they were supposed to cross the Wabitsch on leather pontoon bridges . Due to heavy rainfall, the leather pontoons were soaked with water and too heavy for transport and were left behind. At 2:30 a.m. the alarm was triggered in the Russian camp when the Swedish artillery from 28 guns began to bombard the Russian positions on the opposing river bank. The Swedish success depended on how many troops were able to cross the river without the help of the pontoons before the Russian units arrived. Karl led the attack personally and waded across the river at the head of his men. The Swedes formed themselves with difficulty along the swampy shore and began to advance through the marshland. Meanwhile, the fascines were laid out on the riverbanks to help the Swedish cavalry cross. The pioneers as well as the Swedish vanguard were fired at by Repnin's Russian artillery.

Karl in the middle of the battle

General Repnin saw the danger of a division of the Russian forces and ordered the immediate departure of his troops north to the units of Boris Sheremetev . Five Swedish battalions tried to prevent this movement. Sheremetev, in turn, sent reinforcements in the direction of Repnin's position. Further Swedish reinforcements prevented these Repnin's troops from reaching. Repnin now decided to withdraw to the south and east.

Thereupon nine squadrons of the Swedish cavalry under General Rehnschild crossed the river Wabitsch on the right wing , attacked the Russian cavalry under General Heinrich von der Goltz and drove them south. Up until that point, Sheremetev's forces were still awaiting the Swedes' attack on their position, assuming that the Swedish attack on Repnin's forces was just a ruse . When this attack did not materialize, they began to attack the almost undefended Swedish camp in the west. But when Sheremetev heard of Repnin's retreat to the south, he decided to break off the attack and retreat towards Shklov on the Dnieper .

The Russian forces under Repnin had evaded into a nearby forest, from where they shot at the Swedes, who were now on open ground. In the one-hour firefight that followed, the Swedes suffered great losses. Only when their order of battle, which they had lost by crossing the river, was restored, the Swedish regiments successfully stormed the forest, whereupon the Russian troops withdrew.

evaluation

The losses in the battle were very different: 265 killed and 1,028 wounded Swedes, 977 killed and 675 wounded Russians. However, while the losses of the Russian army could be quickly replaced, for the Swedish army every man lost meant an irretrievable loss.

The success of the slaughter was hardly exploited. Although it opened the way for the Swedish army to the Ukraine, a lasting persecution, which would have been suitable for finally crushing the Russian army, did not take place. The Swedish troops were unable to carry out such an operation because of the great exhaustion.

Tactically, two aspects of the battle were noteworthy. On the one hand, the massed use of artillery at the beginning of the fight was an innovation that would later characterize Napoleon's warfare . On the other hand, leading a lengthy firefight in the battles of Charles XII. A rarity. The young king preferred the direct assault.

Voltaire later judged Charles XII: "Of all his battles, this was perhaps his most glorious, in which he faced the greatest dangers and showed the greatest care."

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b} Николай Шефов. Битвы России. Военно-историческая библиотека. М., 2002.
2. ↑ ^{a b} Советской военной энциклопедии в 8-ми томах
3. ↑ Robert K. Massie: Peter the Great - His life and his time . Fischer, Frankfurt / M. 1987, p. 399.
4. ↑ Bengt Liljegren | Liljegren, Bengt - Karl XII: En biografi, Historiska media, 2000, Sidan 151.
5. ^ A. von Drygalski: Nordischer Krieg , in: Bernhard von Poten: hand dictionary of the entire military sciences , vol. 7, Leipzig 1879, p. 198f
6. ^ The course of the battle according to: A. von Drygalski: Northern War , in: Bernhard von Poten: Short dictionary of the entire military sciences , Vol. 7, Leipzig 1879, p. 199 and Robert K. Massie: Peter the Great - His life and his time . Fischer, Frankfurt / M. 1987, pp. 397-399
7. ^ François Marie Arouet de Voltaire: History of Charles XII., King of Sweden , German Book Association, Hamburg / Stuttgart 1963, p. 130

literature

• Bernhard von Poten : Concise dictionary of the entire military sciences , Vol. 7, Leipzig 1879.
• Robert K. Massie : Peter the Great - His Life and Time . Fischer, Frankfurt / M. 1987. ISBN 3-596-25632-1
• François Marie Arouet de Voltaire: History of Charles XII., King of Sweden , German Book Association, Hamburg / Stuttgart 1963.