Battle at Koporje

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Battle at Koporje
Koporje fortress in the 17th century
Koporje fortress in the 17th century
date September 28, 1708 (July), October 8, 1708 (grg.)
place Koporje , today's Russia
output Swedish victory
Parties to the conflict

Sweden 1650Sweden Sweden

Russia Tsarism 1699Tsarist Russia Russia

Commander

Sweden 1650Sweden Carl Gustaf Armfelt Anders Erik Ramsay
Sweden 1650Sweden

Russia Tsarism 1699Tsarist Russia Brigadier Fraser

Troop strength
1800 men approx. 3800 - 5000 men
losses

70 dead and wounded (Swedish information)

600 dead and wounded (Swedish information)

In the battle near Koporje on September 28th (July) / October 8th (Grg.) 1708 a division of Georg Lybecker's army defeated a Russian force in the Great Northern War at Koporje in Ingermanland . This was preceded by the battle on the Neva , which also ended with a Swedish victory.

Sources

There are few known Swedish sources as to what happened. There is an official report sent by Georg Lybecker to Governor General Niels Stromberg in Reval , a report from Colonel Ramsay who commanded the Swedish department . Both reports are similar in their representations. Finally, a short message from Cavalry Captain Bengt Stigman has been preserved as part of the description of his military career.

prehistory

Course of the campaign in Ingermanland 1708

The Swedish army had been on the defensive in the Baltic States and Ingermanland for several years. Superior Russian armed forces had initially conquered the New Zealand, including the Nevad Delta, and taken part of Swedish Livonia . Often there was a completely unbalanced balance of power between the Russians and Swedes in the military encounters of 3: 1 in favor of the Russians and beyond. The reason for this was the concentration of Swedish resources on the Polish theater of war where Charles XII. operated with the main Swedish army. In 1708 he undertook an invasion of the Russian heartland to defeat the last remaining enemy of the war, Peter I.

In order to relieve the Swedish main army, the Finnish army, under the command of Georg Lybecker, was supposed to attack Saint Petersburg . The campaign began militarily successfully for the Swedes. The Neva was successfully crossed on September 9, 1708 and the Russian counterattacks were repulsed in the battle on the Neva . However, a direct attack on Saint Petersburg failed due to a lack of supplies, a lack of support from the Swedish fleet and insufficient siege artillery. As a result, the operational goal of the campaign had become a long way off. Alternatively, the goal remained to bind and employ as much of the Russian forces as possible in this region and thus relieve the burden on Karl's army in the Ukraine . The Swedish army operated cut off from its own lines in what was now Russian Ingermanland and was now looking for a way back to Swedish territory.

A report reached Lybecker's army while they were unloading supplies received from the sea. These reports stated that the Russians were moving their cavalry from Duderhof to Koporje with the order to block the Swedes from further advance. Immediately after receiving the message, Lybecker dispatched a cavalry division of 1,800 men under the command of Colonels Ramsay and Carl Gustaf Armfelt . They received orders to monitor the Russian forces and to attack when the opportunity arises.

course

Immediately after this force reached a nearby village, the Swedes learned that a Russian command of 100 horsemen and 100 infantrymen had passed through the town an hour earlier and they took position at Koporje. Ramsay and Armfelt discussed the situation with several officers and decided to proceed to Koporje. The further advance went over a long hill uphill towards an open field that reached as far as the fortress of Koporje. The Russian units formed two battle lines along the clearing a few hundred meters from the fortress. Additional reserves were positioned behind it. The Swedes took up a combat position in front of these lines after they reached the field .

The official Swedish reports put the strength of the Swedish division at 1,800 mounted men. According to Swedish information, the Russian armed force is said to have been 5000 strong. Russian soldiers captured in the course of this battle state that the size of the Russian division was 3800 men, divided into five dragoon regiments and one Cossack regiment .

Gate of the former Koporje fortress

Armfelt took command of the right wing and Ramsay of the left wing. The orders were that the attack should only be carried out with a drawn sword and not with musket fire . When the Swedish attack began, the Russian lines also stormed the Swedes. Cossacks and boyars who were in the center of the lines opened fire first. Cossacks first attacked the left center of the Swedes. Major de la Barre made a counterattack and put the Cossacks to flight with several squadrons of cavalry. The Russian line tried to regroup, but the strong Swedish attack forced both Russian lines to retreat. The Russians were now streaming back. On the way back, the panicked Russians passed a deep depression that ran through the field. When trying to pass the trench, many Russians got stuck in the mud and formed an easy target for the Swedish gunfire of the pursuing Swedes. Major Danielsson and his entourage dismounted their horses, jumped into the trench, and with their swords killed a large number of the Russians trapped there. The garrison of the fortress tried to support the Russians with artillery fire . But this was not enough to stop the Swedes, who pursued the retreating Russians to a several kilometers distant river that the Russians had to swim through.

The Russians who fled to the fortress were followed by Lieutenant Colonel Brakel with seven companies to the bridge. They forced some Russians to jump off this bridge to save themselves. The Russian fire from the fortress was intense but very inefficient. It just killed one officer and wounded another. When the Swedes withdrew from the fortress, the Russians who remained there carried out a sortie with infantry and cavalry on the Swedes. It is said to have been a total of 1200 men. Colonel Armfelt counterattacked again and repulsed them. The Russians strengthened themselves again and in turn started the attack. Finally Armfelt decided to withdraw in an orderly fashion.

consequences

The Swedish losses are estimated at 70 men, those of the Russian at 600 men. In addition to the equipment, the Swedes also managed to capture several army letters. Including a letter from Vice Admiral Cornelius Cruys to Brigadier Fraser and a letter from Fraser to Major General Robert Bruce . Both letters were only a few days old and accordingly contained important military secrets about the planned Russian operations against Lybecker's army.

The information contained there about an approaching and numerically superior Russian relief army worried Lybecker so much that he immediately broke off the campaign and initiated an immediate evacuation from the sea. The hasty escape led to heavy Swedish losses in the battle of Kolgompya on October 27, 1708 .

literature

  • Krigsarkivet, Krigshandlingar. Stora nordiska kriget, Vol. 12d, Lybecker's letter of October 1, 1708.
  • Peter From, Katastrofen vid Poltava. Lund (2007)
  • Christer Kuvaja. Krigen kring Östersjön, del 4: Karolinska krigare 1660–1721. Schildts Förlags Ab, Helsingfors, 2008