Battle of Vellinghausen
| date | 15. bis 16th July 1761 |
|---|---|
| place | Vellinghausen |
| output | Allied victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
|
|
|
| Commander | |
|
Charles de Rohan, Prince de Soubise |
|
| Troop strength | |
| 70,000 | 140,000 |
| losses | |
|
approx. 300 killed and 1000 wounded |
about 5,000 men |
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Western theater of war
Hastenbeck - Krefeld - Sandershausen - Lutterberg 1758 - Bergen - Minden - Gohfeld - Fulda - Korbach - Emsdorf - Warburg - Rhadern - Kampen Monastery - Langensalza - Saalfeld - Vellinghausen - Arnsberg - Wilhelmsthal - Lutterberg 1762
The Battle of Vellinghausen was a battle of the Seven Years' War on 15./16. July 1761 between the Allies and France .
Starting position
In February and March 1761, Duke Ferdinand von Braunschweig surprisingly launched an offensive against the French army. Their high command was initially surprised by this advance, and it was not until the summer that a counter-offensive could be brought about. Charles de Rohan, Prince de Soubise therefore united his troops with the Corps Victor-François de Broglies . With this force of 140,000 soldiers, which clearly outnumbered the Allied troops, the generals wanted to crush Ferdinand. He and his troops had established themselves in a permanent camp near Vellinghausen.
On July 10, Broglie and his brother undertook a reconnaissance of Ferdinand's position, where he was almost captured by a Prussian-English detachment. A Prussian hussar could only capture Broglie's hat and telescope.
Course of the battle
The French attack began on the afternoon of July 15th. Broglie's troops attacked from the east, while Soubise initially only marched further and was supposed to attack from the south the next day. The battle dragged on the first day until around 10 p.m., before darkness and exhaustion of the combatants made further fighting impossible. Ferdinand's army had repeatedly succeeded in repelling the advance of the French troops in the course of the battle.
At dawn on July 16, the fighting resumed. Broglie took over the right wing and Soubise the left with his strength. In the course of the day, the offensive efforts of the French failed again. After Ferdinand's troops were able to take an important hill, the French troops finally disbanded and fled. Because of the terrain, Ferdinand's cavalry could not take advantage of the disorder of the French retreat, which saved the French forces further and heavier losses.
The French lost about 5,000 men, five flags and nine cannons, the allies under Ferdinand's command mourned about 300 dead and 1,000 wounded.
Effects
Broglie and Soubise blamed each other for the defeat. The repeated disagreement between the French leadership prevented further operations for the rest of the year.
Report from a participant
The following report comes from the pen of Colonel Ernst-Christoph von Heinemann (May 18, 1734 - December 27, 1785), at that time the commander of the ducal-Braunschweig artillery corps.
“Action near Wellinghausen [Vellinghausen ad Lippe], July 15th and 16th 1761
The Corps of Gen. Lieut. Granby [Hanover and Brunswick troops] camped on the hill near Süd-Denkeren [Süd-Dinker]; the right wing joined the above-mentioned place and the left towards Wellinghausen, but in such a way that this Wellinghausen was behind the left wing. The front was covered with couched [confusing] terrain, as bushes and pits and the river Aes [Ahse, left tributary of the Lippe], which was occupied by the Hessian hunters. The hussars stood on the left wing on the Anger to Heintrop, and further to the left a battalion von Penz from the Legion Britanique. Our commandos and piqueter [from pique = lances, French. Military language = outpost] stood close behind the hussars. Repoussir on the afternoon of July 12 at 4 o'clock [jmd. push back] the enemies our light troops and were already advanced to our piqueter and charmuzirten [advance and skirmish / skirmish] with this. There was an immediate noise in the camp and everyone sat under the gun; a mountain-Scottish battalion, which constituted the left wing, immediately had to open up and form up on our flanque for the soutiens [reinforcement] of the piqueter along with two canons of ours; we fired a few canons under the enemy, whereupon they immediately withdrew; but the mountain Scots had also lost 1 captain and 30 men.
On the 13th and 14th everything was and remained very calm. On the 15th of July at 3 p.m., however, the noise came all at once. The enemy advanced on our left wing, so we received orders to be ready at once to move out; 2 6 pound canons also had to go to the left wing, but everything became quiet again immediately and the canons returned to their parc, but at 5 o'clock, when everything was quiet, we stopped once behind our left wing a violent little fire [rifle shooting], so we were very close and already at the piquetern. Everyone immediately ran to the rifle and set us on the march to form and position ourselves on our flanque on the hill behind the bush. But we had hardly arrived at this place and the regimental canons were posted, so we had already very close in front of us, about 500 paces, had 1 enemy battalion deployed - and we had done a few canon shots, so we received the enemy Canonade, notwithstanding we celebrated hard and the ammunition mostly fired, the enemies soon became superior to us in the number of canons as their size, and this made our great loss, which must be infinitely greater if we do not have a hill and they however had a reason [valley] that caused the majority of the balls to pass over [us]. During this time our camp was broken up by those left behind and the baggage was then sent away; but it happened that the canon bullets, which passed over us, reached our camp and had killed people there. The enemy infantry always moved to the right to win the left flanque from us and the small fire was already beginning strongly on our left wing at the Legion Britanique . So we had maintained this post for about an hour and a half, so we had to pull ourselves back a little from the hill to the camp behind the bush [forest] and, since the enemy moved more and more to the left and wanted to break through there, our regiment had to leave in the Holtz, to keep the enemies out there or to evade them. There the little musquete fire went on in the most terrible way and lasted until the dark of night; almost all ammunition had been used up by the infantry and was also incapable of delogging the enemy from the woods. So the regiment had pulled itself out of the woods to a camp, with a small hollow path leading through it. The left wing stood at Wellinghausen, which castle was occupied by 100 men. On the other side of Wellinghausen stood the Mountain Scots and Legion Britanique. We remained in this position through the night, which, because of its darkness, only made a pause in the fire. The Wutgenauische Corps pushed against our left wing during the night in order to defend the great road to Hamm, where the night was always fired and where the enemies advanced most violently.
That night the enemy had advanced as far as the hill we were leaving, had placed heavy canons there, and as the day of July 16th was beginning to dawn, we received the most violent canonade, and this was right Our flanque was, so we had the most violent canon and cartache fire en flanque. Of the regiment there would undoubtedly be little left if one did not take advantage of the situation and were only a few steps in front of the front in the little hollow way , would have laid. En fronte the enemy brought us to 350 paces close to 10-pound and 16-pound canons, with which he could take us well and destroy us completely, but did not do so because we were rather concealed from him. So we still maintained our place. The little fire then began to grow stronger and stronger on the left behind Wellinghausen, near the Wutgenau Corps, and was supported there by the most violent canonade. The main aim of the enemy was to get through to Hamm on this way and to cut us off the lip; They therefore made the most violent attacks there one after the other and let one regiment march past another in front of us, to which we then gave nothing from our canons, so that our regimental canons had fired all the bullets. The fire therefore continued violently until about 8 o'clock, when the Corps of Lieutenant General von Spörken arrived at our wing and General Braun with a brigade of artillery attacked the enemy in the most violent manner, so that we were superior to the enemy .
The Most Serene Prince Frederick [of Braunschweig] then finally brought the enemy to give way with the regiment and other regiments of the Wutgenauischer Corps by making courageous advance. The enemies lost in the area through the artillery and small fire terrible. The enemies had to take their retreat in front of us at 300 paces and we did not neglect to make these passports from our regimental canons with cartridges and bullets, which we received again, quite hot, followed immediately with the regiment. But they ran so terribly that only cavalry could have caught up with them if they were so close and could have done something in the bushes. The enemies were thus pursued by the whole corps up to an hour after Höltrop [Hultrop], a whole The French regiment was coupiret [cut off] and taken prisoner by the English grenadiers and we got 2 canons, so the enemies were left on the retreat. The defilees behind Höltrup, so occupied by the enemy, probably prevented us from pursuing him further, and so we marched back at 1 a.m. to the camp we had before the affair. "
Found objects
Relics and finds are exhibited in the Welver home .
literature
- Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz : History of the Seven Years War in Germany. 5th edition. Haude and Spener, Berlin 1940 ( full text in the Google book search).
- Olaf Groehler : The wars of Friedrich II. 5th edition. Military publishing house, Berlin 1989, ISBN 3-327-00038-7 .
- Great General Staff (Ed.): History of the Seven Years' War in a series of lectures, using authentic sources, edited by the officers of the Great General Staff. Volume 5: The campaign of 1761. Self-published. Berlin 1937, pp. 735–756 ( full text in the Google book search).
- Friedrich Menneking: Victoria by Vellinghausen 1761. Walks into the history of the Seven Years' War in West Germany. Hüttemann, Paderborn 1989, ISBN 3-927029-24-6 .
Web links
- DigAM digital archive marburg: Plan of the battle at Vellinghausen between the Allies and the French, July 15 and 16, 1761
- Object portal "museum-digital: westfalen": plan of the battle near Vellinghausen
Individual evidence
- ↑ In handwriting The original text is Pranby, was corrected according to the source Th. Carlyle.
Coordinates: 51 ° 39 ′ 44 " N , 7 ° 59 ′ 43" E