Battle of La Albuera

Battle of La Albuera

Part of: Napoleonic Wars on the Iberian Peninsula

Sketch of the battle situation

date	May 16, 1811
place	La Albuera in Extremadura , Spain
output	Allied victory

Parties to the conflict
United Kingdom Portugal Spain ( Junta Suprema Central ) King's German Legion	France Duchy of Warsaw "Spain" ( King Joseph Napoleon )
Commander
Sir William Beresford Joaquín Blake y Joyes José de Zayas	Nicolas Jean-de-Dieu Soult
Troop strength
35,284 men of whom: 10,449 British and Allies 10,201 Portuguese 14,634 Spaniards including 2,013 cavalry 50 cannons	24,260 men including 4,012 cavalry 40 guns
losses
5,956 dead, wounded and missing	approx. 7,000 dead, wounded and missing

The Battle of La Albuera was a battle of the Napoleonic Wars on the Iberian Peninsula that took place on May 16, 1811 near the Spanish town of La Albuera . An Allied army from Great Britain (supported by Hanoverian troops in exile ), Portugal and rebellious Spain on the one hand and French troops (supported by auxiliary troops from the Duchy of Warsaw and the Napoleonic satellite state Spain ) on the other. The combined Portuguese and British-Hanoverian troops were under the direct command of the English General Sir William Beresford , who was also Marshal of the Portuguese Army; the Spanish insurgents were commanded by General Joaquín Blake y Joyes ; the French army was commanded by Marshal Soult . The battle ended in a narrow and loss-making victory for the Allies.

background

During the winter of 1810/11, Wellington protected Lisbon with the help of the strong fortified lines of Torres Vedras . The French forces under Massena wintered in front of the line; they were unable to attack them or even to take care of themselves adequately, and as a result have been greatly reduced. In March 1811, Massena recognized the untenability of his situation and withdrew to the Spanish border fortress Ciudad Rodrigo , which guarded the road from Portugal to Salamanca . He left a small force behind in the Portuguese fortress of Almeida . The hasty retreat from Torres Vedras in the middle of winter had largely destroyed his army's ability to attack. South of the Tagus were the Portuguese fortress of Elvas and the Spanish fortress Badajoz on the main road from Portugal to Madrid . The French operations in this area were the responsibility of Soult, who was also employed elsewhere, e.g. B. with the siege of Cadiz . In January 1811, Soult thinned out the siege forces of Cadiz in order to assemble a field army that went to Badajoz. In response, British and Spanish troops attempted to break the siege of Cadiz, which led to the Battle of Barrosa on March 5, 1811. Barrosa was a tactical defeat for the French, but it was not used to end the siege. Badajoz surrendered to the French on March 10, 1811 (allegedly by bribery rather than military action), and Soult immediately went to the Seville area to support the siege of Cadiz and a repetition of the tactics that had led to Barrosa, to prevent.

Wellington believed that these four fortresses should be captured to protect Portugal from renewed invasion and allow his army to invade Spain. The fortresses were particularly important because of the poor condition of the supply routes in the Pyrhenean Peninsula: they were difficult to circumvent, but the logistics for a siege were also problematic. He decided to split his army and try to take Almeida and Badajoz at the same time. 20,000 men (10,000 of them British / Hanoverian) under Beresford were dispatched to besiege Badajoz, while Wellington marched with twice the number to Almeida.

While Beresford was besieging Badajoz, he heard on May 12th that Soult was again approaching with 25,000 men from the south. He immediately broke off the siege and moved southeast towards the small town of La Albuera, where he took a defensive position as discussed with Wellington the month before. On the afternoon of the 15th, a Spanish force under Blake and Castanos arrived and placed themselves under his command. Beresford now had an army of 36,000 men with 50 cannons.

The area around La Albuera is generally flat and open, with small bumps. The Albuera River flows east through the city and splits into two smaller arms that were no obstacle to infantry and artillery. Trees prevented a clear view of the movements of the enemy army.

plans

Beresford expected an attack from the east and therefore made La Albuera the center of his deployment, extending about 1.5 kilometers to the left and three kilometers to the right of the place. A low hill (no higher than 50 meters) runs through La Albuera and he occupied it, with all his troops heading east.

Its left flank was covered by Hamilton's Portuguese division, Collins brigade and the majority of the Portuguese cavalry. Carl von Altens King’s German Legion (1st and 2nd light battalion) were stationed in the village and behind them were the 2nd and 4th British divisions with over 1,000 cavalry men. His right flank was Blake's 12,000 Spaniards with some cavalry, but these had arrived late and not properly positioned on the 15th.

Soult had 24,000 men including 4,000 cavalrymen with 60 cannons. He did not know that the Spaniards had united with the Allies and therefore expected only 23,000 enemy troops. He planned only a weak attack on the center and ordered three-fourths of his troops in a wide arc to the south to attack Beresford's right flank.

• The commanders of the battle
• 

  William Carr Beresford (Great Britain)

• 

  Nicolas Jean-de-Dieu Soult (France)

• 

  Francisco Javier Castaños (Portugal)

• 

  Joaquín Blake y Joyes (Spain)

battle

The attack began early on May 16, 1811, with an attack by Goudinot's brigade on La Albuera. The onslaught moved Beresford to reinforce its center, as Soult had hoped. In the south, the Spanish division Zayas (4,800 men strong), which suddenly burst out of the wood, was attacked on its right flank by 8,400 infantrymen, supported by artillery and 3,500 cavalrymen. This was Girard's V Corps in the mixed order Napoleon preferred. It was the most massive single attack of the Spanish campaign by a compact mass of infantry. This caught the Spaniards off guard, but they held the position despite losing a third of their force.

Beresford was surprised by the maneuver and ordered Blake to direct an entire division south instead of east, but he did not personally monitor this movement, as Wellington presumably would have done. So he failed to see that Blake, still expecting an attack from the east, was only moving four battalions and not the whole division. Beresford now ordered the second division to support the heavily under pressure Spaniards and to form a second line behind them. But their commander, Stewart, immediately threw his troops into the fray. His leading brigade under Colborne attacked the left flank of the French and held them in check with their 2,000 muskets.

Destruction of Colborne's brigade

The British 3rd Regiment of Foot (The Buffs) protects its flags from Uhlans of the 1st Lancer Regiment of the Vistula Legion

Bereford repels an attack by a Uhlan (wrongly shown in the red uniform of the 2nd Guard Lancers Regiment )

Then came the disaster. A sudden rainstorm broke out over the battlefield and none of the muskets could fire. Stewart had neglected to plan a defense against enemy cavalry and now, through the pouring rain, 3,500 French horsemen rushed towards them. Colborne's brigade had no time to form a square and was practically defenseless. In five minutes they lost 1,300 out of 1,600 men and five flags. The Uhlans from the 1st Cavalry Regiment of the Polish Vistula Region impaled many enemy soldiers and spared no one. It was a terrible example of the vulnerability of infantry unprepared for cavalry attack.

Some of the cavalrymen advanced and attacked Beresford and his staff. The general, a tall, strong man, parried a lance thrust and, taking a rider by the collar, pulled him off his horse and threw him to the ground.

Hoghton's brigade came to the rescue, along with Abercrombies, and they formed the line. Seven British battalions, about 3,700 men in rows of two, faced two French divisions of about 7,800 men in a close-range battle that may never have been the same in military history . From a distance of perhaps 18 meters, both sides fired volley after volley, closing the ranks towards the center if there were gaps in the line. The gruesome killing continued in an area smaller than a cricket field (approximately 130 × 150 m). Neither side could move forward, nor was either side ready to give way. Nobody seemed to know how this hopeless situation could be ended. Beresford seemed unable to take decisive action, while Soult had recognized that the opponent, with 15,000 men, was stronger than he had thought and immediately went on the defensive. This deadlock was resolved by Sir Lowry Cole . Major Henry Hardinge , realizing that something had to be done to save the regiments being crushed before his eyes, had urged Cole, on his own initiative, to bring the 4th Division into action.

Battle in La Albuera

During the entire battle, the two light battalions of the King's German Legion had successfully defended the bridge over the Albuera River, preventing the French under Godinot from breaking through here. Now they have been called in to strengthen the front. The French took advantage of the change between KGL and the replacing Spaniards and took the place. The order was then revoked and the KGL had to laboriously recapture the lost ground half an hour later, losing 100 men.

Turn the battle around

Cole ordered 4,000 men to advance in line on a front of 1,200 meters; with squares at both ends to protect against cavalry. In fact, 1,600 French dragoons attacked ; however, they were repulsed.

Then three French columns , each consisting of three battalions , supported by artillery, advanced against them. The British infantry were defeated in a ratio of 1: 3, but because of the line against column situation there were 2,000 effective muskets against 360. Slowly but steadily, the British infantry, led by three fusilier battalions, advanced, and it was the French who gave in first. Soult belatedly threw the reserve - 6,000 men from Werle's brigade - into action, but his columns disbanded and there was a general retreat. Beresford finally brought units forward from the center and left flank, and the French were driven back across the river into the woods from where they had come that morning. There was no persecution. Both armies remained in their positions, exhausted and depressed from the appalling losses.

consequences

Allied losses amounted to 5,916 men: 4,159 British, 389 Portuguese and 1,368 Spanish. In his report of May 21, 1811, Soult estimated the British casualties at 5,000 men, including 800-1,000 prisoners; the Spanish to 2,000 men with 1,100 prisoners and the Portuguese to 700 to 800 men. The French losses are harder to estimate. Soult originally declared 2,800 casualties in his report to Napoleon, but the July 6 official figures increased the number to 5,936. British historians also doubt this because of the comparison of the 241 officers reported by Soult as losses compared to only 362 returnees. Sir Charles Oman extrapolated these numbers and came up with the approximate figure of 7,900 losses.

The French withdrew on the 18th and Soult complained bitterly of the British:

“ They couldn't be convinced that they had lost. They were completely defeated, the day was mine and they didn't know it and they didn't want to flee. "

- Paget: Wellington's Peninsular War. Battles and Battlefields. 1996, p. 138

Beresford, unnerved by the losses, wrote a somber report, but when Wellington read it, he declared:

“ It doesn't work like that. It's going to drive people crazy in England. Write me a victory. "

- Paget: Wellington's Peninsular War. Battles and Battlefields. 1996, p. 138

It was so because it was the French, after all, who had left the battlefield.

La Albuera was a victory at a high price, but it helped weaken French morale further by realizing how difficult it was to get the British Allied army to accept impending defeat.

literature

• N. Ludlow Beamish: History of the King's German Legion. Volume 1. T & W Boone, London 1832, ( digitized ; facsimile edition: Naval & Military Press, Dallington 1997, ISBN 0-9522011-0-0 ).
• Mike Chappell: The King's German Legion. Volume 1: 1803-1812 ( Men-at-arms Series 338). Osprey, Oxford 2000, ISBN 1-85532-996-4 .
• John Gurwood (Ed.): The dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington during his various campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries and France. From 1799 to 1818. Volume 5. Compiled from official and other authentic documents. 2nd edition. Murray, London 1844, ( digitized ).
• Charles Oman : A History of the Peninsular War. Volume 4: Dec. 1810 - December 1811. Masséna's retreat, Fuentes de Oñoro, Albuera, Tarragona. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1911 (Reprint. (= Greenhill Military Paperback ). Greenhill Books et al., London 2004, ISBN 1-85367-618-7 ).
• Julian Paget: Wellington's Peninsular War. Battles and Battlefields. Updated edition. Leo Cooper, London 1996, ISBN 0-85052-603-5 .
• Jac Weller: Wellington in the Peninsula. 1808-1814. Reprinted edition. Kaye & Ward, London 1973, ISBN 0-7182-0730-0 .

Remarks

1. ^ Oman: A History of the Peninsular War. Volume 4. 1911, p. 631 ff.
2. ^ Weller: Wellington in the Peninsular War. 1973, p. 176.
3. ^ Weller: Wellington in the Peninsular War. 1973, p. 177.
4. ^ Beamish: History of the King's German Legion. 1832, p. 340 .
5. ^ Oman: A History of the Peninsular War. Volume 4. 1911, p. 389 .
6. ↑ Appendix XV . In: Oman: A History of the Peninsular War. Volume 4. 1911, pp. 631-633.
7. ↑ Appendix . In: Gurwood (Ed.): The dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. Volume 5. 1844, pp. 770-771.
8. ↑ Appendix XVI . In: Oman: A History of the Peninsular War. Volume 4. 1911, pp. 634-635.

Web links

• Friedrich Engels : Albuera , article for The New American Cyclopædia
• Battle of Albuera (English)