Sergio Huidobro

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Sergio Huidobro Justiniano (born December 25, 1921 in Santiago de Chile ) is a former Chilean rear admiral and diplomat . During the military dictatorship under Pinochet , he was in command of the marine infantry (Infantería de Marina) and later Chilean ambassador to the People's Republic of China .

Life

Military career and promotion to rear admiral

Sergio Huidobro occurred after the end of his schooling in 1942 as a midshipman in the Navy (Armada de Chile) and found after several uses as an officer in naval units before it a course for 1,955 Marines at the US Marine Corps at the Marine Corps Base Quantico visited. He was then deployed to the military mission in Washington, DC and then completed a course for commanders and general staff officers at the US Army base in Fort Benning . After his return to Chile he did again service as a troop officer before he was again on missions abroad with the US Southern Command in the Panama Canal Zone between 1965 and 1968 . He later completed a course in naval training at Naval Station Norfolk of the US Navy and was most recently a sea captain and designated commander of the marine infantry.

After his promotion to Rear Admiral, Huidobro was appointed Commander of the Marine Infantry (Infantería de Marina) in 1971 as the successor to Rear Admiral Luís Urzúa Merino and remained in this post until his retirement in 1975.

Participation in the military coup

After Salvador Allende's election victory , Huidobro, along with other strictly anti-communist officers, offered his resignation in order not to have to serve a Marxist government. The then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Fernando Porta Ángulo , invited him to a meeting and was able to avert his resignation by arranging a meeting between the newly elected Chilean president and high-ranking officers. This secret conversation with Allende took place on September 12, 1970, with the participation of Naval Commander-in-Chief Porta and the Director General of Naval Services, Vice Admiral José Toribio Merino , as the second most senior flag officer. Other participants included the interior minister-designate José Tohá González , the senator and long-time general secretary of the Communist Party Luis Corvalán , the senator and writer Volodia Teitelboim , Jorge Insunza Becker , Manuel Mandujano and Jorge Molina Valdivieso . Admiral Porta left the meeting in the expectation that sooner or later the president would break with the Communist Party and was able to persuade Merino and other officers critical of the government such as Huidobro to stay. Three years later he was ousted by the same actors and pushed out of office because he did not want to participate in their coup plans.

Huidobro took an openly negative attitude towards President Allende from the start during the left-wing government. As a close confidante of the then Commander in Chief of Marine Zone 1 in Valparaíso and later Commander in Chief of the Navy, Vice Admiral José Toribio Merino, he was privy to the preparation of General Augusto Pinochet's military coup in 1973 . The actions of Merino and Huidobro in the run-up to the military coup are described by Patricia Verdugo as follows:

“On that night of Saturday, August 8, 1973, a key event occurred: one of those events that will change the course of history by two people dating to tell a lie. At that time, Huidobro made the decision to take a bold step. He summoned Ariel González, the chief of intelligence on the General Staff, from the capital. Very late at night they concocted the lies to be served to the admirals at their Sunday meeting. Yes, they would say at this meeting that they had been to a meeting in Santiago de Chile the evening before, at which the army and air force had agreed that the coup should take place on Tuesday 11th at 6 a.m. It was as simple as that. Like two children making up a story to get something from their parents. Only in this case it wasn't about childishness. It was two grown men who lied to trigger an armed act with grave consequences. And so the meeting came about. The admirals heard the report from Huidobro. One of the admirals asked Merino if he had taken part in the conversation. Merino looked at Huidobro, who without blushing asked permission to call the sea captain Ariel González into the room. Nobody dared to doubt the words of the intelligence chief. Then the question arose of who should go to Santiago de Chile and conclude the agreement on the part of the Navy. Full power of attorney was granted to Admiral Huidobro. "
'Y fue esa noche del sábado 8 de agosto cuando ocurrió un episodio clave, de aquellos que marcan el curso de la historia a partir de dos seres humanos que pactan decir una mentira. Huidobro decidió, entonces, un movimiento audaz. Hizo venir desde la capital, con carácter urgente, al capitán de Navío Ariel González, jefe de Inteligencia del Estado Mayor de la Defensa. Ya muy tarde en la noche urdieron la mentira para la reunión dominical de los almirantes. Sí, les dirían que ambos habían ido esa noche a una reunión en Santiago, en la cual el Ejército y la Fuerza Aérea habían acordado que el golpe sería el martes 11, a las seis de la mañana. Así de simple. Como dos niños que inventan una historia para conseguir algo de sus padres. Sólo que en este caso, no había puerilidad. Eran dos adultos que mentían para gatillar una acción armada de graves consecuencias. Y llegó la reunión. Los almirantes escucharon el informe de Huidobro. Uno de ellos, preguntó a Merino si había participado de las conversaciones. Merino miró a Huidobro y éste, sin siquiera ruborizarse, pidió autorización para hacer ingresar a la sala al capitán de Navío, Ariel González. Nadie osó dudar de la palabra del jefe de Inteligencia. Vino entonces la pregunta. ¿Quién iría a Santiago a ultimar el acuerdo por la parte de la Armada? Se le dieron plenos poderes almirante Huidobro. '

The Chief of the General Staff of the Navy, Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal Prado , had already set off for Santiago de Chile to discuss the details of participation in the coup with the chiefs of the other branches of the armed forces.

On September 9, 1973, Huidobro, together with the chief of naval intelligence, Captain Ariel González, delivered a letter signed by Merino to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Pinochet, and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Lieutenant General Gustavo Leigh , in which the appointment for the coup was set for September 11, 1973.

In the letter it said:

"9. September 1973. Gustavo and Augusto. On my word of honor, day H is the 11th at 6:00 a.m. If you cannot keep this appointment with all of the forces you command in Santiago, please explain this on the back. Admiral Huidobro is authorized to negotiate with you and to discuss all matters. It greets you with confidence and understanding, Merino. ”On the back of the letter, Merino added,“ To Gustavo: It is the last opportunity. JT Augusto: If you don't concentrate all your energies in Santiago right from the start, we won't see the future anymore. Pepe. "
9 de septiembre de 1973. Gustavo y Augusto. Bajo mi palabra de honor, el día H será el 11 y la hora, las 06.00. Si Uds. No pueden cumplir this fase con el total de las fuerzas que mandan en Santiago, explíquenlo al reverso. El Almte. Huidobro está autorizado para tratar y discutir cualquier tema con Uds. Los saluda con esperanza y comprensión, merino. A Gustavo: es la última oportunidad. JT. August: Si no pones toda la fuerza de Santiago desde el primer momento, no viviremos para ver el futuro. Pepe. '

The reply brought from Huidobro to Merino bore the signatures of Leigh and Pinochet, as well as Pinochet's seal as Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

During the coup of September 11, 1973, Huidobro ensured the personal safety of Admiral Merino and his officers through a company of marines, who shielded the commander during critical moments and escorted them to the headquarters of the putschists.

Huidobro remained in command of the Marines until 1975, when he retired. He was succeeded by Rear Admiral Sergio Cid Arraya . Huidobro also acted as head of cabinet of Admiral Merino, who, in addition to his function as commander-in-chief, was also a member of the government junta.

Diplomatic mission in China

In 1977 Sergio Huidobro was appointed Ambassador of Chile to the People's Republic of China.

Aftermath

In November 2000 protests broke out in the port of Valparaíso. The so-called FUNA committee ( Comisión Funa ), a group of left-wing human rights activists, accused numerous former naval officers of being responsible for imprisonment and torture on the ships La Esmeralda , Lebu and Maipo stationed at the Valparaíso naval base during the Pinochet dictatorship . She relied on the Rettig report drawn up by the Chilean Truth Commission ( Comisión de Verdad y Reconciliación Nacional ) chaired by Raúl Rettig and other reports from the Organization of American States (OAS), Amnesty International and the US Senate . In addition to Rear Admiral Huidobro, the accused also included Vice Admiral Adolfo Walbaum Wieber , then Commander of Marine Zone 1, Vice Admiral Pablo Weber Munnich , Commander of the Fleet, and Rear Admiral Hugo Cabezas Videla , Chief of the General Staff of the Navy, as well as numerous other high-ranking officers.

family

His marriage to Maríana Medel de la Barra had a son.

Publications

  • Decisión naval , 1989

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Jonathan Haslam: The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile. Verso, London 2005, ISBN 1-84467-030-9 , p. 58.
  2. ^ Néstor Taboada Terán: Salvador Allende, ¡mar para Bolivia! Plural Editores, La Paz 2004, ISBN 99905-75-45-2 , p. 64.
  3. Patricia Verdugo: Interferencia Secreta: 11 de septiembre de 1973. Sudamericana, Santiago de Chile 1998, p. 18.
  4. ^ José Toribio Merino Castro: Bitácora de un almirante. Memorias (memories). Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago de Chile 1999, ISBN 956-13-1553-X , p. 229.
  5. Ismael Huerta Díaz: Volvería a Ser Marino (Memories). Volume 2. Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago de Chile 1988, p. 99.
  6. ^ José Toribio Merino Castro: Bitácora de un almirante. Memorias (memories). Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago de Chile 1999, ISBN 956-13-1553-X , p. 391.
  7. Leonidas Morales T. (Ed.): Cartas de petición. Chile 1973-1989. 2nd edition, Cuartopropio, Santiago de Chile 2006, ISBN 956-260-379-2 , p. 109.
  8. Funan a La Esmeralda al llegar a Valparaíso . In: El Mostrador, November 5, 2000, transcript viewed September 27, 2017.