José Toribio Merino

Admiral José Toribio Merino

José Toribio Merino Castro (* 14. December 1915 in La Serena , † the thirtieth August 1996 in Viña del Mar ) was a Chilean Admiral and politicians , on the day of the military coup of 11 September 1973 Commander of the Navy (Armada de Chile) was and held this position until March 8, 1990. At the same time he was during the military dictatorship under General Augusto Pinochet from September 11, 1973 to March 8, 1990 member of the government junta (Junta de Gobierno de Chile) and most recently between March 11, 1981 and March 8, 1990 as Pinochet's successor president Government junta.

Life

Training as a naval officer and promotion to vice admiral

Merino was the son of Vice Admiral José Toribio Merino Saavedra , who was also Commander in Chief of the Navy between 1927 and 1928. After attending school in 1931, he entered the Naval School (Escuela Naval) , which he left in 1936 as a midshipman . In that year he also completed a nautical training on the tanker Maipo on a trip to the USA , before he was subsequently employed on the sailing training ship General Baquedano . After attending a course for artillery officers in 1940 , he served on the USS Raleigh (CL-7) , an Omaha-class light cruiser of the United States Navy, and took part in patrols in the Panama Canal Zone and off Guadalcanal between 1944 and 1945 .

After the end of the war, Merino held various positions as a naval officer and in 1950, as a corvette captain, made another voyage to the USA to take over the light cruiser O'Higgins, which had been bought by the USA . In 1952 he became the commandant of the corvette Papudo and, after a general staff course at the Naval War Academy (Academia de Guerra Naval), he was lecturer in logistics and geopolitics at the naval school in 1954 , before he was a naval attaché at the embassy in Great Britain between 1956 and 1957 .

In 1959 he was appointed commander of the ship Angamos . After teaching as a professor at the Naval War Academy between 1960 and 1961, he was promoted to command of the destroyer Almirante Williams in 1962 and as such promoted to sea captain in September 1962 . Thereafter, Merino was Chief of Staff of the Fleet and Commodore of Operations Unit 4 from 1963 to 1964 and then Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Navy between 1964 and 1969. On January 1, 1969, he was promoted to rear admiral and appointed commander and director of armaments.

Subsequently, in 1970, after his promotion to Vice Admiral , Merino was appointed Director General for Naval Services. Thereupon he took over the function of commander of the fleet and naval judge at the end of 1970 and held them until March 1972. He was then appointed commander of the First Marine Zone in Valparaíso .

Naval crisis and first coup tendencies

In July and August 1973 there was a crisis in the Navy after 60 NCOs and sailors had been arrested. Several officers were subsequently discharged from the Navy for subversive activities, arrests and torture.

Dissatisfied with these developments, some vice admirals asked at the end of August 1973 to dismiss the Commander in Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raúl Montero Cornejo . On September 8, 1973, the Admiralty met with Secretary of Defense Orlando Letelier to discuss the matter. Merino then said that he did not want to succeed him and that he would rather retire ('Yo lo único que deseo es que llegue el momento de mi retiro, e irme. Yo no desearía ser comandante en jefe de la Armada'). At this meeting only three admirals defended the work of their previous commander-in-chief: Rear Admiral Daniel Arellano Mac Leod from the Directorate General for Services and at that time Minister of Finance in the Allende Cabinet, Rear Admiral Hugo Poblete from the Directorate for Supply, and Rear Admiral Hugo Cabezas , the Chief of Staff of the Navy and thus Deputy Montero. Poblete was arrested after the coup. In retrospect, the uprising of the admirals against their commander-in-chief at the meeting in the Ministry of Defense formed a kind of preliminary stage to the military coup.

Merino was among the first military personnel willing to bring about the fall of Allende. He also pointed this out in his later memoirs, in which he also described that within the Navy there had already been the first tendencies towards the removal of the president a year earlier. At that time, the Allende government was informed and it was expected that the Navy Personnel Committee would suggest that Vice Admiral Merino and Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal Prado should retire as they already met the legal requirements (40 years of active service) at that time. Merino was one of the admirals with the closest ties to the US armed forces .

Participation in the military coup of September 11, 1973

In this capacity he was also privy to the preparations for General Pinochet's military coup against President Salvador Allende in September 1973.

The actions of Merino and his confidante Rear Admiral Sergio Huidobro , Commander of the Marine Infantry, in the run-up to the military coup, are described by Patricia Verdugo as follows:

“On that night of Saturday, August 8, 1973, a key event occurred: one of those events that will change the course of history by two people dating to tell a lie. At that time, Huidobro made the decision to take a bold step. He summoned Ariel González, the chief of intelligence on the General Staff, from the capital. Very late at night they concocted the lies to be served to the admirals at their Sunday meeting. Yes, they would say at this meeting that they had been to a meeting in Santiago de Chile the evening before, at which the army and air force had agreed that the coup should take place on Tuesday 11th at 6 a.m. It was as simple as that. Like two children making up a story to get something from their parents. Only in this case it wasn't about childishness. It was two grown men who lied to trigger an armed act with grave consequences. And so the meeting came about. The admirals heard the report from Huidobro. One of the admirals asked Merino if he had taken part in the conversation. Merino looked at Huidobro, who without blushing asked permission to call the sea captain Ariel González into the room. Nobody dared to doubt the words of the intelligence chief. Then the question arose of who should go to Santiago de Chile and conclude the agreement on the part of the Navy. Full power of attorney was granted to Admiral Huidobro. "

'Y fue esa noche del sábado 8 de agosto cuando ocurrió un episodio clave, de aquellos que marcan el curso de la historia a partir de dos seres humanos que pactan decir una mentira. Huidobro decidió, entonces, un movimiento audaz. Hizo venir desde la capital, con carácter urgente, al capitán de Navío Ariel González, jefe de Inteligencia del Estado Mayor de la Defensa. Ya muy tarde en la noche urdieron la mentira para la reunión dominical de los almirantes. Sí, les dirían que ambos habían ido esa noche a una reunión en Santiago, en la cual el Ejército y la Fuerza Aérea habían acordado que el golpe sería el martes 11, a las seis de la mañana. Así de simple. Como dos niños que inventan una historia para conseguir algo de sus padres. Sólo que en este caso, no había puerilidad. Eran dos adultos que mentían para gatillar una acción armada de graves consecuencias. Y llegó la reunión. Los almirantes escucharon el informe de Huidobro. Uno de ellos, preguntó a Merino si había participado de las conversaciones. Merino miró a Huidobro y éste, sin siquiera ruborizarse, pidió autorización para hacer ingresar a la sala al capitán de Navío, Ariel González. Nadie osó dudar de la palabra del jefe de Inteligencia. Vino entonces la pregunta. ¿Quién iría a Santiago a ultimar el acuerdo por la parte de la Armada? Se le dieron plenos poderes almirante Huidobro. '

The Chief of the General Staff of the Navy, Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal Prado , had already set off for Santiago de Chile to discuss the details of participation in the coup with the chiefs of the other branches of the armed forces.

On September 9, 1973, Sergio Huidobro, together with the chief of naval intelligence, Captain Ariel González, brought a letter signed by Merino to the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Pinochet, and to the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Lieutenant General Gustavo Leigh , in which the appointment of the Coup was set on September 11, 1973.

In the letter it said:

As the successor to dictator Augusto Pinochet , Admiral Merino became president of the ruling military junta in 1981

"9. September 1973. Gustavo and Augusto. On my word of honor, day H is the 11th at 6:00 a.m. If you cannot keep this appointment with all of the forces you command in Santiago, please explain this on the back. Admiral Huidobro is authorized to negotiate with you and to discuss all matters. It greets you with confidence and understanding, Merino. ”On the back of the letter, Merino added,“ To Gustavo: It is the last opportunity. JT Augusto: If you don't concentrate all your energies in Santiago right from the start, we won't see the future anymore. Pepe. "

9 de septiembre de 1973. Gustavo y Augusto. Bajo mi palabra de honor, el día H será el 11 y la hora, las 06.00. Si Uds. No pueden cumplir this fase con el total de las fuerzas que mandan en Santiago, explíquenlo al reverso. El Almte. Huidobro está autorizado para tratar y discutir cualquier tema con Uds. Los saluda con esperanza y comprensión, merino. A Gustavo: es la última oportunidad. JT. August: Si no pones toda la fuerza de Santiago desde el primer momento, no viviremos para ver el futuro. Pepe. '

The reply brought from Huidobro to Merino bore the signatures of Leigh and Pinochet, as well as Pinochet's seal as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In the course of the coup on September 11, 1973, Huidobro took care of the personal safety of Admiral Merino and his officers through a company of marines who shielded the commander during critical moments and escorted them to the headquarters of the putschists.

Commander in Chief of the Navy and member of the military junta

After the coup, Merino succeeded Admiral Raúl Montero Cornejo as Commander in Chief of the Navy (Armada de Chile) . At the same time he became a member of the ruling military junta chaired by General Augusto Pinochet.

As a member of the ruling military junta, Merino was responsible for the economic sector, subject to Pinochet's ultimate decision-making power. The 1980 constitution separated the executive and legislative branches. Merino then succeeded Pinochet as President of the government junta on March 11, 1981, and held this position until March 8, 1990. At the same time as his resignation, which is regarded as an important date in the process of the country's return to democracy, Merino resigned after more than fifty years from active military service. His successor as Commander in Chief of the Navy was Admiral Jorge Martínez Busch , who initially also took over the office of President of the Junta de Gobierno de Chile ("Government Junta of Chile").

Torture of the navy during the military dictatorship

After the coup, the navy took particularly brutal action against supporters of the Popular Front government Allende and the Unidad Popular (UP), which is proven by numerous publications. In the Rettig report drawn up by the Comisión de Verdad y Reconciliación nacional chaired by Raúl Rettig , for example, on the events at the Valparaíso naval base:

“The navy used the ships Lebu , Maipo and the training ship Esmeralda , all three at the Valparaíso naval base , as detention, torture and interrogation facilities . Likewise the naval aviation base El Belloto , the naval school and especially parts of the barracks Cuartel Silva Palma [all in Valparaíso]. The motor ships Lebu and Maipo , which belonged to the South American Steamship Company (Compañía Sudamericana de Vapores) , served the Navy as detention centers. The company informed the Rettig Commission that the Maipo came under the control of the Navy on September 11, 1973 at 10:00 a.m. when members of the Navy took over command and later ordered the ship to leave for Pisagua on September 15, 1973 at 11:00 p.m. The Maipo was then replaced as a prison ship by the Lebu, which was confiscated on the same day . In November 1973 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found that 324 political prisoners were on board the motor ship Lebu . Basically one can say that the Maipo and Lebu were only used as prison ships. On board the ships, some prisoners were housed in cabins, but the vast majority were held in the holds below deck, where they were held in extremely confined spaces under unsanitary conditions without adequate minimum provisions. With regard to the Lebu , the ICRC confirmed these conditions after its visit on October 1, 1973 and described them as follows: The prisoners are isolated from the outside world, the families do not know their whereabouts, the quality of the food was rather poor and the quantity inadequate, and in general the conditions of detention were extremely poor. Prisoners were tortured and ill-treated on this motor ship. With regard to the training ship Esmeralda , the Commission's investigations revealed that a special naval unit was installed on board to interrogate the prisoners, both those housed on the ship and those who were detained for this purpose from other detention areas in the Marine were brought to the ship. These interrogations were regularly combined with torture and ill-treatment. At the naval aviation base El Belloto , in the buildings of the naval school and especially in the barracks Cuartel Silva Palma , interrogations took place under torture and abuse. "

‚La Armada empleó como lugares de reclusión, interrogatorio y / o tortura los barcos" Lebu "," Maipo "and the Buque Escuela" Esmeralda "estos tres en el puerto de Valparaíso. La Base Aeronaval de "El Belloto", the Academia de Guerra Naval y, especialmente, una de las dependencias del "Cuartel Silva Palma". Las motonaves "Lebu" and "Maipo", de propiedad de la Compañía Sudamericana de Vapores, sirvieron como centros de detención de la Armada. Dicha compañía informó a this Comisión que el "Maipo" quedó a disposición de la Armada de Chile el 11 de septiembre de 1973 a las 10:00 horas, cuando su personal tomó el mando, disponiendo posteriormente su zarpe hacia Pisagua el 15 de septiembre de 1973 at 23:00 horas, luego de lo cual fue reemplazado por el "Lebu", requisado en la misma fecha, como barco-prisión. In the mes de noviembre, the Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja constató la permanencia de 324 prisioneros políticos en la motonave "Lebu". En términos generales, tanto el "Maipo" como el "Lebu" sólo füron empleados como centros de detención. En estos barcos, algunos prisioneros estuvieron en camarotes, aunque la gran mayoría permaneció en sus bodegas, en condiciones de gran hacinamiento y total falta de higiene y servicios minimos. Respecto del "Lebu", la Cruz Roja Internacional, después de su visita del 1 ° de octubre de 1973, confirmó estos hechos, señalando: el aislamiento del exterior en que se habenraban los detenidos, por ignorar su familia su permanencia allí; the regular calidad e insuficiencia de la comida; y, en general, las pésimas condiciones de detención. En dicha motonave se practicaron torturas y malos tratos a los prisioneros. En el caso del Buque Escuela "Esmeralda" (20), las investigaciones practicadas por esta Comisión permitieron comprobar que una unidad especializada de la Armada, se instaló en su interior con el objeto de interrogar a los detenidos, que se habenraban en la misma nave ya los que eran traídos desde otros recintos de reclusión de la Armada. Esos interrogatorios, por regla general, incluían torturas y malos tratos. In the Base Aeronaval "El Belloto", in the Academia de Guerra y sus dependencias y especialmente in the "Cuartel Silva Palma", también se practicaron interrogatorios con malos tattos y torturas. '

Naval detention and torture facilities were also located in the Isla Quinquina facility in Concepción , on Isla Dawson south of Punta Arenas . The naval bases of Talcahuano and Fuerte Borgoño also served as centers for imprisonment and torture , according to the Valech Commission established in 2001 .

Private

Merino, who died in 1996 of complications from cancer, was married and had three children.

publication

• Bitácora de un almirante. Memorias. Memories, Santiago de Chile 1999, ISBN 956-13-1553-X ( limited preview in Google Book Search)

Web links

• Biography on the homepage of the Navy
• Entry (No. 5) in 11 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1973: Golpe Militar en Chile
• Biography in memoriaviva.com
• Biography in icarito.cl

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Patricia Verdugo: Interferencia Secreta: 11 de septiembre de 1973. Sudamericana, Santiago de Chile 1998, p. 18.
2. ^ José Toribio Merino Castro: Bitácora de un almirante. Memorias (memories). Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago de Chile 1999, ISBN 956-13-1553-X , p. 229.
3. ↑ Ismael Huerta Díaz: Volvería a Ser Marino (Memories). Volume 2. Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago de Chile 1988, p. 99.
4. ^ José Toribio Merino Castro: Bitácora de un almirante. Memorias (memories). Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago de Chile 1999, ISBN 956-13-1553-X , p. 391.
5. ↑ After the military coup in 1973 and 1974 there was a concentration camp in Pisagua in which numerous political opponents of the government were imprisoned and tortured.
6. ^ Report of the Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación