Security indicator
Safety indicator is a derived from operating experience parameters of a safety feature of the system .
The parameter is determined from the frequency with which a security property of the system appears. Incidents and accidents provide information on how a system can fail (with regard to the type, scope and cause of the damage).
Properties and meaning of safety indicators
Today, safety indicators represent an essential and necessary tool for safety management systems in all risk-relevant systems (such as nuclear technology , chemistry and in transport systems : aviation , ship , rail , motor vehicle ). They can be easily derived from operation and as quantitative values in their Meaning unambiguous and verifiable. They give the security management a clear picture of the security status of the system.
The trend tracking of the indicators about malfunctions - in the run-up to accidents - gives the management information on possible deterioration of the system, whereupon corrective measures can be initiated. ( Leading indicators / Potential accident fore-runners ).
The trend tracking of the accident events of comparable systems gives an operational management information about the general accident risks of the system and its changes, whether a learning process has taken place based on the accident experience and which measures were effective (lagging indicators) .
Based on the cause of the accident, targeted improvement measures can be initiated. They also represent a source for the selection of essential indicators in the run-up to accidents (leading indicators) . This results from the fact that the majority of the identified accident causes are composed of a chain of individual faults in the system, with the individual fault generally being insignificant in terms of safety (cf.).
In the financial sector , the indicators are used accordingly and are defined as follows:
- Leading indicators are indicators that change before the financial economy as a whole changes.
- Lagging indicators are indicators that change after the financial economy as a whole has changed.
A basic management axiom is that you cannot manage what cannot be measured. It is therefore necessary to define a set of measurable system performance variables (performance outcomes) for each system in order to be able to assess whether the system actually behaves as it was planned, designed and approved.
According to a good health and safety performance (H&S) of a company is a good indicator of good management.
The performance of the management itself can be checked on the basis of indicators, such as through H&S audits, training, the involvement of the workforce in the company policy and its goals as well as through regular reviews of the safety culture . The management's reporting on the company's performance and its goals is a key management indicator (reporting indicator) . However, it is pointed out that there is still little clarity about which indicators are the most important.
In order to expand the level of experience beyond the individual corporate areas, national and international statistical surveys are carried out on the accident events and their causes (lagging indicators) in the various industries (such as air traffic, shipping, nuclear power plants ) .
Applications of security indicators
aviation
In civil aviation , accidents that have occurred worldwide have been investigated since 1960 with regard to their causes with the aim of preventing repetitions of accidents of the same type and improving safety measures (lagging indicators) . The evaluations of the causes of accidents usually show a chain of events, which also make it difficult to analyze the causes of accidents.
The statistical evaluations of the annual accident figures in civil aviation from 1960 to 1970 show a clear decrease in the accident rate, which indicates a corresponding learning process in safety technology. From 1991 to 2010 the accident rate fell only slightly from approx. 1.5 to 0.5 events per 1 million starts and year. The number of accidental deaths that have occurred, on the other hand, varies considerably from year to year, from less than 5 to 1,300 deaths and with no discernible trend over time.
The accident rates determined in are continuously standardized to the take-offs of the aircraft, with the reason that the accident frequency is correlated with the number of flight movements and less with the flight duration. This is derived from the fact that the accident rate is determined much more by the take-off and landing phase than by the duration of the cruise (11% share in 2001 to 2010). The relation of the accident rate to the flight hour would not result in realistic accident figures.
To investigate the various influencing factors, the accident events are broken down into the following categories, e.g. As the type of aircraft (scheduled, charter, cargo), type of aircraft , the flight phase (start, cruise , landing , airport ) as well as categories of damage, such as loss of flight control , fuel loss, fire / smoke coming off the start and runway , System and component errors, bird strikes .
The accident statistics show special characteristics for the following categories:
- older aircraft types compared to newer machines,
- Take-off and landing phase compared to the cruise flight,
- Loss of flight control,
- Collision / near-collision with landscape objects,
- Departure of the aircraft from the runway.
Aviation in Germany
For civil aviation in Germany, the ( Federal Office for Aircraft Accident Investigation ) BFU publishes annual reports on “Accidents and serious disruptions in the operation of civil aircraft”. The statistical accident data for all aircraft (airplanes, helicopters , gliders ) in Germany show an almost constant trend over the period from 1991 to 2008 with around 40 deaths per year. There is no correlation with the changing number of aircraft or the total number of flight movements.
Airfield management
For the safety assessment of the operational processes of an airport by the safety management the following safety indicators are mentioned (leading indicators):
- Violation of traffic rules on the airfield
- unauthorized personnel on the airfield
- Disruptions and accidents on the airfield (concerning personnel, aircraft or airfield facilities)
- Repair of road damage caused by outside influences
- Bird strike damage
- Damage to warning markings
- Main power supply interruption
- Limited availability of the lighting system
- Failure of signaling devices
- Limited alertness of the fire brigade
- Limited availability of fire protection equipment
- Insufficiently qualified fire protection personnel.
Nuclear technology
The IAEA recommends using a comprehensive set of safety indicators (SI) (leading indicators) to record the safety or risk status of a nuclear power plant (NPP) in its entirety . The risk analysis models , which depict the failure structures of the systems, provide a suitable basis for deriving the SI .
Czech Republic
In accordance with the recommendation of the IAEA, an SI system was installed at the Dukovany NPP in the Czech Republic , which contains a total of 184 indicators recommended by WANO and IAEA. The SI about the current status of the components are displayed using four colors (value ranges):
- Green: excellent
- White: normal
- Yellow: warning
- Red: not allowed
United States
The American safety authority NRC has created a computer-based safety indicator program (Reactor Oversight Process) for ongoing monitoring of nuclear power plants in the USA , which is carried out by the staff of the respective nuclear power plant. The recorded results of the SI are reported to the NRC quarterly, which in turn publishes them in.
The SI used in the NPP are derived from the structure of the risk analysis of the respective NPP (Cornerstones of Safe Operation) and are structured as follows:
- Incident-triggering events (initiating events) - systems and components that make the use of safety systems necessary in the event of failure in order to avoid a reactor accident .
- Safety systems (mitigating systems) - systems and components that are used in the event of a disruptive event.
- Barrier systems (Barrier Integrity) - components that are assigned to the three containments of the nuclear power plant's radioactive inventory:
- the fuel rod cladding, the uranium fuel tablets (Pallets) include;
- the reactor primary circuit, which encloses the fuel elements in the reactor core and
- the reactor containment , which encloses the primary circuit.
- Emergency Preparedness (Emergency Preparedness) - Emergency measures are planned in the event of an accident, results of emergency exercises.
- Radiation protection of the staff (Occupational Radiation Safety) - measures and means for limiting the radiation exposure of personnel.
- Radiation protection of the population (Public Radiation Safety) - measures and means for limiting the radioactivity release from the NPP.
- Assurance (Security) - measures and facilities for defense against sabotage, alcohol and drug use.
- Efficiency of the staff (human performance) .
- Security awareness of personnel (management attention to safety and workers' ability to raise safety issues) - safety awareness in the workplace.
- Problem-solving inventions (Finding and fixing problems) - The management program for problem solving.
The current status of the recorded parameters is displayed using four colors ("Color-coded performance indicators"):
- Green: the component is in perfect condition,
- White: minor safety-related deviation,
- Yellow: moderate safety-related deviation,
- Red: significant safety-related deviation.
South Korea
SI programs based on the model of the NRC were developed for the nuclear power plants in South Korea . The Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) of the Korean NPP is also the basis for determining the SI .
chemistry
According to the OECD , the supervisory authority of a chemical plant has an important role to play in the company's introduction and application of safety indicator programs to prevent chemical accidents . The authority should create the regulatory framework for the application of the SI and use the SI even in the event of an accident to improve its own level of information, such as warning and evacuating the surrounding population, deploying the police , fire brigade and other emergency services .
The SI is understood as a measurable variable that enables insights into the safety concept of a plant, which is not directly possible with other methods. There are two main types of SI:
- Activities indicators: Should show the actions and measures of the management that serve to reduce the system risk (leading indicators) .
- Outcome indicators: Should show to what extent the measures initiated by management reduce the probability of malfunctions, accidents and injuries (lagging indicators) .
Pipeline systems
To improve the safety of the Canadian pipeline network and to protect the environment, the Canadian National Energy Board (NEB) initiated a Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) program in 2011 . The pipeline network, which is subject to statistical evaluation, comprised 39,193 km of pipeline length in 2000, 40,760 km in 2008 and 62,607 km in 2009.
The main groups recorded by the SPI concern (lagging indicators):
- Number of deaths in accidents
- Number of people injured in accidents
- Number of pipeline breaks
- Number of pipeline leaks (≤1.5 m³ and> 1.5 m³)
- Amount of gas releases
- Management deficits as a contributor to accidental injuries.
The annual number of pipe breaks in the period from 1991 to 2009 fluctuated between zero and 6 events, with an average of around 2 events per year. In 2009 the rate again reached a maximum value of 5 events. This is partly due to the significant expansion of the pipeline network this year. The largest proportion of the causes of the pipe breakage (65%) is caused by corrosion of the metal wall.
- Diagram: Number of pipe breaks per year
The number of pipeline leaks in the period from 2000 to 2009 is given on average for the leak sizes (≤1.5 m³) with 37 and (> 1.5 m³) with 5 events per year, with no discernible trend in the recording period.
In order to evaluate and improve the safety program of the pipeline management and the level of training of the personnel, the incidents with accident injuries in the period from 2000 to 2009 were examined according to the following cause characteristics and divided into two groups (values in brackets - number of cause characteristics determined in the recording period):
Direct causes:
- Inappropriate positioning (4)
- Inappropriate arrangement (6)
- Inappropriate use of tools and equipment (4)
- Failed Warning (1)
- Insufficient protection (4)
- Incorrect application of procedures (1)
- Hazardous working conditions (1)
- Unsuitable labeling (1).
Basic causes:
- Inappropriate leadership and supervision (3)
- Unsuitable tools and equipment (4)
- Unsuitable working guidelines (3)
- Unsuitable engineering (2)
- Incorrect assessment / assessment (5)
- Insufficient knowledge level (3)
- Insufficient motivation (2).
Individual evidence
- ^ A b [1] , Aviation Glossary Aviation Glossary - Defining the Language of Aviation
- ↑ Hopkins, Thinking about process safety indicators, 2008
- ↑ [2] (PDF; 604 kB), Tomic, Nuclear Safety Performance Indicators, Final Report of the Project, Volume 1: Project performance and the main technical findings - Overview (page 40), European Commission, EUR 23914 EN, Jan. 2009
- ^ Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK, 252 p., ISBN 1840141042
- ^ Economic Indicator
- ↑ http://www2.icao.int/en/ism/Guidance%20Materials/DOC_9859_FULL_EN.pdf ( Memento of March 24, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) , Safety Management Manual (SMM), ICAO Doc 9859, ISBN 978-92- 9231-295-4 , 2009
- ↑ a b Archived copy ( memento of the original from January 5, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Mark Mansley, HEALTH & SAFETY INDICATORS FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS - A report to the Health and Safety Executive, ”2002
- ↑ a b c Archived copy ( memento of the original from January 23, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Boeing Airplane Safety
- ↑ [3] (PDF; 153 kB), Boeing - Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents Worldwide Operations, 1959-2010
- ↑ [4] , CAST / ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT)
- ^ [5] , Federal Office for Aircraft Accident Investigation
- ↑ Archived copy ( Memento of the original dated December 16, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Annual Report 2008 - Accidents and Disruptions in the Operation of Civil Aircraft
- ↑ a b [6] (PDF; 15.6 MB), IAEA-TECDOC-1141, Operational Safety Performance Indicators for NPPs, IAEA, Vienna, 2000
- ↑ a b [7] , US NRC - ROP Action Matrix Summary and Current Regulatory Oversight
- ↑ [8] ( Page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , YONG SUK LEE, A FEASIBILITY STUDY ON THE ADVANCED PERFORMANCE INDICATOR CONCEPT FOR IMPROVING KINS SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (SPI), Dec. 2010
- ↑ a b [9] (PDF; 3.1 MB), GUIDANCE ON DEVELOPING SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS related to Chemical Accident Prevention, OECD, Paris 2008
- ↑ [10] , National Energy Board - Pipeline Regulations - Safety Performance Indicators
