Edward Atkinson

Edward Atkinson as a participant in the Terra Nova Expedition (1911)

Edward Leicester Atkinson (born November 23, 1881 on St. Vincent , † February 20, 1929 in the Mediterranean ) was a British parasitologist , doctor in the Royal Navy and polar explorer . He was part of the scientific team of the Terra Nova Expedition to Antarctica under the direction of Robert Falcon Scott from 1910 to 1913. During this research trip he was given command of the expedition base in Scott's absence and led the group that eventually brought the tent with them found the bodies of Scott, Henry Bower, and Edward Wilson . Atkinsons was later charged to have disregarded Scott's order to use the sled dog teams to rescue the South Pole group and to be responsible for the scurvy disease of some expedition members. The Atkinson Cliffs ( 71 ° 20 ′  S , 168 ° 50 ′  E ) on the north coast of Victoria Land are named after him.

Origin and education

Atkinson was born to an English financial accountant and his wife on the Caribbean island of St. Vincent. He spent his school days from 1895 to 1900 at the Forest School in Walthamstow and completed a medical degree at St Thomas' Hospital in London until 1906 , where he also appeared as a light heavyweight champion in boxing. In 1908 he joined the Royal Navy as a doctor, where he was stationed at the Royal Naval Hospital in Gosport . As part of medical research, he wrote a treatise on gonorrheic rheumatism.

The Terra Nova Expedition

see main article: Terra Nova Expedition

South trip

After a winter mainly spent in scientific work, Atkinson set out with Scott's team south on October 31, 1911, staying with the group while driving over the barrier and climbing Beardmore Glacier , first as a pony guide and later as a sled puller. On December 22nd, he returned to the base at the summit of the glacier at 85 ° 7 'south with the first support group, where he arrived on January 29th, 1912 after a basically problem-free journey.

Atkinson had received verbal orders from Scott on the future use of the expedition's dogs that had returned to base prior to the ascent on Beardmore Glacier. With this order he commissioned Atkinson to ensure that the dogs were brought to the One Ton Depot in February and " to get as far as possible with the (dog food) depot that was placed at the One Ton Depot " - probably, to meet and help the returning polar group. This mandate deviated from Scott's earlier orders (see below), and the lack of explicit intention in the new order would create problems later.

Commandant at Cape Evans

Upon his return to Cape Evans, Atkinson took command. There he learned that the lead dog handler, Cecil Meares, had stopped expeditionary work, was waiting for the ship to take him home, and was "not available" for work on the barrier. So Atkinson decided to carry out Scott's latest assignment himself and take the dogs to the depot. To this end, he and the auxiliary dog ​​handler Dimitri Gerow were at Hut Point on February 19 , when Thomas Crean walked from the barrier and reported that Lieutenant Edward Evans was seriously ill in a tent about 55 kilometers to the south and needed help would need. Atkinson quickly decided that this mission was more important and set off with the dogs to bring Evans to Hut Point. This succeeded, the group returned on February 22nd.

Evans was able to inform Atkinson of further changes to the orders regarding the dogs - Scott wanted them to be brought to 82 or 83 degrees south in the hope that they could meet the polar group there in mid-February. Atikinson's main concern, however, was his patient's well-being, and he decided to stay with Evans. The task of bringing the dogs and supplies to the One Ton Depot in accordance with Scott's earlier orders fell to Apsley Cherry-Garrard , with the last order received through Evans either being forgotten or deemed impractical. Atkinson still did not think of the possibility that Cherry-Garrard's drive might be a rescue mission and repeated Scott's instruction that the dogs should not be jeopardized. Cherry-Garrard left with Gerow and the dogs on February 26th. He carried additional rations with him, which should be stored in the depot for the polar group. They did not advance further south than One Ton Depot , and after waiting there for several days for Scott, they returned to Hut Point on March 16 in poor physical condition and with news from the polar group.

Concern for the welfare of the group grew, and on March 26, Atkinson went with Patrick Keohane and no dogs in another attempt to look for signs of Scott's return. They could only get as far as Corner Camp before the weather forced them to turn back on March 30th. At this point Atkinson stated: "With me I was sure that the polar group had perished".

Before the full onset of winter, Atkinson led an attempt to rescue the Northern Group, which had not been heard from since it left more than a year earlier. The rescue group left Hut Point on April 17, but could not advance further than Butter Point on the tongue of the Ferrar Glacier . The following winter at Cape Evans was a difficult and tense time for the decimated expeditionary crew, but Atikinson maintained a program of scientific and recreational activities and was able to maintain morale. When the winter ended, one faced a dilemma: should one clarify the fate of the southern group first, or should one try again to save the northern group? They chose the former option.

The discovery of Scott's tent

On October 29, 1912, Atkinson led a group of dogs and mules to search for traces of the polar group. On November 12th, the tent with the bodies of Scott, Wilson and Bowers was discovered, 18 kilometers south of the One Ton Depot . Atkinson found Scott's diary and learned the course of the men's deaths; he then read the relevant passages to the assembled men, including those dealing with the deaths of Boatswain Evans and Oates. Another march south in search of Oates' body only revealed his sleeping bag. On their return to Hut Point on November 25th, the group learned of the safe return of the northern group. Here Victor Campbell took command as the senior officer.

Controversy over the dogs

While he was in command in the critical period from February to March 1912, Atkinson had to interpret and carry out Scott's varying instructions about the use of the dogs after the barrier had been crossed. Scott's original instructions, "never changed", said that dogs should be spared and "not risked" for science trips the following year. In his instructions to George Simpson and Cecil Meares just before he left for the south, Scott ordered that the dogs would be used "to go to One Ton Camp 5 after their return from the polar voyage, where they were to accompany the polar group for a while." Carrying "XS" rations, or definitely 3, ... and as much dog food as they can carry ". This work should be completed by January 12, 1912. The only obvious purpose of requesting a dog food depot for January 12th at One Ton Depot is to allow the dogs to continue their journey south later and to provide assistance to returning polar travelers. Fatally, Scott did not elaborate on his plans (nor was he asked to; it was a naval expedition), but perhaps at this early stage he foresaw that he would need the dogs to get home safely. In practice, the XS rations were deposited, but the dog food never arrived. This could be due to an oversight, misunderstanding, communication problem, or disobedience (see below). The importance of this omission only became apparent later - it meant that any future use of dogs south of the depot, for rescue purposes or otherwise, would at least be problematic.

Scott further complicated the situation by taking the dogs on the polar voyage far more south than he had originally planned, so they didn't return to base until January 5th. Fiennes argues that Scott merely showed flexibility in changing his plans. However, a growing concern that he might need the dogs may be gleaned from Scott's Dec. 22nd order to Atkinson to "come as far as you can." Again, Scott did not explain his instruction and, as usual, his subordinate asked no questions. But whatever Atkinson understood in this assignment, he stuck to the original order that the dogs should not be risked, apparently even after he had received final instructions from Lieutenant Evans Scott to close the dogs to 82 or 83 degrees bring. As mentioned, the communication was received too late to be practical, but Atkinson could have drawn from it another indication that Scott expected difficulties on the way back. This, along with Evans' poor physical condition, could have moved him to change the program - he was an intelligent officer, not an automaton. However, after sending Cherry-Garrard and the dogs to the One Ton Depot on February 26th, Atkinson, who had by now realized that there was no dog food in the depot, wrote: "It cannot be stressed enough that the dog teams are only that The return of the southern group should accelerate and were by no means intended as a means of rescue ". In Atkinson's defense, it must be stated that Scott's group was not yet overdue. According to Cherry-Garrard, Atkinson had instructed him to judge for himself if he didn't meet Scott at the depot. His options were to wait or go further south and kill some dogs as food for the rest. Still following Scott's orders to be careful with the dogs and facing inclement weather, eye problems, illness, and poor navigational skills, he decided to wait. This decision was considered correct by Atkinson, but would later cause many moral problems for Cherry-Garrard.

In the face of the increasing burden of proof, did Atkinson stick to the original instructions too long? Or did he simply lack the resources to act differently? Fiennes wonders whether Atkinson (or Meares or Cherry-Garrard or Scott himself) is partly to blame, but does not come to a definite conclusion. He wonders why Atkinson Meares, who returned to base on January 5th knowing that the dog food depot had not been opened, allowed him to wait idle at Cape Evans until he left on March 5th on the Terra Nova , and Charles Wright was certain that Meares should have been sent to the depot and not Cherry-Garrard. In later years Atkinson claimed that Meares "refused orders" (whose?) When he failed to open the dog food depot. Fiennes concludes: "There are many individuals involved in what Scott called a" wretched mess "and each have their own version of what motivated their action or interaction at the time."

Controversy over scurvy

Atkinson was the only medically qualified officer to see the bodies of Scott, Wilson, and Bowers. The extent to which he conducted a detailed investigation is unknown, and no medical report on the causes of death has ever been published. However, figuratively speaking, he clearly told Cherry-Garrard that there was no evidence of scurvy in the bodies.

The truth of this statement has been questioned by Scott's critics for more minor reasons. For example: Lieutenant Evans was seriously ill with scurvy on the return trip, why not others too? Scurvy had been a problem on previous Antarctic expeditions, including Scott's on the Discovery , and the diet hadn't changed much since then. The increasing weakness of the polar group on the way back, and particularly that of Edgar Evans, is consistent with symptoms of scurvy. And, of course, Atkinson's statements may have served to save the expedition's reputation - scurvy was sort of stigmatized. Huntford, however, is certain: "By now Scott was almost certainly in the early stages of scurvy." He says the same about Edgar Evans.

The growth in scientific understanding of the nature and causes of scurvy in the years after 1912 may have supported the belief that Scott and his comrades suffered from it. Even Raymond Priestley , a member of the expedition's scientific staff who had once denied the occurrence of scurvy, began to see things differently fifty years later. However, despite the lack of understanding of the causes of the disease, the symptoms were well known, and Solomon and Fiennes clearly point out that it is hard to imagine that such a conscientious scientific observer as Edward Wilson had recorded absolutely no sign of scurvy in the polar group if there were any.

First World War

On his return to England Atkinson worked briefly at the London School of Tropical Medicine , where he parasites researched before he went to a medical expedition to China to explore a parasitic flatworm that schistosomiasis caused among British sailors. After the outbreak of World War I , Atkinson signed up for active service. He was sent to the Gallipoli Peninsula to investigate fly-borne diseases and contracted pleurisy that left him bedridden. In 1916 he served on the Western Front and fought on the Somme , for which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order . After a mission in northern Russia, he was seriously injured in an explosion on board the HMS Glatton in the port of Dover. Despite burns and blindness, he was able to save several men before he fled the ship and was subsequently awarded the Albert Medal .

Next life

After the war, Atkinson reported to Cherry-Garrard the results of his research on the nutritional defenses of Scott's group on the barrier and plateau. He concluded that the rations served on the barrier could generate only 51% of the nutritional energy required for a typical barrier work day. The corresponding rate for the plateau rations was 57%. These results provided a substantial explanation (hunger) for the physical weakness of the polar group. In addition, Atkinson continued his naval career. In 1928 his wife died and he suffered a nervous breakdown. He recovered and was remarried a few months later and was promoted to medical officer. On February 20, 1929, Atkinson died on his way back to England on a ship in the Mediterranean at the age of 47 and was buried at sea. Eight years later, Cherry-Garrard wrote an additional preface to the 1937 edition of his book The Worst Journey in Atkinson's honor . "His voice has been with me many times since these days - that rough, deep, affectionate, monosyllabic way in which he spoke to you ... there was nothing he could do to let the affection shimmer through. I'm glad to have this opportunity to to be able to testify to some of what we owe him. "

The Atkinson Cliffs in Antarctica are named after him.

literature

• Leonard Huxley (Ed.): Scott's last Expedition. In two volumes. Smith, Elder & Co, London 1913;
  • Volume 1: The Journals of Captain RF Scott.
  • Volume 2: The Reports of the Journeys & the scientific Work undertaken by EA Wilson and the surviving Members of the Expedition.
• George Seaver: Foreword. In: Apsley Cherry-Garrard : The worst Journey in the World: Antarctic, 1910-1913. Chatto & Windus, London, 1965 (again: Penguin et al., Harmondsworth et al. 1983, ISBN 0-14-009501-2 ).
• Apsley Cherry-Garrard: The worst Journey in the World: Antarctic, 1910-1913. Penguin et al., Harmondsworth et al. 1983, ISBN 0-14-009501-2 .
• Roland Huntford : The Last Place on Earth. Pan Books, London 1985, ISBN 0-330-28816-4 .
• Susan Solomon : The Coldest March. Scott's fatal Antarctic expedition. Yale University Press, New Haven CT et al. 2001, ISBN 0-300-08967-8 .
• Sara Wheeler : Cherry. A life of Apsley Cherry-Garrard. Jonathan Cape, London 2001, ISBN 0-224-05004-4 .
• Ranulph Fiennes : Captain Scott. Hodder and Stoughton, London 2003, ISBN 0-340-82697-5 .

Notes and individual references

1. ^ ^{A b} William C. Campbell: Edward Leicester Atkinson: Physician, Parasitologist, and Adventurer. Journal of the History of Medicine Vol. 46, 1991, pp. 219-240.
2. ↑ Edward Leister Atkinson  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Short biography on the website of the Polar Museum in the Scott Polar Research Institute (accessed November 13, 2012)  
3. ↑ Wheeler, Cherry. A life of Apsley Cherry-Garrard. 2001, p. 138.
4. ^ Atkinson. Cherry-Garrard, Wright, and Keohane
5. ^ SLE, Volume 1, Appendix, p. 628 - Atkinson's Report
6. ↑ Atkinson was the longest serving and only naval officer present, as Scott and Evans were on their way south and Campbell was out with the northern group
7. ↑ There are various accounts of the reasons for Meares' withdrawal from the expedition. Huntford (p. 435) cites an argument with Scott; Fiennes (p. 340) states that Meares had to return to England to attend to the affairs of his late father.
8. ↑ Evans, Lashly, and Crean formed the last support group that Scott left on January 3rd. Lashly stayed behind to take care of Evans while Crean went to Hut Point. Both were later awarded Albert Medals for lifesaving
9. ↑ Scott had been clearly over-optimistic about the speed of his support group on the return trip and had expected Atkinson to get the order much sooner
10. ↑ Impractical because (1) it was received too late, (2) Meares was no longer available, and (3) there was no dog food in the depot
11. ↑ "Captain Scott had given strict regulations that the dogs should not be risked in any way" - from Atkinson's report "The Attempt to Meet the Polar Party" in "Scott's Last Expedition", Vol. II, p. 304
12. ^ Atkinson in SLE, Vol. II, p. 309
13. ↑ This group was originally supposed to explore the east, but had changed direction after they encountered Amundsen in the Bay of Whales (SLE, vol. II, p. 85). She returned to Cape Evans and set out north on February 9, 1911 with the Terra Nova.
14. ^ Atkinson's report in SLE, Vol. II, pp. 310-16
15. ↑ Apparently this decision was made almost unanimously with only one abstention. Wheeler, p. 141, states that Lashly abstained; Solomon, p. 258, cites Cherry-Garrard.
16. ↑ Nine mules, a gift from the Indian government, were brought ashore during the Terra Nova’s brief visit in March 1912, along with snowshoes and blinkers, which, according to Atkinson (SLE, vol. II, p. 321), made them much more effective than last year's ponies. However, Wheeler (p. 143) says the mules were not a success
17. ↑ George Seaver, foreword from 1965 to Cherry-Garrard's Worst Journey : p. 32 in the Penguin Travel Library edition
18. ↑ XS = "Extra Summit". One XS ration was the weekly provision requirement of four men
19. ^ Seaver, p. 30
20. ^ Wheeler, p. 161, and Cherry-Garrard's suspicions of a cover-up
21. ^ Fiennes, p. 275
22. ↑ Fiennes, pp. 360f
23. ↑ SLE, Vol. II, p. 298 - when and how he found out is not known
24. ↑ SLE, Vol. II, pp. 300–01
25. ^ Fiennes, p. 358
26. ↑ SLE, Vol. II, p. 306
27. ↑ Fiennes, pp. 360-362
28. ^ Fiennes, p. 360
29. ↑ Solomon, p. 279
30. ^ Fiennes, p. 372
31. ↑ Huntford, p. 488 and p. 499
32. ↑ Solomon, p. 280
33. ↑ In the winter of 1911, according to Cherry-Garrard (p. 262), Atkinson gave a lecture on scurvy in which he "tended towards Almroth Wright's theory that scorput is caused by acidic poisoning of the blood by bacteria"
34. ↑ Huntford, however, says (p. 499) that Wilson was not a practicing physician and "showed no evidence of being capable of diagnosing the complicated progression of scurvy unless in its final stages"
35. ↑ Cherry-Garrard, p. 618
36. ↑ Quoted from Wheeler, p. 239