Railway accidents in Frankfurt (Main) Süd
The railway accidents at Frankfurt (Main) Süd station were two flank journeys , the one on May 9, 1996 and February 19, 1997, in a period of less than a year, in the area of the Frankfurt (Main) Süd station in the same constellation and in the area the same switch took place. In the second accident , a left tank cars , the gasoline was charged, in the midst of surrounding residential buildings in flames.
Starting position
The Frankfurt (Main) Süd train station is located in the Sachsenhausen district of Frankfurt in the middle of dense development. At the western end of the station, in addition to the route from the main train station and the S-Bahn route from Darmstadt Hauptbahnhof, two connecting routes flow which, coming from the south, are now mainly used for freight traffic : A connecting curve with a narrow radius to the right of the Main-Neckar Bahn and one from the Riedbahn . Both lines are initially run parallel to each other through the station and join to the east of the platforms after a slight left turn via a switch connection. This is secured by an exit signal for each of the tracks . However, both had only slip paths of 65 meters in length. In order for that to be sufficient, the entry speed into both tracks was limited to 40 km / h when the signal was signaled to “stop” . However, this was not monitored in the entry track from the Riedbahn by a train control . Originally, there were stump tracks as additional security, into which a train was diverted if it were to run over the signal showing "Halt". But they were removed in 1984.
the accident
May 9, 1996
The freight train 52272 came in the evening, shortly after 9:30 p.m., from the Riedbahn, the train 52272 from the Main-Neckar-Bahn, both from Mannheim . Train 52272 was pulled by the electric locomotive 151 033 , train 52272 by the locomotive 140 439 . The train from the Main-Neckar-Bahn was signaled “free travel” , the train from the Riedbahn at the distant signal “expect stop” and at the main signal “stop”. The engine driver braked the train and then said, when he recognized a main signal, that it was showing "clear travel". Since the two exit signals were in a slight left curve, however, he had inadvertently referred to himself the signal that was valid for the train from the Main-Neckar-Bahn, which showed "clear travel". It was only when the emergency braking system started at a speed of 58 km / h that he noticed his mistake. Since the slip path was only designed for 40 km / h, it came to flanking.
February 19, 1997
Shortly after midnight , the 52266 container train from Würzburg to Lübeck from the Main-Neckar-Bahn arrived at Frankfurt's Südbahnhof. It was pulled by locomotive 151 072. In parallel, the Kesselwagenzug 73541 with the locomotive ran from the Riedbahn Coming 150,026 from the Industrial Park one to Würzburg. The engine driver of the boiler train recognized the distant signal showing "Wait stop" and braked down to 40 km / h. As he drove into the train station, he perceived two main signals in the distance, one showing “stop”, the other “free travel” and the speedometer 70 km / h. He referred to the “drive free” signal and accelerated. As he drove past the platform, he could not see the signal because it was in the slight left curve and the view was obscured by the platform roof. When he had passed the platform roof, he noticed that the signal that was valid for him commanded “stop”. He braked immediately, but only came to a stop on the switch , as the slip path was only designed for 40 km / h.
The locomotive driver of the container train noticed at the parallel entrance that the tank car train was too fast to be able to stop in time. 166 meters in front of the switch, he triggered an emergency brake , but this was no longer sufficient to prevent the flanking run . The two locomotives derailed. Two tank cars caught fire. They carried 170 cubic meters of gasoline . The gasoline in the car ignited and burned with a 50 meter high stitch flame . The surrounding dense residential development barely escaped a catastrophe .
consequences
After the first accident
The property damage in this first accident was relatively minor. The railway classified the collision as a "dangerous event in railway operations". The signal systems worked perfectly and corresponded to the basic signaling plans. A signal repeater was installed to compensate for the obstructed visibility from the platform roof . The public prosecutor's office saw no reason to take action.
After the second accident
It was only this second accident that prompted Deutsche Bahn and the Federal Railway Authority to conduct a signal show and a reconstruction trip. It was confirmed that there was a considerable risk of confusion with the two exit signals. The Federal Railway Authority then prohibited parallel entry on both tracks.
The public prosecutor's office initiated an investigation, but there were no criminal proceedings - according to Erich Preuss also because they failed due to the confusing responsibility structures after the German rail reform . The reasons for hiring the train driver related to the fact that the exit signal was covered by the platform roof at the crucial moment when he could have braked in time.
It was agreed between the city of Frankfurt and the railway that in future dangerous goods transports will no longer be driven through the Frankfurt Südbahnhof.
literature
- Erich Preuss : Railway accidents at Deutsche Bahn. Causes - Background - Consequences. Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-613-71229-6 , pp. 93-100.
Remarks
- ↑ The collision took place “in accordance with the regulations”!
Individual evidence
- ↑ Erich Preuss, p. 93f.
- ↑ moest: Offenbach Gbf reactivated . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International 2/2019, p. 108.
Coordinates: 50 ° 6 ′ 2.7 ″ N , 8 ° 41 ′ 23.4 ″ E