Deutsche Bahn

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Deutsche Bahn AG

legal form Corporation
founding January 1, 1994
Seat Berlin , GermanyGermanyGermany 
Number of employees 323,944 (2019)
sales 44.4 billion euros (2019)
Branch Transport / logistics
As of December 31, 2019

The Deutsche Bahn AG (short DB AG , colloquially often DB or the railway ) is a federally owned railway company . The company is organized as a stock corporation and is wholly owned by the Federal Republic of Germany . There are around 600 affiliated companies under the umbrella of the DB Group , including several railway infrastructure companies and a number of railway companies . DB AG operates most of the German rail network as well as most of the rail traffic in Germany and is also internationally active in the transport and logistics sector. The DB AG was created in 1994 from the merger of the Deutsche Bundesbahn and the Deutsche Reichsbahn of the GDR .

BahnTower at night
The BahnTower in Berlin at Potsdamer Platz - the corporate headquarters of DB

The group is divided into a large number of companies, including DB Fernverkehr ( long-distance passenger transport), DB Regio ( local passenger transport) and DB Cargo ( rail freight transport ). The group subsidiary DB Netz also operates large parts of the German railway infrastructure and thus the largest rail network in Europe. The company generates around half of its total sales in rail transport. The other half of the operative business make up the further transport and logistics business as well as various service providers. The company generates part of its sales through transport contracts with the public sector ; The maintenance and expansion of the infrastructure are also subsidized. The group companies in passenger transport carried around 4.4 billion travelers with their trains and buses in 2016. In 2016, the DB logistics companies transported 277 million tons of goods by rail .

Group structure, organization


passenger traffic

The Passenger Transport division (brand name: DB Personenverkehr, previously DB Bahn ) is divided into the business units DB Long-Distance ( Long-Distance Passenger Transport ) , DB Regio ( Local Public Transport ) and DB Arriva ( Local Passenger Transport Abroad).

ICE 3 at the entrance to Cologne Central Station

In 2017, DB carried 142.2 million long-distance passengers. DB Fernverkehr AG carried the majority of this with its national and cross-border long-distance lines.

In transport , the company in 2017 yielded a transport capacity of more than 2.4 billion passengers, 55,306 million passenger kilometers were completed. The passengers contributed to 32 percent of the turnover in the regional business unit, around 67 percent of the money came from the federal states, which are responsible for local transport under the regionalization law.

Talent 2 traction vehicle as RE Dresden – Leipzig in the city of Leipzig

The former urban transport division was responsible for the S-Bahn in Berlin and Hamburg between 2005 and 2010 as well as for numerous bus companies, see Bahnbus (Germany) . In 2005, the two S-Bahn networks carried around 524.4 million passengers over a total distance of 5,104 million kilometers.

On January 1, 2011, the passenger transport department was restructured as part of the Arriva takeover. The DB Bahn Urban GmbH and DB Regio AG in joint business field DB Regio merged. Since then, national local passenger transport has been provided by the DB Regio business unit, DB Arriva's international activities.

In 2015 the brand structure of DB was changed, which is why the umbrella brand for passenger transport was renamed from DB Bahn to DB or DB Personenverkehr .

Transport and logistics

DB Cargo freight train
DB Cargo freight train

The Transport and Logistics division operated in the market with the DB Schenker Logistics and DB Schenker Rail business units, which were combined under the DB Schenker umbrella , as well as the Intermodal business unit, which operates in combined transport . In 2016, rail freight transport was separated from the logistics division and DB Schenker Rail was renamed DB Cargo .


The infrastructure department is divided into the business areas of network , passenger stations and energy .

DB Engineering & Consulting , which is responsible for construction supervision , construction management and maintenance, is also assigned to this department without being part of a business area.


Railway chief Richard Lutz, 2017


Board members are:

In 2020 there were some changes on the board of Deutsche Bahn. On the one hand, Sigrid Nikutta was appointed to the Executive Board on January 1, 2020. She took over the freight transport and logistics department from Alexander Doll . In addition, she takes on the operational management of the rail freight subsidiary DB Cargo . It is intended to rehabilitate the freight traffic, especially single wagon traffic , which has been problematic for years , and bring it into the black.

On February 1, Levin Holle was appointed Chief Financial Officer and Logistics Officer. Before that he worked as head of financial market policy in the Federal Ministry of Finance . He also succeeds Alexander Doll .

Supervisory board

Ten members are elected by the general meeting of shareholders , i.e. appointed by the sole shareholder (of the Federal Republic of Germany represented by the Ministry of Transport ). Ten other members are elected by the employees.

The chairman of the supervisory board is Michael Odenwald , his deputy Torsten Westphal (chairman of the railway and transport union EVG).

Further members of the supervisory board are:

Employee representatives

The approximately 230,000 employees (as of 2006) are divided among the business areas, sorted by board department

Advisory Boards

The railway advisory board was founded in 2002 , and a customer advisory board in 2004 .



The state railways of Europe, in Germany the Deutsche Bundesbahn and the Deutsche Reichsbahn, had to look back on a decade-long decline in the share of rail traffic in the early 1990s. At the same time, the further increase in vehicle traffic was predicted as a horror scenario. In this situation, politicians demanded that the railway must regain shares. The state monopolies of the state railways were viewed as inefficient. The official railways were not geared towards the growing international transport. Various national standards made operations even more difficult. The restructuring of the European railway market began with the EC Directive 91/440 / EEC passed in 1991. The railways should change from the authority to the company, the rail networks should also be open to competitors and competition between the railway companies , which were mathematically separated from the infrastructure companies, should take place.

Rail reform

In 1993, the Bundesbahn made losses of 7.9 billion euros in Germany alone. In addition, the Deutsche Reichsbahn had to be incorporated. In the first stage of the rail reform , the Federal Railroad was merged with the West Berlin VdeR and the Reichsbahn to form the Federal Railroad Fund . On January 1, 1994, the Federal Railway Authority took over the regulatory tasks. While the officials of the former Federal Railroad got the federal railway assets as employer, the entrepreneurial part was transferred to the Deutsche Bahn AG in January 1994. The newly created Deutsche Bahn AG should be able to act in a customer and market-oriented manner and generate profits.

The company's founding deed was signed on January 1, 1994 in a Berlin notary's office. On January 10, 1994, the merger of the two former German state railways was celebrated at Berlin's Ostbahnhof .

Along with the rationalization and modernization, Deutsche Bahn cut its staff. On January 1, 1996, local rail transport was regionalized . The states ordered transport services directly with federal funds because the tasks for local transport are transferred to the states. Further corporate divisions were newly created, the traction and plants division , which managed the locomotives, was dissolved on January 1, 1998, and numerous parts of the company were spun off. Finally, on January 1, 1999, in a legally prescribed second stage of the rail reform, the business areas for long-distance traffic, local traffic, freight traffic, railways and passenger stations were converted into joint stock companies, which was intended to increase transparency. As part of a third stage, it was planned for 2002 to dissolve the holding company, which holds everything together.

With the Hanover – Berlin high-speed line, the third new German railway line for high-speed traffic was opened on May 24, 1998. The travel times between Berlin and many West and South German destinations were shortened by around three quarters of an hour. On June 3, 1998, the Eschede railway accident occurred . 101 people died in the worst train accident in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In 2002 the company took back a majority stake in Schenker von Stinnes , which was spun off in 1991 . With the timetable change on December 15, 2002, numerous other changes came into force. A new price system was put into effect, while 45,000 employees in contact with customers received new uniforms. At the same time, seven Intercity Express lines were run on the new high-speed route Cologne – Rhine / Main . On August 1, 2003, after a decrease in the number of long-distance passengers by around ten percent, the price system was revised again. The Services division was founded at the beginning of July 2003 . The business units DB Energy , DB Fuhrpark , DB Services , DB Telematics and heavy vehicle maintenance were merged into it.

Even if Deutsche Bahn praised its successes on the occasion of its 10th anniversary, transport politicians came to a differentiated result. It was considered a success that the federal government only interferes with investments and infrastructure issues, but leaves the daily business to Deutsche Bahn. The Deutsche Bahn also got more and more competitors and the operative business ran without subsidies. However, the public sector paid around ten billion euros annually to order local transport and to maintain and expand the infrastructure. Freight and passenger traffic grew, but rail freight traffic lost shares and the percentage of traffic in passenger traffic rose only slightly despite the heavily subsidized local traffic. The aim of the rail reform of shifting more traffic to the rails was thus not achieved.

Recent developments

On December 12, 2004, the upgraded Berlin – Hamburg line went into operation at speeds of up to 230 km / h. This reduced the travel time on the 286 kilometers of rail to one and a half hours. In the following months, the number of passengers on this route rose sharply. Many new routes, such as the north-south long-distance railway tunnel (Tiergarten tunnel ), with a total of six new train stations ( Berlin Hauptbahnhof , Gesundbrunnen , Jungfernheide, Potsdamer Platz , Südkreuz , Lichterfelde Ost) were put into operation with the small timetable change in May 2006. The commissioning of the new Berlin railway junction as well as the upgraded Berlin – Halle / Leipzig line for 200 km / h and the high-speed line Nuremberg – Ingolstadt – Munich resulted in significantly reduced travel times on other routes. In December 2006 a new timetable came into effect. The Intercity-Express lines Munich - Nuremberg - Leipzig - Berlin - Hamburg and Munich - Nuremberg - Frankfurt - Cologne - ... have been running every hour since then. Between Nuremberg and Munich and between Frankfurt and Cologne an Intercity-Express every half hour was established, in Leipzig an hourly Intercity-Express connection to and from Dresden was created. The full commissioning of the Nuremberg – Ingolstadt – Munich high-speed line reduced many travel times to and from Munich by around half an hour. On the Franconia-Saxony main line , regional trains replaced the previously used intercity trains .

TGV POS and ICE 3M in Paris, 2012

From June 2007 to 2012, DB held a ten percent stake in the European rail company Thalys . On July 10, 2007, the jointly operated by Deutsche Bahn and SNCF began high-speed traffic between Frankfurt am Main (via Mannheim - Kaiserslautern - Saarbrücken ) with the Intercity Express and Munich (from December 9, 2007) and Stuttgart (via Karlsruhe - Strasbourg ) with the TGV POS to Paris .

In March 2010, Deutsche Bahn announced a public takeover offer valued at EUR 2.9 billion for the listed British transport company Arriva . The sale was completed on August 27, 2010. The European Commission had previously approved the takeover subject to certain conditions. In particular, Deutsche Bahn had to sell the Arriva Group's German business within a year . This took place in December 2010.

The company made a loss of 1.33 billion euros in 2015. According to a press report, the federal government wanted to provide DB with 2.4 billion euros in order to avert financial difficulties in the group and in return secure a stronger influence on the company. Initially, it was planned to raise equity by one billion euros from budget funds. The federal government should then forego dividends of 350 million euros per year for four years.

With the timetable change in December 2017, the new Ebensfeld – Erfurt line went into operation, and travel times on the axis between Berlin, Halle / Leipzig, Nuremberg and Munich were reduced by one to two hours.

As part of a “climate protection program” presented in September 2019, the federal government announced that it would invest one billion euros in equity in DB from 2020 to 2030. This should enable the company to invest additional capital.

ICE of the Velaro type near Angermund , North Rhine-Westphalia

In July 2020, at a joint press conference with Siemens Mobility, Deutsche Bahn announced the acquisition of 30 new high-speed trains based on the 407 series ICE that is already in operation . Together with the new ICE 4 vehicles, the number of which is to increase to 100 trains by 2026, DB wants to achieve a capacity of around 220,000 seats in long-distance transport .



Privatization plans

At the end of June 2006, DB's supervisory board issued a public statement in favor of an IPO of the company. In May 2008, the aim was to sell a proportion of the company's shares to private investors for autumn 2008; Initially, a maximum of 49.9% of the shares in Deutsche Bahn should be sold.

In the debate, five different models were essentially discussed, which were developed by a consortium of experts around the US company. Booz Allen Hamilton with regard to their effects on, among other things, possible privatization proceeds , effects on public budgets and competition in rail transport . The models discussed ranged from a sale of shares of the existing (vertical) integrated group up to a complete sale of privatized transport companies after the separation of the transport service and rail network - infrastructure .

In the further course of the discussion about the sale of the shares, the infrastructure area was removed from the intention to sell. To the then agreed to on 9 November 2006 coalition committee in principle on the part carried out capital - privatization of Deutsche Bahn AG, but without power and train stations. Only parts of the passenger transport, logistics and services divisions were then to be sold. For this purpose, these business areas were bundled in 2008 under the umbrella of the 100% subsidiary DB Mobility Logistics AG . At the end of 2008 - in view of or on the occasion of the financial crisis from 2007 onwards - the planned capital privatization was postponed indefinitely. In January 2011, the IPO was de facto completely canceled. In March 2011, railway boss Rüdiger Grube reaffirmed that an IPO was not an issue for the time being.

Opponents of rail privatization are of the opinion that, analogous to the development in Great Britain, line closures and deterioration in services would be the immediate consequences of privatization. The Alliance Rail for All argues z. For example, state subsidies for rail operations will not decrease even after privatization, but the need to save money for the purpose of raising funds for a dividend would lead to a deterioration in service . DB is assuming a dividend of 3 to 4 percent to be distributed. A study commissioned by the Federal Association of German Industry and the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry comes to the conclusion that after privatization, in order to meet the return expectations of investors , the railway would have to reduce network expansion and maintenance measures and / or have them financed by the federal government. The expected return can only be met if the state subsidizes accordingly . Subsidizing a privatized railway for the benefit of private investors is mentioned in the study as a problem for the political implementation of privatization.

Separation of network and operation

Work in a control center of DB in Duisburg

It is controversial whether the railway transport companies of the DB group (e.g. DB Regio , DB Fernverkehr ) should be completely separated from its railway infrastructure companies (e.g. DB Netz , DB Energie ).

The European Commission has, due to the lack of independence of DB Netz within the holding structure an infringement procedure initiated against the Federal Republic of Germany. The European Court of Justice dismissed the action in a judgment on February 28, 2013. According to the European Commission, there are indications that Deutsche Bahn is dictating the access conditions of competitors.

The Monopolies Commission recommended in a Special Report in September 2009 to manufacture by rapid privatization of the transport division of Deutsche Bahn, the independence of the infrastructure. This is the only way to create fair competitive conditions for the benefit of consumers.

In mid-November 2013, the European Commission announced that it would take the Federal Republic of Germany to the European Court of Justice for suspected unlawful aid .


The class 490 of the Hamburg S-Bahn

Digitization and autonomous driving

With Sabina Jeschke, Deutsche Bahn has had a board member for digitization since 2017 and, according to its own information, plans to operate parts of the network fully automatically by 2023 at the latest. However, experts and trade unions see this rather critically. DB Cargo has announced that it will make an autonomous shunting locomotive ready for series production by 2021 , which is currently being tested in Munich .

In September 2018, Deutsche Bahn also announced that it would be converting the route network across Germany as part of the “ Digital Rail Germany ” program . This is to be completely digitized by 2040 and equipped with digital interlockings and the train control system ETCS . This should avoid delays due to block sections that are too large and high route utilization. In addition, national barriers between the European rail networks are to be dismantled, thus strengthening freight traffic. The Federal Ministry of Transport under Minister Andreas Scheuer has promised DB that the federal government will support this project . The consulting firm McKinsey has estimated the costs at around 30 to 35 billion euros. One of the first projects being implemented is the partial retrofitting of the Hamburg and Stuttgart S-Bahns .

Agenda for a better railway

Due to the persistently poor punctuality in long-distance transport (70.4% in November 2018) as well as maintenance deficiencies and a negative development in rail freight transport at DB, the supervisory board and politicians, at the insistence of the public, demanded a concept from the rail board that should ensure improvements in the short and medium term. Rail boss Richard Lutz and the other members of the DB board then presented a “ five-point plan ” in a meeting with the BMVI on January 17, 2019 . This is to be carried out this year and provides, among other things, an increase in punctuality in long-distance transport to 76.5% (annual average), a strengthening of rail freight transport and investments in infrastructure supported by the federal government amounting to 11 billion euros.

In March 2019, the company also announced that it would record and publish traveler punctuality in long-distance transport , which also takes account of connection losses by travelers.

Group strategy "Strong Rail"

The agenda for a better railway , which was presented in January 2019, was followed by the new corporate strategy Strong Rail in June 2019 . It stipulated that DB intends to focus more on its core business, the railways and mobility services in Germany, in the coming years . At the same time, freight transport, local public transport with DB Regio and long-distance transport are to be strengthened and new customers won. The group wants to achieve this through massive investments in infrastructure as well as in personnel (100,000 new employees are planned in the coming years) and technology. At the same time, the German clock and the digitization of the existing network play a major role. The Federal Government and Transport Minister Andreas Scheuer have promised financial support, provided that concrete improvements can be seen quickly.

Key figures

Passenger transport performance of the railways in Germany as a percentage of total motorized traffic (source: Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure )

In Germany there are an average of 40,000 train journeys every day. Most of the trains are operated by DB's own 24 railway companies (see also table below ). The rail network Deutsche Bahn applies after the Swiss SBB -Netz, the Czech ČD -Netz and the Belgian (railway network as the fourth densest in Europe Vatican and Monaco not considered).

In 2018, 148 million passengers used DB's long-distance trains, and around 2 billion passengers in total passenger traffic. The share in long-distance traffic is expected to increase to consistently over 150 million in 2019.

According to the company's own calculations, 94.1 percent of all trains in DB's passenger traffic arrived at their destination on time in 2017. According to the definition of the company, arrival is considered to be on time if the arrival time according to the timetable is exceeded by less than 6 minutes. In 2018, 73 percent of long-distance trains were on time. The actual goal of 82 percent punctuality is not expected to be achieved until 2025. In 2017, 0.7 percent of the trains that started did not arrive at the destination station. 0.3 percent of the planned trains did not even leave. These trains are not included in the punctuality statistics.

The long-term credit rating of Deutsche Bahn is by the rating agency Standard & Poor's the rating AA- rated (as of the statement of December 2017).

Around 205,000 employees worked in Germany in 2018. At the end of 2018, there were around 319,000 employees worldwide. DB ranks 13th among the most popular employers in Germany.

As of December 31st 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 annotation
Group sales (in € billion ) 28.228 23.963 25.055 30.053 31.309 33,452 29,335 34,410 37.979 39.296 39.119 39.720 40.5 40.57 42.7 44 44.43
Group result (EBIT) (in € billion) 0.465 0.951 1.352 2,477 2,895 2.483 2.208 1.817 2.177 2.529 1.767 1,830 −0.154 1.461 1.688 2.111 1,837
Consolidated balance sheet total (€ billion) 47,647 46.348 47.101 48,440 48,529 48.193 47,303 52.003 51.791 52.525 52.894 55.883 56.059 56,324 56,436 58,527 65.828
Employee 242,759 225,512 216,389 229,200 237.078 240.242 239,828 276.310 285,319 287.508 295,653 295.763 297.202 306,368 310.935 318,528 323,944 Full-time, TZ proportionately included
Railway stations and stops 5,665 5,697 5,707 5,730 5,699 5,718 5,707 5,700 5,685 5,645 5,668 5,676 k. A. k. A. k. A. k. A. 5,679
Company's own rail network (km) 35,593 34,718 34,211 34,122 33,978 33,862 33,721 33,723 33,576 33.505 33,448 33,426 33.193 33.241 33,348 33,299 33,423 almost the entire main railway network in Germany
Passenger transport service :
Travelers (billion) ≈ 1.682 ≈ 1.695 ≈ 1.785 1,854 ≈ 1.835 1.919 1.908 1,950 1.981 2.035 2.235 2.254 2.251 2,365 2.564 2.581 2.603 Rail transport only, from 2008 including international business
Passenger kilometers (billions) 69.534 70.260 72.554 74.788 74.792 77.791 76.772 78,582 79.228 88.433 88.746 88.407 88.636 94.698 95.854 97.707 98,402 from 2008 including international business
Transport performance freight :
Freight transport (million tons) 282.3 283.6 266.5 307.6 312.8 378.7 341.0 415.4 411.6 398.7 390.1 329.1 300.2 277.4 271.0 255.5 232
Tonne kilometers (billions) 79.864 83.982 83.111 96,388 98.794 113.634 93.948 105.794 111.980 105.894 104.259 102.871 98.445 94.698 92.651 88.237 85.005
Operations management on the DB rail network ( DB Netz AG ):
Train-path kilometers trains of the DB Group (million) 917.8 912.7 887.7 888 902 881 832.6 839 832 808 788 784 751 733 728 737 767.3 DB Group (all train types )
Train-path kilometers from external companies (million) 70.4 88 110 128 147 162 170.4 195 219 231 247 260 290 321 331 349 368.3 NBE
Total train-path kilometers (billion) 0.988 ≈ 1.001 ≈ 0.978 1.016 1.049 1.043 1.003 1.034 1.051 1.039 1.035 1.044 1.041 1.054 1.059 1.086 1.090 DB + NBE

As of November 30, 2007, Deutsche Bahn had a total of 42,935 civil servants and 3,696 civil servants on leave. Based on the current working limit of 65 years, the number is expected to drop to around 42,000 by 2015, to around 15,500 by 2025 and to around 1,600 by 2035. From 2041, with a limit of 65 years, there will be no more civil servants at DB AG. The company pays the federal railway assets for the officials subordinate to it the expenses that would be incurred for comparable employees. In 2006, the company spent a total of 1.537 billion euros on this. Access to the civil service career of the former Deutsche Bundesbahn had already been closed in 1992. The company anticipated an increase in the average age of employees to over 50 by 2015.

Since 2011, the company has distributed a dividend of 500 million euros to the federal government as the sole owner. A dividend of 525 million euros was paid out in 2012, 200 million euros in 2013, 700 million euros in 2014 and 850 million euros each in 2015 and 2016. From 2017, the railway reduced the dividend payment to 600 million euros. The dividend has been flowing back to the company in full for several years. The "rail dividend" is paid in the course of the rail financing cycle.

Between 1994 and 2018, more than 5,400 kilometers of the DB route network were shut down. According to statistics from the Federal Railway Authority and the figures from the annual reports, however, this trend is declining.

Financial consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic , DB made around 3.7 billion euros in losses in the first half of 2020 and, according to Deutsche Bahn boss Lutz, is at the beginning of the worst financial crisis in the company's history. Decisive for the record loss are above all the collapsed passenger numbers at DB Fernverkehr and the billions in depreciation at the foreign subsidiary Arriva . But the losses of other subsidiaries such as DB Regio (around 600 million euros) and DB Cargo (around 350 million euros) also have an impact.

As a result, people from politics and business again called for a structural reorganization of the DB Group and accused the railway of having done poorly even before the Corona crisis. They therefore also criticized the lump-sum billion aid that Andreas Scheuer promised DB to alleviate the economic consequences of the corona.


Data affair

In January 2009, Deutsche Bahn hit the headlines because of a scandal in the area of employee monitoring because it had repeatedly compared master data of its employees (including addresses, telephone numbers and bank details) with other databases. In the further course, cases became known in which bank accounts, private contacts and other personal information were obtained and evaluated.

For example, video recordings of gas stations that employees were driving to were obtained.

In at least nine cases, the Berlin research service Network Deutschland GmbH was commissioned to review employees, their spouses, suppliers and other contractual partners. The company was also asked at least twice by the Transnet union to compare the membership and employee files in order to verify that contributions were paid correctly.

According to research by Günter Wallraff , employee data were also manipulated in several cases. These manipulations were then used, among other things, to resign critics of CEO Hartmut Mehdorn and to privatize capital.

In order to clear up the data affair, the Supervisory Board appointed the lawyers Herta Däubler-Gmelin and Gerhart Baum as special investigators in March 2009 . On March 30, 2009, Hartmut Mehdorn offered his resignation at the annual press conference in Berlin, which was accepted with effect from April 30, 2009.

In the special meeting of the supervisory board on May 13, 2009, it was finally decided to leave the board members Bensel , Hansen (health-related), Suckale and Wiesheu on May 31. The railway waived claims for damages against the responsible board members, but offered them termination agreements, which resulted in severance payments in the millions. In addition, the heads of corporate auditing, corporate security and compliance left the company (Josef Bähr, Jens Puls and Wolfgang Schaupensteiner).

At the end of May 2009 it became known that Wolfgang Schaupensteiner had destroyed data to cover up the data affair in January 2009.

In the 75-page final report from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) dated August 7, 2009, in which the corporate governance was reviewed between 1995 and February 2009, PwC announced that the fault of the board of directors could "not be established", so that a lawsuit could "not be filed recommend". In May 2011 it was announced that, according to a secret report from March 2009, in which the head of internal auditing at Deutsche Bahn had been questioned by two special investigators from KPMG , “Mehdorn and other top managers about the snooping and illegal e-mail surveillance knew and played an active role ”.

The new CEO Grube emphasized in May 2009 that he was looking for a fresh start. For example, the creation of new board departments for compliance, data protection and law made data protection more important. The fine of 1.1 million euros imposed in October 2009 by the Berlin data protection officer Alexander Dix for several violations of the Federal Data Protection Act in the amount of 1.1 million euros was accepted by DB.

Deutsche Bahn lost 45 million euros, 18.5 million euros alone for the investigation and as a fine, and another 26.5 million euros for the severance payments for top managers.

In the course of the investigation of the data affair, Lobbycontrol also uncovered at the end of May 2009 that the company had spent 1.3 million euros to covertly place positive contributions in the media, in particular on the planned IPO. As a result, the chief representative for communication and marketing of Deutsche Bahn, Ralf Klein-Bölting, was dismissed on May 29, 2009 by the CEO. The covert PR was carried out by the Berlinpolis company , which was commissioned by Deutsche Bahn through its parent company EPPA.

Claims for compensation

As the direct successor to the two Deutsche Reichsbahnen ( Deutsche Reichsbahn (1920–1945) and Deutsche Reichsbahn (1945–1993) ), Deutsche Bahn AG has been increasingly confronted with claims for compensation since 2014. With the support of the Train of Remembrance Initiative , the Jewish community of Thessaloniki is demanding compensation payments for the 58,000 deported Greek Jews who were transported to the concentration camps with the help of the Deutsche Reichsbahn . The prisoners themselves had to bear the transport costs of the prisoners to their death.

The Union of Victims' Associations of Communist Tyranny is demanding appropriate compensation for former slave laborers in the GDR .

Negative prices

The locked oyster , the negative prize of the journalists' association Netzwerk Recherche for particularly restrictive public relations , went to Deutsche Bahn in 2006. In October 2007, Deutsche Bahn received the negative Big Brother Award in the “Economy” category. Criticisms included the trend to force non-anonymous payment methods when selling tickets, as well as the unnecessary collection of photos and dates of birth from BahnCard customers.

In the same year, Hartmut Mehdorn, the then chairman of the board of management of Deutsche Bahn, was also awarded the minus title “ Sprachpanscher des Jahres ” by the German Language Association because of the frequent use of unnecessary Anglicisms throughout the group at that time . Thereupon the DB tried to avoid this at least apart from the already established brands.


The journalists Mark Spörrle and Lutz Schumacher deal with absurdities and grievances at Deutsche Bahn in a satirical way in the book series "enken ju vor träwelling " . The song Deutsche Bahn by the a cappella group Wise Guys also makes ironic references to everyday problems such as delays, technical problems and the situation on the trains.

See also


  • Heiner Monheim , Klaus Nagorni (Hrsg.): The future of the railway: Between closeness to the citizens and going public. Evangelical Academy Baden, Karlsruhe 2004, ISBN 3-89674-119-5 .
  • Erich Preuß : The broken railway: 1990-2000 - facts, legends, backgrounds. transpress, Stuttgart 2001, ISBN 3-613-71154-0 .
  • Erich Preuss: Railway in transition: facts - backgrounds - consequences. transpress, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-613-71244-X .
  • Christian Esser , Astrid Randerath : Black Book Deutsche Bahn - The explosive truth about the machinations of Deutsche Bahn. Bertelsmann, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-570-10036-3 .
  • Tim Engartner : The privatization of Deutsche Bahn. About the implementation of market-oriented transport policy. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2008, ISBN 978-3-531-15796-2 . (At the same time: Cologne, University, dissertation, 2007).
  • Arno Luik : Damage to the overhead line: The planned disaster of the Deutsche Bahn , Westend, Frankfurt / M., 2019, ISBN 978-3-86489267-7

Web links

Commons : Deutsche Bahn  album with pictures, videos and audio files
 Wikinews: Deutsche Bahn  - in the news

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Claudia Panke: Management of the consequences of privatization in the personnel area using the example of Deutsche Bahn AG. ISBN 3-428-11709-3 , p. 60.
  2. report. Retrieved May 17, 2020 .
  3. n-tv NEWS: Bahn paid too much to its own subsidiary. Retrieved July 28, 2020 .
  4. a b Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Deutsche Bahn Facts & Figures 2016 . March 2017 ( PDF file [accessed March 26, 2017]). PDF file ( Memento from March 26, 2017 in the Internet Archive )
  5. Deutsche Bahn AG: Annual Report 2017. p. 103.
  6. Deutsche Bahn AG: Annual Report 2017 p. 303.
  7. DB press release 074/2010
  8. ^ DB Regio AG: Annual Report 2005 ( Memento from September 30, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 1.9 MB) , April 2006.
  9. ↑ A story with a future , accessed on December 2, 2019
  10. BVG boss Nikutta takes on a double function at the railway. Retrieved February 5, 2020 .
  11. ↑ Head of Finance and Logistics | Deutsche Bahn AG. Retrieved on February 5, 2020 (German).
  12. a b Transport in Figures 2015. DVV / BMVI, archived from the original on December 23, 2015 ; Retrieved December 19, 2015 .
  13. Supervisory Board of DB AG | Deutsche Bahn AG. Retrieved July 16, 2020 .
  14. Compensation: It’s crazy what the train has to pay for delays. Retrieved March 12, 2019 .
  15. Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Deutsche Bahn reports 70 million more passengers and 10 percent more performance in freight transport for 2006 . Press release from February 2, 2007.
  16. ^ Nikolaus Doll: Deutsche Bahn is afraid of spitting mothers and pensioners . April 25, 2016 ( [accessed March 12, 2019]).
  17. Federal Association of German Industry, German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (client): Privatization of the integrated Deutsche Bahn AG - Effects and alternatives ( Memento of May 16, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 7.5 MB) , January 2006, p. 51f.
  18. a b Cheered anyway , Die Zeit, Hamburg, January 8, 2004, No. 3
  19. ^ Die Bahnreform ( Memento of March 3, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) , Federal Railway Assets, December 16, 2005, accessed on May 18, 2007.
  20. Full steam ahead. In: DB Welt , March 2010 edition, p. 3.
  21. Schell (2009), p. 137 f.
  22. Schell (2009), p. 150.
  23. Erich Preuss: The broken path. transpress, Stuttgart 2001, ISBN 3-613-71154-0 , p. 72ff.
  24. Booz Allen Hamilton: Privatization variants of the Deutsche Bahn AG "with and without network" . January 2006, p. 57.
  25. ^ Announcement New DB division. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 10/2003, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 428.
  26. Deutsche Bahn, Arriva purchase for 2.9 billion euros sealed. Retrieved August 27, 2010 .
  27. Bidding race for Arriva business in Germany . In: Die Welt , August 12, 2010.
  28. DB sells Arriva Deutschland Group ( Memento from January 11, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Deutsche Bahn, December 8, 2010, accessed on December 8, 2010.
  29. Nikolaus Doll: No matter what the railway boss does - it's all of no use . In: The world . October 20, 2016, ISSN  0173-8437 ( online ).
  30. Key points for the climate protection program 2030. (PDF) September 20, 2019, p. 11 , accessed on September 20, 2019 (German, "Version according to the Climate Cabinet").
  31. manager magazin: Deutsche Bahn awards billions in contracts to Siemens - manager magazin - company . ( [accessed on July 16, 2020]).
  32. Report of the DB Supervisory Board for an IPO. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . Issue 8–9 / 2006, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 378.
  33. DDP: Bahn is preparing for IPO in autumn , May 15, 2008, accessed on May 15, 2008.
  34. Financial crisis stops Deutsche Bahn going public on January 14, 2008.
  35. ^ IPO on Saint Never's Day ( memento of February 8, 2013 in the Internet Archive ), January 19, 2011.
  37. ^ Resistance in the Länder against privatization , Focus Online, September 25, 2007.
  38. ^ Rail for everyone: 12 arguments against going public .
  39. ^ Bahn gegen Volksaktien-Modell , Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 13, 2007.
  40. Privatization of the integrated Deutsche Bahn AG - effects and alternatives ( Memento of May 16, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 7.5 MB), Berlin, 2006, pp. 20-21.
  41. Case C-556/10
  42. Thomas Ludwig: Grube's powerful opponent. In: Handelsblatt . No. 240, 2012, ISSN  0017-7296 , p. 6.
  43. Monopolies Commission presents a special report on the competitive situation on the railway markets ( Memento of March 4, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 227 kB). Press release of the Monopolies Commission of September 21, 2009.
  44. Subsidies: EU is suing Germany for rail and post . Spiegel online , November 20, 2013.
  45. Nikolaus Doll: The driverless age of trains does not begin in Germany. In: WORLD online. September 12, 2018, accessed April 1, 2019 .
  46. Philipp Seibt: How the German rail network should become digital. In: SPIEGEL online. September 19, 2018, accessed January 4, 2019 .
  47. Deutsche Bahn: Five-Point Plan for 2019 | Deutsche Bahn AG. Retrieved January 17, 2019 .
  48. Meeting at the Ministry of Transport: Deutsche Bahn agrees package for more punctuality . ISSN  0174-4909 ( [accessed January 17, 2019]).
  49. Deutsche Bahn measures passenger punctuality. In: train travel blog. March 11, 2019, accessed March 16, 2019 .
  50. strategy. Retrieved July 3, 2019 .
  51. "Strong Rail" and "Deutschlandtakt": The railway wants to get better. Retrieved July 3, 2019 .
  52. BPK | Deutsche Bahn AG. Retrieved on March 28, 2019 (German).
  53. 2016  ( page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved November 30, 2016.@1@ 2Template: Dead Link /  
  56. Internet site of the DB Archivlink ( Memento from January 11, 2016 in the Internet Archive ). Retrieved March 7, 2015.
  57. FVW Medien GmbH: Big premium: Deutsche Bahn wants to hire 24,000 employees. November 15, 2018, accessed August 25, 2020 .
  58. a b At a glance . In: Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Integrated Annual Report 2018 . March 28, 2019, p. 282 ( [PDF]).
  59. Key figures . In: Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Annual Report 2003 . 2003.
  60. ↑ Key performance indicators . In: Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Data and facts 2004 . Berlin 2004, p. 10 .
  61. At a glance . In: Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Annual Report 2005 . Berlin 2005.
  62. At a glance . In: Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Annual Report 2006 . Berlin 2006.
  63. Profit and Loss Account; Multi-year overviews . In: Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Facts and Figures 2007 . S. 30 to 33 .
  64. At a glance . In: Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Annual Report 2008 . Berlin 2008.
  65. See DB Mobility Logistics AG, Facts & Figures 2009. (PDF; 664 kB) December 31, 2009, archived from the original on January 30, 2012 ; Retrieved August 28, 2010 .
  66. Annual Report 2010. (PDF; 7.8 MB) Deutsche Bahn AG, archived from the original on May 18, 2013 ; Retrieved April 25, 2012 .
  67. See Deutsche Bahn AG, Data & Facts 2011. (PDF; 894 kB) Archived from the original on April 25, 2012 ; Retrieved July 30, 2012 .
  68. Annual Report 2012 - 10-year overview. (PDF; 160 kB) Deutsche Bahn AG, archived from the original on May 18, 2013 ; Retrieved March 22, 2013 .
  69. a b Annual Report 2013 (PDF; 15.7 MB) Deutsche Bahn AG, accessed on May 20, 2015 .
  70. Annual Report 2014. (PDF; 24.5 MB) Deutsche Bahn AG, archived from the original on January 11, 2016 ; accessed on July 27, 2015 .
  71. Deutsche Bahn Facts and Figures 2015. (PDF) Retrieved on May 28, 2018 .
  72. a b Deutsche Bahn Facts & Figures 2017. (PDF) Retrieved on May 28, 2018 .
  73. a b Integrated Report Deutsche Bahn 2017. (PDF) Retrieved on June 20, 2017 .
  74. Selected key figures . In: Deutsche Bahn AG, Group Management (Ed.): Integrated Report 2019 . Berlin April 2020.
  75. Deutsche Bahn - EBIT until 2017 | Statistics. Retrieved January 8, 2019 .
  76. a b Developments in the 2015 financial year . In: DB Netz (Ed.): Annual Report 2015 . Frankfurt am Main 2015.
  77. a b c d DB Netz AG - Annual Report 2017 (PDF) Retrieved on January 8, 2019 .
  78. ↑ Key performance indicators . In: Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Annual Report DB Netz AG 2018 . June 2019 ( [PDF]).
  79. BT-Drs. 16/7653 Answer of the federal government to the small question of the MPs Horst Friedrich (Bayreuth), Patrick Döring, Joachim Günther (Plauen), other MPs and the parliamentary group of the FDP (PDF; 76 kB).
  80. Manfred Schell: The locomotive pulls the train . Rotbuch publishing house. Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-86789-059-5 , p. 153.
  81. Staying fit at work made easy. In: DB Welt , April 2009 edition, p. 17.
  82. Without a source
  83. ^ Ministry of Transport: Federal government demands a dividend of 700 million euros from the railway . In: Spiegel Online . May 14, 2014 ( [accessed January 12, 2018]).
  84. Balance sheet: Deutsche Bahn makes a loss of 1.3 billion euros . In: The time . March 16, 2016, ISSN  0044-2070 ( [accessed January 12, 2018]).
  85. Deutsche Bahn: Taxpayers must save rail with billions . September 21, 2016 ( [accessed January 12, 2018]).
  86. Since 1994 more than 5400 route kilometers by Deutsche Bahn shut down. December 29, 2018, accessed December 29, 2018 .
  87. EBA - Lists and statistics on line closures. Retrieved January 8, 2019 .
  88. DB presents half-year figures for 2020 - DB wants to grow again with record investments after the Corona crisis | Deutsche Bahn AG. Accessed July 30, 2020 .
  89. manager magazin: Deutsche Bahn is heading towards a loss of billions - manager magazin - company. Accessed July 30, 2020 .
  90. Deutsche Bahn lost billions - not just because of Corona. Accessed July 30, 2020 .
  91. Computer manipulation at the railway - comprehensive surveillance ( Memento from April 26th 2009 in the Internet Archive ). In: Frankfurter Rundschau, April 23, 2009 (Internet Archive Way Back Machine of April 26, 2009).
  92. Alexander Dix (Berlin State Data Protection Officer): Interview with Deutsche Bahn AG about the company's business relationships with Network Deutschland GmbH on October 28, 2008; published on the websites and (PDF; 56 kB) Accessed February 8, 2009 .
  93. Kevin P. Hoffmann: Transnet union asked Bahn for data synchronization . In: Tagesspiegel, May 17, 2009 .
  94. ^ Günter Wallraff: In Mehdorn's service . In: Die Zeit, No. 18 of April 23, 2009 .
  95. ^ N. Doll and O. Haustein-Teßmer: Sawn-off railway managers take severance payments with them . MONEY FOR EX-EXECUTIVES. In: Die Welt , May 13, 2009 .
  96. All are innocent . In: Junge Welt, May 17, 2009.
  97. M. Bauchmüller: Ex-senior public prosecutor hushed up data affair . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 28, 2009 .
  98. a b Stuttgarter Zeitung ( online )
  99. Deutsche Bahn AG: DB draws conclusions from data misuse / Pit: "New beginning in corporate culture" . Press release from May 13, 2009.
  100. Carsten Brönstrup: Snooping costs 1.1 million euros in: Der Tagesspiegel from October 24, 2009.
  101. LobbyControl: Short study: The hidden influence of Deutsche Bahn for the privatization of the railways and against the GDL strike: .pdf
  102. Bahn paid millions for deception . In: Handelsblatt, May 29, 2009.
  103. ^ Deutsche Bahn again in the twilight ( Memento from May 31, 2009 in the Internet Archive )., May 29, 2009.
  104. ^ Bahnchef Grube fires another top manager ( Memento from June 2, 2013 in the Internet Archive ). In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , May 29, 2009.
  105. LobbyControl: Berlinpolis denies - but not the core: the involvement in the PR affair of Deutsche Bahn AG . Retrieved June 17, 2009.
  106. ^ [1] Tickets in the Tod-Jüdische Allgemeine.
  107. [2] Forced labor: GDR victims' associations demand compensation from Bahn
  108. Laudation on the presentation of the Big Brother Award 2007
  109. - Hartmut Mehdorn-ist Sprachpanscher 2007 ( Memento from September 25, 2016 in the Internet Archive )
  110. Less Anglicisms at Deutsche Bahn Bahn speaks German instead of German. Süddeutsche Zeitung GmbH, June 24, 2016, accessed on September 26, 2016 .
  111. Nikolaus Doll: Language terminator Ramsauer combats "Railway English". WeltN24 GmbH, October 6, 2015, accessed on September 26, 2016 .