Saudia Flight 162

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Saudia Flight 162
Lockheed L-1011-385-1-15 TriStar 200, Saudia - Saudi Arabian Airlines AN0692212.jpg

The affected aircraft on August 17, 1980
Accident summary
Accident type Structural failure
place Over the Gulf of Bahrain
date December 23, 1980
Fatalities 2
Survivors 289
Injured 20th
Aircraft
Aircraft type Lockheed L-1011 TriStar 200
operator Saudia
Mark HZ-AHJ
Departure airport Jeddah
Stopover Dhahran International Airport
Destination airport Karachi / Jinnah International Airport
Passengers 271
crew 20th
Lists of aviation accidents

On December 23, 1980 there was an incident on a Lockheed L-1011 TriStar on the international scheduled flight Saudia Flight 162 from Jeddah via Dhahran to Karachi , in which two of the 291 occupants died and the aircraft was badly damaged.

Just four months earlier, another Lockheed L-1011 Tristar 200 ( Saudia Flight 163 ) had burned out after an emergency landing due to an on-board fire at Riyadh Airport , killing all 301 occupants.

course

The plane took off from Jeddah at 10:30 p.m. local time and landed in Dhahran at 12:29 a.m. without incident. The aircraft was refueled there. In addition, 60 passengers got off the plane and 87 were added. At 01:51 a.m., the aircraft took off from runway 34L with the clearance to fly on route Amber 1 and climb to 33,000  ft. (10,050  m ). The estimated flight time was one hour and 52 minutes. At 2:12 a.m., an explosive decompression occurred while climbing 29,000 ft (8,840 m) above the international waters of the Gulf of Bahrain , creating a hole about 1 m long and 45 cm wide in the cabin floor through which a 14 year old girl and a 1½ year old boy were ripped off the plane. Their bodies were not found. Debris shot through the cabin , including metal parts and tire rubber parts, injuring several passengers. There was also a loss of fluid in the hydraulic systems  A and B, which is why the associated warning light came on, as well as the failure of the power generator of engine no.2 (tail engine) and a warning via the left main landing gear flap after it was torn off. The oxygen masks were deployed manually and the flight captain took control, whereupon he initiated an emergency descent and decided to make an emergency landing at Doha Airport . Air traffic control in Bahrain handed control over to air traffic control in Doha, which gave the TriStar pilots clearance to land on runway 34. When the flap lever was set to 4 °, the flaps did not extend and the pilot reported that he had to turn the ailerons to the left in order to keep the aircraft in level flight on a stable course . He decided to land without the flaps extended and dumped 16 tons of fuel to reduce the aircraft mass for the landing. Meanwhile, the cabin crew held the passengers calm and demonstrated the brace position to them . During the approach , the landing gear was extended in the normal manner and the aircraft landed at 02:48, using full braking force to stop the aircraft. The captain then steered the aircraft over a taxiway onto the apron , where he switched off engines No. 1 (left) and No. 3 (right). The aircraft doors L-1 and L-2 were opened without the emergency slides being inflated because the required energy from the generator of engine no. 2 was not available. The auxiliary engine started by the flight engineer could not be connected to the busbar . Finally, the aircraft was evacuated via the approaching stairs. Five passengers who were slightly injured were rushed to hospital for examination and treatment and were later released. After the incident, the plane was repaired.

Accident investigation

Both the Fairchild A-100 voice recorder and the Lockheed 209E flight data recorder did not work properly despite being in good condition, with the former only recording calls after landing and the latter recording incorrect data. The accident was investigated by the NTSB . The investigation revealed that a tire had failed, as did its P / N 3-1311-3 rim. The thickness of the flange made by the B. F. Goodrich Company was approximately 1.17 cm , which met the requirements for rims made before June 24, 1975 but not for those made since: rims made after were manufactured on June 24, 1975, had to have a flange thickness of approx. 1.24 to 1.40 cm and were assigned to type P / N 3-1365, the so-called "improved wheels". The NTSB found that domestic airlines who defended the Lockheed TriStar, a number of material fatigue-related failure of rims of the type P / N 3-1311-3, the "unimproved wheels", had reported. For example, there were 8 cases of failure of the “unimproved wheels” at Air Canada , 30 at Trans World Airlines and 56 at Eastern Air Lines . Pan American World Airways , which had only used "improved wheels", had reported no problems in this regard. Saudia also had several such incidents with the "unimproved wheels", but none with the "improved wheels". During the investigation, evidence was found that a fatigue crack formed in the failing rim, which was not discovered despite established procedures. Finally, while rolling to the runway in Dhahran, two parts of the rim tore off. During the climb, a pressure difference built up due to the tire pressure, so that the remaining rim parts failed due to the resulting forces, whereby the tire bead pressed against the jagged part of the rim flange. As a result, the tire burst and the gas escaped explosively, whereupon one part of the rim shot through the pressure bulkhead, damaging the hydraulic system, and another into the cabin, causing part of the cabin floor to shoot into the ceiling and the controls for the landing flaps and damaged the ailerons. In addition, the electrical systems were badly damaged.

Security Recommendations

The NTSB issued the following five safety recommendations to the FAA on January 6, 1981 :

  • 1. The airworthiness directive to all operators of the Lockheed TriStar to measure the flange thickness of all rims of type P / N 3-1365 with a serial number up to 1404 at the next tire change or within 20 cycles, which are used on aircraft with a maximum take-off mass of 195 t or more were used, combined with the requirement to remove all rims with an outer flange thickness of less than 1.245 cm for aircraft with a maximum take-off mass of 195 t or more (was accepted).
  • 2. The initiation of an investigation of parts manufactured by BF Goodrich by a quality assurance review group or the assurance of the compliance of the manufacturer with the current regulatory requirements for production certification and specifically the issuing and approval of "service bulletins", investigations and incident reports , Maintaining proper manufacturing and inspection records, and coordinating incidents with primary airframe manufacturers (accepted).
  • 3. The request to all tire, rim and airframe manufacturers to publish and disseminate all technical data to all operators in order to determine the effect on the material fatigue of the aircraft rims by increasing or decreasing the internal tire pressure (was rejected).
  • 4. Establishing a program with airlines, rim and airframe manufacturers to find effective non-destructive inspection techniques for all combinations between aircraft and rims, and encouraging operators to run effective inspection programs (rejected).
  • 5. Prompt dissemination of all required rim inspections and performance programs to all foreign civil aviation agencies with regulatory responsibility for operators of aircraft and equipment manufactured in the USA (was accepted).

swell

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Flight accident data and report HZ-AHK in the Aviation Safety Network (English), accessed on November 1, 2017.

Coordinates: 24 ° 15 ′ 0 ″  N , 50 ° 33 ′ 0 ″  E