American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade

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The articles Bombardment of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade overlap thematically. Help me to better differentiate or merge the articles (→  instructions ) . To do this, take part in the relevant redundancy discussion . Please remove this module only after the redundancy has been completely processed and do not forget to include the relevant entry on the redundancy discussion page{{ Done | 1 = ~~~~}}to mark. Old language friend ; 18:40, Apr 24, 2018 (CEST)


On 7 May 1999, during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia , met five US JDAM -gelenkte bombs the Embassy of the PRC in the district of Novi Beograd in Belgrade . The attack killed three Chinese reporters and outraged the Chinese public. The US said the intention was to bomb the nearby Yugoslav Supply and Procurement Directorate. President Bill Clinton later apologized for the bombing, declaring it an accident. CIA Director George Tenet testified before a congressional committee that the bombing was the only bombing carried out by his organization during this campaign and that the CIA had the wrong coordinates for a Yugoslav military target on the same street. The Chinese government released a statement on the day of the bombing calling it a "barbaric act".

Sequence of events

In the days before the bombardment, an attack folder marked "Belgrade Warehouse 1" was circulating in order to be approved by the command. The folder came from the CIA and described the target as a warehouse for a Yugoslav government agency that was suspected of being used as an arms store. That is why the attack was approved by President Bill Clinton .

It is unclear whether other NATO leaders also approved the attack. A post-war report by the French Defense Ministry stated that some of the US military operations had been carried out outside the strict framework of NATO and that a dual structure existed. NATO had no authority over the B-2 stealth bombers that carried out the attack.

According to the CIA, the target was checked against a “non-attack” table, but no alarm was triggered; these are lists of protected buildings such as schools, hospitals and religious places. The later investigation reported some interviews with NATO and US officers who found the embassy in the database at its correct location the day after.

The attack was carried out by United States Air Force bombers from the 509th Bomb Wing directly from Whiteman Air Force Base , Missouri , on the night of May 7-8 . The bombers were armed with JDAM-GPS-guided bombs, but the programmed coordinates were those of the Chinese embassy 440 meters away. At midnight local time, five bombs hit the south end of the embassy almost simultaneously. The embassy had taken precautionary measures because of the ongoing bombing of Belgrade and sent the workforce home or quartered in the basement, but the attack still claimed three victims, Shao Yunhuan (邵云环), Xu Xinghu (许杏虎) and his wife, Zhu Ying (朱颖), as well as twenty injured.

Chinese reactions

The attack dramatically increased tensions between the US and China. An official statement by Chinese state television called it a "barbaric attack and a gross violation of Chinese sovereignty". China's UN ambassador described "NATO's barbaric act" as "a gross violation of the UN charter, international law and the governance of international relations" and "a violation of the Geneva Conventions". President Clinton telephoned his Chinese equivalent, Jiang Zemin .

On May 12, the American flags were hoisted at half-mast on Chinese territory to mourn the victims. The photo shows the flag of the American consulate in Hong Kong. "The lives of those who were killed or injured were only marginal in contrast to the escalating tension between the two powers," reported a study of diplomatic exchanges regarding the affair. "The apologies demanded by the Chinese government and any regrets brought by the American government were only marginal, at best pro-forma."

Large demonstrations took place in front of embassies and consulates of the USA and other NATO countries in China as a result of the bombing reports. On May 9, 1999, Vice President Hu Jintao condemned NATO's “barbaric” and “criminal leadership” in a national televised address, which “has inflamed the anger of the Chinese people”. He said the unauthorized demonstrations in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Shenyang reflected anger and patriotism. The Chinese government supported this but pressed against the extreme and illegal implementation.

The protests lasted for several days, during which time thousands of stone-throwing demonstrators "trapped" US Ambassador James Sasser and other staff in the embassy. The US consul's home in Chengdu was set on fire and protesters attempted to burn down the consulate in Guangzhou. There are no reported casualties.

"During the first day and a half of the crisis, many of our colleagues, especially those in the Chancery and at some of the Consulates, were in significant danger. Though US Marines protected the Chancery from direct assault, officers on the spot engaged in a full-scale destruction of classified materials that might fall into the hands of demonstrators should the Embassy be overrun. In hindsight, it appears the danger was never that close, but several Chinese did jump the compound wall and had to be confronted by Marines in full battle gear before they were persuaded to jump back over the wall. Except for Shanghai, with its own Marine Guard contingent, the other Consulates were protected only by Chinese security guards. In Chengdu those guards were of virtually no help. Demonstrators climbed the compound wall, set fire to the Consul's residence, and smashed their way through the outer door of the Consulate. They were using a bike rack to try to crash into the interior - while screaming that they were going to exact vengeance - when city security forces finally arrived and routed them. Our colleagues were understandably terrified through this ordeal. They were frantically calling the Embassy and local contacts, and getting increasingly agitated by the slow, almost grudging response of the Chengdu authorities. "

- Paul Blackburn, Foreign Service Officer : The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.

“During the first day and half of the crisis, many of our colleagues, especially those in the office and some in the consulate, were in great danger. However, US Marines protected the office from direct attacks and officers on the ground were busy destroying secret documents should the embassy be overrun by demonstrators. In retrospect, the danger was never great, some Chinese jumped over the enclosure wall and first had to be confronted by marines in full riot gear to be persuaded to jump back. With the exception of Shanghai, which had its own naval contingent, the other consulates were only guarded by Chinese security guards. In Chengdu, these security forces were of little concern. The demonstrators climbed the wall, set fire to the consul's residence and smashed the consulate's outer door. They used a bike rack to get inside while yelling for revenge until the city security guards arrived and reassured them. Our colleagues were understandably frightened by this ordeal. They desperately called the embassy and local contacts and became more and more excited by the reluctant answers from the Chengdu authorities. "

- Paul Blackburn, Foreign Service Officer : Organization for Diplomatic Studies and Training

President Clinton's apologies and the US Department were not allowed to be broadcast on Chinese state television. The demonstrations lasted four days before the Chinese government intervened, temporarily broadcasting the apology and the police ordered the demonstrators to hold back. The presidents of the two nations finally spoke on May 14th.

comparison

Relations began to normalize again towards the end of 1999. In August, the US government made a "voluntary humanitarian payment" of $ 4.5 million to the families of the three Chinese people killed and the 27 injured. On December 16, 1999, the two governments reached a settlement that said the US will pay $ 28 million to repair the damage to the Chinese Embassy and China will pay $ 2.87 million to repair the damage to the US Embassy and other nations Compensate for damage.

Official investigations and retrospective reports

Late on May 8, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen and George Tenet said in a joint press conference that neither the crew nor the equipment were to blame for the incident. The first attempt to explain the bombing was on May 10th. William Cohen told reporters, “In simple terms; one of our planes attacked the wrong target because the bombing instructions were based on an outdated map ”. The CIA was not mentioned in the statement. It was then revealed that the CIA was in possession of cards showing the embassy at the bombed site.

While US officials began to speak out officially to avoid further questions, they continued to inform journalists unofficially. For example, on May 10th, Eric P. Schmitt published a report together with people who mostly later worked in DCI Tenet's agency. The officials briefed Schmitt that "the Chinese embassy and a headquarters of the Yugoslav army [...] look very similar: same size, shape and height" and that the buildings were 180 meters apart, less than half the real distance.

Media criticism focused on the NIMA , the national image and card authority. The NIMA released a report to counter the attacks claiming that "recently published newspaper reports that considered the accuracy of the NIMA maps were inaccurate or incomplete" and that "a paper map is neither intended nor used as a primary source." identify and approve a goal ”.

US State Department official report

In June, a delegation headed by Thomas R. Pickering flew to China to present their version of the incident.

According to the official report, the CIA analysts knew that the address of the Yugoimport office was at 2 Bulevar Umetnosti. With this information they tried to determine the geographical position of the office by taking the known positions of the buildings on the parallel street. Pickering explained this technique as intersecting and cross-bearing. Although the method described does not fit any definition of the methods given, this could be the informal military name for it.

Parallel lines were drawn from known addresses and locations on a parallel street. With this information an attempt was made to reconstruct the pattern of the street addresses of the Bulevar Umetnosti, which was unknown to the locators. The road pattern was not as expected, however, and the direction finders mistakenly located the embassy "in a small side street with a little distance from Bulevar Umetnosti" and the actual destination. This is not true because the street in question (Ulica Tesnjevog Cveta) does not cross Bulevar Umetnosti, as it ends 200 m before that. A procedure to determine known coordinates at a known address produced coordinates of another address on a street that is neither a continuation of the targeted nor a linked one.

Various tests to prevent attacks on sensitive targets failed because the position of the embassy had not been renewed since it moved to New Belgrade three years earlier. So the bombers went up with bombs programmed with the coordinates of the Chinese embassy.

In contrast to the original statement, this report did not draw any direct connection between the use and the targeting of the embassy. The explanation did not address why the target authorization declared the listed property as a warehouse even though it was an office building.

Comment from George Tenet

On July 22nd, George Tenet gave a statement at a public hearing by the House Intelligence Committee . In addition to the arguments in the United States Under Secretary of State Pickerings Statement in China, he confirmed that the target package came from the CIA and that it was a CIA solo effort. In addition, he was not personally aware of any CIA attack orders in circulation and claimed that the CIA was in possession of cards showing the correct position of the embassy. United States Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre alleged "NIMA is not at fault" and brought evidence of it the same day.

Chinese response

Few Chinese people believed the US version of events and believed that the attack was deliberate.

Former Ambassador Li Daoyu said "we are not saying it was a decision by Clinton or the White House," but the Chinese government described the US declaration for "the so-called false bombing" as "anything but convincing" and had the US Version of events never accepted.

Investigations of the observer / politics

Jens Holsoe of the Danish newspaper Politiken contacted the British newspaper The Observer with a hint to conduct a joint investigation. Holsoe, along with John Sweeney and Ed Vulliamy of the Observer, interviewed numerous sources, notably a 4-star NATO officer, a 2-star staff officer, a former senior US intelligence officer, a NATO flight controller at the Kosovo airstrike headquarters in Naples and a US NIMA officer. After four months, they published their results on October 17th.

According to the journalists' investigation, the bombardment was a deliberate attack, there is an allegation consistent with the pattern of the night's attacks that, according to an official NATO briefing on May 8, “the focus was on the national leadership [Yugoslavia, Note] to smash. ”Except for the“ FDSP weapons store ”, every target that night was a command post.

Another article in the Observer dated November 28, 1999 added some details. The report reported by some American officers who suggested the reason behind the attack on the embassy was a suspicion that Željko Ražnatović , also known as Arkan , a Serb paramilitary commander wanted by the ICTY for war crimes, was there. The NATO briefing on May 8, claiming its headquarters is in the Hotel Yugoslavia 500 meters away, agrees with this interpretation.

NATO representatives rejected the investigation. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described it as "balderdash" and British Secretary of State Robin Cook said there was not "a scrap of evidence to support this wild theory."

The New York Times originally refused to report on the investigation until the results could be confirmed. Andrew later mailed Rosenthal letter to informing the Times that the Times could not find any evidence to support the allegations. However, the Times' attempt to endorse the findings did not involve contacting the authors or their sources.

Other sources, including the Washington Post , New York Times, and Chicago Tribune , alleged the inaccuracy of the attacks was to blame, so the hits were not intentional. International news outlets such as The Associated Press , Reuters , and Agence France Press (AFP) published numerous reports in support of both theories. The American press has been criticized for paying little attention to the incident and has repeatedly referred to the incident as “accidental bombing”.

The Observer / Politiken article was largely ignored by the US media. However, a salon article by Laura Rozen included an interview with Washington Post columnist and former intelligence officer William M. Arkin , who was disapproving of the investigation. While acknowledging that the investigators had spoken to NATO intelligence officers, Arkin Rozen said, “The Chinese Embassy and Hotel Yugoslavia, where Arkan’s generals were suspected, are each across the street, and they were both bombed the same night ... I believe the communication came from the hotel. And I think that stupid people who pass rumors on to the Observer made this mistake. "

It is correct that the hotel was attacked on May 7th. NATO was aware of its role and its connection to Arkan. Arkin did not explain how the NATO planners could both know the function of the hotel and successfully attack it and not know the location.

ICTY investigations

A report conducted by the ICTY entitled Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after the Kosovo War explicitly investigated the attack on the Chinese embassy and concluded that the OTP should not have investigated the incident. The decision was made based on the following observations:

  • The source of the error appears to come from the navigational methods used by an intelligence officer trying to determine the location of the FDSP (Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement) building at Bulevar Umenosti 2. The officer used the "cross" and "resection" methods, which are appropriate to determine distances or unreachable points, but not to determine exact positions for air strikes as they only provide approximate positions. With this method he confused the embassy with the FDSP headquarters.
  • The US formally apologized to the Chinese government and agreed to pay China $ 28 million and the families $ 4.5 million in compensation. The CIA dismissed one officer and reprimanded six senior managers. The US government also stated that it had taken corrective action to emphasize individual responsibility and avoid future mistakes.
  • The flight crew involved should not be blamed for having been given incorrect coordinates. It would not be appropriate to bring them to justice because they obtained incorrect information from another organization.

Amnesty International report

Amnesty International investigated NATO's air activities and assessed the legality of the actions. In the case of the attack on the embassy, ​​they reported on both statements, the official and the observer, without judging which one was true. NATO has been criticized for continuing to bomb without interruption, although it was known that it failed to ensure the safety of civilians. An unintentional attack would not open legal action, but the report claims that "the little information necessary to prevent this failure was publicly available" and that "NATO would not have taken the necessary precautions set out in Article 57 (2 ) Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions ”.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Chinese Embassy Bombing In Belgrade: Compensation Issues. Retrieved January 27, 2012 .
  2. Eric Schmitt: In a Fatal Error, CIA Picked a Bombing Target Only Once: The Chinese Embassy. New York Times, July 23, 1999, accessed October 22, 2009 .
  3. ^ A b George Tenet: DCI Statement on the Belgrade Chinese Embassy Bombing House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Open Hearing. CIA, July 22, 1999, accessed October 4, 2006 .
  4. ^ Chinese demand UN meeting after Belgrade embassy attacked. In: CNN. Retrieved October 31, 2015 .
  5. Craig Whitney: US Military Acted Outside NATO Framework During Kosovo Conflict, France Says. New York Times, November 11, 1999, accessed October 23, 2009 .
  6. ^ John Diamond: The CIA and the Culture of Failure: US Intelligence from the end of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq . Stanford University Press, 2008, ISBN 0-8047-5601-5 , pp. 552 .
  7. NATO hits Chinese embassy. BBC News, May 8, 1999, accessed October 25, 2009 .
  8. Embassy strike 'a mistake'. BBC News, May 8, 1999, accessed October 25, 2009 .
  9. Consulate General of the United States Hong Kong & Macau: Statements on NATO Bombing of China's Embassy in Belgrade. (No longer available online.) US Department of State, August 2, 1999, archived from the original on October 13, 1999 ; Retrieved October 4, 2006 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (no longer available, text here:) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.usconsulate.org.hk
  10. Girma Negash: Apologia Politica: States and Their Apologies by Proxy . Ed .: Lexington Books . Westport, Connecticut 2007, ISBN 0-7391-2206-1 , pp. 116 .
  11. a b (Chinese) 资料 : 1999 年 5 月 9 日 胡锦涛 就 我 驻 南 使馆 遭 袭击 发表 讲话. Retrieved July 1, 2011 .
  12. ^ A b "Chinese in Belgrade, Beijing protest NATO embassy bombing". (No longer available online.) Archived from the original on October 9, 2012 ; Retrieved May 9, 1999 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / articles.cnn.com
  13. a b c d Kerry Dumbaugh: Chinese Embassy Bombing in Belgrade: Compensation Issues. Congressional Research Service publication, April 12, 2000, accessed April 8, 2010 .
  14. ^ Paul Blackburn: Dealing with a PR Disaster - The US Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training: Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, accessed May 8, 2013 .
  15. a b c d Eric Schmitt: CRISIS IN THE BALKANS: HUMAN ERROR; Wrong Address of Embassy in Databases. New York Times, May 10, 1999, accessed October 23, 2009 .
  16. ^ William Cohen: Secretary of Defense Cohen's News Briefing on Chinese Embassy Bombing. U.S. Department of Defense, May 10, 1999, accessed October 23, 2009 .
  17. MEDIA RELEASE: 990516-2, accessed on October 23, 2009, May 16, 1999 HRSG: National Imagery and Mapping Agency
  18. ^ Thomas R. Pickering: Oral Presentation the Chinese Government Regarding the Accidental Bombing of The PRC Embassy in Belgrade. US Department of State, July 6, 1999, accessed October 24, 2009 .
  19. Testimony of John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense Before the House Select Committee on Intelligence. (FAS Copy) July 22, 1999; Retrieved October 27, 2006 .
  20. Peter Hays Gries: Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing . In: Contemporary China Center, Australian National University (Ed.): The China Journal . No. 46 , July 2001, ISSN  1324-9347 , OCLC 41170782 , p. 25-43 , JSTOR : 3182306 .
  21. ^ William M. Arkin: Chinese Embassy Continues to Smolder. Washington Post, November 8, 1999, accessed October 26, 2009 .
  22. ^ Strong Protest by the Chinese Government Against The Bombing by the US-led NATO of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Yugoslavia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, November 17, 2001, accessed October 22, 2009 .
  23. NATO bombed Chinese deliberately. Guardian, October 17, 1999, accessed January 27, 2012 .
  24. ^ A b Chinese Embassy Bombing - Media Reply, FAIR Responds. FAIR, November 3, 1999, accessed October 25, 2009 .
  25. a b c d Morning Briefing. NATO Press Office, May 8, 1999, accessed October 25, 2009 .
  26. ^ Truth behind America's raid on Belgrade. The Observer, November 28, 1999, accessed October 25, 2009 .
  27. NATO embassy attack 'not deliberate'. October 17, 1999, accessed June 25, 2011 .
  28. Steven Lee Myers: Chinese Embassy Bombing: A Wide Net of Blame. New York Times, April 17, 2000, accessed December 12, 2007 .
  29. Chinese Embassy Bombing — Media Reply, FAIR Responds. Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting, November 3, 1999, accessed February 3, 2008 .
  30. Laura Rozen: A "Boneheaded" bombing. Salon, February 10, 2000, accessed October 22, 2009 .
  31. ^ Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNICTY, accessed April 18, 2018 .
  32. ^ Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNICTY, accessed April 18, 2018 (paragraph 82).
  33. ^ Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNICTY, accessed April 18, 2018 (Para 84).
  34. ^ Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNICTY, accessed April 18, 2018 (Para 85).
  35. “COLLATERAL DAMAGE” OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS? : Violations of the laws of war by NATO during Operation Allied Force. Amnesty International, accessed October 27, 2009 .
  36. “COLLATERAL DAMAGE” OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS ?, p. 52

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