Environmental migration

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Environmental migration is a change of location of people or groups that is motivated to a decisive extent by environmental changes. Environmental migrants are people or groups who are forced or induced to leave their usual place of residence, mainly due to sudden or progressive changes in the environment that endanger their life or living conditions, and who decide to look elsewhere for a better future. This also includes environmental refugees who, due to sudden environmental changes, e.g. B. Natural disasters, are forced to leave their homes. Often it is the environmental changes not alone, but in combination with political, economic and social conditions that cause people to build a sustainable livelihood in another place. Migration can be temporary or permanent, take place in one's own country or lead abroad. Due to the methodologically diverse state of affairs, the range of scientific estimates for global environment-related migration ranges from 25 million to 1 billion affected persons by the year 2050. Around 80% of global migration does not take place across borders, but within countries ( internal migration ). From 2008 to 2016, an average of around 22.3 million people per year had to leave their place of residence temporarily or permanently as internally displaced persons due to sudden extreme events such as floods, storms, bush and forest fires.

Causes of environmental migration

Environmental changes can occur slowly or suddenly. In both cases, these changes can cause people to lose their livelihood (housing, food, work, ...). Often the environmental factors do not only lead to the decision about migration or flight, but they work in conjunction with political, economic ( labor migration ), demographic and social factors. The decision to leave or to flee is also shaped by the personal or family budget and the personality profile. Both the decision to flee (e.g. in response to disaster) and to stay (due to poverty or illness) can be forced. In the latter case of forced immobility, one also speaks of “trapped populations”. Greater attention must be paid to these people, who are particularly at risk from environmental changes.

Slow environmental change: climate change

The climate change causes slow changes that can be measured only in comparison of several decades and are therefore often not perceived by people directly as climate effects:

These slow processes lead to failures in agriculture and thus in food production - a cause of hunger.

As a result of climate change, the risk of heat death can also increase in many regions of the world. It can be triggered by high air temperatures , especially when the air humidity is high , so that the human body's thermoregulation capacity is exceeded. Around 30% of the world's population is currently exposed to climatic conditions in which the mortality rate from heat is increased for at least 20 days a year. In the year 2100 this share is estimated at around 48%, if a drastic reduction of greenhouse gas emissions succeeds, otherwise around 74% of the world population will be affected. In the vicinity of the equator, these heat conditions will then persist almost all year round, making these regions practically uninhabitable (i.e. without complex cooling technology ). People who are unable to finance this effort will have to emigrate.

In addition to climate change, there are also other causes of slow environmental change and thus environmental migration, e.g. B. tectonic uplifts and subsidence . However, the incidence of environmental migration caused by these causes is much lower than that caused by climate change.

Sudden environmental events

Sudden climatic and environmental events (catastrophes) can be experienced directly by people. This is why they are often given more attention in the media:

These sudden processes lead to the destruction of homes, crops and infrastructure .

Analysis of the impact of climate change on migration

Climate-induced migration is monocausal only in extreme cases. In flat island states, climate-related rise in sea levels even endangers their physical existence if the island population remains in their own country. Most of the time, however, the decision to leave the traditional food spot is multi-causal and the connection between climate change and migration is complex. The empirical research of the risk analysis of climate change across sectors and international borders makes use of mathematical models and is still in its infancy. There are first empirical findings on the causal chain from climate change to drought and heat waves, followed by an intensification of ethnic, political and military conflicts through to displacement and displacement. This connection has been demonstrated in particular for the civil war in Syria since 2011 . Using a coincidence analysis based on data from 50 countries with the greatest inequalities in income and wealth ( Gini coefficient ) and 50 countries with the greatest ethnic fractionation between 1980 and 2010, a significant connection with military conflicts was demonstrated.

The term " Loss and Damage " is used to estimate climate-related losses and damage in order to be able to use them as part of international climate negotiations and national and international climate protection policies ( climate protection , climate adaptation - including support for seasonal or temporary migration or - as a last option - for planned relocation, Climate finance including climate insurance ) based on the polluter pays principle .

Forms of migration in response to environmental change

People react differently to environmental change:

  • active or reactive (depending on preparation)
  • "Voluntary" or forced
  • short-term, periodic or permanent

Periodic and short-term mobility has been a form of reaction to environmental change since time immemorial, for example by shepherds and flocks in response to rainy and dry seasons, to avoid overgrazing or by seasonal workers during the wine harvest. Seasonal migration as a reaction to poor harvests can also develop into permanent migration if harvests fail completely or drought becomes permanent

Migration from the countryside to the cities ( rural exodus ) represents the largest proportion of population movements. The pace of urbanization in low-wage countries in the southern hemisphere is particularly high. The driving force is the hope for a better quality of life, higher incomes, education, health care and security, especially for people whose livelihoods depend on agriculture and are therefore particularly affected by climate change. However, large coastal cities (e.g. in South America) are threatened by the expected rise in sea levels and other large cities (e.g. in South Africa and Asia) are threatened by increasing water scarcity because glaciers are melting and are increasingly less available as water reservoirs.

Political instability due to environmental change

"Climate change will primarily affect Germany indirectly, for example through instabilities in the international arena." Germany intends to use its membership in the UN Security Council in 2019 and 2020 to combat climate and fragility risks and therefore invited to the international “Berlin Climate and Security Conference” in Berlin in 2019, which sent a call for action to the UN -Security Council has addressed.

The American journalist Todd Miller reports with reference to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center that a person is forced to move much more often because of environmental disasters than because of war.

See also: Consequences_of_global_warming # wars_and_ violent_conflicts

history

There are many examples in human history of migration due to environmental change. Here are just a few examples:

from Mesopotamia due to drought to Europe about 50,000 years ago
from Asia to North America over the Bering Bridge , made possible by falling sea levels during the Wisconsin glaciation about 20,000 years ago
Migration of peoples in Central Europe in connection with drought and deforestation in the years 300 to 500
Lisbon earthquake in 1755 with flight from Lisbon and the surrounding area to the rest of Europe

Despite the long history of environmental migration , it is taking on a new quantity and quality in the 21st century, as the Director General of the International Organization for Migration puts it:

“We are currently witnessing human mobility on an unprecedented scale. Of the 7 billion people on our planet, over 1 billion are migrating inside or outside their country ... Human migration has always been linked to the environment, but political awareness of this link is relatively new. We now know that the causes of the current migration crisis also include phenomena such as climate change and its consequences, i.e. soil degradation, more frequent and more extreme sudden events, desertification, water scarcity and recurring droughts. We also know that in the future a significant number of people will be affected by sea level rise, coastal erosion, acidification of the seas and soil salinization and that they may react to this with migration ... The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is convinced of this that migration is inevitable in view of demographic, social, economic and political reality, but at the same time necessary and even desirable for the prosperity of the countries, provided that it is managed with care and takes place with respect for human rights. "

- William Lacy Swing: Aid to Environmental Migrants: A New Imperative . In: Atlas of environmental migration . oekom, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-86581-837-9 , p. 10-11 .

In a contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC , migration was examined as an adaptation to climate change

Legal situation and political action

Global

Environmental migrants are not legally defined. They also do not enjoy their own legal status. This is nearly impossible due to the variety of environmental, social, economic and political factors that lead to environmental migration. Humanitarian aid and disaster risk reduction are necessary for people who are affected by sudden environmental events or are exposed to such risks. But environmental migration has been increasingly understood - since around 2010 - not only as a problem and a tragedy, but also as a challenge and opportunity for political action. Milestones on the way to a new understanding are the 2010 UN Climate Change Conference in Cancún and the Foresight Report from 2011. With a view to the next 50 years, the Foresight Report deals with future challenges and possibilities of migration caused by environmental changes. Here, environmental migration is seen as a possible climate adaptation strategy by people. The hikes are to be regulated, i. H. to free them from illegality and to steer it democratically ( citizen participation , participation ) that both particularly vulnerable people and particularly sensitive nature are protected. The United Nations strongly recommends using the strengths of migrants. This can be done, for example, with incentives to invest in the countries of origin to protect damaged ecosystems and local communities, whereby the remittances of migrants to their countries of origin are used less for short-term consumption needs and more sustainably.

In October 2015, 109 states adopted the Nansen protection agenda (“Agenda for the protection of cross-border displaced persons in the context of disasters and climate change”). This agenda contains measures in the areas of disaster risk reduction, adaptation to climate change and humanitarian aid. Building on this, the “Platform on Disaster Displacement” was launched in May 2016, based in Geneva.

The preamble to the Paris Climate Treaty , which was passed by 196 countries in 2015, also points out that countries must urgently meet their obligations towards migrants and other particularly vulnerable groups as a result of climate change.

On the basis of their New York Declaration of 2016, the member states of the United Nations started a process in 2017 that is expected to be completed by the end of 2018 with the “ Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration ”. The draft of the results document for the UN conference in Marrakech (Morocco) on December 10 and 11, 2018, which was completed on July 11, 2018, lists 23 goals for safe, orderly and regular migration, including unsafe, chaotic, illegal and irregular migration should be contained. Here it says among other things (points 2i and 5h): "We will ... develop strategies to adapt and strengthen resilience to sudden and insidious natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation such as desertification, land degradation, drought and sea level rise, Taking into account the possible implications for migration and recognizing that adaptation in the country of origin is a priority. ”and“ We will ... work together to identify, develop and reinforce solutions for migrants who have adverse effects due to insidious natural disasters climate change and environmental degradation, such as desertification, land degradation, droughts and sea level rise, are forced to leave their country of origin, including by providing options for planned resettlement and resettlement in cases where adaptation or return is not possible Visa issuance. "

The German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) expanded the proposal for a climate passport that was made by Hans Joachim Schellnhuber in a policy paper published in August 2018. "Based on the Nansenpass , this document is intended to offer people who are existentially threatened by global warming the option of gaining access to and rights equivalent to citizenship in largely safe countries."

“Climate change should be at the top of the international agenda. Climate protection must become the new imperative of foreign policy. The security consequences of climate change are already grave today. The stability of entire regions of the world is at stake. In the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Central America, water is becoming increasingly scarce. Agriculture and fisheries have to adjust to falling yields. Wherever people's livelihoods are threatened, conflicts are mapped out. Flight and migration could intensify in a way that is hardly manageable. ”With this in mind, the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research initiated the Berlin Call for Action - a call for action to the UN Security Council .

Flat island states

A combination of sea level rise, land erosion, El Niño-driven drought and heat waves, and saltwater intrusion into the groundwater could result in the loss of 1.2 to 2.2 million people on islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Caribbean. As particularly at risk due to the climate, z. B. the Maldives (345,000 inhabitants), Kiribati (110,000 inhabitants), Marshall Islands (53,000 inhabitants) and Tuvalu (11,000 inhabitants). The Alliance of Small Island States (Alliance of Small Iceland States - AOSIS) therefore calls for limiting global warming to 1.5 ° C. Under the motto “Migration with Dignity”, the government of Kiribati is pressing for industrialized countries to live up to their responsibility for climate change through migration agreements as compensation and, like other countries, attaches importance to better local training to enable labor migration. Kiribati has also bought land in Fiji so that the population could be relocated.

See also

source

  • Diana Ionesco, Daria Mokhnacheva, Francois Gemenne: Atlas of environmental migration . oekom, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-86581-837-9 , p. 169 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b International Organization of Migration (IOM): Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP) Glossary . Geneva 2014 ( MECLEP Glossary (PDF; 352 kB) ).
  2. ↑ a b Adger, WN, JM Pulhin, J. Barnett, GD Dabelko, GK Hovelsrud, M. Levy, Ú. Oswald Spring, and CH Vogel: Human security . In: Field, CB, VR Barros, DJ Dokken, KJ Mach, MD Mastrandrea, TE Bilir, M. Chatterjee, KL Ebi, YO Estrada, RC Genova, B. Girma, ES Kissel, AN Levy, S. MacCracken, PR Mastrandrea , LL White (Ed.): Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA 2014, pp. 755-791 .
  3. ↑ a b c d Political Paper: Time-Just Climate Policy: Four Initiatives for Fairness. At: wbgu.de , accessed on November 29, 2018
  4. ↑ a b Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change. Final Project Report . Ed .: Government Office for Science. London 2011 ( Foresight Report 2011; 234 pages (PDF; 6.1 MB) ).
  5. ↑ Camilo Mora, Bénédicte Dousset, Iain R. Caldwell, Farrah E. Powell, Rollan C. Geronimo, Coral R. Bielecki, Chelsie WW Counsell, Bonnie S. Dietrich, Emily T. Johnston, Leo V. Louis, Matthew P. Lucas , Marie M. McKenzie, Alessandra G. Shea, Han Tseng, Thomas W. Giambelluca, Lisa R. Leon, Ed Hawkins & Clay Trauernicht: Global risk of deadly heat . In: Nature Climate Change . tape 7 , 2017, p. 501-506 .
  6. ^ Andy J. Challinor, W. Neil Adger, Tim G. Benton, Declan Conway, Manoj Joshi, Dave Frame: Transmission of climate risks across sectors and borders (Review) . In: Philos Trans A Math Phys Eng Sci . tape 376 , no. 2121 , June 13, 2018, p. pii: 20170301 , doi : 10.1098 / rsta.2017.0301 .
  7. ↑ Nina von Uexkull, Mihai Croicu, Hanne Fjelde, and Halvard Buhaug: Civil conflict sensitivity to growing-season drought . In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences . tape 113 , no. 44 , November 1, 2016, p. 12391-12396 , doi : 10.1073 / pnas.1607542113 .
  8. ↑ Kelley, CP, Mohtadi, S., Cane, MA, Seager, R. and Kushnir, Y .: Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought . In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences . tape 112 , no. 11 , March 17, 2015, p. 3241-3246 , doi : 10.1073 / pnas.1421533112 .
  9. ^ Carl-Friedrich Schleussner, Jonathan F. Donges, Reik V. Donner, and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber : Armed-conflict risks enhanced by climate-related disasters in ethnically fractionalized countries . In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences . tape 113 , no. 33 , August 16, 2016, p. 9216-9221 , doi : 10.1073 / pnas.1601611113 .
  10. ↑ Alison Heslin, Natalie Delia Deckard, Robert Oakes, Arianna Montero-Colbert: Displacement and Resettlement: Understanding the Role of Climate Change in Contemporary Migration . In: Reinhard Mechler, Laurens M. Bouwer, Thomas Schinko, Swenja Surminski, JoAnne Linnerooth-Bayer (eds.): Loss and Damage from Climate Change. Concepts, Methods and Policy Options . Springer, Cham 2018, ISBN 978-3-319-72025-8 , pp. 237-260 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-319-72026-5 .
  11. ↑ Reinhard Mechler, Laurens M. Bouwer, Thomas Schinko, Swenja Surminski, JoAnne Linnerooth-Bayer: Loss and Damage from Climate Change. Concepts, Methods and Policy Options . Springer, Cham 2018, ISBN 978-3-319-72025-8 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-319-72026-5 .
  12. ↑ a b Monique Barbut: Realizing the Potential . In: Atlas of environmental migration . oekom, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-86581-837-9 , p. 12 .
  13. ↑ Alex De Sherbinin, Andrew Schiller, Alex Pulsipher: The vulnerability of global cities to climate hazards . In: Environment and Urbanization . tape 19 , no. 1 , 2007, p. 39-64 .
  14. ↑ Jochem Marotzke : Don't panic - also with the climate . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung . No. 13 , 29 March 2020, p. 58 .
  15. ^ A b Improving the Climate for Peace. Berlin call for action. (pdf; 310 kb) June 4, 2019, accessed April 13, 2020 .
  16. ^ Todd Miller: Storming the Wall. Climate Change, Migration, and Homeland Security . City Lights Publishers, San Francisco 2017, ISBN 978-0-87286-715-4 .
  17. ^ Todd Miller: One Planet: Climate change, migration, and border militarization. December 9, 2018, accessed on April 13, 2020 : "According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, a person is more likely to be displaced by environmental forces than by war."
  18. ↑ Cancun Adaptation Framework 2010 (PDF; 246 kB)
  19. ↑ Nansen Protection Agenda for People Fleeing Natural Disasters, Volume 1 (PDF, Number of pages 56, 6.0 MB, English)
  20. ↑ Nansen protection agenda for people fleeing natural disasters, Volume 2 (PDF, number of pages 104, 2.4 MB, English)
  21. ^ Platform on Disaster Displacement, accessed August 7, 2018
  22. ^ The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), accessed August 7, 2018
  23. ↑ "Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration", A / CONF.231 / 3 on www.un.org of July 30, 2018
  24. ↑ Heiko Maas , Ottmar Edenhofer , Johan Rockström : It is a global effort. Climate protection must become the new imperative of foreign policy. The security consequences of climate change are already grave today. In: time online . June 4, 2019 ( zeit.de [accessed January 10, 2020]).
  25. ↑ Alison Heslin: Climate Migration and Cultural Preservation: The Case of the Marshallese diaspora . In: Reinhard Mechler, Laurens M. Bouwer, Thomas Schinko, Swenja Surminski, JoAnne Linnerooth-Bayer (Eds.): Loss and damage from climate change. Concepts, methods and policy options . Springer, Cham 2018, ISBN 978-3-319-72025-8 , pp. 383-391 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-319-72026-5 .
  26. ^ AOSIS: Urgency of Now Declaration of Action. 2017, accessed December 3, 2018 .
  27. ^ McNamara, KE: Cross-border migration with dignity in Kiribati . In: Forced Migration Review . tape 49 , 2015, p. 62 ff .
  28. ^ Walter Kälin: Climate refugees or disaster displaced persons . In: German Review on the United Nations . tape 65 , no. 5 , 2017, p. 207-212 .