Voting device

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A Diebold voting machine used in a referendum in Brazil in 2003
(Gervásio Baptista / ABr)
Voting machine from India

A voting machine is a mechanically or electrically operated device that is used in elections to cast and count the votes . Voting computers are mainly used today , which significantly change the previous voting process. In Germany they are also known as electronic or computer-controlled voting machines .

The manufacturers of voting computers ( Nedap , Diebold ) promise the saving of personnel, a fast counting result, the avoidance of counting errors, easier voting for disabled people and the avoidance of unintentionally invalid votes. Critics consider manipulation possible and do not rule out counting errors due to technical errors. A possible election fraud could not be proven without storing ballot papers ; an election process without manual evaluation is not transparent. In addition, the keeping of voting secrecy is uncertain and the profitability of voting computers is questionable, according to the critics.

Types of voting machines

There are many different mechanical voting machines and voting computers around the world:

Mechanical voting devices

All over the world there are various mechanical devices for voting, from simple punching devices for ballot papers in the USA to voting devices that mechanically record votes.

Two variants of mechanical voting machines were still permitted in Germany for the 2005 Bundestag election . In a variant, a chip is inserted into the slot in the voting booth that is assigned to a particular party or to the abstention. This actuates a mechanical counter that increases the count of the elected party. In addition, the chips for each party are collected separately in a bag to make it easier to check the choice if necessary. After the end of the election, the individual counter readings are added up and compared with the number of votes cast. Another variant are devices in which the voter has to pull a button up to a certain resistance point in order to cast his vote.

In Germany, mechanical devices were recently only used in a few municipalities, as they no longer met the increasingly complex requirements ( accumulation and variegation ).

Voting computer

Voting computers are computers that are equipped with special hardware and software for carrying out elections. All over the world the most varied types are in use, which are used either for casting votes or for the automatic counting of ballot papers via document readers.

The last only voting computers approved in Germany were the devices of the integral voting system (devices with associated voting and device application software) from Nedap / HSG Wahlsysteme GmbH. It was called an “integral electoral system” because it not only supported the implementation of the voting process with hardware and software, but was also the only electoral system in the world to contain software for preparing and following up an election. The system used here was closed source ; the interested public was not allowed to check the integrity of the source code when using the Bundestag and European elections. In its judgment of March 3, 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court declared the use of these voting computers to be unconstitutional due to a lack of public traceability.

When dismantled, the NEDAP devices looked like a suitcase that turned into a voting booth in a few simple steps . For the electoral committee there was a control unit connected to the device, with which they released the vote for each individual voter. The voting slip was displayed on an integrated control unit and the voter could select his votes by pressing a button. After doing this, he pressed a "Vote" button.

By June 2006, around 15 million votes were cast on the devices in 84 German cities and municipalities in elections at local, state and federal level. The users included cities such as Cologne , Dortmund , Cottbus and Koblenz .

In 2007 a voting computer cost 4,750 euros.

The largest manufacturers included:

  • Nedap (Netherlands) - Nedap manufactured the only voting computers so far that were approved for federal and European elections in Germany , but their use was declared unconstitutional in 2009 and is therefore prohibited.
  • Diebold (USA)
  • ES&S (USA)
  • Sequoia (USA)
  • INDRA (Spain)

See also: digital dial pen

safety

The use of computers over a paper ballot presents different and new requirements with regard to the voting process and the election evaluation. To what extent device errors can be excluded and manipulation security guaranteed has been a matter of dispute for years.

Voting computers used in Germany and the Netherlands

The group "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet" and the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) demonstrated on Dutch television on October 5, 2006 that voting computers from the Nedap company can be easily manipulated without the manipulation being understandable for an election officer or voter. The type ES3B device used differs from the types ESD1 and ESD2 used in Germany only in minor details, which are mainly due to the different voting systems.

In a detailed report of their investigation, the groups describe further safety deficiencies:

  • The locks on all devices can be opened with the same keys that can be bought for one euro.
  • The administration password ("SECRET") of the administration software was contained in plain text in the binary code .
  • A man-in-the-middle attack between the keyboard, display and the voice memory would be possible. Sealing the devices, as was done in the mayoral election in Cottbus in 2006, could make this attack more difficult, but the quality of the seals used has been criticized. In addition, the seal does not prevent the possible exchange of the voice module.

The Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) had carried out the test for the voting machines in Germany. The PTB considers it possible in principle to manipulate the elections. However, an attacker would have to have specialist knowledge and a great deal of criminal energy. At least the criminal energy has already been proven by the election fraud scandal in Dachau and the events surrounding the nomination of the SPD candidate for mayor in Hamburg in 2007 and other cases. Cases have become known in the USA in which elections may have been tampered with through the design of ballot papers for mechanical voting machines and software.

The distribution of the devices of the company Nedap, HSG Wahlsysteme GmbH, which have been approved in the Federal Republic of Germany, expresses itself in several press releases about the manipulation security of their devices.

Members of the CCC and Dutch computer experts carried out practical tests on voting computers in German polling stations. In the process, a number of possibilities were discovered to manipulate the election result at will as well as to “eavesdrop” on the voting behavior of a voter. A detailed report for the Federal Constitutional Court was prepared in May 2007 about these security deficiencies.

Maintaining voting secrecy

Electronic devices can provide information about their activities through compromising emissions . In order to prevent the processing data from being read, for example by Van Eck phreaking (TEMPEST), voting devices must be specially shielded. The closer a possible reader gets to the voting device, the more difficult this undertaking becomes.

Since voting computers are publicly accessible, maintaining voting secrecy is a major technical challenge. An effective countermeasure, for example, has to go far beyond the usual shielding of sensitive company computers, to which the public usually does not get that close. The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) gives recommendations on the protection of state classified information and sensitive company computers; there is currently no recommendation specifically for voting computers.

Examples of problems with voting machines (abroad)

  • In the presidential election in the United States in 2000 , the counting of votes in Florida was delayed because correct evaluation of the ballot papers marked by means of mechanical punching voting machines was not possible. The new touchscreen devices also caused breakdowns and in 2007 the decision was made to get rid of paperless voting computers. Ballot papers are now scanned for evaluation, the result of which can be recounted by hand in case of doubt. It is striking that Florida was a pioneer in the field of voting computers, and experts understand their decision to abolish voting computers as a lasting signal.
  • In the United States ' congressional elections on November 7, 2006, around 80 percent of eligible voters had to vote using an electronic voting machine. A third of the voters were confronted with new devices for the first time. There were massive problems.
  • Italy is said to have stopped all voting computer projects during the reign of Romano Prodi in November 2006, due to fraud allegations in the parliamentary elections in April 2006.
  • In August 2008, following a lawsuit filed by the State of Ohio, Premier Election Solutions admitted that a software bug in its voting machines was causing votes to be incorrectly counted. The software error had been undetected for ten years.
  • In 2014 Namibia was the first country in Africa to use voting machines for national elections to the National Assembly and the Presidency . The use of the devices without a verification printout was declared unconstitutional by the Namibian Supreme Court in February 2020 . This does not apply retrospectively.

Germany

Legal basis

The basis for the use of voting computers was formed by Section 35 of the Federal Election Act (BWahlG) and the Federal Voting Machine Ordinance (BWahlGV), which was issued on March 3, 2009 and declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court.

Approval of the devices

So far, two devices have been approved in Germany.

New device types to be approved were subjected to a central test procedure in accordance with the BWahlGV by the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt before the Federal Ministry of the Interior granted approval for their use in certain elections. However, the individual devices were not tested as long as the manufacturer guaranteed identical construction with a type that had already been tested.

A control option such approved devices for the voter did not exist, since the publication of the complete test reports and related documents so far, citing trade secrets were denied by the equipment manufacturer.

Critics consider the Federal Office for Information Security to be better suited for testing programmed voting computers than the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt.

It is controversial whether and under what circumstances voting computers are suitable for carrying out correct and secret elections. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court declared their previous use unconstitutional in a landmark decision on March 3, 2009 . The use of voting computers is only compatible with the Basic Law under strict conditions.

Legal proceedings / petitions (2005-2008)

Because of the concerns about the security against manipulation, the observance of voting secrecy and the lack of publicity in elections with the voting machines used in Germany, there have been and still are several legal proceedings:

  • An appeal was lodged against the use of voting computers in the 2006 mayoral election in Cottbus . The appointment of the mayor was postponed by eight days to November 28, 2006, but the appeal was rejected.
  • From October 17, 2006 to November 28, 2006, a Bundestag petition to delete Section 35 of the Federal Election Act , which received more than 45,000 supporters, ran.
  • November 2007: The Petitions Committee of the German Bundestag declares on the above petition from 2006: In an area as essential for democracy as holding elections, the committee believes it is of enormous importance not to allow any irritation or doubts to arise […] The advantages of the voting machines in the voting process are therefore, in the opinion of the committee, in no reasonable relation to the disadvantage that they pose at any time . A little later, on the recommendation of the Petitions Committee, the Bundestag decides to transfer the petition against voting computers to the Federal Government as material and to make it known to the parliamentary groups in the German Bundestag.
  • January 2008: With the help of the CCC , a Hessian voter submitted an application for a temporary injunction to prohibit the use of voting machines from NEDAP in the state elections in Hesse in 2008 . On January 23, the State Court of Justice rejected this application, as an earlier election test in an ongoing election process was inadmissible.

The Federal Constitutional Court in the matter of "voting computers" (2009)

There were several objections against the use of voting machines in the 2005 Bundestag election, which the German Bundestag rejected with a resolution of December 14, 2006. In mid-February 2007, election review complaints were lodged with the Federal Constitutional Court against the decision of the Bundestag . In a June 2007 report by the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) for the Federal Constitutional Court, this voting computer from NEDAP was tested. The published analysis dealt critically with the claims made by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the manufacturer about the security of the system.

On March 3, 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court declared the Federal Voting Machine Ordinance to be unconstitutional. According to the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, the voting computers used in the election to the 16th German Bundestag did not meet the requirements of the Basic Law.

For the use of voting computers, the constitutional judges assume “that the essential steps of the voting process and the determination of the results must be reliably verifiable by the citizen without any special expertise” . They emphasized the principle of public voting, which results from Art. 38 i. V. m. Article 20 (1) and (2) of the Basic Law result in and dictate that “all essential steps are subject to the choice of public scrutiny” .

economic aspects

Following a request for information under the Dutch Freedom of Information Act, the Dutch group Wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet (“We don't trust voting computers”) was able to publish documents relating to the conversion of ballot boxes to voting computers in Amsterdam in July 2006. According to the paper, this increased the cost per election from 1.6 million to 2.7 million euros.

See also

literature

  • Richard Sietmann: "A new situation". E-voting in Germany after the election machine hack , c't 24/2006, pp. 72–79 ( online ).
  • Richard Sietmann: Question of confidence. Fundamental concerns about electronic voting systems . In: c't 26/2007, ISSN  0724-8679 , pp. 80-82.
  • Martin Will: Voting computer on the constitutional test bench . In: Computer und Recht 2008 , pp. 540–544.

Web links

Commons : Voting device  - collection of images, videos, and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c BVerfG , judgment of March 3, 2009, Az. 2 BvC 3/07, 2 BvC 4/07, full text = BVerfGE 123, 39 - voting computer.
  2. ↑ Overview of the use of voting computers in Germany
  3. ↑ "Wij vertrouwen stem computer niet"
  4. ↑ Dutch citizens' initiative cracks Nedap voting computer , heise.de
  5. ↑ CCC calls for a ban on voting computers , golem.de
  6. ↑ CCC calls for a ban on voting computers - Nedap fends off allegations , heise.de
  7. ↑ CCC calls for a ban on voting computers on spiegel.de
  8. ↑ Description of the Nedap ESD1 and ESD2 from CCC berlin.ccc.de
  9. ↑ Investigation by the Dutch testing authority TNO , p. 4, (PDF; 3.8 MB)
  10. ↑ Nedap / Groenendaal ES3B voting computer a security analysis (PDF; 8.5 MB)
  11. ↑ Interview with Dieter Richter, c't Computermagazin, 2006 ( Memento from January 29, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Authority considers manipulation possible
  12. ↑ Press release HSG-Wahlsysteme GmbH, May 31, 2006 ( Memento of September 28, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
  13. ↑ Dutch people hack voting device ( Memento from December 6, 2006 in the Internet Archive )
  14. ↑ Possibility of manipulation: Hackers cracked German voting computers on spiegel.de
  15. ↑ Expert opinion confirms the manipulability of voting computers on heise.de
  16. ↑ CCC: Voting computers are fundamentally insecure : Hacker Club submits report for the Federal Constitutional Court
  17. ↑ Manipulated voting machine: Chaos Club hacks Democracy spiegel.de
  18. ↑ BSI M 4.89 - Radiation security .
  19. ^ Sentence according to voting machines: Florida rows back heise.de, February 3, 2007
  20. ^ Another election machine debacle in the USA heise.de, November 8, 2006
  21. ↑ Italy stops voting computer projects Message from heise online from November 30th, 2006 7:24 pm
  22. ↑ Uncounted votes: Voting machine manufacturer gives error to heise.de, 23 Aug. 2008
  23. ^ Namibian election first in Africa to use electronic voting machines. ABC News, Nov. 28, 2014.
  24. ^ Election survives EVM challenge. The Namibian, February 6, 2020.
  25. ↑ Heike Schrepf, Norbert Greif, Dieter Richter: Wahlgeräte in Deutschland , Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (DuD), Volume 33, Issue 2, February 2009, pp. 88–91, doi: 10.1007 / s11623-009-0038-y
  26. ^ Mistrust of voting machines: Voting in Cottbus on heise.de
  27. ↑ itc.napier.ac.uk: ( Memento of October 26, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Petition to delete Section 35 of the Federal Electoral Act without replacement (Bundestag petition on the website of Napier University in Edinburgh)
  28. ↑ c't 26/2007, p. 81.
  29. ↑ CCC wants to ban voting computers in Hessen on heise.de
  30. ↑ Hesse's Ministry of the Interior has no doubts about voting computers on heise.de
  31. ↑ heise online: Hessian municipalities are allowed to use Nedap voting machines on Sunday on heise.de
  32. ^ Ulrich Wiesner: Voting computer and public control
  33. ^ Constitutional lawsuit against voting computers (Heise Background, February 21, 2007)
  34. ↑ a b c BVerfG, press release No. 19/2009 of March 3, 2009.
  35. ↑ Dutch e-voting opponents want to network resistance in Europe , on heise.de