American food policy in occupied Germany

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The Hunger Winter of 1947 : Thousands Protest Against the Catastrophic Food Situation (March 31, 1947)

The American food policy in occupied Germany deals with the food policy of the United States and to a limited extent, the other Allies in the Western occupation zones of Germany (the American occupation zone , the British zone of occupation and the French occupation zone ) in the first two years of the ten year occupation of West Germany in the Postwar period after World War II .

background

Just before the start of World War II, the German government introduced food rationing , which resulted in limited food availability. During the war there were occasional food shortages, so that a black market developed. In general, the food supply was adequate, especially compared to the situation in some other European countries. This was partly due to the unscrupulous exploitation of the occupied countries by the German government, for example through the famine plan that resulted in the death of millions of people in the German-occupied areas of the Soviet Union , as food diverted to Germany and to the German troops in the Soviet Union or the German blockade that led to the Dutch famine in 1944/45 ( Hongerwinter ). The inadequate food rations also formed part of the Holocaust and led to tens of thousands of deaths in Warsaw alone , and in the winter of 1941/42 the German Wehrmacht let about two million Soviet prisoners of war starve to death.

Widespread food shortages did not occur in Germany until after the end of the war in May 1945. Food production suffered from the effects of the war, including the destruction of arable land, livestock and machinery. In addition, there was a labor shortage after the forced laborers who had worked in Germany returned to their homeland. The situation worsened due to a period of bad weather. As a result, German agriculture was only able to produce food for city dwellers with a nutritional value of 1,000 kilocalories per person per day. During this period, food supplies were restricted across Europe, including the UK and France, resulting in continued food rationing.

Planning for the occupation of Germany

During the planning for the occupation of Germany, the Allies faced the problem of whether to keep the food allotments for the country at the minimum necessary to prevent disease and political unrest, or at a level that fully met the needs of the population has been. The principle that the Germans should have no better access to food than the hardest hit country of the Allies was introduced, but not implemented in practice. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force originally set the standard for rations to be 2,600 kilocalories per day. This matched the level of rations in Belgium and France and the upper end of the scale considered adequate according to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration .

After the beginning of the occupation of Germany, it turned out to be impossible to provide food as planned. The Allied planners had underestimated the extent of the damage to the German infrastructure and overestimated the ability of the German population to produce their own food. After the food supplies set up by the German government during the war were exhausted, the calculation of the food rations was therefore reduced to 1,000 to 1,250 kilocalories per day. Most German civilians, however, were able to supplement these rations themselves. Displaced persons , including Holocaust survivors, were given more generous rations averaging 1,600 to 2,000 kilocalories, and some of these people also had access to other sources of food.

German prisoners of war

After the German surrender, the US decided to classify the majority of German prisoners of war as Disarmed Enemy Forces (DEF) and not as official prisoners of war, which would have given them the protection of the Geneva Convention and thus entitled to the same food quantities as the US Had troops.

The living conditions of these prisoners were often harsh. Numerous prisoner-of-war camps in West Germany were huge open spaces fenced with barbed wire without adequate accommodation and other basic facilities, especially in the early days (see Rheinwiesenlager ). Since the danger of German retaliation against Allied prisoners of war no longer existed, "there were fewer efforts to procure food and shelter than would otherwise have been the case, and as a result tens of thousands of prisoners died of hunger and disease who might have survived" .

The International Red Cross was never allowed to be fully involved in the DEF camps and the Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP was the British equivalent of the American DEF), and although conditions gradually improved, died In the French camps alone, according to conservative estimates, over 16,500 people in 1945.

After the German surrender , the International Red Cross was prohibited from providing food aid or visiting prison camps. After trying to get closer to the Allies in autumn 1945, however, he was allowed to inspect the camps in the British and French occupation zones and to help the prisoners interned there.

On February 4, 1946, the Red Cross was also allowed to visit and help prisoners in the American zone of occupation , often only with very small amounts of food. During their visits, the delegates discovered that the German prisoners of war were often interned under appalling conditions. They brought this fact to the attention of the authorities and they gradually managed to make some improvements.

German civilian population

The German Red Cross , which had been thoroughly Nazified during the war and whose director Ernst-Robert Grawitz played an important role in the medical experiments on Jews and "enemies of the state", was dissolved, and the International Red Cross and some other approved international ones Aid organizations were prevented from working by strict controls on deliveries of goods and travel.

It is estimated that the average German civilian in the American and British occupation zones received 1200 kilocalories per day. Non-German displaced persons , on the other hand, received 2,300 kilocalories through food imports and the help of the Red Cross.

For fear of a Nazi uprising, the American occupation forces received strict orders not to share their food with the German population. This order also applied to their wives, who later came to Germany during the occupation. The women had the order to deny their German maids access to any leftover food, “the food had to be destroyed or made inedible”, although many housewives disregarded these official orders in view of the starving German population. According to an American intelligence investigation, however, a German university professor is said to have said: “Your soldiers are friendly, good ambassadors, but they cause unnecessary resentment when they pour leftover cocoa , which is urgently needed in our hospitals, down the drain. That makes it difficult for me to defend American democracy among my compatriots ”.

At the beginning of 1946 the American President Harry S. Truman allowed foreign aid organizations to travel to Germany in order to get an idea of ​​the food situation. In mid-1946, non-German aid organizations were allowed to help starving German children. The food situation was worst in the very cold winter of 1946/47, when the Germans only consumed 1,000 to 1,500 kilocalories per day, a situation made even more difficult by the severe shortage of heating material. An adult in the US consumed an average of 3,200 to 3,300 kilocalories, in the UK 2900 kilocalories, and in the American Army 4,000 kilocalories.

There were differing views on the precise effects of the food crisis on the health and mortality of Germans. Herbert Hoover reported in the fall of 1946 on the American and British occupation zones that hunger had led to a 40% increase in mortality among Germans over the age of 70. John Farquharson, on the other hand, cites statistics that indicate that edema caused by hunger was rare in 1946/47. According to the British Medical Journal , mortality in the British Occupation Zone was higher than pre-war until June 1946, after which the death rate fell below 1938 levels. After it became clear that mortality would not increase as the Nazis threatened during the war , food controls have been relaxed.

Historian Nicholas Balabkins notes that the Allies' plans to restrict German steel production and their control over where coal and steel production was shipped resulted in offers from Western European countries to deliver food in exchange for much-needed German coal and machinery, were rejected. Neither Italy nor the Netherlands could sell the vegetables they had sold to Germany in the past, so a significant portion of the harvest had to be destroyed as a result. Denmark offered 150 tons of lard per month, Turkey offered hazelnuts, Norway offered fish and fish oil, and Sweden offered considerable amounts of fat. The Allies, however, were not ready to allow the Germans to trade.

Another consequence of the Allied policy of " deindustrialization " was a drastic decrease in the available fertilizers for German agriculture, which led to a further decrease in the capacity of food production

The infant mortality rate was in Germany until almost the end of 1948 twice as high as in other Western European countries.

Adequate nutrition for the German population in occupied Germany was a legal obligation of the Allies under Article 43 of the Hague Land Warfare Code of 1907.

JCS 1067

The "Handbook for Military Government in Germany", a document from the occupation that advocated the rapid restoration of normal life in Germany and the reconstruction of Germany, was available in August 1944. The US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau , author of the Morgenthau Plan , who campaigned for the division and deindustrialization of Germany, introduced the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt , who greeted it enthusiastically with the following words:

“Too many people here and in England hold the view that the German people as a whole are not responsible for what has taken place - that only a few Nazis are responsible. That unfortunately is not based on fact. The German people must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization. "

“Too many people here and in England are of the opinion that the Germans as a whole are not responsible for what happened - that only a few Nazis are responsible. Unfortunately, this does not correspond to the facts. The Germans must be made aware that the entire country was involved in a lawless conspiracy against the rules of modern civilization. "

However, following opposition from some members of the US government, a revised document was drafted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 ( JCS 1067 ). In it, the military government of occupied Germany was ordered "... not to take any steps towards the economic reconstruction of Germany or with the aim of maintaining or strengthening the German economy" and to keep hunger, disease and civil unrest at such a low level that they would not pose a threat to the occupying forces.

On March 20, 1945, President Roosevelt was warned that JCS 1067 was not tough enough, it would make the Germans "stew in their own juice". Roosevelt's answer was, “Let them have soup kitchens! Let their economy go under! ”When asked whether he wanted the Germans to starve, he replied:“ Why not? ”

In August 1945, Genera Lucius D. Clay was increasingly concerned about the humanitarian and political situation in the area under his responsibility. He said: "There is no choice between being a communist on 1,500 kilocalories a day or a supporter of democracy on 1,000 kilocalories".

Two years later, in July 1947, JCS 1067 was abolished and replaced by JCS 1779 , which noted that "an orderly, prosperous Europe needs the economic contributions of a stable, productive Germany".

General Clay later wrote in his memoirs that "there is no doubt that JCS 1067 had the Carthaginian Peace in mind, which shaped our operations in Germany during the first months of the occupation."

Effects

Nicholas Balabkins sees Allied politics in a positive light, claiming that American food deliveries saved the lives of "millions of Germans" despite food shortages until 1948. Balabkins also notes that the food rations distributed were poorly composed “and were well below the minimum nutritional standard” and without access to food from other sources, recipients would ultimately have starved to death. Balabkins also cited an agency which stated that the rations were "at levels that led to starvation quite quickly".

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Manfred J. Enssle: The Harsh Discipline of Food Scarcity in Postwar Stuttgart, 1945-1948 , p. 482.
  2. ^ Lizzie Collingham, The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food , pp. 216-218.
  3. ↑ Lizzie Collingham: The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food , p. 207.
  4. ^ Lizzie Collingham: The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food , p. 194.
  5. ^ A b Lizzie Collingham: The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food , p. 467.
  6. ^ Ian Buruma: Year Zero: A History of 1945 , p. 63.
  7. ^ Ian Buruma: Year Zero: A History of 1945 , p. 64.
  8. ↑ a b Atina Grossmann: Grams, Calories, and Food: Languages of Victimization, Entitlement, and Human Rights in Occupied Germany , S. 122nd
  9. ^ Atina Grossmann: Grams, Calories, and Food: Languages ​​of Victimization, Entitlement, and Human Rights in Occupied Germany , p. 131.
  10. ^ A b c d S. P. MacKenzie: The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II In: The Journal of Modern History , Volume 66, No. 3, September 1994, pp. 487-520.
  11. ↑ Note: SP MacKenzie: “... (ICRC) requested assurances from the belligerents that they intended to abide by the terms of the 1929 Geneva Convention. For these states to do so, however, would involve maintaining adequate standards regarding food, shelter, labor, and hygiene - all roughly equal to those granted rear-area troops. "
  12. ^ A b ICRC in WW II: German prisoners of war in Allied hands. ICRC , February 2, 2005, accessed April 13, 2019 .
  13. ^ David P. Forsythe: The humanitarians: the International Committee of the Red Cross , Cambridge University Press, p. 45.
  14. ^ Richard Dominic Wiggers: The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians after World War II , pp. 281-82.
  15. ^ Richard Dominic Wiggers: The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians after World War II , p. 280.
  16. ^ Richard Dominic Wiggers: The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians after World War II , p. 279.
  17. ^ Eugene Davidson: The Death and Life of Germany , p. 85
  18. ^ Eugene Davidson: The Death and Life of Germany , p. 86
  19. ^ Richard Dominic Wiggers: The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians after World War II , p. 282.
  20. ^ Richard Dominic Wiggers: The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians after World War II , p. 244.
  21. ^ Richard Dominic Wiggers: The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians after World War II , p. 285.
  22. ↑ The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria, No. 1, p. 8.
  23. ^ John E. Farquharson: The Western Allies and the Politics of Food: Agrarian Management in Postwar Germany . Berg Publishers , 1985, ISBN 0-907582-24-9 , pp. 237 ( online ).
  24. ^ British Medical Journal , November 30, 1946.
  25. ↑ Nicholas Balabkins: Germany Under Direct Controls: Economic Aspects of Industrial Disarmament 1945-1948 , p. 125.
  26. ^ Nicholas Balabkins: Germany Under Direct Controls: Economic Aspects of Industrial Disarmament 1945-1948 , p. 91.
  27. ^ Richard Dominic Wiggers: The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians after World War II , p. 286.
  28. ^ Nicholas Balabkins: Germany Under Direct Controls: Economic Aspects of Industrial Disarmament 1945–1948 , p. 101.
  29. ^ Richard Dominic Wiggers: The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians after World War II , p. 274.
  30. ^ Richard Dominic Wiggers: The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians after World War II , p. 279. "In postwar Germany and Japan, the US Army financed the most urgent food imports by citing obligations under Article 43 of The Hague Rules of Land Warfare. "
  31. ^ Michael R. Beschloss: The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941–1945 , p. 196.
  32. ↑ Pas de Pagaille! In: Time Magazine . July 28, 1947, accessed on August 4, 2020 (free registration required).
  33. ^ A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change, p. 129 ( Google Books ).
  34. ↑ Nicholas Balabkins: Germany Under Direct Controls: Economic Aspects of Industrial Disarmament , pp. 100-103.
  35. ↑ Nicholas Balabkins: Germany Under Direct Controls: Economic Aspects of Industrial Disarmament , pp. 102, 107, 108.
  36. ↑ Nicholas Balabkins: Germany Under Direct Controls: Economic Aspects of Industrial Disarmament , p. 107, specified in a footnote as a testimony of Dennis A. FitzGerald , Secretary General of the International Emergency Food Council, at the Hearings of the House Committee on Appropriations in 1947 .

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