Rafz railway accident

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Rafz railway accident on February 20, 2015
Cut open driver's cab of the Re 460 087.
Cut open driver's cab of the Re 460 087.
                  
Mainline track from Jestetten
                  
                  
Accident site at points 14
                  
                  
closed track section signal
                  
                  
S-Bahn 18104 to Schaffhausen
                  
on track 4
                  
IR 2858 to Schaffhausen
                  
on track 5
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
IR 2859 to Zurich
                  
on track 3
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
Line track to Hüntwangen - Wil

Situation map of the accident site in Rafz train station

The Rafz railway accident was a side collision between two SBB trains on February 20, 2015 when the operational situation at Rafz station on the Eglisau – Neuhausen railway line was disrupted . An InterRegio train passing through Zurich - Schaffhausen crashed into a RABe 514 S-Bahn multiple unit that was traveling from Rafz to Schaffhausen. Six people were injured, one seriously. The cause of the accident was the crossing of a closed signal by the S-Bahn.

Starting position

The S-Bahn multiple unit RABe 514 046 arrives as empty material train 28821 according to schedule at 6.27 a.m. on platform 4 in Rafz. It then goes back to Schaffhausen as the S-Bahn train 18104, mainly for schoolchildren from the German villages of Lottstetten and Jestetten , in order to provide connections for school attendance in Singen (Hohentwiel) . The InterRegio train 2858 from Zurich, consisting of the Re 460  087 locomotive and five SBB Eurocity wagons , was supposed to pass through track 3 to Schaffhausen at 6.30 a.m. and cross S-Bahn train 19725 in Jestetten Süd , which then went on schedule at 6.40 a.m. Clock arrives in Rafz on platform 3. S-Bahn 18104 to Schaffhausen was supposed to leave immediately on track 4.

On the morning of February 20, operations on the Zurich – Bülach – Schaffhausen line were severely disrupted due to an insulation fault on a switch in Niederglatt . The delayed Interregio IR 2859 Schaffhausen – Zurich did not arrive on track 3 in Rafz until 6.39. The return train Interregio 2858 from Zurich was 10 minutes late. Due to the lack of a switch connection in Rafz, it was already directed to the right track in Hüntwangen - Wil and passed through the Rafz station on track 5. Its crossing with the S-Bahn train 19725 was planned because of the delay in Jestetten Süd.

Rafz train station is equipped with modern security technology. Nevertheless, the collision could not be prevented.

In both of the trains involved in the accident, there was a train driver and a trainee train driver in the driver's cab . Because the candidate did not yet have a driving license in the S-Bahn train, the engine driver drove. The Interregio was controlled by the aspirant who was about to take the test under the supervision of the instructor driver.

Rafz station is equipped with modern security systems. It has an Elektra II electronic interlocking from Thales from 2009 and train control ZUB and Integra-Signum . In Rafz, ZUB is only set up for passing trains and not for turning trains.

the accident

When Interregio 2859 entered track 3, the Lottstetten track became free and the signal for the IR 2686 on track 5 started moving. Train 18104 on track 4 then started at 6.40:10, although the signal intended for it indicated a stop. At 6.40:31 he drove past the closed track section signal and had already reached a speed of 59 km / h. The Integra Signum track magnet there triggered an emergency brake , so that train 18104 came to a standstill at 6.40:44 a.m. almost 100 meters after the signal. The S-Bahn train standing on the exit point 14 violated the clearance profile of the approaching Interregio 2858.

The Interregio was covered with the Re 460 087 necessary for a trip cooperative advertises.
The affected power car from RABe 514 046

The IR 2858 entered the Rafz train station at a speed of around 110 km / h. The aspirant train driver who was moving noticed the irregularity and initiated emergency braking , which, however, had no significant impact on the impending flank collision . At 6.40:52 the Re 460 087 crashed into the side wall of the RABe 514 046 multiple unit. The side wall of the S-Bahn multiple unit was dented and slit open in the lower area. The locomotive and the five wagons of the Interregio derailed, two wagons were inclined. To rescue the seriously injured training locomotive driver , the fire brigade had to cut open the driver's cab of the interregional locomotive.

Difficult exit from the Rafz train station in the direction of Schaffhausen because of the winding track.

The immediate cause of the collision was driving off despite the closed exit signal from the S-Bahn. A gap in the train control system ZUB is partly responsible for the accident . ZUB was not effective in this particular case because the S-Bahn coming from Schaffhausen turned around in Rafz to return to Schaffhausen. When a train arrives from Schaffhausen to Rafz, it receives information from ZUB about the position of the signal in the direction of Zurich. Because the S-Bahn was going back to Schaffhausen in this case, ZUB had no information about the status of the signal in the direction of Schaffhausen. In order to prevent the accident, the SBB had to equip Rafz station with additional balises and program it to prevent departure. Such balises have been required since 2010 if at least one train turns per day on a weekly average. That was just not the case in the north head of Rafz with one turn per working day . Although an S 5 coming from Zurich turns every hour in Rafz, no balises were installed in the southern head either, but had already been ordered.

The Rafz station has become more confusing since the renovation in 2011, criticized the president of the VSLF train drivers' union . The driver traveling north on track 4 has the track section signal belonging to track 5 right in front of his eyes because of the winding track. The exit signal at the north end of the station is also on the right instead of the usual left of the track.

After the accident in Granges-Marnand , the SBB developed its own warning app for the LEA , which warns the train drivers about an exit signal indicating a stop when departing. The app could not prevent the collision in Rafz because it was only being tested at the time of the accident.

consequences

Five travelers were slightly injured in the accident. The seriously injured train driver of the Interregio was out of danger to life after an operation. The trainee engine driver, who was also in the driver's cab of the Interregio, was injured with moderate severity. The recovery of the damaged vehicles and the repair work on the infrastructure began in the late afternoon. About 60 meters pavement redone with a switch had and a ruined tower - foundation to be replaced. No damage was found to the bridge at the accident site. The vehicles involved in the accident were taken to Olten and Yverdon for repairs . The property damage to the rolling stock amounts to several million Swiss francs according to initial estimates by SBB. Since the night of February 22nd, Rafz station has been open again. Additional barriers were necessary for work on the catenary and points.

After the accident in Rafz, traffic from Zurich to Schaffhausen was directed via the Rhine Falls Railway. RABe 514 on the Rhine bridge near Laufen .
Re-entry of a Bpm 61 with the help of two pneumatic cranes

The Intercity trains Zurich – Schaffhausen– Stuttgart and some additional trains during the evening rush hour between Zurich and Schaffhausen ran via Winterthur – Andelfingen . The interregional trains between Schaffhausen and Zurich were canceled. Buses were used in regional traffic between Hüntwangen-Wil and Jestetten. The travelers from Zurich to Schaffhausen were directed via Winterthur .

At the suggestion of the VSLF locomotive drivers' union , the regulation was introduced that the speed of 40 km / h must not be exceeded when trains are starting or after a change of direction when departing. This increases the likelihood that, in situations like in Rafz, the train can be stopped before the danger point.

The restrictions of the safety systems at turns are to be removed with the further development of the train control. ETCS Level 2 is intended to prevent erroneous departures after turning. The introduction of ETCS Level 2 throughout Switzerland is planned for 2025. ETCS Level 2 in Specification 3.4.0 is not yet applicable in larger train stations .

Comparison with the near collision in Altdorf on October 15, 2011

Here in Altdorf there was almost a collision. Train 21223 drove off despite the exit signal (AS C5) showing stop, while the oncoming ICN 10012 approached on track 4 . The distance from signal C5 to the danger point at the switch is 26 meters.

On Saturday, October 15, 2011, the S 2 21223 Baar Lindenpark - Erstfeld departed from Altdorf station on platform 5 with the exit signal closed. Shortly before the exit signal, the driver noticed that the signal was stopping and initiated an emergency stop. As the signal passed the closed signal, the Euro-ZUB train control responded and the Stadler Flirt railcar came to a standstill 42 meters after the signal. He violated the profile of track 4, where a passage for the ICN 10012 was set. After consulting the dispatcher , the train was quickly set back behind the signal. There was no longer enough time to trigger an emergency call. Shortly afterwards, the ICN 10012, which had to reduce its speed from 140 to 80 km / h due to a construction site, drove through track 4.

In Rafz, only 8 seconds passed from the standstill of the S-Bahn after the emergency brake to the impact of the Interregio. In this short time it was not possible for the driver to reset the train and clear the route of the interregio after consulting the operations control center .

The safety of railway operations depends primarily on the correct work of the drivers. Train controls cover the known effects of incorrect actions, but a residual risk remains.

literature

References and comments

  1. ↑ by Andrian, Scheeder, pp. 170-171.
  2. ↑ Train collision in Rafz: Five injured after a collision between two trains. First SBB press release on February 20, 2015. Accessed on March 22, 2015 .
  3. ↑ a b c d e f grazing collision in Rafz: Zurich – Schaffhausen line is expected to be back in service when operations begin on Saturday. Second SBB press release of February 20, 2015. Accessed on March 22, 2015 .
  4. ↑ a b c d e f g Rafz - Driving over the signal led to a grazing collision. The SBB is taking precautionary measures. Press release by SBB of February 27, 2015. Accessed on March 22, 2015 .
  5. ^ Walter von Andrian: Corrigenda . In: Swiss Railway Review . No. 5 . Minirex, 2015, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 246 .
  6. ↑ In certain cases, modern signal boxes withdraw the driving authorization for a correctly moving train if the approved route is violated. At the time of the accident, only Siemens was able to meet this requirement. In Rafz, however, there would not have been enough time to brake quickly.
  7. ↑ a b by Andrian, Scheeder, p. 171.
  8. ↑ S-Bahn crossed signal. In: 20 minutes. February 27, 2015, accessed March 22, 2015 .
  9. ^ A b by Andrian, Scheeder, p. 172.
  10. ↑ In its two media releases on February 20, 2015, SBB stated that the time of the accident was 6.43 a.m. (see also Andrian, Scheeder, p. 174)
  11. ↑ «There was a loophole in the security system». In: 20 minutes. February 20, 2015, accessed March 22, 2015 .
  12. ^ President of the train driver criticizes the SBB after the train accident. In: Tages-Anzeiger. Tamedia, February 22, 2015, accessed March 22, 2015 .
  13. ↑ a b c by Andrian, Scheeder, p. 174.
  14. ^ Information from the VSLF on the railway accident in Rafz (ZH) dated February 20, 2015. (No longer available online.) Association of Swiss Locomotive Drivers and Candidates VSLF, February 22, 2015, archived from the original on April 2, 2015 ; accessed on March 22, 2015 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.vslf.com
  15. ^ Mathias Rellstab: Near collision between ICN and S-Bahn in Altdorf . In: Swiss Railway Review . No. 12 . Minirex, 2011, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 614-615 .
  16. ↑ Final report of the Swiss Accident Investigation Board SUST on near misses between S-Bahn Zug 21223 and ICN Zug 10012 from Saturday, October 15, 2011 in Altdorf. (PDF; 3676 kB) March 8, 2012, accessed on February 22, 2015 .