Granges-Marnand railway accident

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Granges-Marnand railway accident
The NPZ control car was compressed by a third.
The NPZ control car was compressed by a third.
            
Mainline track from Payerne
            
            
guarded level crossing
            
Breakpoint of the
            
S-Bahn 12976 to Lausanne
            
on track 1
            
            
            
            
            
            
Turnout 3 (right), standing on distraction
            
Switch 1
            
Collision point at switch 1
            
for train 12976 closed exit signal
            
parked freight cars
            
on track 6
            
            
slight left turn
            
Regio-Express 4049 to Payerne
            
Planned passage on platform 2
            
            
            
Main track to Moudon

Map of the accident site at the Granges - Marnand train station

The railway accident from Granges - Marnand was a head-on collision on the Broyelinie on the evening of July 29, 2013. An outgoing S-Bahn Payerne - Lausanne collided with the RegioExpress Lausanne - Payerne. A train driver was killed. 26 people were injured, six of them seriously. The engine driver had left despite the group exit signal pointing to a stop .

Starting position

When the electromechanical signal box in Granges-Marnand was supplemented with a domino attachment in 1975, the passenger trains were still accompanied by a train driver or conductor who was responsible for closing the doors. The stations were served and the locomotive driver received the permission to leave from the station board . In most stations - also in Granges-Marnand - the train driver observes the change of passengers, the door closing and the signal and decides on the time of the train departure according to the schedule .

There are only a few train crossings at the Granges-Marnand station : two in the morning and two in the evening when the Regio-Express Payerne – Lausanne runs in the outward or opposite direction, and for occasional freight trains .

The group exit signal towards Moudon is more than 300 meters away from the train stop at the only platform . Although the trains are already accelerating to a respectable speed on this section and the exit signal is 16 meters behind the last switch , the group exit signal is secured with an Integra sign and not additionally with ZUB . What was common at the time and complied with the legal requirements. The exit towards Moudon is in a slight right-hand bend, on the inside of which on the day of the accident four parked freight cars obstructed the view.

Despite the unusual track system, the Granges-Marnand station is not secured with ZUB .

The Regio-Express is on schedule in Palézieux direction Payerne and Romont winged . Instead of the three-part dominoes with automatic coupling provided for this purpose, the four-part RBDe NPZ-France 562  002, which runs separately, was used for train 4049 Lausanne – Palézieux – Payerne .

There were 45 people on the two trains. Because of the summer vacation, fewer passengers traveled than usual. Because the NPZ in Lausanne started on head track 70 , there were probably only a few passengers in the control car, which was far from the platform entrance .

the accident

The S-Bahn 12976, driven by a Domino train, made a stop in Granges-Marnand on track 1 as planned. After the passenger change was completed, the engine driver took note of the distant, stop-indicating group exit signal and folded the rear-view mirrors . In the opposite direction, a route was set for the Regio-Express 4049, which was supposed to pass through platform 2 without stopping. Because the Regio-Express had to drive on switch 3 in a distracting position, its speed was indicated at 60 km / h.

A three-part domino was used for S-Bahn train 12976.

After waiting a little over a minute, the S-Bahn train driver mistakenly believed that the signal had started moving and drove off. He opened the exterior mirrors for a visual inspection, observed the ZUB display and accelerated the train. Why the train driver erroneously believed that the group exit signal switched to a driver attack was never investigated. When his composition had reached a speed of 69 km / h, he noticed the oncoming Regio-Express, released an emergency brake and fled into the baggage compartment of the RBDe DO 560 213 railcar. The collision occurred after 84 meters at a speed of 60 km / h. On the return train, rapid braking was initiated at 55 km / h. Before the collision at switch 1, the Regio-Express covered another 40 meters and had a speed of 45 km / h.

Due to the force of the collision, the NPZ control car Bt 29-35 950 was compressed to behind the front entrance door. Its fatally injured train driver could only be recovered after hours. As a result of the collision, the two intermediate cars were separated and the rear half of the train with the NPZ RBDe 562 002 multiple unit was pushed back 57 meters. 26 people were injured, 6 of them seriously. They were taken to the surrounding hospitals.

consequences

The Regio-Express 4049 was driven by an NPZ 562.

The Payerne – Moudon line was interrupted until the evening of July 30th. The vehicles involved in the accident were transported to the Yverdon industrial plant . The SBB estimated the damage at 8 million francs.

On October 1, the SBB introduced the so-called four-eyes principle in Granges-Marnand and six other stations with similar conditions. The drivers of stopping trains are informed about upcoming train crossings . The dispatcher , who is also the local switchboard operated, issued from the drivers with a hand panel which a rating indicates that Abfahrerlaubnis . The stations concerned are designated in the RADN route table with CR (Croisement / Junction). The SBB described the measure as an interim solution until technical improvements have been implemented. With the timetable change in December 2013, the announcement of the departure permit by the dispatcher was introduced in another five stations.

In addition, the SBB decided to equip 21 unoccupied stations with similar conditions as Granges-Marnand with speed monitoring.

The Granges-Marnand accident prompted SBB to develop a warning app for the LEA , which warns the train driver of an exit signal when leaving.

In June 2014, the vehicles severely damaged by the accident were finally demolished.

Varia

On the morning of September 16, 2013, there was almost another frontal collision on the north side of the Granges-Marnand train station. Train 12913 Lausanne – Payerne started after stopping on platform 1 despite the closed group exit signal, while the Regio-Express 4022 Payerne – Lausanne approached in the opposite direction. The signal box in Granges-Marnand is also equipped with a button that can be used to interrupt the power supply. The dispatcher used the button and brought train 12913 to a stop before the collision occurred.

literature

References and comments

  1. Final report SUST, p. 12
  2. ^ A b Mathias Rellstab, Walter von Andrian: Almost another accident in Granges-Marnand . In: Swiss Railway Review . No. 11 . Minirex, 2013, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 564 .
  3. Railcar RBDe 560 213 on the Zugspitze, second class car B 29-43 163 and control car ABt 39-43 826
  4. First / second class car AB 39-35 113 and second class car B 20-35 605
  5. Avenches , Châtillens , Cugy , Estavayer-le-Lac (only track 1), Yvonand and Zweidlen (only track 3)
  6. ^ Walter von Andrian: Measures in the departure process at the SBB . In: Swiss Railway Review . No. 11 . Minirex, 2013, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 564 .
  7. Bauma , Galmiz , Lucens , Turbenthal and Wald
  8. Boncourt , Courtemaîche , Eschenz , Feuerthalen , Kempten , Kloten , Knonau , Kreuzlingen , Laufenburg , Le Locle , Le Pont , Mammern , Nieder- and Oberurnen , Noiraigue , Ossingen , Palézieux , Schlatt , Steckborn , Tägerwilen - Gottlieben , Uznach and Weiach- Kaiserstuhl
  9. ^ Mathias Rellstab: Further measures in the aftermath of Granges-Marnand . In: Swiss Railway Review . No. 2 . Minirex, 2014, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 54 .
  10. ^ Walter von Andrian, Fabian Scheeder: The collision in Rafz . In: Swiss Railway Review . No. 4 . Minirex, 2015, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 170-174 .
  11. ^ Rapport final du Service d'enquête suisse sur les accidents SESA sur la mise en danger survenue lors du croisement des trains 12913 et 4022 on 16 September 2013 in Granges-Marnand (VD). (PDF 0.4 MB) Final report of the Swiss Safety Investigation Board SUST on the train hazard of trains 12913 and 4022 on September 16, 2013 in Granges-Marnand (VD). March 5, 2015, accessed April 10, 2015 (French).