ETCS in Switzerland

This product introduction (describing migration ) and application of the train protection system European Train Control System in the Swiss Railways.

The main article describes the technical function of ETCS as well as the political and economic requirements for the development of this standard.

→ Main article : European Train Control System

The fundamental decision to use ETCS in Switzerland was made in February 1998. Underlying were

• equipping the new Mattstetten – Rothrist line for 200 km / h,
• the replacement of existing train protection systems due to obsolescence and
• interoperability with EU neighboring countries

including the associated cost reductions.

On March 24, 2006, the SBB Board of Directors approved the concept for the network-wide implementation of ETCS. The plan was to be able to use the entire standard gauge network in Switzerland with ETCS from 2016.

Trial and new lines with ETCS Level 2

In the 1990s, the Swiss Federal Railways (SBB) also wanted to be able to travel faster than 160 km / h on planned new lines. To do this, however, a system for signaling the driver's cab had to be introduced, since at higher speeds a reliable and weather-independent reading of normal route signals is no longer possible. The SBB included the ETCS, which was still in an early development phase, in the evaluation .

The following new lines in Switzerland have been in operation with ETCS Level 2 since 2007 :
1 Mattstetten – Rothrist with
   upgraded Solothurn – Wanzwil line (Dec. 2004)
2 Lötschberg Base Tunnel (Dec. 2007)

Test route Zofingen – Sempach

One of the first applications was the safety equipment for the new Mattstetten – Rothrist line. Before making a final decision, SBB wanted to gain sufficient experience with the new train control system itself. In July 1998, the radio coverage with conventional GSM for the 40 km long pilot section Zofingen - Sempach with European Train Control System Level 2 (ETCS L2) was tendered internationally and awarded in December 1998.

However, it was not possible to adhere to the planned schedules, which provided for corresponding operational tests with the following decision in the summer of 2000. The driver's cab software had not yet proven to be operational. On the night of April 17, 2001, after around 450 errors had previously been detected in around 120 test drives, a first large-scale test with a tight schedule could be carried out. On the night of April 27, 2002, the first commercial application of ETCS L2 went into regular operation on this section . In the first few months of operation, the system proved to be secure, but the reliability and availability were rated as unsatisfactory. The number of faults was reduced in the following months.

On the night of November 30, 2003, the ETCS equipment was taken out of service . The ETCS was replaced by conventional signaling that had been set up in the previous months . After the underlying draft of the ETCS specification became obsolete, the system was permanently decommissioned. The pilot system could not be upgraded to later ETCS versions.

New Mattstetten – Rothrist line

Intercity tilting train operated by ETCS Level 2 on the Mattstetten – Rothrist route

The commissioning of ETCS L2 in regular operation planned for December 2004 on the new Mattstetten – Rothrist line and the upgraded Solothurn – Wanzwil line was initially classified as too risky. For this reason, provisional conventional signaling was installed for timely commissioning. On July 2, 2006, a nocturnal advance operation was started. From 9:30 p.m., the trains ran at speeds of up to 160 km / h with ETCS. In the period from July to October, around 250 out of 2,300 trips were unsuccessful. A quarter of the malfunctions had operational reasons such as errors in vehicle dispatching. Another third was caused by connection problems between the ETCS vehicle computer ( European Vital Computer , EVC) and the ETCS line control center ( Radio Block Center , RBC). Problems with the distance measurement of the locomotives caused further delays . The requirements for the ETCS odometry are high because the ETCS L2 only has a few balises installed in the route. The faulty detection of the path through wheel revolutions due to slip and skidding was therefore supplemented with radar and acceleration sensors .

On March 18, 2007, the route was completely switched to ETCS L2 . Since then, up to 250 passenger trains and 50 freight trains have been running daily with ETCS control with minimal intervals of two minutes in mixed traffic ( freight and passenger trains ). It was the first use of ETCS L2 in regular operation . When the timetable changed in December 2007, the top speed was increased from 160 to 200 km / h. According to other information, the maximum speed had already been increased on July 29, 2007; however, this was initially only used in the event of delays.

The SBB's goal of delaying less than a minute per train per week due to ETCS was considered to have been fully achieved in spring 2007. After six years of operation, SBB drew a positive conclusion in mid-2013. They were satisfied with the reliability of ETCS, even though the requirements for capacity and security are very high. Around 650 vehicles from various railway companies now have access to the ETCS-L2 routes. Two conditions in the planning permission order of the Transport Department (DETEC) required that the fallback level on the new construction and the upgraded route be dismantled no later than ten years after the start of operations. The dismantling work (7.4 million francs) approved by the SBB Group Management in November 2010 and planned for the end of 2013 and beginning of 2014 should be completed by 2017. Optimizations to ETCS were also planned.

By the summer of 2017, the line will be modernized with ETCS L2 from the previous status SRS 2.2.2+ so that locomotives can run with SRS 3.4.0.

Lötschberg base tunnel

The Lötschberg Base Tunnel, which went into operation in 2007, has been equipped with ETCS Level 2 since it opened .

With the rail reform from January 1, 1999, the responsibility for determining the train control systems to be used changed. However, the newly responsible Federal Office of Transport (FOT) continued to pursue the strategy of applying the EU standard ETCS in Switzerland as well. This is why the BLS obliged to use level 2 in the Lötschberg base tunnel and not ETCS level 1 as originally intended .

Lötschberg base tunnel (34,577 m)
Legend 14.65 North portal 778 m above sea level M. 15.76 Adelrain splitting switch 788 m above sea level M. 29.28 Culminating point 828 m above sea level M. 33.89 Canton border Bern - Valais 35.22 Ferden splitting switch 767 m above sea level M. 49.11 South portal

In the Lötschberg base tunnel , BLS AG has been using ETCS L2 in regular operation since it opened. In the event that ETCS L2 would not have been available at the opening, a conventional "emergency signaling" was prepared. However, it would have had a lower capacity of around 40 trains per day, u. a. because of a reduced top speed of 160 km / h. Due to the positive experience with ETCS L2 , it was possible to dispense with the commissioning of the emergency signaling.

ETCS L2 enables a top speed of 250 km / h in the Lötschberg base tunnel. Although this speed is not extended in scheduled traffic, operational management is demanding as two thirds of the tunnel are only single-lane . If a train because of a derailment or a fire , the change direction of travel needs, is the ETCS mode Reversing (RV) are available. It allows the system to monitor reverse travel without the driver having to change the driver 's cab . The RV operating mode was later included in the ETCS specification.

On October 16, 2007, an ETCS-related accident occurred on the new Lötschberg base line near Frutigen , which only resulted in property damage. The cause of the derailment were software errors in the ETCS line control center . A stop command given by the line control center during the transition from conventional train protection ( level 0 ) to ETCS L2 was not transmitted to the Re 465 locomotive and the lack of confirmation was not recognized. The event caused temporary concern among experts about the operational safety of the complex ETCS system.

migration

Development of ETCS Level 1 Limited Supervision

Originally the SBB intended to switch their entire network directly from Integra-Signum to ETCS L2 . However, this would have resulted in very high costs for the replacement of all previous interlockings and a long time flow due to the complexity. Since with ETCS L1 the communication between the traction vehicle and the route infrastructure takes place via track-bound facilities such as balises, the requirements for the secure radio connection, an ETCS route control center and the interlocking technology are lower than with L2. The conversion to ETCS Level 1 Full Supervision (ETCS L1 FS) reduces capacity on heavily used routes, as the decision made at the same time in Luxembourg shows. In addition to this disadvantage, a high investment in trackside equipment is necessary, as has become known on the Spanish high-speed lines .

The SBB wanted a simplified version that essentially takes over the functions of classic train control systems. The inclusion of the LS mode in the ETCS system specification ( System Requirements Specification , SRS) was applied for in 2002 with the Change Request (CR) 637 at the European Railway Agency (ERA).

To ensure that ETCS is introduced and operated on the entire Swiss standard gauge network according to uniform principles, the FOT commissioned SBB in 2005, as the most experienced provider, with system leadership .

After prolonged resistance at European level, a solution emerged within the framework of the so-called ETCS Baseline 3 with limited supervision that would enable the Integra-Signum to be replaced during the transition period. Thanks to the so-called mini- LEU from Siemens , which transmits the terms of the signals to the balise, the signals can be connected with little effort and at low cost.

In a pilot test from September 2009 to February 2010 in Burgdorf , evidence was provided that the requirements of SBB can be met. For this purpose, 30 signals were equipped with ETCS L1 LS for the first time worldwide and an ETCS on-board device was temporarily installed in an RBe 540 multiple unit .

The development of ETCS L1 LS carried out in cooperation with the Deutsche Bahn , the similar migration problems in the power conversion to ETCS has and part of the freight corridor 1 ( Rotterdam -) Emmerich - Basel - ( Genoa wants to equip it).

Following these technical and political developments, the SBB announced in 2011 that the existing Integra-Signum and ZUB train control systems on the Swiss rail network would be supplemented by ETCS Level 1 Limited Supervision (ETCS L1 LS) by the end of 2017 .

With ETCS L1 LS - as with the Integra-Signum and ZUB - the driver is responsible for safety. However, this train control system monitors it in the background. Because ETCS L1 LS was only introduced with Baseline 3 , ETCS vehicle equipment based on SRS 2.xx cannot yet support the ETCS L1 LS application. Such vehicles require Integra Signum and ZUB equipment with a “backpack” or ZUB 262ct , which reads the ETCS telegrams and forwards the information to the Integra Signum and ZUB vehicle devices.

The first on-board units based on baseline 3 should be available in the course of 2017. The Federal Office of Transport hopes to be able to issue the first operating permits for the timetable change in December 2017.

See also: Section Limited Supervision Mode in the European Train Control System article

Migration strategy

1. Migration step: Equipping the vehicles with ETM , also known as the “backpack”, which carries the ETCS telegrams

Since 2014, newly purchased vehicles have to be equipped with or prepared for ETCS.

In December 2000, the FOT defined the strategy for the migration to ETCS, which pursues the following objectives:

• With a comprehensive replacement of the outdated Integra Signum and ZUB train protection systems with ETCS L1 LS only one train control equipment is required instead of the previous four (Integra-Signum, ZUB, ETM and ETCS).
• The changeover to ETCS L2 is to take place in the long term, because it is mainly associated with the replacement of the relay interlockings that are still widely used . With the use of ETCS L1 LS - in contrast to ETCS L2 - premature replacement of the interlockings is avoided on existing routes equipped with external signals . For this, however, enough vehicles equipped with ETCS must be available.
• Guaranteeing the interoperability of the standard gauge network with the neighboring countries of the European Union .
• Existing risks of overriding blocking signals should be reduced through the increased use of additional Eurobalises for speed monitoring.

2nd migration step : Replacement of the Integra Signum magnets and ZUB coupling coils by ...

... Eurobalises and EUR loops resulting in the transfer of Euro-Signum and Euro-ZUB serve.

In addition to ETCS L1 LS, Euro Signum and ZUB information will continue to be transmitted.

Because the balises will be transmitting ETCS-compliant information from 2017 at the latest, vehicles that are only equipped with ETCS will be able to move freely in Switzerland from this point on.

From 2017 onwards, vehicles that are only equipped with Integra-Signum and ZUB can operate as such with ETCS only on route sections without ETCS Level 2 .

The information transmission elements of the previous Integra-Signum train control system had to be replaced by components from the ETCS kit since 2003 and those from ZUB since 2008. The Eurobalises emit the Integra Signum and ZUB information in the data telegram appendix reserved for national applications (package 44). Since July 2014, every new vehicle must be equipped with ETCS or be prepared for later equipment.

So that the desired migration could be implemented technically and operationally, it took place in several stages:

• By 2005, all line traction vehicles and control cars were equipped with Eurobalise Transmission Module (ETM), also known colloquially as a “rucksack”. A simplified ETM-S was available for shunting locomotives , construction service vehicles and historic locomotives . The ETM forwards the information received from the Eurobalises to the Integra Signum and ZUB on-board devices.
• By 2017, the Integra Signum magnets as well as the track coupling coils and line conductors of the ZUB were replaced by Eurobalises or Euroloops . This system was called Euro-Signum or Euro-ZUB . In order to receive the Euro-Signum and Euro-ZUB data, all locomotives had to be equipped with ETM, ZUB 262ct or ETCS on-board equipment with the appropriate NTC module (software).
• The ETCS L1 mode was also implemented by 2017 LS introduced in track equipment. The balises and loops then transmit the corresponding ETCS information in addition to the national Euro-Signum and Euro-ZUB signal commands. Since this step and the continuous GSM-R equipment was completed in December 2017, ETCS vehicles (ETCS only) have been able to drive on the Swiss network without the former special national safety devices . From this point on, ETM or ZUB 262ct can be dispensed with in ETCS traction vehicles and these can be removed.

Introduction of ETCS Level 1 Limited Supervision

Freight corridors 1 and 2.

The transport ministers of the Netherlands , Germany , Switzerland and Italy decided in a joint declaration in 2009 to implement ETCS on the European freight transport corridor 1 . It was agreed that ETCS should be put into operation on the north-south axes through Switzerland when the timetable changes in December 2015. The rest of the standard gauge network should then be converted to ETCS by the 2017 timetable change.

The first Eurobalise was laid in Airolo in 2012 as part of a ceremony by SBB and its contractors . On this first section of the route, the last evidence for an operating license for ETCS L1 was provided with shadow drives LS were required. Since then, the railway lines in Ticino have been on ETCS L1 LS as well as Euro-Signum and Euro-ZUB converted.

From October 2012 to the beginning of 2013, BLS has the Blausee- Mitolz service station and the Spiez - Frutigen section with ETCS L1 LS equipped. There was u. a. with shadows on slopes of 27 ‰ the reliability of the distance measurement checked.

At the 2017 timetable change , the Swiss standard gauge network was converted to ETCS L1 LS largely completed. Most of the connections to neighboring countries were not yet ready. Commissioning of the missing sections will take place in the course of 2018.

• 

  Conversion of the Swiss rail network to ETCS L1 Limited Supervision

• 

  Schedule for the changeover of the BLS network to ETCS L1 LS

• 

  ETCS has been available on the Swiss rail network since 2017.

• 

  On the Gotthard line and the Lötschberg - Simplon axis ETCS has been put into operation, 2015.

Uniform error disclosure

If the on-board unit of the train control system detects an error, a message is automatically sent to a central incident management system via the train radio.

With the migration to ETCS L1 LS , the technically available options are now to be used for automatic error disclosure. With ETCS L1 LS , no fail-safe system ( SIL 4) similar to PTC is required on the line side. A malfunction or failure of the line equipment does not have to lead to the braking of a train. A continuation of the journey is permitted if faults in the train control system are recognized and rectified so quickly that safe rail operations are nevertheless guaranteed.

The FOT aims to ensure that all track-side faults that can be identified by the vehicle equipment are automatically transmitted to a central system for fault management and forwarded by this to the infrastructure operator concerned . Regardless of whether a Euro-Signum, Euro-ZUB or ETCS is used on a vehicle, the behavior of the error disclosure system should be as identical as possible.

If the train control system detects an error, it sends a message via the GSM-R train radio to a central system for fault management. This processes incoming error messages and automatically informs the infrastructure operator or the railway company concerned.

For ETCS only vehicle equipment , there was no solution for the transmission of fault messages in 2012. In 2014, the statutory requirements for the automatic transmission of errors were created in the implementing provisions for the Railway Ordinance (AB-EBV).

Increase in security standards

In 2012, a significant part of the signals was only secured with the Integra Signum. In the case of insufficient braking after a closed distant signal or when restarting against a main signal indicating a stop , a train collision could not necessarily be prevented by the Integra sign or the Euro sign. But in 2012 there were also main and distant signals without any train control equipment. They were in marshalling yards and in places with speeds of less than 40 km / h.

Risk assessment and effects of various train control systems

danger	Probability of occurrence	risk	Euro sign	Euro-ZUB	ETCS L1 LS with stop / warning function	ETCS L1 with speed monitoring
Failure to comply with a speed limit	medium	high	partially	Yes	partially	Yes
Failure to keep a stop	small to medium	high	partially	Yes	partially	Yes
Exceeding the line speed	small	medium	No	partially	No	yes, except for special cases
Early acceleration after speed restriction	medium	medium	No	partially	No	yes, except for special cases
Early departure with a signal indicating a stop	big	very high	No	partially	No	partially

1. ↑ ^{a b} Warning only needs to be acknowledged, the braking curve is not monitored.
2. ↑ ^{a b} The emergency braking only takes place at the signal, the slip path is not sufficient.
3. ↑ A selective speed monitoring is possible, but very complex. It only takes place in individual cases, e.g. B. when cornering after exiting a tunnel.
4. ↑ The number of monitoring areas is limited. Afterwards, only the maximum speed of the train can be monitored.
5. ↑ ^{a b} Small compromises when there is no route information, e.g. B. at track harps .
6. ↑ ^{a b} Only with a loop or additional infill balises . The loop is also only active for trains passing through, as it has to be activated via a balise

The table above shows that practically complete monitoring of train movements is only possible with ETCS L1 LS including speed monitoring . ZUB also offers good protection against high and very high dangers. The change from Integra-Signum to ETCS L1 LS only with stop / warning evaluation does not bring any security gain - with the exception of better error disclosure .

Increased security at SBB

In 2011, the SBB decided to retrofit a further 1700 with speed monitoring (Euro-ZUB) in addition to the 3200 signals already equipped with the migration to ETCS. A risk assessment was used to decide which signal locations should be equipped with Euro-ZUB instead of Euro-Signum.

While simple monitoring was set up in front of danger points with a low risk - with emergency braking at a stop and pre-warning, but without braking curve monitoring - braking curve monitoring was also implemented in front of danger points with high risk.

BLS and SOB security concepts

At BLS and the Swiss Southeast Railway (SOB), the switch to ETCS L1 LS with speed monitoring was well advanced in 2014 . From the point of view of the two private railways , risk-oriented equipment has the disadvantage that the risks suddenly change if there is an operational change. On single-track routes , as often occurs with BLS and SOB, an insignificant station can become an important crossing point if a train is delayed . In addition, the train control is usually adjusted too late when the timetable changes.

BLS and SOB have decided to equip all train running signals with speed monitoring. The BLS has around 1300 signals. Where it appears necessary, the speed monitoring is supplemented with a departure prevention. It ensures that the train cannot accelerate from a standstill before a signal indicates a stop. Speed ​​monitoring also includes speed changes and speed limits on the open road.

On the standard gauge lines of the Transports de Martigny et Régions (TMR) and the Travys as well as the Erzingen – Schaffhausen , Kreuzlingen – Konstanz lines and in the Basel area by DB Netz , the signals are also equipped with speed monitoring in the same way as BLS and SOB, with a few exceptions. The three- rail track of the Rhaetian Railway (RhB) and the four-rail track of the Zentralbahn (zb) will migrate to ETCS with speed monitoring in 2019.

Network-wide use of ETCS L2

ETCS L2 is to be in operation on the following routes by 2020:
  1 Mattstetten – Rothrist and Solothurn–
     Wanzwil (December 2004)
  2 Lötschberg base tunnel (December 2007)
  3 Gotthard base tunnel (2016)
  4 Ceneri base tunnel (2020)
  5 fountains ( excl.) - Altdorf –Rynächt
     (August 2015)
  6 Pollegio Nord– Castione Nord
     (December 2015)
  7 Pully - Villeneuve (April 2017)
  8 Sion - Sierre (2018)
  9 Giubiasco - S.Antonino (May 2018)
10 Roche VD - Vernayaz (202x)
11 Visp - Simplon (202x)

ETCS L2 has been used in the Gotthard Base Tunnel since it opened in 2016. The access routes well - Altdorf -Rynächt and Pollegio North Castione North were already on 2015 ETCS Level 2 converted. The Ceneri base tunnel will also be put into operation directly with ETCS L2 .

For the network-wide introduction of ETCS Level 2, the SBB presented the BAV with a migration plan in two variants in December 2016:

• Variant 1: If ETCS Level 2 were to be introduced to replace lost interlockings, this would result in migration by 2060 and costing CHF 9.5 billion. Among other things, up to 230 level crossings with a total cost of 0.6 billion Swiss francs would be required in the meantime.
• Variant 2: A second variant envisages replacing all interlocking interlockings with new ETCS interlockings within 13 years from around 2025 at a cost of around 6.1 billion Swiss francs. The feasibility of this variant will be examined by the end of 2019.
• Basis: Simply maintaining the conventional control and safety technology would also cost 6.1 billion francs.

From 2018 all new vehicles must be equipped with ETCS. The FOT decided in August 2011 that from 2025 only ETCS L2 will be used to replace interlockings . This increases safety because ETCS L2 permanently monitors the speed of the trains. On routes with freight and passenger traffic, the capacity can be increased by up to 15 percent. Because an outside signal has to be seen by the driver for at least 6 seconds, signals can often only be installed on winding routes after a greater curve-free distance, which reduces the route capacity. With ETCS L2 , this disadvantage is eliminated because all information is displayed on the screen without delay .

While ETCS L2 was used exclusively on new lines until 2015 , since then ETCS L2 has also been used in connection with the renewal of signal boxes on various sections of the Gotthard line . This is the first time that ETCS L2 will be used in medium-sized stations . In preparation for the network-wide use of ETCS L2 , various use cases were checked for their operational suitability. Only vehicles with full ETCS equipment can run on the lines converted to ETCS L2 . Therefore, since 2015 trains without ETCS can no longer get on the Gotthard mountain route.

On the Gotthard Railway, ETCS according to SRS 2.3.0d was used for the first time in Switzerland . SRS 2.2.2+ was used in the Level 2 projects that were previously commissioned . After frequent disruptions occurred on both sections of the route during commissioning, the situation had eased by spring 2016 and achieved the same reliability as before. Still existing ETCS problems on individual vehicle types were eliminated in cooperation with the vehicle manufacturers.

In April 2017, equipment with ETCS L2 went into operation on the Lausanne – Villeneuve route with minor starting problems . According to information from 2013, the ETCS functions merging , separating and turning should be used in regular operation for the first time. ETCS Level 2 should be ready for series production in 2020.

On the Sion - Sierre section, an ETCS L2 solution with infrastructure equipment from Siemens is to go into operation for the first time in Switzerland on October 28, 2018 . The defined functions of ETCS L2 are implemented on the real infrastructure of previous railway systems in an existing electronic interlocking . This includes technical interfaces (e.g. maneuvering signals) as well as the examination of existing regulations and rules within the framework of demanding operational processes. So far, this has not played a role in the implementation on new lines excluding train stations.

Track-side SRS of the ETCS Level 2 lines

Railway line	Current SRS
Mattstetten – Rothrist and Solothurn – Wanzwil	2.2.2+
Lötschberg base tunnel	2.3.0d
Brunnen (excl.) - Altdorf –Rynächt	2.3.0d
Gotthard Base Tunnel	2.3.0d
Pollegio North - Castione	2.3.0d
Lausanne (excl.) - Villeneuve	2.3.0d
Giubiasco	2.3.0d
Sion - Sierre	2.3.0d
Ceneri base tunnel	2.3.0d

criticism

The MRCE ES 64 F4-115 (189 115) advertises ETCS.

Between 2002 and 2007, CHF 610 million was invested in the procurement and testing of the system. In order to open up the Swiss network to interoperability, a further CHF 300 million will be used to equip the network with ETCS L1 LS . The prices for ETCS vehicle equipment are approaching the previous prices for ZUB and Integra-Signum. The retrofitting of the Integra-Signum and ZUB to ETCS L1 LS does not bring any significant security gain . For a further retrofitting of 1,700 signals with the functions of speed monitoring between the pre- and main signal and departure prevention, only 50 million Swiss francs are available. At the SBB, around 6,000 of around 11,000 signal points remain without speed monitoring. In contrast to the European Union , ETCS is not funded by public funds in Switzerland.

With the conversion of conventional routes to ETCS L2 , network access for vehicles without ETCS was restricted from 2015. No solution has yet been found for historic trains to enable them to run on route sections with ETCS L2 .

When maneuvering caused with most accidents on the railways because there the Zugbeeinflussungen are not present or superseded be set. During the practical introduction of ETCS, these functions have not yet been implemented due to the complexity and various local conditions. The previously used GSM-R radio standard also limited its use in larger train stations. With the development status of SRS 3.6.0 , however, the regulatory prerequisites are given to carry out station operations more safely without local or national special solutions. In Switzerland, the test center set up in Wallisellen is used for this purpose .

For vehicles without ZUB on- board equipment, the stricter rules of ETCS operation apply throughout the network, which force additional speed reductions in order to avoid violent emergency braking . These can particularly endanger passengers standing on the train. Engine drivers reported that ETCS triggered emergency brakes without prior notice if the speed was exceeded by 0.1 km / h. According to SBB, these and other restrictions lead to a loss of travel time of around 20 seconds when entering a train station.

In contrast to the ZUB operation, the ETCS monitoring curve does not extend to a standstill. The automatic release at 15 km / h leads to a residual risk. If a locomotive driver loses his ability to act in this phase, the train can continue to roll in an uncontrolled manner and hit the buffer stop in a terminal station without braking .

costs

According to an analysis in Switzerland, the conversion of 25 vehicles of a series accounts for around 30 to 40 percent for the ETCS components, 10 percent for their commissioning, 10 to 20 percent for necessary technical adjustments to the vehicle and 20 to 50 percent for the one-off Development of the implementation.

The high costs of ETCS vehicle equipment have to be borne by the freight transport companies that are in competition with road transport . The long depreciation periods for rail vehicles and systems as well as the lower share of the traction vehicle in relation to the transport volume in tonne-kilometers justify the investment.

As investment support for the railway companies, there are under certain conditions for the ETCS retrofitting of the vehicles used until the end of 2024 a cheaper train path price. The full ETCS equipment of a traction vehicle or control vehicle costs several hundred thousand francs . An amount of the same amount is added for each vehicle type for planning and project planning.

On the track side, ETCS L1 LS and the individual evaluation of the danger points should result in around 50 percent less costs than with full ETCS monitoring (speed and braking curve monitoring ) of all danger points. The postponement of the full equipment with ETCS L2 to the time of the technical obsolescence of the interlocking technology makes the migration easier to plan and makes better use of the existing investments. In addition, a fall in equipment prices on the part of suppliers and continuous qualification of specialists can reduce the financial burden.

Web links

• Status reports of the Federal Office of Transport's railway expansion programs
• ETCS Further information from the Federal Office of Transport

Individual references, comments

1. ^ ^{A b} Peter Eichenberger: Increase in capacity through ETCS . In: signal + wire . tape 99 , no. 3 , 2007, ISSN  0037-4997 , p. 6-14 .
2. ↑ Andreas Zünd, Hans-Peter Heiz: The network-wide implementation of ETCS in Switzerland . In: signal + wire . tape 98 , no. 7 + 8 , 2006, ISSN  0037-4997 , p. 6-9 .
3. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Stefan Sommer: ETCS in Switzerland - step by step to the goal. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . Issue 7/2013, ISSN  1421-2811 , pp. 351-353.
4. ↑ Urs Dolder: The introduction of driver's cab signaling at the SBB. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International. Issue 8-9 / 2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , pp. 354-358.
5. ^ Paul Messmer, Christopher Nicca: The radio supply with GSM-R for the ETCS pilot route Zofingen - Sempach of the SBB. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International. Issue 7/2000, ISSN  1421-2811 , pp. 310-313.
6. ^ Walter von Andrian: Nocturnal test drives with driver's cab signals at the SBB. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International. Issue 6/2001, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 253 f.
7. ^ Walter von Andrian: Driver's cab signaling Zofingen-Sempach in operation. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International. Issue 6/2002, ISSN  1421-2811 , pp. 276-277.
8. ^ Walter von Andrian: Persistent disturbances in the FSS test operation. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International. Issue 8–9 / 2002, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 379.
9. ^ Walter von Andrian: Test track for ETCS Level 2 switched off. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International. Issue 1/2004, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 36.
10. ↑ ERTMS development reaches the CRITICAL point . In: Railway Gazette International . tape 161 , no. 1 , 2005, ISSN  0373-5346 , p. 29-33 .
11. ^ Walter von Andrian: Interoperability and ETCS. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International. Issue 4/2005, ISSN  1421-2811 , pp. 172-174.
12. ^ Walter von Andrian: New delay in ETCS on the NBS Mattstetten - Rothrist. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International. Issue 1/2007, ISSN  1421-2811 , pp. 13-14.
13. ↑ European Train Control System ETCS - Status Report 2016. (PDF; 3.3 MB) (No longer available online.) In: Website. Swiss Confederation, Federal Office of Transport FOT, April 7, 2017, p. 19 , archived from the original on February 28, 2018 ; Retrieved April 26, 2017 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
14. ↑ European Train Control System ETCS - Status Report 2016. (PDF; 3.3 MB) (No longer available online.) In: Website. Swiss Confederation, Federal Office of Transport FOT, April 7, 2017, p. 34 , archived from the original on February 28, 2018 ; Retrieved April 26, 2017 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
15. ^ Railway amateur, 9/2007
16. ↑ Jacques Pore: ERTMS / ETCS - experiences and perspectives . In: signal + wire . tape 99 , no. 10 , 2007, ISSN  0037-4997 , p. 34-40 .
17. ↑ SBB are dismantling the ETCS fall-back plan . In: Swiss Railway Review . No. 5 , 2013, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 244 .
18. ↑ ^{a b} SBB: New line Mattstetten (excl.) - Rothrist (excl.) (NBS) Technical conditions of the line and requirements for the rolling stock. (PDF; 103kB) (No longer available online.) In: Network Statement, Appendix 9. SBB, I-FN-VT-GRE, February 1, 2017, archived from the original on April 26, 2017 ; Retrieved April 25, 2017 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
19. ↑ European Train Control System ETCS - Status Report 2016. (PDF, 3.3 MB) (No longer available online.) In: Website. Swiss Confederation, Federal Office of Transport FOT, April 7, 2017, p. 58 , archived from the original on February 28, 2018 ; Retrieved April 26, 2017 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
20. ^ Hans G. Wägli: Swiss rail network and Swiss rail profile CH +. AS Verlag , Zurich, 2010, ISBN 978-3-909111-74-9 .
21. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} European Train Control System ETCS - Status Report 2013. (PDF; 3.0 MB) (No longer available online.) In: Website. Swiss Confederation, Federal Office of Transport FOT, April 4, 2013, formerly in the original ; accessed on May 27, 2017 .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.    
22. ↑ Increase in the speed limit in the Lötschberg base tunnel in NZZ Online from December 31, 2008.
23. ^ Walter von Andrian: ETCS accident on the Lötschberg base line in Eisenbahn-Revue International, Issue 12/2007, ISSN  1421-2811 , pp. 584-585.
24. ↑ Jean Gross: Final report on the derailment of freight train 43647 of BLS AG on switch 34 (entrance to Lötschberg base line). (PDF; 2.3 MB) (No longer available online.) Swiss Accident Investigation Center for Railways and Ships (UUS), June 23, 2008, archived from the original on April 2, 2015 ; Retrieved July 20, 2013 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
25. ^ ^{A b c} Christian Panten, Jan Richard: Acceleration of the ETCS - Migration through the "Limited Supervision" operating mode . In: Railway technical review . tape 56 , no. 11 , 2007, ISSN  0013-2845 , p. 689-695 .
26. ↑ ^{a b c d} Federal Office of Transport (FOT): ERTMS. Implementation in the standard-gauge railway network in Switzerland ( memento of October 24, 2014 in the Internet Archive ). Bern, December 2012
27. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Walter von Andrian: From Signum and ZUB to ETCS Level 1 Limited Supervision. In: Swiss Railway Review , Issue 4/2010, ISSN  1022-7113 , pp. 198–199.
28. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} André Schweizer, Christian Schlatter, Urs Guggisberg, Ruedi Hösli: Train control concept and implementation of the migration to ETCS L1 LS for the standard-gauge private railways BLS and SOB . In: Swiss Railway Review . No. 3 . Minirex, 2015, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 146-149 .
29. ^ ^{A b} SBB, Walter von Andrian: ETCS L1 LS and speed monitoring at SBB. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International. Issue 11/2011, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 543.
30. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Federal Office of Transport (FOT): Guideline. Train control in the Swiss standard-gauge railway network. Migration from Signum / ZUB ( memento from October 24, 2014 in the Internet Archive ). Bern, 2012
31. ↑ New delays in "Baseline 3"? In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 6 , 2016, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 297 .
32. ↑ The following standard-gauge railways and lines have no or only limited network access (according to BAV: Guideline. Train control ... ): Steam Railway Association Zürcher Oberland , Deisswil – Worblaufen and Worblaufen – Oberzollikofen ( three -rail track of the RBS ), Niederbipp-Oberbipp (three -rail track of the ASm ), Rigi-Bahnen ( rack railway ), Rorschach – Heiden (cogwheel route of the AB ), Stadtbahn Lausanne , Foundation Museum Railway Stein am Rhein – Etzwilen – Hemishofen – Ramsen & Rielasingen – Singen and by summer 2016 Wohlen – Bremgarten West (three- rail track of the BDWM meanwhile dismantled )
33. ^ Level 2 on the Gotthard . In: Railway Gazette International . tape 171 , no. 9 , 2015, ISSN  0373-5346 , p. 30 .
34. ↑ When traveling in the shadows, the ETCS L1 LS runs in the background without any active intervention on commercially used passenger or freight trains. (BAV: European Train Control System ETCS. Status report 2012 )
35. ^ Mathias Rellstab: Swiss migration to ETCS L1 LS largely completed. In: Swiss Railway Review. No. 2/2018. Minirex, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 99.
36. ↑ Implementing provisions for the Railway Ordinance (AB-EBV) DETEC , July 1, 2016 (PDF; 3 MB). AB 38.3 Coordination  between infrastructure and vehicles
37. ↑ European Train Control System ETCS - Status Report 2016. (PDF; 3.3 MB) (No longer available online.) In: Website. Swiss Confederation, Federal Office of Transport FOT, April 7, 2017, p. 26 , archived from the original on February 28, 2018 ; Retrieved April 26, 2017 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
38. ↑ ^{a b c d} Migration from ETCS Level 2 at a dead end? In: Swiss Railway Review . No. 6 , June 2017, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 282 .
39. ↑ ^{a b} Martin Messerli: SmartRail 4.0: The ETCS interlocking. (PDF) (No longer available online.) SBB, April 20, 2017, pp. 5, 12 ff. , Archived from the original on April 23, 2017 ; accessed on April 23, 2017 (German). Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
40. ↑ The restart of the 185 series on the Gotthard failed . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 2 , 2016, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 80 f .
41. ↑ North-South axis: SBB is taking measures to improve the quality of the Gotthard. In: sbb.ch. Swiss Federal Railways, April 19, 2016, accessed on April 23, 2016 . 
42. ↑ Bombardier TRAXX locomotives approved for operation in the Gotthard Base Tunnel. In: press release. Bombardier Transportation (Switzerland) AG; Brown Boveri Street 5; CH-8050 Zurich, November 29, 2016, accessed on April 5, 2017 . 
43. ↑ Trafic ferroviaire restreint entre Lausanne et Villeneuve mardi 25 avril 2017 également. In: website. bahnonline.ch, April 24, 2017, accessed on May 7, 2018 (French). 
44. ↑ Stefan Sommer: ETCS in Switzerland - step by step to the goal. (PDF; 8.5 MB) (No longer available online.) In: Website. Association of Swiss Locomotive Drivers and Candidates VSLF, November 26, 2013, pp. 44-45 , formerly in the original ; accessed on May 4, 2017 .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.    
45. ↑ Planned restrictions on the infrastructures - SBB. (PDF) (No longer available online.) SBB Infrastructure, March 9, 2017, archived from the original on September 26, 2015 ; Retrieved April 5, 2017 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
46. ^ Replacement buses between Martigny and Leuk. In: sbb.ch. SBB, October 25, 2018, accessed on October 27, 2018 . 
47. ↑ ^{a b} -: Comprehensive ETCS tests. In: website. Siemens Schweiz AG, Corporate Communications, June 2014, accessed on May 4, 2017 . 
48. ↑ Introduction of ETCS Level 2 on the Lausanne (excl.) - Villeneuve route. (PDF) (No longer available online.) SBB Infrastructure, July 21, 2016, archived from the original on April 27, 2017 ; Retrieved April 26, 2017 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
49. ↑ European Train Control System (ETCS): Forward-looking steps in train protection. SBB, September 9, 2011, accessed on December 7, 2015 . 
50. ^ ^{A b} Walter von Andrian: Wrong developments in train protection. In: Swiss Railway Review. Issue 6/2013, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 274.
51. ↑ Chris Jackson: ERTMS moves on: 'there is no way back' . In: Railway Gazette International . tape 163 , no. 10 , 2007, ISSN  0373-5346 , p. 608 f .
52. ^ ^{A b} Walter von Andrian, Mathias Rellstab: Switzerland: ETCS brings travel time extensions . In: Swiss Railway Review . No. 2/2020 . Minirex, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 100 .
53. ↑ Wolfgang Jakob, Danilo Alba, Hannes Boyer, Patrick Clipperton, Ralf Kaminsky, Nigel Major, Cabeza Lopez Paco, Jacques Pore: ERTMS / ETCS - A Powerful Tool to Make Rail Traffic More Efficient . In: signal + wire . tape 98 , no. 12 , 2006, ISSN  0037-4997 , p. 40-43 .
54. ↑ Railway Network Access Ordinance (NZV) Art. 19c