Odometry (ETCS)

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Around 50 m in front of an ETCS stop board (top left in the picture), a simple Eurobalise (bottom right in the picture) serves as a reference point for the odometry and thus enables a better approach to the signal.

The odometry ( English odometry ) is an essential functionality of the European Zugbeeinflussungsssystems European Train Control System ( ETCS ).

The ETCS specification describes odometry as the “process of measuring the movement of a train along a track” which is used “to measure speed and distance”. ("The process of measuring the train's movement along the track. Used for speed measurement and distance measurement.")

The odometry is part of the ETCS vehicle reference architecture. The distance, speed and acceleration measurement must correspond to safety requirement level (SIL) 4 and is required for numerous functions of ETCS. These include u. a. the monitoring of constant maximum speeds and braking curves , position reports , the assignment of a train to a signal for issuing a travel permit , roll-away and standstill monitoring and (in level 3 ) as a basis for track vacancy reports .

meaning

Two Eurobalises on one track on the new Erfurt – Leipzig / Halle line

Clearly marked Eurobalises assigned to a fixed reference point of the route network enable the train to determine its exact position at these points. Starting from this reference point, the vehicle equipment continuously determines the path covered from the (known) balise position and relative path distance. Although Eurobalises are often laid about one kilometer apart, the train has location information available at any time in between, which can be processed for a variety of purposes.

ETCS essentially uses three different location information for a wide variety of purposes:

  • Approximate position of the head of the train ( estimated position ) where the head of the train is most likely to be from the point of view of the ETCS vehicle equipment. The characteristics of train and odometry are taken into account. This very likely location information is used for many non-safety-critical functions of ETCS. The level and RBC change takes place on the basis of this position information. It can also be processed, for example, by traffic control systems (TMS) or in automated driving (ATO) in order to optimize operation.
Excerpt from a driver's cab display (DMI) while an ETCS braking curve is running from currently 43 km / h to 0 km / h in 190 m: the max safe front end is always used as a basis for monitoring the braking curve . The actual distance to the target point is most likely greater. (In order to still reach the actual target point, a release speed must be provided.)
  • front safe front end ( max safe front end ), which results when the train has moved as far as could just be expected. This position information usually overestimates the distance covered since the last reference data point. In particular, it is used as the basis for the braking curve calculation.
  • Minimum safe front end , which results when the train has moved as short as expected. This position statement under estimates since the last reference point distance covered in the rule. In Full Supervision (FS) mode, an emergency brake is triggered when it has reached the end of the driving permit (EOA). It is also used to determine the location at which a train with its entire length has passed a speed-limiting switch and is allowed to accelerate again. Conditional (i.e. spatially limited) emergency stop orders (CES), such as those sent out regularly by some ETCS infrastructure operators for the purpose of assessing the stop , also refer to them.

Some ETCS functions also use corresponding information on the end of the train ( estimated , minimum or maximum safe rear end ). For example, in ETCS Level 3, the minimum safe rear end is also transmitted in the train integrity report required for track vacancy reports.

Eurobalises are read by the vehicle via an ETCS antenna (Balise Transmission Module, BTM).

Safe from the front and rear minimal Zugspitze resulting confidence interval of Zugstandorts ( train position confidence interval ) describes the area that the train is located in the with a defined probability. It includes the odometry error in both directions ( under-reading amount , over-reading amount ) and the double location accuracy of the relevant balise group . The odometry error is in turn composed of the distance measurement error when reading the underlying Bali location and the inaccuracy of the odometry for the path covered since then.

The distance measurement used by ETCS is relative, i.e. without reference to the environment in which the train is moving. Instead, Eurobalises serve as reference points. The main balise group ( last relevant balise group , LRBG) serves as a common spatial reference point for track and vehicle equipment. The greater the distance to the LRBG, the greater the confidence range. The trust area is usually reset when a new balise group is crossed and becomes an LRBG. For this one is linking the balise group required.

The balise laying accuracy is taken from the chaining information if chaining is available. The Q_LOCACC variable is used for this , which has a range of values ​​from 0 to 63 m and can be defined to the nearest meter. Otherwise, the national value Q_NVLOCACC is used or, if this is not set or not available (Baseline 2), its default value (12 m). In the Deutsche Bahn network, this national value is also 12 m.

The odometry error must be taken into account when planning the ETCS infrastructure. The larger the odometry error, the earlier the brake is announced and used. In order to avoid unnecessarily early use of the brakes, especially at critical points, excessively large distances between decisive balise groups should be avoided. In addition, in very long block sections it may be necessary to lay additional balises, which are only used to reposition the train in order to increase capacity. In Germany, for example, 50 and 300 m u. a. to arrange data points in front of block identifiers which are only used for localization. Other applications, before which the distance measurement error is minimized by means of upstream location data points, are main signals in the train station, main signals at stops on platforms on the open route , in front of ÜS level crossings and at system changes.

If a national train control system is integrated into ETCS vehicle equipment as a Specific Transmission Module , this also uses the ETCS odometry.

In automated driving (ATO), precisely laid balises are used in conjunction with odometry data for precise stopping, in the Thameslink project, for example, from ± 50 cm.

conditions

For the distance covered since the last LRBG, the distance measurement error ( over / under reading amount ) to be added lengthways to the top of the vehicle in both directions should not exceed 5 m + 5% of the distance covered. In the event of a malfunction of the vehicle equipment, it should nonetheless define a safe confidence interval. (If the vehicle equipment exactly fulfills the minimum requirements of the specification and an assumed balise laying error of ± 5 m, the distance measurement error on both sides would be exactly 60 m after 1000 m, for example.

If the inaccuracy of the speed measurement is not suppressed by national value, the speed measurement for speeds below 30 km / h must not exceed a tolerance of ± 2 km / h, for speeds above this the tolerance increases to ± 12 km / h at 500 km / h h linearly.

The approximate position of the Zugspitze should be determined less than a second before a position report is sent.

variables

The acceleration, speed and distance information from the odometry are compared by the ETCS on-board computer ( European Vital Computer , EVC) against numerous distance, speed and braking deceleration variables.

In the ETCS language ("ETCS Language"), variables ("variables") are used to code individual values ​​of data. Variables are combined into defined packages ("packets"). One or more packets in turn form a message ("message") that is transmitted via Balise (n), radio (Euroradio) or Euroloop . When transmitting via Eurobalise, a message can consist of one or more telegrams ("telegrams"), with each balise transmitting exactly one telegram.

ETCS uses 36 variables for distance specifications, including:

  • D_CYCLOC: Interval in which a position report is expected
  • D_NVROLL: Maximum path of the path and rollback monitoring
  • D_LINK: Distance to the next linked balise group
  • D_LRBG: Distance between the approximate position of the Zugspitze and the last relevant balise group (LRBG)
  • D_RBCTR: Distance to the RBC change
  • D_TEXTDISPLAY: Distance at which a text should be displayed

All these distance variables are 15 bits wide and have a range of values ​​from 0 m to 327,660 km.

20 m before the front safe Zugspitze reaches the end of the driving permit, a release speed of 15 km / h enables a faster approach than is possible within the target speed monitoring (TSM).

Another 18 variables concern speeds, including:

  • V_MAIN: maximum permissible speed based on the signaling
  • V_MAXTRAIN: maximum speed of the train
  • V_NVONSIGHT: maximum speed when driving on sight
  • V_NVREL: Release Speed
  • V_SHUNT: maximum speed when maneuvering
  • V_STATIC: locally permissible speed of the route (section of the Static Speed ​​Profile)
  • V_TRAIN: speed of the train

All speed variables begin with "V_", are 7 bits wide and cover a range of values ​​from 0 to 600 km / h in 5 km / h steps.

Another five variables concern braking accelerations. The 6-bit wide variables begin with "A_" and cover a range of values ​​from 0 to 3 m / s², in steps of 0.05 m².

For four of the variables distance, nine of the speed variables, and all five variables are acceleration of the route to the train when entering an ETCS area in the form of National values ( National Values transmitted). In addition, the Q_NVLOCACC variable is used to transmit a standard value for the balise laying accuracy, which is used if no linking information is available.

Sensors

The processing of odometry data is an essential task of the ETCS on-board device.

The use of only one measuring principle is not sufficient for a SIL 4 safe position determination. Rather, it is necessary to link several measurement methods. In a system sometimes called a Speed ​​and Distance Unit (SDU), the data obtained from various sensors and according to various measuring principles are converged, evaluated, corrected and implausible values, if necessary, suppressed in order to ultimately provide cyclical distance, speed and acceleration information to the higher-level systems to provide. In addition, a confidence interval with the maximum expected overshoot and undershoot is transmitted. In addition to instantaneous measured values, characteristic properties are also included. The selection and configuration of the sensors depends partly on the type of train.

Algorithms select the trustworthy sensors on the basis of status and plausibility tests and calculate distance, speed and acceleration using a combination of the sensor data. The exact algorithms are company secrets. If they are set too restrictively, this can lead to reduced availability. The selection, arrangement and configuration of the sensors used can in principle be freely chosen by the manufacturer, provided that the safety requirements for the odometry system are met. The safety requirements for the overall odometry system in turn result in requirements for the individual sensors.

Common sensors used for odometry are displacement pulse generators and radars, and sometimes also acceleration sensors. The “ EBICab 2000” system from Bombardier , for example, uses two optical pulse generators that are mounted on separate wheel axles, as well as a Doppler radar (as of 2006). The “Trainguard” system from Siemens uses two position pulse generators and two radars.

The ETCS equipment supplied by Alstom for the ICE 3 uses a radar in the (powered) end car and two distance pulse generators in the neighboring (non-powered) transformer car. For the Wuppertal suspension railway , on the other hand, Alstom uses wheel pulse generators, radar and acceleration sensors. In the future, Alstom is planning a combination of two wheel sensors, two GNSS sensors and an acceleration sensor on a 2-out-of-3 computer system. In Norway, the manufacturer received approval in mid-2020 for an odometry system based on inertial sensors and satellite navigation, which is to be used on 450 trains by 2026. The system should do without radar and, with the sensors in the train, be insensitive to weather influences and also function in tunnels.

Tight curves and steep gradients are considered to be comparatively difficult boundary conditions for odometry.

By analyzing operating data, a better understanding of the large amount of data provided by the sensors can be developed in order to improve the performance of the odometry. Such findings can also be used to optimize the selection and combination of sensors and fusion algorithms .

Speed ​​sensor

Tachometer on a bogie

Revolution counter, and tachometer , Radachsgeber or odometer pulse form the basis of ETCS odometry generally.

For example, magnetism or the Hall effect are used for scanning . Possible designs include installation in tapered roller bearings in new vehicles and retrofitting of sensors between the axlebox bearing housing and housing cover. In addition to the revolution counting, direction monitoring is also required.

The classic determination of the distance covered by determining the unrolled wheel circumference comes up against physical limits, which can lead to considerable differences between the distance actually covered and the measured distance. The reasons for this include measurement errors when determining the wheel diameter, time-dependent fluctuations in the unrolled diameter (wear), and sliding and skidding when braking and accelerating. In modern vehicles, there is often no free-running axle (without brake and drive) available, which is necessary for optimal distance measurement by means of an encoder. Furthermore, anti- skid and anti- skid systems make it difficult to measure distances per wheel rotation. Algorithms that recognize the slip resulting mainly from traction and braking systems are adapted to the behavior of the respective train type.

If you inadvertently forget to enter the correct wheel circumference during maintenance, the distance actually covered and the calculated distance drift further apart with each revolution.

In order to determine the distance covered and the speed from the rotational speed, the wheel diameter or circumference must be measured regularly and set on the ETCS on-board unit.

Doppler radar

Doppler radar for measuring distance and speed on a traction vehicle

Doppler radars use the Doppler effect to measure speed. The radars aligned with the superstructure are insensitive to measurement errors from the effects of sliding and skidding on the wheel.

However, they are considered to be prone to ice and snow. A particularly smooth, level superstructure such as the slab track , but also a blanket of snow, from which radio waves are uniformly reflected back, lead to poor values. Furthermore, radars are considered to be comparatively imprecise at very low speeds.

Accelerometer

Acceleration sensors are also used in some cases . They are insensitive to sliding and skidding, but cannot measure the distance covered, only accelerations.

For some train types, accelerometers are temporarily excluded from odometry at certain speeds. On the new lines of VDE 8 , the slab track proved to be so “flat and smooth” that actually functioning acceleration sensors were occasionally reported as malfunctioning, as the “rumbling” on the line was much less than expected. A data analysis from several thousand journeys showed that, given the unexpectedly good damping of the train type, the threshold for testing the sensor was set too high, so that limit values ​​were regularly exceeded and the sensor was excluded from the odometry. After evaluating the recorded data, the threshold value was adjusted, thereby improving the security and reliability of the system.

More sensors

Optical sensor on the power car of an ICE 1, aimed at the rail head

On the ICE 1 , sensors based on light-emitting diodes (LEDs) are used as the primary odometry system.

The use of satellite navigation (GNSS) is being considered or tested . In this context, the use of EGNOS and "virtual balises", whereby balise information is read from a digital map stored on the vehicle and Eurobalises should be largely superfluous, are being considered. They also experimented with satellite navigation in combination with fixed waypoints. A combination of satellite positioning in conjunction with Doppler radar, an optical sensor, an axis pulse generator, an eddy current sensor and an inertial sensor was also proposed for ETCS Level 3. Experiments were also carried out with laser scanners to recognize characteristic elements of the superstructure and, for example, switches and signals along the route that were compared with a digital route map stored on the vehicle.

Automatic object recognition with the help of software.

Before the end of 2019, DB Fernverkehr plans to test a system that uses object recognition from a camera behind the windscreen to obtain odometry data for over a year at VDE 8.

The Swiss Federal Railways are planning a combination of satellite navigation, inertial navigation and cycle path measurement to precisely locate rail vehicles.

A precise trackside location using fiber optics ( Distributed Acoustic Sensing ) is also being discussed .

GALILEO test and development environments were also used for experimentation .

Simulation of the sensors

During laboratory tests of ETCS vehicle devices, electrical signals for odometry or the speed can be transferred directly.

history

Already for the automatic train (LZB), which was ready for mass production in the 1970s, a vehicle-mounted odometry was developed. Due to its many loop crossings, the LZB provides reference points in high density compared to ETCS.

In the first ETCS project description from 1991, the creation of harmonized interfaces between the ETCS onboard unit and other peripheral systems of the vehicle equipment, such as odometry, was planned.

In the German ETCS pilot project Jüterbog-Halle / Leipzig , the importance of odometry and the complexity of sensor technology were the most important experiences in 2005.

An initially permissible deviation of seven meters, plus a percentage of the distance since the last tracking balise, could not be observed. Experience in test operation had shown that the systems available at the time did not succeed in providing such precise values ​​even under adverse weather and environmental conditions, SIL 4-safe. At that time, odometry was also considered safe, but not yet sufficiently robust. Alstom's system configuration - with speed measurement, radar and acceleration sensors - was considered vulnerable to adverse weather conditions; a revision was planned for 2007. The configuration used by Siemens, with two radars and a wheel pulse generator, was also not considered suitable for winter. Since the radar devices available at that time could not be heated, both radars failed in snow and ice, so that only speed information was available and emergency braking was initiated. Sensors and software were then further developed. Odometry component suppliers are also working on more robust software for their systems.

The ICE 1 , which was equipped for operation on the new Mattstetten – Rothrist line , also initially encountered odometry problems. With several new software versions, the robustness and maintainability have been significantly improved according to the manufacturer. The contractually required maximum limitation of the odometry error to 2% had been observed and a resumption of sensor activity after a failure of the distance measurement was implemented.

An operational trial of the first five ETCS-equipped ÖBB locomotives of the 1116 series around 2007 revealed a number of necessary improvements, including radar problems in winter. During the system integration of ETCS in Austria in the early 2010s, odometry problems and the resulting reactions on the vehicle and the track equipment were among the most common errors. In the first winter after the commissioning of ETCS there were “massive problems with the odometry”, which could be resolved by retrofitting balise groups in front of block signals, by improving the vehicle software and by heating the radar. The ICE T equipped with ETCS for use in Austria also showed "considerable odometry problems" during operation. The cause was the position pulse encoder drivers used, which were finally successfully exchanged for drivers used in other ICE series.

In the first months of operation of the new Erfurt – Leipzig / Halle line that went into operation in December 2015 , defective odometry components resulted in more delay minutes per incident than the failure of GSM-R radio modules. On the way back from the ceremony for the opening of the new Ebensfeld – Erfurt line , the premiere train suffered multiple emergency brakes in December 2017 due to an incorrectly entered wheel diameter and reached its destination with a 130-minute delay. In the following days there were a number of individual faults on ICE 1 multiple units, all of which fell within the scope of odometry. The majority of these multiple units had not previously been tested under real conditions. The deficiencies were eliminated within a few weeks.

With the locomotives of the Re 460 series , which were equipped with ETCS for the new Mattstetten – Rothrist line in the 2000s , the speed and distance recording caused major problems, which only succeeded after several years. As part of a modernization that began in 2018, the installation of IGBT converters led to a changed dynamic behavior of the traction motor , drive and wheelset, as a result of which the mathematical odometry model used up to now was no longer consistent. To u. To precede calculated speeds that are no longer safe, a safety surcharge of up to 18 km / h has been introduced, which is deducted from the determined speed in a fallback mode ("degraded" mode). Depending on the permitted speed, locomotive drivers should drive 10 to 20 km / h slower than permitted for the time being. If an emergency brake does occur, the odometry is restarted and the error is usually eliminated.

As the SBB announced in July 2019, incorrect settings had occurred in the maintenance of vehicles, which prevented the precise position of vehicles. As a result, a fire-fighting and rescue train in Flüelen and, on June 27, 2019, a Re 420 on the Lausanne – Villeneuve route were granted a travel permit not intended for the train. Incorrect parameters for the odometry (interchanged measurement angles and radar coefficients after maintenance) were stored in the Re 420, which led to a large inaccuracy in positioning (confidence interval). The error occurred after a driving license had been reduced due to a previous signal by means of a conditional emergency stop. The error occurred when establishing a connection to the RBC. Neither the onboard systems nor the safety systems along the railway line would have responded to this error. A repetition of this error should be excluded by various measures. The affected locomotive was parked, further journeys in ETCS level 2 areas were prevented by blocking the on-board computer ID. With systematic and continuous monitoring for abnormal odometry values, four vehicles were subjected to an inspection. In addition, all railway companies operating on the Swiss network were made aware of compliance with the maintenance processes, and information and instructions were distributed to train drivers and dispatchers. Software and configuration changes are also required on the track side. As an immediate measure, the stall assessment was deactivated in all affected RBCs and the odometry data continuously monitored. If an emergency brake occurs on the affected routes, the cause of which is not clearly identifiable, the train may continue to operate in Staff Responsible (SR) mode to a suitable point in order to be towed afterwards. As a result of the RBC changes made by July 15, 2019, there will be increased emergency brakes on some vehicle types when entering ETCS. The error is triggered by a double command of the level change within a computer cycle of the ETCS on-board unit, initially announced in advance by the RBC and shortly afterwards by a balise. Certain vehicles should drive at reduced speed at certain ETCS entrances. The problem should be eliminated by adapting the balise configuration.

outlook

The Swiss Federal Office of Transport sees better odometry as an essential prerequisite for the further expansion of ETCS Levels 2 and 3 in the standard gauge network. (Status: 2019). Without precise distance measurement, even in difficult external conditions or malfunctions, applications with driver's cab signaling or automatic train operation are hardly promising to implement.

Others

The ETCS-based train control system ZSI 127 uses a simplified odometry that only uses distance pulse generators.

The vehicles equipped with the ETCS-like train control system S-Bahn Berlin are equipped with a distance pulse generator and a radar.

Web links

literature

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