Reversing

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Mode reversing symbol in the driver's cab display ( DMI )
Driver's desk in the driver's area of ​​a new ICE 3 . The DMIs are arranged in the middle. In the desk is u. a. an integrated travel direction switch that can be used to change from forward to reverse.

In the European train control system ETCS, reversing (abbreviation RV ) is an operating mode in which trains are allowed to drive backwards in emergencies and incidents without changing the driver's cab .

The ETCS specification describes the operating mode as the operating state of the on- board unit in which the driver can change the direction of travel of the train without changing the driver's cab. (“ERTMS / ETCS on-board equipment mode that allows the driver to change the direction of movement of the train while controlling the train from the same cab.”). According to the specification, it should enable trains to escape a dangerous situation as quickly as possible and reach a "safe" location quickly. This enables trains to be evacuated on their own.

Reversing was first installed in the Lötschberg Base Tunnel, which opened in 2007, and is also used in the Gotthard Base Tunnel, which opened in 2016 .

properties

Reversing is one of 17 modes of the current ETCS specification.

It may only be selected in certain areas permitted by the route. This announcement should be made in front of the corresponding area of ​​the route. The route informs the train of the beginning and end of the reversing area, the distance, how far backwards (in relation to the end of the area) and the permitted speed. Reversing can be used in levels 1 , 2 and 3 .

This reversing information is one of the route information optionally provided by the route to the train.

  • The reversing area information (packet 138) is used to transmit the distance to the area with permissible reversing ( D_STARTREVERSE ) and its length ( L_REVERSEAREA ).
  • The reversing supervision information (package 139) is used to inform the vehicle of the reversing distance from the reference point ( D_REVERSE ) and speed ( V_REVERSE ).

The relevant balise group (LRBG) serves as the reference point . In level 1, information on the reversing area and its monitoring is transmitted via balise groups (and repeated on the following groups). In levels 2 and 3, the transmission takes place via RBC, if a corresponding balise group becomes an LRBG.

After switching to reversing mode, the route can provide the train with new information on the permissible route, the reference point on which it is based and the permissible speed. If the route sends the train new information about a reversing area, this information replaces all previous information of this type from the on-board unit. It is also possible to extend the beginning of the reversing area backwards (based on the end of the reversing area). The approximate position of the Zugspitze ( estimated front end of the train ) is used as a location reference .

Due to limited route data, the monitoring of the On-Board Unit in reversing mode is limited to compliance with the permissible maximum speed and the route approved for reversing. Emergency braking is triggered if the limit is exceeded . If the service brake application curve (SBI) is exceeded , there is a forced instead of a service brake. Emergency brakes triggered in reversing mode can only be released after confirmation by the driver or by extending the reversing distance in the meantime. If you then continue to drive against the direction of travel without an extended reversing distance, an emergency brake is triggered again.

In contrast to other operating modes, the maximum permissible speed in reversing mode is always determined by the route. There is no standard or national value . Level and RBC changes are not possible in reversing mode. Balise reading errors and system versions transmitted by balises that are larger than those of the vehicle are ignored in Reversing, as are faults in the balise reading device. The rollback monitoring ( Reverse Movement Protection ), which triggers an emergency braking when driving forward in the event of impermissible backward movements, acts in reversing on forward movements.

The vehicle continues to transmit position reports along the route , just as it would with a regular forward drive .

procedure

A change to reversing can take place from the operating modes Full Supervision (FS), Limited Supervision (LS) and On Sight (OS).

If the driver stops within a reversing area in the event of a dangerous event, he is informed that reversing is permitted. A symbol is displayed on the driver machine interface to the right below the speedometer.

If the vehicle device detects that it wants to drive backwards - for example by means of a direction switch turned into the reverse position - it asks for confirmation by means of a yellow symbol surrounded by a flashing yellow frame. After confirmation, the symbol turns gray and there is an immediate mode change to RV, in levels 2 and 3 the RBC is also informed about the mode change. In the DMI , the speedometer disc and planning area are hidden, instead the actual speed and the distance and speed permitted for reversing are shown. The driver should start driving when the mode change is complete.

The route remains set until the train has left the reversing area. Distance and speed are monitored according to the reversing information transmitted to the train. The rest of the process after the train has stopped at the end of the reversing distance is regulated by the infrastructure operator. At the end of the necessary reverse travel, the driver should deactivate the driver's cab in order to leave the reversing mode.

When driving backwards, the ETCS specification does not reset the location confidence interval (status: 2011). When setting the reverse train route, therefore, in addition to the maximum train length, the maximum odometry deviation in the route transmitted by the travel permit must be taken into account accordingly. This ensures that a reversing train can always move in a cleared route.

use

Reversing was first used worldwide in the Lötschberg Base Tunnel, which opened in 2007. Only every second block section is used.

In the Lötschberg and Gotthard Base Tunnels , trains are evacuated backwards using reversing in conjunction with highly automated tunnel control technology, without the driver leaving the driver's cab and other train personnel involved. In the opinion of the tunnel operator BLS from 2011, it was shown that reversing works reliably, but it is still not entirely clear how reliably a function can be relied on that is never used in normal operation. In the very rare event of an incident, very special operation by the driver is required, which is very different for each vehicle and on-board device.

Visp train station is around 5 km south of the south portal of the Lötschberg base tunnel.

In the event of an incident, a tunnel control system known as an automatic function calculates an evacuation concept for clearing the tunnel and requests appropriate routes from the signal boxes. The route protection is then carried out in the reverse routes to be set as in the forward routes . On this basis, travel permits are generated and updated according to the road conditions. A maximum of 80 km / h is permitted in the tunnel, and 40 km / h from around 1500 m in front of the portal. The target braking takes place in the Frutigen or Visp train stations . The RBC is informed about the route status in the signal boxes of the two stations that do not belong to the level 2 area via appropriate interfaces.

North portal of the Gotthard Base Tunnel

In the Gotthard Base Tunnel, drivers of passenger trains should try to change to the driver's cab (which is mandatory for driving through the tunnel) with the ETCS equipment switched on at the other end of the train in the event of an incident. If the circumstances do not allow this, reversing is also permitted for passenger trains. For reversing, among other things, the Gotthard Base Tunnel has an increased safety distance before and after freight trains, which means that only four instead of the planned six freight trains can pass through the tunnel in each direction. In Rynächt and in the southern approach area, there are stops where reversing trains can be parked. When a reversing train (as known from Position Report) reaches this location, the RBC sends a reversing distance of zero meters in order to prevent further reversing and thus set routes can be canceled again. Trains that are to use the tunnel must be able to reverse. This meant, for example, that the ETR 470 is not allowed to enter the tunnel (as of 2015).

In the Gotthard and Ceneri Base Tunnels, ETCS signals must be set up back to back for reversing . As a result, it is not possible to protect an electrical electrical separation point of the overhead line by signal coverage. There is a risk that a current collector will remain in an electrical separation bridged over both contact wires, which can lead to heating, tearing and ultimately short circuits on the vehicle roof. Shortly before the Gotthard Base Tunnel was opened, this problem became acute and immediate measures were taken.

Reversing is considered controversial in Switzerland.

Reversing is described in the guideline for ETCS operational management of the Austrian Federal Railways (ÖBB).

Reversing is not planned in the Deutsche Bahn network and we therefore do not plan on the route side. Instead, vehicles are reset according to the usual rules for vehicles without ETCS equipment.

history

After the Lötschberg Base Tunnel went into operation in June 2007, a software error was discovered in the vehicle software in November 2007, with which most of the locomotives traveling through the tunnel were equipped, around 450 in total. The calculation of the reset distance permitted with reversing was incorrect, whereby trains were not stopped at the intended location. The tunnel operator then temporarily shut down the reversing function. To compensate for this, u. a. Only reversible trains are permitted in passenger traffic and additional train attendants are used. As an immediate measure, operations were restricted in such a way that every train can leave the tunnel in forward travel in every conceivable case. Furthermore, u. a. the automatic activation of the major event alarm in the automatic computer, as a result of which reversing routes would have been automatically requested, prevented. Rescuing and dealing with an incident would have been more difficult because not all trains could have left the tunnel in reverse. The ban was lifted on April 7, 2008 after the affected vehicle software had been corrected, test drives had been carried out and safety evidence had been provided. According to information from BLS AlpTransit at the end of 2008, reversing already worked on the first test drive, despite many critical voices in advance.

Reversing was not yet available in vehicles equipped according to SRS 2.2.2+ . For the Gotthard base tunnel, trains therefore had to be upgraded to SRS 2.3.0d . After such software was initially not available for the ETR 610 , the SBB applied for an exemption from the BAV in order to be able to offer long-distance traffic between Switzerland and Italy through the tunnel temporarily without an upgrade.

A national rule (NR) that will apply in Switzerland from 2015 essentially requires that no braking is carried out in the reversing operating mode if an L1-LS balise group has been read.

After a malfunction in the trial operation, no automatic functions were available in the Gotthard Base Tunnel at the end of January 2016. a. also no automatic initiation of reversing.

After a freight train traveling south had come to a standstill in the Gotthard Base Tunnel between the multifunctional stations Sedrun and Faido on the night of February 17, 2017 , freight trains behind it were supposed to reverse to the north. One of the locomotives involved came to a stop on a switch. As a result, the tunnel was only fully navigable again after seven hours. The cause is a route set by the operations center over a section that is too short.

Two improvements to the reversing functionality are planned for the Gotthard and Ceneri Base Tunnels in 2020: On the one hand, the reversing safety distance, which was previously set to 1500 m based on the train length, has been designed to be configurable so that lower values ​​can also be allowed. On the other hand, any inaccuracies in the odometry are taken into account when calculating the reversing driving permit. If the vehicle reports a confidence interval greater than the ± 5 percent of the covered distance provided in the specification, this value is used to calculate the reversing distance.

German-language name

In German is Reversing mixed designated or described as reversing , driving backwards in case of danger , reversing in the tunnel in case of danger , Zürcksetzen , reversing with operation from the Zugspitze , secured reverse running in an emergency or signal even reverse travel .

DB Netz describes the operating mode as resetting , the ÖBB as reversing .

In Switzerland, the Swiss driving regulations initially used the ETCS operating modes in the respective national language with the English abbreviations, e.g. B. Reverse train (RV) . However, since most of the English terms have been used in practice, in the future (as of 2015) the terms will be used uniformly in English, including reversing .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c ETCS specification , subset 023, version 3.3.0, pp. 17, 19, 28.
  2. ↑ a b c d ETCS specification , subset 026, version 3.6.0, section 4.4.18.
  3. ↑ a b c d e ETCS specification , subset 026, version 3.6.0, section 5.13
  4. ↑ a b c Markus Fanta, Nicolas Steinmann: Protective measures for electrical disconnection of the catenary in the Ceneri base tunnel . In: Electric Railways . No. 2-3 , 2019, ISSN  0013-5437 , p. 76-85 .
  5. ↑ ETCS specification , subset 026, version 3.6.0, section 4.3.2.
  6. ↑ Norbert Apel, Jenny Strahl: Modes and their functionality - Description of the modes and transitions between modes . In: Peter Stanley (Ed.): ETCS for engineers . 1st edition. Eurailpress, Hamburg 2011, ISBN 978-3-7771-0416-4 , pp. 64-71 .
  7. ↑ a b c d ETCS specification , subset 026, version 3.6.0, section 3.15.4.
  8. ↑ a b c d e f ETCS specification , subset 026, version 3.6.0, section 3.11.7.
  9. ↑ ETCS specification , subset 026, version 3.6.0, section 3.7.1.
  10. ↑ a b ETCS specification , subset 026, version 3.6.0, sections 7.4.2.34, 7.4.2.35, 7.5.1.23, 7.5.1.27, 7.5.1.50, 7.5.1.170.
  11. ↑ ETCS specification , subset 026, version 3.6.0, section 8.4.4.6.1
  12. ↑ a b c d e Karin Löfstedt: Operating Scenarios . In: Peter Stanley (Ed.): ETCS for engineers . 1st edition. Eurailpress, Hamburg 2011, ISBN 978-3-7771-0416-4 , pp. 72-89 .
  13. ↑ ETCS specification , subset 026, version 3.6.0, section 3.1.4.1.7.1.
  14. ↑ ETCS specification , subset 026, version 3.6.0, section 4.7.2.
  15. ↑ a b c ETCS specification , ETCS Driver Machine Interface (document ERA_ERTMS_015560 ), version 3.6.0, sections 8.4.2 and 13.3.1.1.
  16. ↑ a b ERTMS OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND RULES. (PDF) European Railway Agency, April 9, 2019, p. 48 f. , accessed on December 7, 2019 .
  17. ↑ a b Dagmar Wander, Bruno Affolter: The safety system for the Gotthard base tunnel in a laboratory test . In: signal + wire . tape 103 , no. December 12 , 2011, ISSN  0037-4997 , p. 6-11 .
  18. ↑ a b c Peter Teuscher: Lötschberg Base Tunnel: Review of the construction and the first probation year in operation . In: Railway technical review . No. November 11 , 2008, ISSN  0013-2845 , p. 760 f .
  19. ↑ National ETCS solutions or standardization of the ETCS? In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 2 , 2009, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 66-69 .
  20. ↑ Marco Lüthi, Markus Montigel, Erwin Achermann, Hans-Peter Vetsch: Railway operations control systems to increase the safety of long railway tunnels . In: ETR SWISS . No. November 11 , 2011, ISSN  0013-2845 , p. 60-63 .
  21. ↑ a b Peter Germann, Hans Stadelmann, Eduard Wymann: Experiences with ETCS L2 in the Lötschberg base tunnel . In: Railway technical review . No. November 11 , 2011, ISSN  0013-2845 , p. 64-67 .
  22. ↑ Christian Hellwig, Dagmar Wander: Through the mountain at high speed - ETCS level 2 in the Lötschberg base tunnel . In: signal + wire . tape 96 , no. October 10 , 2004, ISSN  0037-4997 , p. 14-17 .
  23. ↑ a b Start of regular operations in the Gotthard Base Tunnel . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 2 , 2017, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 66-69 .
  24. ↑ Corrigenda to issue 2/2017 . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 3 , March 2017, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 142 .
  25. ↑ a b c The Gotthard Base Tunnel after a year and a half of operation . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 10 , 2018, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 512 f .
  26. ↑ Gotthard section converted to ETCS Level 2 . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 10 , 2015, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 482-486 .
  27. ↑ a b ETCS operational management guidelines. (PDF) 4,03,01_LF_Betriebsführung_ETCS. ÖBB Infrastruktur , July 11, 2012, p. 13, 285–288. , accessed December 7, 2019 .
  28. ^ Richard Kahl: ETCS Level 2 . In: Jochen Trinckauf , Ulrich Maschek, Richard Kahl, Claudia Krahl (eds.): ETCS in Germany . 1st edition. Eurailpress, Hamburg 2020, ISBN 978-3-96245-219-3 , pp. 203 .
  29. ↑ Second ETCS software error put the Lötschberg base tunnel at risk . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 1 , 2008, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 22 f .
  30. ↑ No more reversing ban . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 6 , 2008, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 292 .
  31. ↑ a b Gotthard delays: Findings and measures taken by SBB . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 6 , 2016, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 274-277 .
  32. ↑ Migration to ETCS and approval of vehicles in Switzerland . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 12 , 2012, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 590-592 .
  33. ↑ Total failure on the Gotthard axis . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 3 , March 2016, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 131 f .
  34. ↑ a b A freight train breakdown in the GBT raises questions about the safety concept . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 4 , April 2017, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 200 .
  35. ↑ Addendum to the freight train breakdown in the Gotthard base tunnel . In: Swiss Railway Review . No. 5 , May 2017, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 224 .
  36. ^ Walter Fuß, Dagmar Wander, Patrick Sonderegger, Leif Leopold ,: Railway safety technology in Swiss tunnels . In: signal + wire . tape 111 , no. December 12 , 2019, ISSN  0037-4997 , p. 44-50 .
  37. ^ ICE 4 and IC 2 in Switzerland . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 3 , March 2017, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 120 f .
  38. ↑ Rainer Eschlbeck: The European Train Control System . In: Your train . No. 5 , 2010, ISSN  0948-7263 , p. 20-24 .
  39. ↑ European Train Control System (ETCS) project. (PDF) Part of the specification sheet 1, Appendix 1 - Glossary -. DB Netz, p. 16 , accessed on December 7, 2019 .
  40. ↑ Peter Gerber: The forest of signal boards is being expanded with ETCS . In: Swiss Railway Review . No. 2 , February 2015, ISSN  1022-7113 , p. 94-96 .