Combat readiness (NVA)

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Under combat readiness was understood in the National People's Army of the GDR 's willingness and ability of military forces, under all conditions organizes the battle to start and commanded combat tasks to fulfill.

context

Readiness for action depended on many factors. In addition to technical and material prerequisites, the “political and moral condition”, the level of military training, the leadership quality of commanders and staffs, the operational readiness of combat technology and the alerting system were of great importance. The ability of the army command and the troops to establish the level of combat readiness ordered in each case was also important.

The National People's Army was conceived and developed as a mobilization army from the start . For the NVA's LaSK, this meant that there were six active divisions (in addition to many smaller and independent units and troops), which were divided into two military districts ( III and V , comparable to the strength of an army corps ) and 5 mobilization divisions . These were formed from some of the non-commissioned schools / training centers (AZ), a cadrated AZ (without non-commissioned school as a base) in the Waldfrieden property near Burg / Magdeburg of the NVA as the basic inventory and the military teaching facility for students (Seelingstädt near Gera).

In the 1980s, for example, a total of 430,000 to 500,000 men was planned in the event of war. The first operational squadrons should be able to carry out the tasks assigned to them without prior mobilization. Essentially, this affected all forces and associations of the NVA. Extensive mobilization preparations were planned for the second season. The mobilization could be triggered under cover or officially ordered in connection with the triggering of the highest level of combat readiness . In the 1980s, the NVA distinguished between four levels of combat readiness.

Each mobilization division had one or more control camps in which the heavy weapon systems ( tanks , armored personnel carriers, armored personnel carriers, artillery systems, rocket launch systems, anti-tank guidance systems, portable and on SPw, pontoon parks, rifle weapons, ammunition and explosives of all types and sizes, etc.) were stored and permanently maintained.

All technology that was not subject to purely military use was taken from the national economy. According to the presentation order, they had to show up at their assembly points at their assembly points at the ordered time, fully fueled with their vehicle and driver. There they were divided into the respective units, units and associations (according to the planning) and led in columns to their troops.

If necessary, this technology was overmolded beforehand (on the display site) and equipped with basic military equipment (camouflage net, spade, night lighting for searchlights, etc.).

Alert channels

Until the mid-1970s, the alert routes were determined by the existing radio and wire connections to the armed forces, units, units and facilities of the NVA. The alarm was issued manually and separately in all directions. Only then was the introduction of central alarm systems in the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty and in the NVA, the alarm system "MONUMENT" and "SCHNUR" , accordingly. The main news center of the MfNV secured the technical requirements for their use . The systems were installed in the operational command center of the Ministry of National Defense . Here the analysis of incoming signals from the staff of the United Armed Forces in Moscow , which possibly led to the triggering of higher levels of combat readiness in the NVA via the Schnur system, took place. No signals from Moscow were required to check the readiness of branches of the armed forces , units , units and facilities of the NVA. All communications / telecommunications connections connected to the Schnur system were subject to dual use. When using the Schnur system, they were automatically switched off from their state of constant use by the system and released again after the alarm. Alerting at the locations was organized via the daily combat divisions in the battalions, companies and platoons. Foot and vehicle alarms were designated for the daily duty output, which, in the event of an alarm, had to notify the army members living at the location (outside sleepers without a telephone connection) on fixed routes.

Combat readiness levels

  • Constant combat readiness - the normal state of most units and staffs. This meant, for example, that around 85% of the workforce had to be available on site, or at least on site, in order to be able to carry out initial combat tasks within a few minutes in the event of an alarm.
  • Increased combat readiness - measures were initiated to increase the readiness of the troops to carry out combat and mobilization tasks. As a rule, the entire staff was ordered into the barracks and the equipment and armament prepared for the following levels of combat readiness.
  • Readiness for action when there is a risk of war - further measures such as moving into secret decentralization rooms (including alternating concentration rooms ) and field airfields . This stage prepared the transition to the highest level of combat readiness. One began with the depreservation of the stored Soll-2-Technik, which was specially made available for the troops to be mobilized. Often it was older technology that was familiar to the mobilized reservists.
  • Full combat readiness - All forces (for example the LaSk mobilization divisions ) were fully mobilized and placed in the highest readiness to carry out combat tasks . This completed the mobilization of the NVA.

Parallel to the levels of combat readiness, there were a number of levels of readiness in the NVA's message system that could be triggered before one of the levels of combat readiness was triggered. So u. a. the readiness levels messages / air traffic control (BNF 1-3) or the radio, radio relay or switch combat readiness. With the help of these readiness levels, the message system could be set to the highest level of readiness before all other levels of combat readiness,

Real historical releases from higher levels of combat readiness

Construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961

To seal off the border and to militarily secure the building of the wall , Walter Ulbricht triggered the level of increased combat readiness for the entire NVA on August 13, 1961 at 1:30 a.m. The armament was made ready for use, movable supplies loaded onto motor vehicles, aircraft ammunitioned and prepared for the start of the battle. NVA units sent their liaison officers to the neighboring staffs of the Group of Soviet Armed Forces in Germany (GSSD).

Cuban Missile Crisis 1962

In the course of the Cuban Missile Crisis, on September 11, 1962 , the United High Command put large parts of the Soviet Army on alert, but left the armed forces of the other Warsaw Pact member states in normal combat readiness. After the crisis escalated on October 22, the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Grechko , ordered the armed forces of the other member states to be alarmed the next day. Accordingly, Walter Ulbricht ordered increased combat readiness for the entire NVA on October 23 at 9:00 p.m. Although Ulbricht acted in his capacity as chairman of the National Defense Council , he did not convene the body. The impending discharge of a third of the soldiers in the basic military service on November 1, 1962, was postponed and soldiers had to return to work from vacation. The full readiness for mobilization was established. The Volksmarine began to move a larger number of battle clear ships in "more favorable starting positions".

On October 24th, the NATO forces switched to the Minimize system and triggered the orange alert . The high command of the Warsaw Pact then increased the combat readiness to the level of combat readiness in the event of war . On October 26th, the 5th US Army Corps ordered the US land forces to be on high alert . As the crisis eased, the Orange Code was revoked for NATO . The Warsaw Pact armed forces maintained their combat readiness level until November 21, 1962. With the downgrading of the combat readiness level, the authority of the high command was returned to the national command.

Destruction of the “Prague Spring” in 1968

In preparation for the intervention of the Warsaw Pact troops to suppress the political movement of the Prague Spring , the NVA initially participated with two divisions ( 7th Panzer Division and 11th Motorized Rifle Division ) in Operation Danube , known as the maneuvering exercise . On August 20, 1968, Defense Minister and Army General Heinz Hoffmann announced by secret telex to the chiefs of Military Districts III and V the triggering of the increased combat readiness (EG), whereby in addition to the standard measures of the EG, the staffs and troops within the objects are on full combat readiness (VG) were to be brought. Weapons and ammunition should be given out, and troops should be kept on standby within the facilities. On August 21, 1968 shortly after 1:00 am, Hoffmann triggered the announced level of combat readiness with the signal "Barrage" and at the same time had the border between the GDR and CSSR cordoned off.

The divisions taking part in the maneuver were in full combat readiness . On September 11, 1968, the NVA was returned to permanent combat readiness , except for the two divisions, which were ordered back to their locations.

Action against the Solidarność movement in Poland from 1980 to 1982

In the summer of 1980, the Solidarność trade union emerged from a strike movement in Poland . The GDR leadership feared that this increasingly political movement could mean Poland's departure from the Warsaw Pact and, in effect, the extensive isolation of the GDR. Erich Honecker was therefore one of the most resolute supporters of a military solution. The party and state leaders of the WVO met on December 5, 1980 in Moscow to discuss how to proceed. Defense Minister Hoffmann signed order 118/80 on December 6, 1980. The 9th Panzer Division of the NVA , which was stationed in the north of the GDR near Eggesin , was thus put into combat readiness in the event of war threat. It was planned that in the event of a trigger they should advance towards Koszalin west of Gdansk with the troop reserves of ammunition or take a position. The situation was very explosive, especially in view of the discussion that German troops could cross the border to Poland again for the first time since 1939. It was not until April 5, 1982, long after martial law was declared in Poland , that the order was lifted again.

Peaceful revolution and opening of the wall in autumn 1989

On October 4, 1989, a train with the refugees from the occupied Prague embassy was supposed to leave the GDR for the West. There were tumults around Dresden Central Station with up to 20,000 participants who wanted to jump on the expected passing train. Stasi Minister Erich Mielke and SED district chief Hans Modrow turned to the NVA leadership between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. with a request for support. Defense Minister Heinz Keßler then triggered increased combat readiness for the entire Military District III . NVA troops were converted into 21 hundreds and received weapons and ammunition. In the night of October 4th to 5th and the following night, up to 2,000 NVA members were deployed.

Before and after the parade and the celebrations for the 40th anniversary of the GDR, from October 6th to 9th, 1989, on the basis of order 105/89 of the Minister for National Defense, the increased combat readiness for a motorized rifle battalion of the 1st Mot .-Schützendivision (1st MSD) in Stahnsdorf near Berlin and for a paratrooper company of the Air Storm Regiment 40 (LStR-40) in Lehnin . Order 105/89 was suspended again on October 11, 1989.

After the Wall opened in the night of November 9th to 10th, 1989, Fritz Streletz put the 1st MSD, the LStR-40 and the Grenzkommando Mitte (GKM) in increased combat readiness on November 10th at 12:00 noon . The Ministry of State Security also put the Feliks Dzierzynski Guard Regiment on this alert. This meant that 30,000 soldiers were in increased combat readiness .

Classification and comparison

The gradual increase in combat readiness could be used as part of the mobilization , but this was not mandatory either as a training situation or for real releases. The levels of combat readiness are comparable to the DEFCON levels of the US military, which, however, in contrast to the combat readiness levels, apply to the entire military or armed forces, while the combat readiness levels could be triggered in small parts down to the unit and object level .

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Youth encyclopedia of military affairs. Military Publishing House of the GDR, 1984, p. 88.
  2. ↑ Note: Under the political-moral condition one basically understood the political reliability of one's own soldiers for the SED regime and the motivation.
  3. ↑ Combat readiness on Flak11.de
  4. ↑ Torsten Diedrich (editor / worker on behalf of the Military History Research Office ): Handbook of the armed organs of the GDR. Augsburg 2004, ISBN 3-8289-0555-2 , p. 483ff.
  5. ↑ Hans-Hermann Hertle: Chronicle of the fall of the wall. 11th edition. Berlin 2009, p. 16.
  6. ↑ Matthias Uhl: "Ready to fight at any time" - The NVA during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In: Dimitrij N. Filippovych (ed.): Before the abyss: the armed forces of the USA and the USSR and their German allies in the Cuba crisis . Oldenbourg, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-486-57604-6 , pp. 99-120. (Series of the quarterly books for contemporary history)
  7. ^ BA Henning Wirtz: Opt out all Nuclear Exchange - a global view of the Cuba crisis.
  8. ↑ August 21, 1968: Entry - No Entry. The participation of the National People's Army of the GDR in the suppression of the "Prague Spring". ( Memento of the original from January 18, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Federal Archives. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.bundesarchiv.de
  9. ^ History and transformation of the SED state, contributions and analyzes, ed. by Klaus Schröder, Akademie-Verlag 1994, p. 167 ff. ( ISBN 3-05-002638-3 )
  10. ↑ Hans-Hermann Hertle: Chronicle of the fall of the wall. 11th edition. Berlin 2009, pp. 78–80.
  11. ↑ Hans-Hermann Hertle: Chronicle of the fall of the wall. 11th edition. Berlin 2009, p. 219.
  12. ↑ Hans-Hermann Hertle: Chronicle of the fall of the wall. 11th edition. Berlin 2009, pp. 220–228.