Little Russian identity

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article or the following section is not adequately provided with supporting documents ( e.g. individual evidence ). Information without sufficient evidence could be removed soon. Please help Wikipedia by researching the information and including good evidence.
View of the Kiev-Pechersk monastery , whose leaders and monks of the leading ideologues of the Little Russian identity and the triune Russian people were among

As a small Russian identity , the cultural, political and ethnic self-identification of those residents will be of as Little Russia area designated within the present-day Ukraine in the Russian Empire , made up, as a component of the triune Russian people understood.

Little Russian identity began to develop in the elite of the hetmanate in the 17th century. An important factor was the idea of ​​the equality of ethnic and social rights and opportunities that the Little Russian elite can enjoy in the Russian Empire, which they had been denied in the union of Poland-Lithuania . In the course of the following centuries the Little-Russian-All-Russian identity, which was officially promoted by the Russian Orthodox Church , developed into the dominant national identity in the territory of today's Ukraine.

In the second half of the 19th century, the Ukrainian idea developed as a counterweight . Characteristic features of Ukrainianism were the negation of cultural and ethnic ties to Russia and the political orientation towards the West, accompanied by the popularization of the alternative ethnonym Ukrainian instead of the official term Little Russian and the popular Russian or Ruthenian ( русини ). These political positions met opposition from those who continued to see themselves as Little Russians and Russian public opinion.

Fundamental shifts in power in the conflict between the two identity variants were triggered by the events of the Russian Revolution in 1917. They led to the rapid development of the Ukrainian national idea and the pursuit of autonomy, up to and including complete detachment from Russia. This was favored on the one hand by the massive influx of political activists from the Austrian Galicia to Kiev, on the other hand by the fact that the politically active bearers of the Little-Russian-All-Russian identity in the course of the Russian civil war in the ranks of the White Army many fell or emigrate had to. After the end of the civil war, the Ukrainian nation-building was continued by the Bolshevik-Soviet leadership as part of the Korenisazija and Ukrainization . The terms Little Russia and Little Russia have been suppressed as "ideologically reprehensible".

Origin and development

The sense of belonging among the Rus remained long after the Mongol invasion and the political division of the Rus. The intellectual and literary culture of both its eastern and its western part testifies to this. Russian chronicles repeatedly repeated the idea of ​​ecclesiastical, historical and dynastic unity of the Rus territories, as well as the need for their political gathering and reunification. Moral and political rights of foreign states to Russian territory were rejected.

The political ideology of Little Russia emerged at the same time as the revival of the Byzantine term Little Russia at the end of the 16th century in the works of the Orthodox clergy in Poland-Lithuania , who after the church union of Brest led a literary polemic with the Catholics and the Uniates . Against the background of the legal, economic and religious discrimination against the East Slav population, which arose in numerous revolts against Polish rule, the Little Russian idea quickly gained popularity among the citizens, Cossacks and Orthodox brotherhoods. The idea of ​​the protective Orthodox tsar, who leads the all-Russian people against the injustice of the Poles, found widespread use. The presence of such moods made it possible for Perejaslav to conclude an alliance in the course of the Khmelnytskyi uprising and for the hetmanate to be politically integrated into Tsarist Russia .

Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries

The unification initiative was not pushed by Russia, but was from the outset Little Russian. After the alliance was formed, a civil war broke out in the hetmanate between the forces who favored Russia and those who sought an understanding with Poland. The civil war known as "The Ruin" ended with the defeat of the Propolian faction and the final consolidation of the Little Russian identity, which had long been anchored in church circles. An important milestone was the publication of the Kiev Synopsis in 1674 by the Archimandrite of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, Innocent Giesel . It describes the dynastic succession between Kiev and Moscow and the existence of an all-Russian people since the times of the Kievan Rus . In the 18th century, the synopsis was the most widespread historical work in Russia.

“We Little Russians and Great Russians need a common poetry, a calm, strong and immortal poetry of truth, goodness and beauty. The Little Russian and the Great Russian are the souls of two twins who complement each other, are closely related and equally strong. It is impossible to give preference to one at the expense of the other. ”- Nikolai Gogol

Under the influence of the native Kiev and Archbishop of the Russian Orthodox Church Theophan Prokopowitsch , the Russian Empire became the primary object of identification for the Little Russians, while Little Russia was understood as a local homeland, which forms the Empire on an equal footing with the former Moscow state. The Cossack elite looked for ways to legitimize their social status in the hierarchy of the Russian Empire in order to benefit from attractive career opportunities. Supporters of the Little Russian idea saw the Russian Empire as their own state, which they were building together with the Great Russians. Their loyalty was fed, among other things, from long-awaited victories over the old enemies of southern Russia: Poland-Lithuania , the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire . Numerous Minor Russians held important political offices as early as the 18th century: Chancellor Alexander Besborodko , Minister for Enlightenment Pyotr Zavadovsky , State Secretary Dmitri Troschtschinsky , Field Marshal Kirill Razumovsky , etc.

Little Russian identity did not seek to blur local peculiarities, as long as they did not contradict what they considered most important: the idea of ​​cultural and political all-Russian unity. Bearers of the Little Russian identity were not of the opinion that they should sacrifice the interests of the Little Russians to the Great Russians or that they should abandon their identity in favor of the Greater Russian.

Little Russian identity was not the only form of self-identification that existed in Little Russia before the appearance of Ukrainians. Among the followers of Hetman Iwan Masepa , who betrayed Peter the Great and became King of Sweden Charles XII. the so-called Khazar myth was popular. He said that the "Cossack people" descended from the ancient Khazars and were therefore not related to the Russians. This version was also recorded in the so-called Orlyk Constitution . At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, theses that were presented in the book History of Rus were popular. There, too, the different origins of the small and large Russians were propagated. Despite all these alternative teachings, until the Russian Revolution of 1917, the majority of the spiritual, cultural and political elite of Little Russia remained the bearers of Little Russia's identity. It fitted itself freely and on an equal footing into the complex and multi-layered structures of the Russian Empire and later the USSR .

Rivalry with the Ukrainian idea

Russian Empire

Historian and Slavist Ivan Linnitschenko , who publicly polemicized with Mychajlo Hruschewskyj about the identity of Little Russia

In the second half of the 19th century an alternative direction of identity emerged, Ukrainianism . The naming refers to the word Ukraine, which originally referred to the border region in which the Zaporozhian Cossacks settled. The foundation of Ukrainianism was laid by the members of the Brotherhood of St. Cyril and Methodist around Nikolai Kostomarov , who at the same time advocated left-wing revolutionary ideas and emphasized the cultural independence of Ukraine.

With the support of the local authorities in the area of ​​the Austro-Hungarian Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria , Ukrainianism was very popular, although the Galician Russophiles opposed it. The rivalry between the Little Russian and Ukrainian identities took on the character of a culture war up to the First World War . The rhetorical battle was fought over the cultural heritage of Little Russia and the self-identification and belonging of many key figures, including Taras Shevchenko . A heated polemic broke out around historical questions, personal details and the interpretation of Little Russian and Ukrainian history. One of the most prominent figures in the ranks of the separatists became Mychajlo Hruschewskyj , author of the 10-volume monograph History of the Ukraine-Rus . He claimed that the Ukrainians had a separate ethnogenesis from the Russians , and tried to prove a separate development of the two peoples over the entire historical period. His views have been sharply criticized by the Russian public and academia. One of his most direct critics was the Kiev Slavist Ivan Linnichenko , who took the position that the history of Ukraine and Russia is inseparable.

A British Ethnic Map of Europe 1923

There was also a large difference between the “Little Russians” and “Ukrainians” in terms of language. While the first regarded the Russian literary language as a common creation and intellectual property of all three Russian sub-peoples and spoke of a dialect of Little Russian, the latter took the view that Ukrainian is an independent language and did everything possible to standardize it as quickly as possible. The vocabulary used in the cases in question was as different as possible from the Russian one.

Soviet Union

During the revolutionary years from 1917 to 1921, the minor Russian identity remained predominant, but was declared obsolete and illegal with the onset of the Bolshevik policy of Ukrainization (the local expression of the general Korenizazija policy). In the 1920s , the Bolshevik internationalists viewed the Ukrainian and Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic as a kind of exhibition pavilion for their nationality policy, hoping to win over the discriminated East Slav population in newly formed Poland . At the same time, the conservative Great Russian imperialism, which had been represented by the White Guards in the Russian civil war, was to be weakened . The Bolsheviks promoted the final realization and consolidation of the Ukrainian identity project. In 1926, the employees involved in the first all-Soviet census were instructed not to register anyone as a Little Russian, but only as a Ukrainian or a Russian. The term Little Russian only survived in the ranks of the white emigrants.

Although the term Little Russian had to give way to the new ethnonym Ukrainian everywhere on orders from the top and the concept of the triune Russian people was replaced by the concept of three different peoples, elements of the Little Russian identity remained. The Soviet power rejected an essential characteristic of Ukrainianism, namely the orientation towards the west. The Ukrainian people were seen as the “brother people” of Russia, and the pursuit of political unity with the Russian was described as a common thread of Ukrainian historical development. In this way the Soviet ideology combined elements of the Little Russian and Ukrainian identities. From the latter, in addition to the terminology, the assertion was adopted that Ukraine only had the status of a colony in the epoch of the tsarist empire.

present

One historian and political scientist takes the view that the Little Russian identity still exists today in parts of Ukrainian society, albeit without a clear definition and political structure. As proof of this, he cites the country's political turmoil and describes the Little Russian identity as a forgotten, but not gone, alternative.

See also

literature

  • Kohut Z . The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nationbuilding // Harvard Ukrainian Studies. - 1986. - 10. - H. 3/4. - P. 556-576.
  • Мацузато К . Ядро или периферия империи? Генерал-губернаторство и малороссийская идентичность // From Imperio . - 2002. - № 2.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d e f g h i Котенко А. Л., Мартынюк О. В., Миллер А. И. «Малоросс»: эволюция понятия до первой мировой войны ( Memento from December 13, 2013 in the Internet Archive ). Журнал Новое литературное обозрение. - М: ISSN  0869-6365 - С.9-27.
  2. ↑ a b c d Долбилов М., Миллер А. И. Западные окраины Российской империи. - Москва: Новое литературное обозрение, 2006. - С. 465-502. - 606 с.
  3. ↑ a b Барановская Н.М. Актуалізація ідей автономізму та федералізму в умовах національної революції 1917–1921 рр. як шлях відстоювання державницького розвитку України (укр.). Проверено February 17, 2013
  4. ↑ a b c Дмитриев М. В. Этнонациональные отношения русских и украинцев в свете новейших исследований // Вопросы истории -, 8. 2002. 154-159
  5. ↑ Данилевский Г. П. Знакомство с Гgоголем. (Из литературных воспоминаний) // Сочинения Изд. 9-е. - 1902. - Т. XIV. - С. 92-100.
  6. ↑ Plokhy S. The Two Russias of Teofan Prokopovych. P. 349, 359
  7. ↑ Когут З. Питання російсько-української єдности та української окремішности в українській української інсультя українській урімці інасультя уріномій уріномій уріномій урімці черультя уріномій урімці ченсультя уріномій уріномій урімці черультя. Студії ранньомодерної та модерної історії України. - К .: «Критика», 2004. - С.133-168.
  8. ↑ Кононенко, Василий. Элита Войска Запорожского - Гетманщины между проектами Малороссии и Российской империи (конец х 20 - начало 60-х гг в XVIII..) Актуальні проблеми вітчизняної та всесвітньої історії, 2010. С. 127-134
  9. ↑ a b Когут З. Українська еліта у XVIII столітті та її інтеґрація в російське дворянство // Коріння ідентичности. Студії ранньомодерної та модерної історії України. - К .: «Критика», 2004. - С.46-79
  10. ↑ Лаппо Иван Иванович Происхождение украинской идеологии Новейшего времени. - Опубликовано в журнале Вестник Юго-Западной Руси, 2007. № 5 .. - Ужгород, 1926.
  11. ↑ Миллер А. И. Формирование наций у восточных славян в XIX в. ( Memento from May 24, 2005 in the Internet Archive ) - проблема альтернативности и сравнительно-исторического контекста. Рус.ист.журнал. - 1999. Т. -. 130-170
  12. ↑ a b Serhii Plokhy. Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008
  13. ↑ a b Марчуков А. В. Малорусский проект: о решении украинско-русского национального вопроса , 23 ноября 2011
  14. ↑ a b Миллер А. И. Дуализм идентичностей на Украине ( Memento from July 30, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) // Отечественные записки. - № 34 (1) 2007. С. 84-96
  15. ↑ Закатнова А. Украинцы победили малороссов в трехвековом идейном бою // Российская газета: газета. - 2012, 3 июня.