Hetmanate
The hetmanate ( Ukrainian Гетьманщина Hetmanschtschyna ) refers to two historical communities in the area of today's Ukraine , each of which was under the leadership of a leader called a hetman :
- the Cossack hetmanate, which was founded in 1648 with the great Cossack uprising and lasted until 1782, and
- the short-lived, dependent puppet state of the Pawlo Skoropadskyj ( Ukrainian state ) installed by the German Empire and the German OHL from April 29 to December 14, 1918.
Formation of the Cossack Hetmanate
Since the end of the 15th century, new historical actors have appeared on the steppe border who were to gain central importance for the history of Ukraine . The Cossacks populate a considerable part of today's Ukraine and in 1648 a community, the hetmanate, is formed. Particularly in Ukrainian historiography, great importance is attached to the designation of the hetmanate as a " state ", while the self-designation in the sources is "Army of the Zaporog Cossacks ".
The term Cossack comes from the Turko-Tatar language and originally means "privateer". First sources from the 15th century speak of Tatars who were in the service of Lithuanian , Polish or East Slavic or Tatar rulers. On their behalf they carried out military and diplomatic tasks on the steppe border ( Ukraine ). Over the course of the century, the Tatars mixed with Russians and Ukrainians , so that as early as the 16th century, Cossacks had predominantly been influenced by East Slavs.
The Ukrainian and Russian Cossacks were decisively shaped by their spatial environment, the steppe border. They lived in the river forests on the lower Dnieper and the lower Don , which offered protection from invasions by other nomads. In Ukraine, Cossacks set up their fortified camps ( sitsch ) in the forests on the banks or on islands of the Dnieper. Since these were partly behind the Dnepr rapids (Ukrainian porohy ), the Cossacks were called Zaporožer (or Zaporoher, Russian Zaporoger ) Cossacks, which means something like "Cossacks behind the rapids".
In the course of the 16th century, the Cossacks formed larger associations on the steppe border of Ukraine. Around the middle of the century, the Starost of Cherkassy and Kaniw Dmytro Wyschneweckyj , who was in Polish service, had a fortress built on the Dnepr island of Mala Khortyzja as a starting point for attacks on the Tatars in the Crimea. This fortress is considered by many to be the first sitsch, despite research findings to the contrary. The highest decision-making body was the assembly of all Cossacks, the ring (kolo), which elected the officers and the supreme leader of the Cossack army, the hetman , and held court.
The elected hetman was given extensive powers, rights of life and death. All Cossacks owed him absolute obedience, but he could be voted out of office again through the "ring". The political organization of the Dnieper Cossacks showed a mixture of centralized military discipline and rudimentary elements of a democratic constitution.
As a result of the spread of serfdom and growing pressure from the Polish nobility, more and more peasants fled to the steppe border. They integrated themselves into the local society and adopted the Cossack way of life. In the course of the 16th century, the population of the Dnepr Cossacks, including the Cossacks in general, as well as the army grew. Officers were also recruited from among the fleeing peasants, so that they too received political weight in the army.
The relationship of the Dnepr Cossacks to the nobility of Poland-Lithuania and their king was very ambivalent. In the Cossack society, too, a social stratification developed, which led to multilayered conflicts of interest among the Cossacks themselves and between Cossack and Polish nobles. With the latter, among other things, competition played a role in the steppe exploitation - an important branch of income for the Cossacks. Since the end of the 15th century, Cossacks had been in the service of state representatives (such as the Starost). Since the second quarter of the 16th century, Cossacks were used significantly more in the Polish-Lithuanian border defense. At the same time, attempts were made to control the armed forces of the Cossacks, who often hired themselves out as mercenaries and were a constant source of unrest. In 1590 the register Cossack was formed as a unit subordinate to the Polish king. The register Cossacks, and only these, were granted privileges by the king for their services. This meant that more and more people tried to be included in the register and later the myth arose that the privileges were “natural” privileges of all Cossacks. In the 20s of the 17th century around 5000 to 6000 Cossacks were in Polish service in this way.
The Dnepr Cossacks broadened their sphere of influence as far as Kiev and in the second decade of the 17th century allied themselves with the religious and cultural elite in Kiev. This was connected to the Orthodox Church and was thus in conflict with the Catholic Poland-Lithuania. Petro Konaschewytsch-Sahaidatschnyj became hetman in the newly formed army of the Dnepr Cossacks. After the church union of Brest in 1595/96, Sahaidatschnyj openly advocated Orthodoxy and supported the Patriarch of Constantinople against Poland, who appointed new metropolitans and bishops in 1620. The Cossacks increasingly made the defense of Orthodoxy their own business. Therefore, their struggle was particularly directed against the United (Greek-Catholic) clergy.
The control of the Polish aristocratic republic over the border region ( Ukraine ) increased in the 17th century. This was not only achieved through increased cooperation with the Cossacks, but also through the establishment of numerous fortified bases. At the same time, the Polish magnates, with the help of their administrators , intervened more and more in the border region and brought the farmers living there into their dependence. Since the end of the 16th century, the Cossacks and the Ukrainian peasants who belonged to them rose again and again against magnates and administrators.
When Poland-Lithuania began to limit the privileges and the number of registered Cossacks, they too became increasingly involved in the protest movements, which, additionally fueled by the arbitrariness of the magnates, turned into popular uprisings against Polish-Lithuanian rule in the 1630s. The great uprising of 1637/1638 was bloodily suppressed by Polish troops and the Cossack register was restored as part of a reform. Some of the paid Cossacks were reduced and placed under direct Polish command, the simpler Cossacks under the command of administrators and magnates. Nevertheless, in large parts of the Ukrainian population, not only among the various Cossack groups, but also among the peasants, the urban population, the petty nobility and the Orthodox clergy, discontent continued to smolder.
A central problem that arose from the repeated recourse of the Polish-Lithuanian state to Cossack mercenaries was the uncontrolled wandering of Cossack units that were demobilized but remained united. The problem of demobilization also arose in May 1647 after extensive preparations had already been made for a campaign against the Tatars and the Ottoman Empire planned by the Polish King Władysław IV - but Szlachta in the Sejm forced the king to reject the war plan. The Cossacks, whose wages often consisted of spoils of war in such situations, had already begun to build boats to attack Ottoman troops. They found themselves now deprived of their income. The mixed situation of a large number of mobilized and now disappointed Cossacks and the oppression of the peasant population created a situation in which only one trigger was needed for a major uprising.
Ukrainian uprising and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi
Bohdan Khmelnyzkyj represented this trigger in 1648. As the son of a Ukrainian nobleman, Khmelnyzkyj had attended a Jesuit school and later joined the army of the register Cossacks. As a result of the conflict with a Polish nobleman who had claimed and plundered Khmelnytskyi, he fled to the Zaporozhian Cossacks . There he was elected hetman at the beginning of 1648 and he managed to win the Cossacks for a new uprising.
The Cossacks rose up for their restricted privileges since 1638, primarily against the Polish nobility and less against the Polish-Lithuanian king. Khmelnytskyi made an alliance with the Crimean Khan , which sent tens of thousands of horsemen to battle on the side of the Cossacks. It was essentially the Tatar cavalry that inflicted heavy defeats on the Polish troops. This became the signal for a popular uprising in large areas of Ukraine.
In addition to the Cossacks, Khmelnyzkyj received support from the formerly free peasants, who revolted against the dependence of the nobility and parts of the city population. Khmelnyzkyj achieved further successes against Polish armies in 1648 and moved with his Cossack army as far as Lviv in western Ukraine. There were serious anti-Jewish massacres with thousands of victims. The exact number of victims of these Cossack pogroms has long been the subject of research controversy. In 1650, in memory of the victims of the pogroms, the 20th day of the month of Sivan in the Jewish calendar was established as an annual fast day.
Uniate clergymen were also murdered by the Cossacks. Khmelnitsky returned to Kiev in January 1649, where he was received as a hero.
In Kiev, Khmelnitsky and the Cossacks came into close contact with the city's Orthodox clergy and educated elite. Hetman Khmelnytskyi announced that he would liberate the whole of the Russians from the Poles and Jews and that he would fight for the Orthodox faith as the independent ruler of the Russians.
His first concern, however, was not to defend Orthodoxy or to secure the independence of the peasants, but to confirm the Cossack privileges. He hoped to have the new Polish king Jan Kazimierz on his side against the nobles. After an unexpected declaration of neutrality by the Tatars in the Battle of Sboriw led to a stalemate, the "Treaty of Sboriw" was signed on August 18, 1649. It represented a compromise that was not satisfactory for either the Cossacks or the Polish Szlachta and therefore did not last long. In detail it provided:
- The number of paid Cossacks was increased to 40,000.
- In the three voivodeships of Kiev , Czernihów and Bracław , only the Cossack Starschyna and the Orthodox nobility should be allowed to hold offices.
- Polish army and Jews were banished from these voivodships.
- The Orthodox Church could not be further discriminated against.
- All those involved in the uprising were promised an amnesty.
- The Orthodox Metropolitan was promised a seat in the Polish Senate.
The Cossacks created a ruling association in Ukraine, which was officially called the Zaporož Army, which is now commonly referred to as the Hetmanate . The administrative organization followed the army organization of the Cossacks. Khmelnyzkyj organized his territory, he controlled areas on both sides of the Dnepr, which were divided into 16 areas (regiments). Khmelnyzkyj served the staff of officers as the executive (executive) who stood by the hetman.
However, the Polish-Lithuanian nobles could not come to terms with the concessions made by the king to the Ukrainian Cossack hetmanate under Khmelnytskyi. In 1651 a military strike followed, which caused the Dnepr Cossacks considerable losses because Khmelnyzkyj could no longer count on the support of the Tatars from the Crimea. The hetmanate of the Dnepr Cossacks alone was no match for the Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania, the leading Central and Eastern European power at the time. So Khmelnitsky was forced to look for allies and in 1651 entered into talks with two potential partners. In the south with the Ottoman Empire, in the north with the Moscow Empire.
Connection with the Tsar
Considerations to connect with the Orthodox Tsar in Moscow were not new. Several Cossack leaders and clergymen from Kiev tried to come under the protection (protectorate) of the Muscovite Tsar.
Chmelnyzkyj also asked the Muscovite Tsar for help in 1648 and offered him the prospect of the position of patron of the Zaporozhe. Tsar Aleksey, however, shied away from the conflict with Poland-Lithuania. In 1652 and 1653 two more Cossack delegations came to Moscow, this time the Tsar and his advisory body, the Boyar Duma, responded to the request of the Ukrainians. The Imperial Assembly (Zemskij Sobor) approved the tsar's decision in autumn 1653.
However, the rulers and the tsar were well aware of the consequences of this alliance with the Dnieper Cossacks, namely a conflict with Poland-Lithuania. The Tsar therefore sent envoys to the king in Poland, who should try to achieve peace between Poland-Lithuania and the Cossacks on the basis of the Treaty of Zboriv. However, this request was seen as interference in domestic Polish affairs and was rejected.
The Muscovite Czar also sent after contracting in 1654 delegations to Ukraine and left the meeting in Perejaslav to the Tsar a loyalty oath swear. The population in Kiev and other cities should also follow this oath of loyalty. Before that, a group of Cossacks from Kiev made their way to Moscow to deliver a petition with 23 articles to the Tsar, in which the rights and privileges of the Cossacks, the nobility and the urban population should be confirmed. The army of the Cossacks was to be a maximum of 60,000 men, the salary was regulated and the hetman was to retain the right, together with the army, to maintain relations with foreign powers. This was confirmed by the tsar in March 1654. However, the tsar restricted external relations, and contacts with the Ottoman sultan and the Polish king were only allowed with the tsar's permission.
The legal content of the Perejaslav oath is very controversial. Since with him the areas that are now part of Ukraine came under the rule of Moscow for the first time, this event is of great importance. The disagreements start with the choice of words. Was it a binding contract under international law between two equal partners in the sense of a military alliance or the oath of allegiance of subjects to a new ruler?
The Ukrainian side likes to emphasize the aspect of equality and accuse the Tsar of breach of contract. In the pre-revolutionary Russian and Soviet historiography, however, the act was celebrated as the "reunification of Ukraine with Russia".
After the failed alliance negotiations with third parties, Chmelnyzkyj had no choice but to submit to the Moscow Tsar if he did not want to lose the war against Poland for good. Nonetheless, he resorted to a dramatic but futile gesture by demanding that the Moscow delegation also swear an oath. This demand was rejected: Only the vassal, not the tsar, had to swear an oath that the ruler would graciously grant rights and privileges.
For Moscow this was the first step towards incorporation of Ukraine. The tsar now called himself “ruler of all of Greater and Little Russia” and referred to the Ukraine ( Lesser Russia) as his “father's inheritance ” ( votčina ).
Masepa's government
The 18th century saw the last economic and cultural heyday of the hetmanate under Hetman Masepa (1687–1708). For the last time, the Dnieper Cossacks appeared as an independent political factor.
Ivan Masepa came from the Ukrainian nobility of the Right Bank. He studied in Kiev at the Academy there and then in the Warsaw Jesuit College. He promoted the Orthodox Church and strengthened the position of the Cossack aristocracy, which came to more property. He didn't forget himself either - after all, he owned around 20,000 estates, which made him one of the richest men in Europe. After several years in the service of the Polish king and trips to Western Europe, he joined the right bank hetman Petro Doroshenko in 1669 and shortly thereafter the left bank hetman Ivan Samojlowytsch . In 1687, with support from Moscow, he was elected Samoylowytsch's successor.
Masepa worked loyally with the Russian government, was friends with the young Tsar Peter I and moved with him against the Ottoman fortress of Azov . Masepa also stood on the Russian side during the Northern War and, with Peters agreement, occupied right-bank Ukraine in 1703. The uprising of Semen Palij against Poland-Lithuania should serve as a pretext . However, he managed to reunite the two parts of the Khmelnytskyi Hetmanate.
In 1708 he changed fronts and joined the Swedish King Charles XII. on his Russian campaign. After the lost battle of Poltava , he fled with the king to the Ottoman Empire. He died there in September 1709 in the city of Bender .
Pylyp Orlyk was elected Masepa's successor. The King of Sweden named Orlyk the new hetman of the Ukrainian Cossacks in exile. Orlyk drew up a liberal constitution for the hetmanate - one of the first of its kind in Europe.
The end of the hetmanate
Even before the reign of Catherine II , the Ukrainian Cossacks had largely lost their military functions. The borders of the empire were far removed from the Ukraine and the Cossacks had not kept pace with the rapidly developing military technology. The Cossack privileges lost their foundations and gradually fell victim to the unification of rule in the Tsarist Empire.
The office of the hetman was abolished in 1764 and the regiments were replaced as administrative units by political and administrative institutions, as they existed in the rest of the empire.
The hetmanate in contemporary Ukrainian national discourse
The Ukrainian national discourse is dominated by attempts to draw a line of state continuity from medieval Kievan Rus via the Cossack hetmanate to the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and today's independent Ukraine. This way of writing “Ukrainian history” goes back to the nestor of Ukrainian historiography, Mychajlo Serhijowytsch Hruschewskyj . It is reflected in many ways, for example in the state symbolism of Ukraine.
Cossacks can be seen as the linchpin of the Ukrainian self-image. Cossacks are omnipresent - in literature and advertising as well as in political propaganda and art. Two of the banknotes of Ukraine are dedicated to the time of the hetmanate: the 5-hryvnia note shows Khmelnyzkyj, while the 10-hryvnia note shows Masepa.
Hetmanat 1918
From April 29, 1918 to December 14, 1918, after the coup d'état by Pavlo Skoropadskyj in Ukraine, a hetmanate was established again. The official state name of Ukraine was changed from " Ukrainian People's Republic " ( Українська Народна Республіка Ukrajinska Narodna Respublika - UNR ) to "Ukrainian State" ( Українська Держава Ukrajinska Dershawa ).
In the armistice negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, representatives of the Central Powers on the one hand and the socialist government of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) signed the so-called " Bread Peace " on February 9, 1918 . It was based essentially on the agreement that the UNR would deliver agricultural products to Germany and in return receive military aid against the Bolsheviks. Until then, the Russian side had refused to sign the unacceptable terms of the peace treaty proposed by the Germans.
From February 18, 1918, German and Austrian troops marched into Ukraine and occupied it. This enabled the UNR government, which had previously had to flee from the advancing Bolshevik troops , to return to Kiev.
In the Ukraine there was an irreconcilable contradiction between the landowners on the one hand and the landless peasant masses who had the socialist government on their side on the other. The landowners turned to the occupying power with a request for support, which then intervened in the powers of the government with a field cultivation order (April 6, 1918), which in turn prompted protests. The German side had long been dissatisfied with the UNR government as an agent to enforce its own interests, and so the German chief of staff in Kiev Wilhelm Groener (1867–1939) used the opportunity to get rid of the uncomfortable socialists.
On April 28, 1918, German soldiers violently disbanded the Rada, which was just in session . The next day the conservative landowner and General Pavlo Skoropadskyj , who had previously agreed to the German terms in negotiations, was declared the hetman of the whole of Ukraine by a congress of landowners. By designating the head of state as a hetman, it was hoped that the connection to “national” Cossack traditions would gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population.
Skoropadskyi's government was de facto a landowner dictatorship supported by German troops. There was much opposition to them, especially in the countryside. The German military was repeatedly deployed to suppress unrest and regional peasant uprisings.
In order to secure the support of the nationalist opposition, the hetman sought a national coat of paint. He promoted Ukrainian art and culture and set up schools. The social and economic situation remained catastrophic, Skoropadskyj's government was only supported by very few social forces from Ukraine itself, but there was strong opposition to it.
When the defeat of the Central Powers became apparent in the late summer of 1918, Skoropadskyj made contact with the Entente, a platoon that could no longer save his regime. In November 1918, the German Reich surrendered and Skoropadskyj lost its most important support. On December 14, 1918, he had to abdicate and was smuggled out of the country incognito.
Social-federalist forces tried to restore the UNR, but soon failed because Bolshevik troops took Kiev on February 2, 1919.
literature
- Carsten Kumke: Between the Polish Aristocratic Republic and the Russian Empire (1569–1657). In: Frank Golczewski (ed.): History of Ukraine . Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993. pp. 58-91. ISBN 3-525-36232-3
- Carsten Kumke: leaders and leaders among the Zaporog Cossacks. Structure and history of Cossack associations in the Polish-Lithuanian border region (1550–1648) . Harrassowitz, Berlin and Wiesbaden 1993 (= Research on Eastern European History, Volume 49). ISBN 3-447-03374-6
- Christian Ganzer: Soviet Heritage and Ukrainian Nation. The Museum of the History of Zaporozhian Cossacks on the island of Khortycja . ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart 2005 (= Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, vol. 19). ISBN 3-89821-504-0
- Frank E. Sysyn: The Jewish Factor in the Khmelnytsky Uprising . In: Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (eds.): Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective . Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988. pp. 43-54.
- Rudolf A. Mark : The failed state attempts . In: Frank Golczewski (ed.): History of Ukraine . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1993. pp. 172-201. ISBN 3-525-36232-3 (e.g. on the Skoropadskyjs hetmanate)
Individual evidence
- ↑ Kappeler, Andreas: "Little History of the Ukraine" 2nd act. Edition, Munich 2000, p. 54.
- ^ Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine (University of Toronto): Hetman Government
- ^ Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine (University of Toronto): Ukrainian State