Critical psychology

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Critical psychology describes a Marxist- oriented scientific direction in psychology . It was created at the same time around 1969, with different focuses, mainly in West Berlin at the Psychological Institute in Faculty 11 of the Free University , at the Psychological Institute of the Leibniz University in Hanover and at the University of Bremen, which at that time did not yet have a psychology course .

For the introduction

The self-designation critical psychology , also critical psychology , is used by different academic directions in psychology. The commonality of these approaches, to which z. For example, social constructivism in psychology, phenomenological psychology or psychoanalytical social psychology counts, lies in their demarcation from scientifically oriented psychology schools, which proceed methodically experimentally - statistically . Furthermore, the representatives of "critical psychology" view themselves skeptically towards "bourgeois, dominant" teaching and claim to question their approaches "in principle".

The term “critical psychology” refers to a specific scientific work context. Starting from Marxist positions in philosophy and social theory , basic concepts (" categories ") were developed in order to develop a "historical paradigm " for psychology and to overcome its "pre-paradigmatic" state.

These basic terms should serve so-called subject - scientific research, i. H. an analysis of subjective problems, which starts from the point of view of the person concerned and records the concrete connection between psychological, social and societal moments. It should enable a social self-understanding about reasons for action, under the assumption that social relationships are created by people and are therefore changeable - and open up corresponding possibilities for action.

With the development of critical psychology the intention is connected to initiate a complete reorientation of psychology ; As with most other "schools", its claim goes beyond that of a scientific school . The term “Berlin school of critical psychology” is therefore basically misleading, but is still in use internationally.

“Critical psychology is [...], according to Klaus Holzkamp, ​​'a never-ending process of gaining knowledge, ... a constant struggle against narrow-mindedness, superficiality, pseudo-knowledge, a permanent questioning of what is apparently self-evident' and 'a fundamental one Swimming against the current, especially against the current of one's own prejudices, and [...] against one's own tendency to allow oneself to be corrupted and give in to the ruling forces, to which all knowledge goes against the grain that could endanger their claim to power. '"

- Ute Osterkamp : Special Piranha


The history of critical psychology is closely related to the history of the Psychological Institute at the Free University of Berlin (PI): The work context arose there in the course of the student movement around 1968 and was only able to anchor itself institutionally there in the long term (although the approach was definitely also elsewhere in Germany - e.g. in Tübingen - and internationally - e.g. in Copenhagen - at universities and technical colleges).

The preparatory work by Holzkamp, ​​Staeuble and others in Berlin was received early on in West Germany and Western Europe. Students, tutors and assistants at universities such as Bochum, Marburg, Hannover etc. v. a. took up the anti-bourgeois approach and organized appropriate seminars and designed publications to the best of their ability. The work of Hermann Buhren, Ali Wacker and Adam Zureck from Bochum will serve as an example . In 1969 you published a reader entitled "Critical Psychology", a pirated print with texts by Herbert Marcuse , Jürgen Fijalkowski , Horst Baier, Klaus Holzkamp , Theodor W. Adorno , JD Bernal, Irmingard Staeuble , Wilhelm Reich and the Krofdorf Manifesto , a "discussion with Peter Brückner "as well as a congress resolution from Hanover. Shortly before that, on 15-16 May 1969 the congress "Critical and Oppositional Psychology" took place in Hanover. It was not constructive because an insoluble dispute between psychologists who asked the organizational question and those who wanted to smash the existing psychological theory / practice in their processes paralyzed all attempts at development.

In 1977 the first " Critical Psychology Congress " in the context of the "Holzkamp School" with more than 3000 participants took place in Marburg, followed by three more at larger intervals. The last one met in 1997 in Berlin. In addition, since 1983, nine further conferences have been held under the name “international holiday university”, and since 2010 again regularly every two years at the FU Berlin and the Alice Salomon University Berlin.

In 1978 the journal " Forum Kritische Psychologie " (FKP) was founded with the aim of promoting and documenting the scientific development of critical psychology. Since the 5th edition, bibliographies on critical psychology have been published regularly in the FKP. The current status (and much more information) can also be found online on the homepage of the “Society for Subject Scientific Research and Practice e. V. ".

Since the late 1980s the institutional situation of critical psychology has deteriorated noticeably. The development at the Free University of Berlin was exemplary : in 1995 the two psychological institutes were merged again against protests by students, which shifted the majority in the university political bodies. Klaus Holzkamp's professorship was not filled again after his death in 1995. The FU was repeated as well as the other universities in Berlin in the years affected by budget cuts and the default is faced to cut jobs in teaching. Even university strikes could not change that. The political will to defend critical psychology against the need to cut costs was present in a large proportion of the students, but not in the decision-makers, who took the opportunity here, as in other departments and universities, to push ahead with the restructuring of the university.

Nevertheless, today, in 2013, critical psychology is still being taught and further developed, albeit under much worse conditions than in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, the Alice Salomon University of Applied Sciences Berlin offered its vacation university Critical Psychology in 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 . The five-day event in September 2018 was attended by more than 900 participants.

On the concept of the critical

If the purpose of scientific work is to question, supplement, rearrange and, if necessary, discard already existing theoretical ideas about a subject area, science can in principle be described as " critical ". Against this background, the question often arises why the term “ critical psychology” underlines an (seeming) matter of course. Their advocates justify this with the claim to place an additional accent on the "critical" on emphasizing the social conditionality of "bourgeois" psychology: Social conditions are criticized in which, according to Marx, people are "humiliated, enslaved, abandoned, a contemptible being ”. The "institutional" psychology , which not only depicts these relationships in itself, but also helps to maintain them, is criticized not only where it can be used as an instrument (e.g. to make torture methods more effective), but rather on a theoretical level - by reducing people conceptually and methodologically to the level of organisms without a history, which inevitably react to a natural environment.

Categorical analysis - historical-empirical research


The starting point for critical-psychological research was the criticism of concepts from traditional psychology, which, however, led to work on new, more adequate, basic psychological terms at an early stage. Basic terms or “categories” are those components of a scientific statement that can neither be confirmed nor refuted in an “actual empirical way” (i.e. through the description and interpretation of currently observable events), but rather determine in advance which section of reality can be captured with a scientific language. According to the behavioristic theorem of “operant conditioning” , organisms, for example, show spontaneous behaviors more frequently when these are “positively reinforced” (that is, they are followed by a reward). When realizing this theorem (e.g. in animal experiments), the assumption of correlation that was formulated with this term can be empirically tested, but not the term "reinforcement" itself. All possible results can (and must) be within the conceptual framework of "Operant conditioning" can be interpreted, which itself remains unaffected: If the connection occurs as expected, this would be e.g. B. to be interpreted as meaning that "positive reinforcement" has taken place; if this is not the case, the interpretation would have to be that a measure was mistakenly chosen that does not have a “positive reinforcing” effect on the organism .

The functional-historical process

In critical psychology (based on Leontjew [1973]) an attempt is made with the “functional-historical analysis of the psychic” to develop psychological categories on a historical-empirical basis and to present this process in such a way that it is scientifically discussed and critically examined can be. Historical empiricism (in contrast to actual empiricism, see below) deals with the natural historical development of the psychic up to anthropogenesis , i.e. with the evolutionary development, the (preliminary) result of which is the human being alive today. The aim is to develop concepts that do justice to the psychological characteristics of the human species. In particular, it is about those human-specific abilities that evolved in the animal-human transition field and made the special, social, way of life of the human species possible. So that u. a. the assertion that society is necessarily in opposition to human nature and that individual needs must fail to be satisfied - a figure of thought that z. B. is of central importance for psychoanalysis . A biologically justified rejection of biological, z. B. Social Darwinist , reasoning.

For this purpose, the natural historical line of development that leads to people is reconstructed in a functional-historical process . In each case, the concrete relationships of the organisms to their environment and (where social behavior has developed) to their conspecifics are considered in detail . This shows that certain living conditions made the development of new psychological abilities (through mutation ) functional , i.e. led to a selection advantage. Since the manifestations of the psychic became more and more differentiated in the real historical process, a correspondingly differentiated system of terms is developed in the functional-historical process, which assigns the more general terms to the phylogenetically earlier phenomena - the starting point of the analysis is the general "sensitivity", which is already Protozoa comes at the end of the special "social nature" of humans.

An important intermediate step in the development of the psychic on the way to a specifically human social way of life is e.g. B. in the ability to grasp so-called "mean meanings", that is, to understand that certain objects are not only usable in a certain situation by chance, but, since they were made for this purpose, generally by people to solve a certain type of problem can be used. (Is assuming, of course, the ability adapted to the situation tools to manufacture or other objects;. This ability also have not only people but for example apes .) The ability to capture "means meanings," the foundation is cognitive Generalization ability of people seen, but also a new form of transferring experience and learning ability, which is not conveyed through social imitation , but through objects and their meaning.

Categorical analysis of the psychic in humans

With the historical transition to the social form of gaining life ("change of dominance"), the functional-historical process reaches its limits, because people no longer see themselves directly in a natural environment, but their individual existence is "mediated by society as a whole". Certain activities that are necessary for the maintenance of society (e.g. food production) do not have to be carried out by every single person, but only by a (sufficiently large) section of the people who are organized in a society. Individual action is therefore not directly “conditioned” by given circumstances, but neither does people act arbitrarily or “freely” in an idealistically transfigured sense. H. without having to take their living conditions into account. It is more appropriate to speak of the “subjective justification” of human action: For the individual, social necessities for action merely represent options for action to which he can consciously relate. This is where its relative freedom lies: it can make existing possibilities the premises of its intentions to act and try to realize them, but does not have to do so.

The principle (which Klaus Holzkamp defines as the “material a priori of individual science”) is that no one can consciously harm themselves. Attempts to refute the validity of this proposition through counterexamples are, since it is an a priori proposition, pointless and can essentially be refuted by two arguments: First, what appears to be self-harm from the external point of view can definitely have a positive meaning from the point of view of the subject - e.g. B. the starvation of an anorectic ; secondly, it is at liberty that people can unconsciously harm themselves - e.g. B. the psychologist who does not succeed in helping his clientele, but cannot attribute his frustration to his poor working conditions and therefore cannot change them for as long as he blames the clients as their "counseling resistance".

With the described possibility relation to the world goes hand in hand with the human potency to take a " Gnostic " distance to the world and to relate to fellow human beings " intersubjectively ", ie to recognize and recognize the justification of their views and intentions.

The transition to a social way of life also changes the relationship between people and their own needs and sensitivities: the individual can now only dispose of the conditions for his own gain of life to the extent that he or she participates in the social process of their production . This form of disposal that arises after the change in dominance is referred to as "personal capacity to act".

In principle, people in every historical situation are faced with the alternative of either using the options for action that are available to them in their particular social situation and coming to terms with their limitations, or trying to limit the general availability of the options for individual action (together with Others) to expand, d. H. to change social conditions. To analyze the contradictions that arise between the interest in securing the level of ability to act once achieved and the risky possibility of expanding it, the pair of terms “generalized” versus “restrictive ability to act” is used.

This analysis is particularly relevant in bourgeois class society , which Holzkamp analyzes in its most general features and sees it characterized by an antagonism between the general interest and the interest in the exploitation of capital: In order to be able to live, wage earners have to come to terms with externally determined working conditions and their labor to capitalists who own means of production sell who appropriate the surplus value produced in work . At the same time, it is ideologically suggested to interpret this historically determined relationship of exploitation as an unchangeable relationship of nature. In capitalist society , power and domination relationships mean that most people are largely excluded from controlling their own affairs. Under these circumstances, safeguarding one's own position is often (if not always) tantamount to reproducing the conditions of one's own oppression, but also the oppression of others.

The social implications of justifications for action in the sense of “generalized” or “restrictive ability to act” are analyzed using the terms “intersubjective relationships” or “instrumental relationships”. For example, the question that can be dealt with in a relationship is to what extent general interests are (can) be pursued cooperatively against the ruling partial interests, or whether relationships are characterized by the mutual use of the other for one's own partial interests.

The implications for the psychological functional aspects of the ability to act, cognition, emotion and motivation, are taken into account through further conceptual differentiations. With the pair of terms “understanding” versus “interpreting” is u. a. addressed the question of whether the societal mediation of individual existence in one's own thinking abolished or eliminated, and thus the direct experience of the individual situation in life is accepted as the limit of possible knowledge. With the help of the terms “generalized” and “restrictive emotionality”, a. clarify to what extent emotional discomfort that accompanies restrictive functional reasons for action can be broken down in such a way that real restrictive conditions become recognizable. The alternative is to separate unpleasant emotions (apparently) from the real living conditions and to interpret them as moments of "inwardness". The term “inner compulsion” finally enables the analysis of the question of how far one “internalizes” requirements set by others in such a way that their origin in relationships of domination is no longer recognizable, and subjectively they are no longer easily “motivated”, i. H. also in your own interest, traceable requirements can be distinguished.

The process of concept development summarized here and its results were presented by Holzkamp in 1985 in the "Fundamentals of Psychology". More recent work shows that Holzkamp's conclusions remain compatible with the historical-empirical findings that have been gained in the meantime.

Functions of critical-psychological categories

Critical-psychological categories are analytical terms, so they should serve interested people to better understand a complex reality. This is based on the assumption that the world, which can only be experienced subjectively in certain sections, is spontaneously interpreted in ideological forms of thought. Often suggested is z. For example, the “personalizing” interpretation of certain problems: a child who frequently leaves school at school, does not finish his tasks in the allotted time and makes a lot of mistakes, appears from this perspective immediately as “unfocused”; the question of whether teachers, classmates and parents behave in this way and whether the school system is designed in such a way that the child can (want to) concentrate, is lost sight of.

In other words, critical-psychological categories serve to examine so-called “preliminary terms ”, which can originate from everyday thinking, but also from scientific discourses, to determine the extent to which they are “too broad, too narrow, 'crooked', in the wrong context , which essential connections are isolated away in them, which central specifications and precisions are excluded etc. ”Interesting examples of such a conceptual criticism are Holzkamp's functional criticism of the term“ personality ”(1988), Markard's examination of attitude research (1984) and Holzkamp's gifted essay 1992 .

As a rule, (scientific) theories that already exist on certain problems, even if they are based on "preliminary terms", are not completely wrong, but have a certain knowledge content. What this consists of must be worked out in a “reinterpretative” manner so that existing findings can be saved in your own conception. A classic example of this is the reinterpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis by Ute Holzkamp-Osterkamp (1976).

A special case of reinterpretation is the possibility of expressing theories that were originally formulated in the “conditionality discourse” in the subject-scientific “reasoning discourse”. The conditionality discourse assumes that human behavior is the result of certain conditions. In this scientific language, theories are formulated in the psychological mainstream: This also applies when theories take psychological characteristics such as " intelligence " or "fearfulness" into account, because such "intermittent variables" are not moments of the subjective, but rather "inner" ones belonging to the person To understand conditions. In the justification discourse, on the other hand, connections are formulated between premises (possibilities for action accentuated in accordance with interests, wishes, expectations, etc.) and intentions (specifically action-related intentions).

Holzkamp was able to transfer statements from one scientific language to the other. a. show using learning theories . The theorem of " operant conditioning " is z. B. in the conditionality discourse formulated as follows: “If the activity of an organism is repeatedly followed by positive reinforcements, then this activity is carried out more frequently.” A reformulation in the reasoning discourse could e.g. For example, if I find that one of my actions is repeatedly followed by rewards, then I will reasonably do so more often. "

The insertion of the word “reasonably” is intended to make it clear that no contingent cause-and-effect relationship is formulated here, which may or may not occur empirically, but an implicative (i.e. meaningfully logical) “justification pattern ”. This is significant from an epistemological point of view: only contingent relationships can namely be empirically falsified and thus tested, while justification models apply regardless of their empirical realization. If a pattern of justification is not empirically realized, this can e.g. For example, this is because a person has accentuated other or additional premises that were not considered in the theory. In the context of his reinterpretation of socio-psychological theories, Holzkamp illustrates this with an everyday example: Although it immediately seems sensible to put on a sweater in cold weather, a person who wants to toughen himself will not do so for good reason.

Current critical psychological empiricism

Methodological principles

The subject of the actual empiricism are processes taking place here and now; In the approach of critical psychology, however, this does not mean “people”, but the world as people experience it. With the help of the historical-empirically obtained basic terms, subjective problems are to be clarified together with the person concerned: Here, social conditions are understood as a concrete relationship between subjective possibilities and disabilities, which can justify different behaviors to a problem. In each case, it is discussed to what extent a person contributes to the maintenance of power and domination relationships in the attempt to solve his problem, and thus consolidates the conditions of his own oppression and the oppression of others, or to what extent he - possibly together with others - can is to expand the general, and thus one's own, control over social living conditions (“restrictive” versus “generalized ability to act”).

From a critical-psychological perspective, it makes no sense to strictly separate conceptual and methodological discussions: “If the subject adequacy of a method is not known, i.e. one does not know what can be investigated with it, the scientific value of the objectification criteria that can be met is also unclear . "

The most important methodological conclusion that arises from the content-related categorical analysis concerns the “ subject-scientific ” character of critical psychology: If researchers want to do justice to the peculiarities of their “subject”, they have to “intersubjectively” focus on one or more other people or on each other Respectively. As a result, the level of “intersubjective understanding” in research must not be undercut, assuming the mutual recognition of those involved as subjects who actively pursue certain intentions from certain life contexts. Even more: The communication must be raised to a "metasubjective" level. For this purpose, all those involved in research, especially those affected by a problem, have to generalize their reasons for action by using subject-scientific terms so that they can be “understood” in the theoretical sense. If those affected do not yet have these terms, they are to be qualified as “fellow researchers”, insofar as this is necessary in view of a given question, since otherwise all those involved lose essential knowledge opportunities.

Subject-scientific generalizations refer to “subjective spaces of possibility”, current empirical statements each concern a “typical space of possibility”. At first, a relationship between possibilities and disabilities is explicated on the level of social living conditions and meanings, which is “typical” for a concrete historical situation. On this basis, it is possible to make assumptions about “typical” contexts in which these possibilities and obstacles are included as premises. In this way, it should finally become clear to what extent specific persons harm themselves or others in the arrangement with the circumstances, or what possibilities exist to expand the general and thus one's own disposal of relevant living conditions (“restrictive” versus “generalized ability to act”).

The subjects concerned decide for themselves whether such statements can be generalized: by checking research results, assigning their own case to a possible space, differentiating theoretical statements or rejecting them as inapplicable for their own case. This enables the relationship between type and individual case to be determined more and more precisely. The empirical validity of theoretical statements (as their practical meaning), on the other hand, should only be justifiable in the continuation of research as a common practice by researchers and those affected: Can the prerequisites specified in the theoretical assumption be realized and then an extension actually occurs the disposition of social living conditions, the assumption can claim validity.

A comprehensive discussion of the methodological principles of subject-scientific research can be found in Holzkamp's Fundamentals of Psychology ; further considerations, particularly on the relationship between subject-scientific and so-called “qualitative” research, can be found in Markard (1993).

Examples of current empirical research

The methodological concept of the "development figure" represents an attempt to concretise the methodological principles of critical psychology . Based on an analysis of the relevant social conditions and meanings, a problem that arises from the data is presented by those affected and their fellow researchers Identified and interpreted, secondly, competing interpretations are discussed and the possibility of “defending against” unpleasant findings is considered, thirdly, the practice of those affected is restructured, and fourthly, the consequences of the practical change are reported back.

A problematic situation could e.g. For example, a toddler who is regularly put to bed with the comment that it is certainly already tired screams every evening and thereby disturbs its parents. One possible interpretation of what happened would be that the child is put to bed very early, not because of his own fatigue, but because of the parents' need to "finally have some rest" in the evening and not have to look after the child. In that light, the child yelled for good reason, namely to let the parents know that they are not yet tired. This interpretation should u. U. be defended against the defense mechanisms of the parents, since it is considered selfish to give priority to one's own needs over those of the child, and this is therefore difficult to admit. One possibility for the practical change that results from this interpretation would be to abandon the fixed bedtime and let the child decide for themselves, depending on their sleep needs, when they want to be put to bed. The consequences would have to be discussed further in each case, as they can in turn be problematic - for example because of the parents' working hours and the need to attend kindergarten at these times.

Examples of current empirical research in critical psychology are:

  • the project subject development in early childhood, in which problems of child-adult coordination, i.e. dealing with (one's own) children, were discussed;
  • the racism project, in which problems of work and life in refugee homes were negotiated together with residents and employees;
  • student practical research , in which students - based on an analysis of the institutional framework - analyze experiences in their student internships;
  • the research project Lifestyle, in which problems that the participating researchers are confronted with in their everyday life are discussed and analyzed (2004).

The youth research of the Tübingen working group around Held and the psychotherapy research of Dreier are also significantly influenced by the concepts presented so far . Furthermore, the projects for which Frigga Haug is (jointly) responsible must be mentioned (women's forms, learning relationships).


(sorted chronologically)

  • Karl Marx: On the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right . Introduction. In the S. and Fr. Engels, Werke Vol. 1. Dietz, Berlin 1976, pp. 378-391.
  • Alexej N. Leontjew : Problems of the Development of the Psychic . Athenaeum Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1973.
  • Klaus Holzkamp : Critical Psychology. Preparatory work. Frankfurt am Main 1971
  • Klaus Holzkamp: Sensual Knowledge - Historical Origin and Social Function of Perception. Athenäum Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1973, ISBN 3-8072-4100-0 .
  • Volker Schurig : The Origin of Consciousness. Campus, Frankfurt am Main / New York 1976, ISBN 3-593-32522-5 .
  • Ute H.-Osterkamp : Fundamentals of psychological motivation research 1 . Campus, Frankfurt am Main / New York 1975, 2nd campus, Frankfurt am Main / New York 1976, ISBN 3-593-32521-7 .
  • Karl-Heinz Braun and Klaus Holzkamp (eds.): Report on the 1st International Congress on Critical Psychology from 13. – 15. May 1977 in Marburg. Vol. 1 and 2. Pahl-Rugenstein, Cologne 1977. ISBN 3-7609-0330-4 , 3-76090-350-9.
  • More Markard : Attitude. Critique of a basic social-psychological concept. Campus, Frankfurt am Main / New York 1984, ISBN 3-593-33422-4 .
  • Klaus Holzkamp: Foundations of Psychology. Campus, Frankfurt am Main / New York 1985, ISBN 3-593-33572-7 .
  • Karl-Heinz Braun, Klaus Holzkamp, ​​Lothar Pawliczak, Werner Röhr, Konstanze Wetzel: Contributions to critical psychology . Teaching texts on psychology. Personality Psychology I / 85 ed. by Manfred Vorwerg. Leipzig 1985
  • Klaus Holzkamp: "Personality" - On the functional criticism of a term. in: Forum Kritische Psychologie , 22, 1988, ISBN 3-88619-722-0 , pp. 123-132.
  • More Markard: Methodology of Subject Scientific Research. Beyond the quarrel about quantitative and qualitative methods. Argument, Hamburg, Berlin 1993, ISBN 3-88619-723-9 .
  • Klaus Holzkamp: Learning. Subject-scientific foundation. Campus, Frankfurt am Main / New York 1995, ISBN 3-593-35317-2 .
  • Klaus Holzkamp: Psychology: Understanding the reasons for action. In: Forum Kritische Psychologie , 36, 1996, ISBN 3-88619-774-3 , pp. 7-112.
  • Barbara Fried, Christina Kaindl, More Markard & Gerhard Wolf (eds.): Knowledge and partiality. Critical Psychology as a Marxist Subject Science. Report on the 4th Congress of Critical Psychology, February 6-9, 1997 at the Free University of Berlin. Argument, Hamburg 1997, ISBN 3-88619-254-7 .
  • More Markard & Training Project Subject Scientific Professional Practice: Against Mainstream and Psychoboom. Critical psychology and student practical research. Argument, Hamburg 2000, ISBN 3-88619-730-1 .
  • Ute Osterkamp , Ulla Lindemann, Petra Wagner: Subject science from the external point of view? Reply to Barbara Fried , in: Forum Kritische Psychologie , 44, 2002, ISBN 3-88619-782-4 , pp. 152-176.
  • Volker Schurig: Psychophylogenesis and environmental psychology as a scientific subject area of ​​critical psychology , in: Forum Kritische Psychologie , 50, 2006, ISBN 3-88619-788-3 , pp. 133–151.
  • Ole Dreier: Psychotherapy in Everyday Life. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge / MA 2007, ISBN 0-521-70613-0 .
  • More Markard: Introduction to Critical Psychology: Basics, Methods and Problem Areas of Marxist Subject Science. Hamburg, Argument, Hamburg 2009, ISBN 3-88619-335-7 .
  • Ulrike Eichinger, Klaus Weber (ed.): Social work. texts critical psychology 3rd Argument Verlag, Hamburg 2012.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. See Holzkamp 1985, 23 ff.
  2. See ibid., 522 ff .; Holzkamp 1996
  3. Ute Osterkamp : Notes on Critical Psychology as Subject Science . In: SonderPiranha SoSe 2000 (Hrsg.): On the receipt of critical psychology. What does critical science mean? 2020, p. 36–39 ( [PDF; 5.8 MB ; accessed on May 17, 2020]).
  4. Krofdorfer Manifest  ( page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.@1@ 2Template: Dead Link /  
  5. See Braun & Holzkamp 1977
  6. See Fried et al. 1997
  7. See
  8. Holzkamp et al. 1978, 4
  9. ^ Vacation University Critical Psychology. Documentation. In: Alice Salomon University of Applied Sciences Berlin. 2018, accessed September 13, 2019 .
  10. ^ Vacation University Critical Psychology. In: Alice Salomon University of Applied Sciences Berlin. 2018, accessed September 13, 2019 .
  11. Marx 1976 [1844], 385
  12. See Holzkamp 1971
  13. Holzkamp 1971
  14. See H.-Osterkamp 1976
  15. Holzkamp 1985, 350
  16. See e.g. B. Holzkamp 1973
  17. H.-Osterkamp 1975
  18. Schurig 1976
  19. Schurig 2006
  20. Holzkamp 1985, 51
  21. Holzkamp 1995, p. 41 ff.
  22. See ibid., 61
  23. See Holzkamp 1986
  24. Holzkamp 1985, 521
  25. Ibid., 564
  26. See Holzkamp, ​​Grundleger, p. 509 ff.
  27. See Markard et al. 2000
  28. ^ Osterkamp 1996
  29. ^ Markard & ASB 2000
  30. See Dreier 2007