Lufthansa flight 5634
| Lufthansa flight 5634 | |
|---|---|
_AN0193922.jpg) The aircraft involved in the accident, D-BEAT, taken in 1992 at Stuttgart Airport |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | Controlled flight into terrain |
| place | Bobigny |
| date | January 6, 1993 |
| Fatalities | 4th |
| Survivors | 19th |
| Injured | 14th |
| Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type | De Havilland DHC-8-311 |
| operator | Lufthansa |
| Mark | D-BEAT |
| Departure airport | Bremen Airport |
| Destination airport | Paris-Charles-de-Gaulle airport |
| Passengers | 19th |
| crew | 4th |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
On January 6, 1993, a De Havilland DHC-8-311 crashed on Lufthansa flight 5634 ( flight number LH5634) . The aircraft of the Stuttgart airline Contact Air was used for Lufthansa CityLine , which in turn operated this scheduled flight from Bremen to Paris-Charles-de-Gaulle airport on behalf of Lufthansa .
During Anflugs in Paris the released already for landing was Bahn was 27 (now 27 L) blocked the short term, so the pilots a swing-over maneuvers conducted to switch to the track 28 (now 26 R). The plane hit this runway at 7:20 p.m. local time, about 1.8 kilometers from this runway, killing four of the 19 occupants and the four-person crew surviving the crash.
Plane and crew
The accident Turboprop machine of the type De Havilland DHC-8-311 with the air vehicle registration D-BEAT has two Pratt & Whitney driven PW123 engines. The aircraft completed its maiden flight on August 14, 1990 and was delivered on August 26 to Contact Air , which initially operated the aircraft for Deutsche Lufttransport-Gesellschaft (DLT), the predecessor of Lufthansa CityLine. A year and a half later, DLT took over the aircraft, but still let Contact Air operate it on its own behalf. At the time of the accident, the aircraft had 5,973 operating hours . According to the flight documents, the permissible loading limits were not exceeded and the center of gravity was observed.
At the time of the accident, the 54-year-old flight captain had had his commercial pilot license for around six years and had 11,924 hours of flying experience, 2,003 of which were on this type of aircraft. The 25-year-old first officer , who was responsible for the controls at the time of the accident, had had his ATPL for one and a half years and a flight experience of 500 hours, 293 of which were on this type of aircraft.
Flight history
The aircraft took off from Bremen Airport at 5:30 p.m. on schedule and climbed to its cruising altitude of 24,000 ft (7,315 m). 25 minutes before the accident, the crew first received permission to leave it in order to finally take up the ILS glide path for runway 27 at an altitude of 4,000 ft (1,219 m) , which was around 25 kilometers (14.4 miles ) at 7:14 p.m. NM ) happened in front of the runway.
Shortly thereafter, a touched Boeing 747 of Korean Air when landing on the runway 27 with an engine to the ground, after which this path until further notice by the air traffic control has been suspended. The air traffic controller asked the crew of flight LH5634 whether they could make a left turn in order to record the ILS glide path of the parallel and 15 meters longer runway 28 (see swing over ). The master responsible for communication affirmed this (“of course we can”). The air traffic controller forwarded LH5634 to his colleague responsible for the southern runway, who informed the crew that they were 1.5 miles from the runway threshold. The pilots were asked if they could already see the runway. They denied this and stated that the machine was in a thick cloud cover. The air traffic controller then instructed the crew to maintain the current heading and be prepared for a possible missed approach procedure : “Ok you continue present heading it would ... could may be ... it will be a missed approach. Report runway in sight if you can "(German:" Ok, keep your current heading, it would be ... could possibly ... will be a missed approach. Report visual contact with the runway if possible. ")
When the air traffic controller informed the crew at 19:19 that they had just crossed the runway threshold, the aircraft disappeared from the radar almost simultaneously. Likewise, the pilots no longer answered his radio messages. Therefore, at 7:20 p.m., the control tower declared an emergency.
The wreckage of the aircraft, which had slid 400 m above the ground after the impact, was found around 1955 in a depression 1 km from the runway threshold and about 500 m north of the usual approach course. Four passengers, including a child, were killed in the accident. In addition, five people were seriously injured and a further eleven people were slightly injured, including the four crew members. Four passengers were uninjured. The machine was written off as a total loss due to the damage .
At the time of the accident, there was a south-southwest wind at the airport from a direction of 190 to 200 degrees and at a speed of 10 to 14 knots . The visibility on the ground was between 700 and 1400 meters. The cloud base was between 200 and 600 feet with a humidity of 100% and a temperature around 9 degrees Celsius.
Cause of accident
The investigation showed that the first officer deactivated the autopilot 80 seconds before the impact and a further ten seconds later the two throttle levers were in neutral. The aircraft type has no automatic thrust control. The Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), which indicates a too high sink rate, triggered the "SINK RATE" alarm for the first time 53 seconds before the impact. Then the alarm tones "TERRAIN" and "PULL UP" could be heard for 47 seconds until the impact.
The accident was caused by misconduct on the part of the crew, even if the weather conditions, especially visibility and cloud cover, were poor and the already demanding swing-over maneuver required even more concentration. The pilots did not notice their too high rate of descent or did so too late, although the GPWS emitted numerous acoustic warnings. Furthermore, they forgot the flaps extend, without which a low-speed stall occurs faster. As indicated by the air traffic controllers, the crew would have in case of missing visual contact with the runway take off and missed approach procedures must carry out.
consequences
After the accident, the Lufthansa CityLine concept was criticized in the media : It was a “sham package”, since the flights were carried out by external companies that did not meet the standard pilot training and safety standards at Lufthansa.
Web links
- Aircraft accident data and report in the Aviation Safety Network (English)
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b Official accident report (PDF; 12.9 MB) of the French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile (French)
- ↑ Data on the crashed aircraft , accessed on September 6, 2011
- ↑ Failed approach . In: Der Spiegel . No. 10 , 1993, p. 261 ( online ). Quote: "After their" CityLine "crash landing near Paris, Lufthansa is under pressure: How safe are airlines that serve short routes under the Lufthansa logo?"
Coordinates: 49 ° 0 ′ 6.6 " N , 2 ° 37 ′ 3.3" E