Naval Intelligence Service

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Naval Intelligence is the term for the Intelligence Service of the Navy of a country. In many countries there is a naval intelligence service to secure the naval forces , the main task of which is to monitor the naval forces of other nations.

Examples of foreign naval intelligence services include the United States Navy intelligence service , which was founded in 1882 under the name Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). The British Navy's intelligence service was also founded in 1882 under the name Foreign Intelligence Committee and renamed the Naval Intelligence Department (NID) in 1887 .

The development of the German naval intelligence service until 1945

From its creation to 1918

Both the intelligence office (department N) of the Reichsmarineamte and the intelligence office (later the intelligence department, or N for short ) in the admiralty's staff must be regarded as the military secret service of the Imperial German Navy .

News office in the Reichsmarineamt from 1897 to 1918

history

The intelligence office in the Reichsmarineamt was established in 1897 by the State Secretary in the Reichsmarineamt, Alfred von Tirpitz . From October 1st, 1897 , August von Heeringen acted as the first board member . This one staff officer was assisted by two younger officers as department heads. During the time of the office there were also occupations of up to 5 officers and additional assistants.

The task of the news office was to collect, evaluate and pass on information in the form of news, articles, factual reports or publications on marine-related processes and events. The focus was on helping, through the organization of intensive propaganda work, that the implementation of the enacted naval laws and the establishment of the imperial navy took place with public and political acceptance. This work was carried out with the superficial view of influencing politics, decision-makers and the public in terms of maritime armaments goals. However, with the entry into force of the 2nd Fleet Act on July 1, 1900, the intelligence center (N) was already above the peak of its activity since it was founded in 1897 and the staffing level had already been reduced to two officers and a few auxiliary staff. The largest expenditure was required by the existing reading service. This concerned the ongoing screening of publications from 163 newspaper and magazine publishers as well as other news agencies and the analysis of marine-related topics from them. The results of this information research were passed on in the form of marine-related short messages, bulletins and summaries in written form to newspaper publishers, journalists, press offices of companies and occasionally also to Reich ministries. The latter was difficult insofar as within the ministries the sovereignty for press releases among the authorities lay with the Foreign Office at this time . But the news office had already started to publish its own publications, maritime literature and magazines or to help shape the content. This particularly affected the magazines " Marine-Rundschau " and the " Nauticus - Yearbook for Germany's Sea Interests", which was published cautiously in 1899 and then published regularly from 1900 onwards.

In addition, information and propaganda pamphlets were distributed centrally and z. Some publications checked before going to press. This type of propaganda was intended to reach a large number of important people, such as writers but also members of the Reichstag, and to influence their opinions in a targeted manner. The aim was to contribute to a positive mood among the population regarding the development of the fleet to the extent that the German Reich could become the second largest naval power of its time.

When war broke out in 1914, the tasks were specified based on the war business distribution plan and the news office was to work with the German press, while the news department of the Admiral's staff, established in 1901, was to serve the foreign press. The news office was assigned to the Admiral's staff, but remained formally as a department in the Reichsmarineamt. After Tirpitz had resigned as State Secretary of the Naval Office in March 1916, the intelligence department was partially subordinated to the Admiral Staff, but a short time later it was completely merged and placed under the control of the Admiral Staff.

Board members

News Department N in the Admiralty staff from 1900 to 1918

history

On the initiative of Admiral Otto von Diederichs - then head of the Admiral Staff - the news office was set up in the Admiral Staff in 1901 and renamed the news department ( N for short ) a short time later . The department moved to the building of the admiralty staff at Königgrätzer Strasse 70 in Berlin . The establishment of the department happened despite the funding cut by Alfred von Tirpitz and as a result the disputes between the two areas were further intensified. Diederichs saw the establishment of the news department as an opportunity to achieve independence without the control of Tirpitz. Tirpitz tried to reduce the functionality of the department by further cuts. Contrary to these disputes, the number of employees grew to four.

As a special feature, the director signed an N followed by the first letter of his surname. The assigned agents were divided into the categories of reporters (BE) or shop stewards (VM). A main reporter (HBE) was assigned to a BE. The BE did not know any other people in the organization. The agents were assigned to different operational areas. In addition to Europe, there were the areas of application in East Africa, West Africa, East Asia, Australia, West America and East America including Central America and the Caribbean. The foreign territories related particularly to the German colonies .

As a result, task-related sub-departments were formed. Espionage activities were carried out through the NI subdivision. From 1913 Fritz Prieger was director here. An admiralty secretary has been assigned to N and NI. A well-known spy of the subdivision was Carl Hans Lody . The so-called report had the focus of the intelligence service gathering information about the potential war opponents England and France.

From 1911 the name War Intelligence Service (KNW) established itself for the international sector, which had specialized in enemy ship movements . In this area, too, the tasks from the beginning of the war were specified based on the war business distribution plan. With the interruption of the communication link to England in 1914, espionage activities were severely restricted and finally broken off with the outbreak of war.

After the declaration of war in August 1914, 21 German spies were arrested by the newly founded MI5 . Around 1915, the former and later head of the intelligence office in the Reichsmarineamt, Karl Boy-Ed, supported the American agent activities of the intelligence department in his function as naval attaché in Washington.

During the war, Department G (counter-espionage) was formed as an additional department. From the spring of 1916, this was headed by Paul Ebert , who later became the director of the news department .

The NIV was set up for sabotage operations in autumn 1916 . The head office was in Lützowstrasse and the Agatit works had been founded as a camouflage . In November 1917 UC 57 was lost during a special mission by the intelligence service. U 156 and U 157 ran out in December 1917 to the Canary Islands on a special mission to import tungsten ore. The takeover was exposed by the British naval intelligence service ( Room 40 ) and the takeover of the ore was prevented.

During the war Wilhelm Canaris was temporarily assigned to the news department.

At the end of the war, the communications department of the Admiralty's staff destroyed large parts of their files. After the war, Fritz Prieger was responsible for handling the naval intelligence service in the naval management office.

Directors
  • Captain zS Arthur Tapken : designated as director from 1901 to March 1914, but had been on the Admiral's staff since 1902 with time gaps
  • Frigate Captain Walter Isendahl : from March 1914 to February 1918
  • Captain zS Paul Ebert: from February 1918 until the dissolution

In the Weimar Republic (1919–1932)

history

The defeat of Germany in World War I caused the military, including the naval intelligence service, to be dissolved. Officially, there were no longer any German secret services. Fritz Prieger, the former head of the NI section of the intelligence department N in the Admiral's staff, was entrusted with the dissolution of the intelligence department. The previous observation, deciphering and evaluation work was officially discontinued.

The importance of the navy declined in the following years and a joint message center for navy and army was set up in the Reichswehr Ministry. At the beginning of 1919, under Lieutenant Martin Braune, the "new" B-service was set up in the Reichsmarine , but its construction was considerably restricted.

From 1921 the General Naval Office of the Reichsmarine published the Marine-Rundschau again , other former organs, such as the Nauticus , were published privately until 1933, then again by the state.

The naval intelligence center was also known as the naval intelligence service . In 1921 a group under the name Abwehr was set up in the Reichswehr Ministry for intelligence tasks of the army, which took over the naval intelligence service in April 1928 after the detachment of the Abwehr from the troop office. At this point in time, the navy's radio defenses were among the first to use shortwave radio alongside the Soviet services. With the reorganization of the defense department, three major areas were created for the army, air force and navy. From 1923 there was a secret armament project for the construction of the new submarine class IIA in a Finnish shipyard, which was secured by the naval intelligence service.

In August 1927, the secret and illegal machinations of the head of the maritime transport department in the naval command, Captain Walter Lohmann , came to the public. Lohmann had administered " black coffers " of the Kriegsmarine and, among other things, used them both for the organization of forbidden armaments projects and for the establishment of the naval intelligence service.

Within the new organization, the former naval intelligence service was able to maintain a certain degree of independence and as a result, from 1932 onwards, cautious efforts were made to organizationally separate the intelligence activities of the army and the navy.

Structure of the naval intelligence service in Abwehr I

Department I “Secret Intelligence Service” (also Abwehr I) was responsible for reconnaissance / reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, with II there was a so-called special service, a cipher and radio listening service, and III formed counter-espionage and counter-espionage. Group I / M (Navy) Secret Intelligence Service Navy of Division I can most likely be seen as the successor to the Navy Intelligence Service . In addition to Group I / M for the Navy, there was also a Group I / H for the Army and a Group I / L for the Air Force.

The group leader from I / M was in charge of the navy's secret reporting service and was in contact with Department III and the Naval War Command (Skl). The leader was also responsible for contact with naval and military attachés of foreign armed forces in naval matters . The group was divided into two subgroups. The first subgroup had three presentations. Unit I / M West had to implement the exploration area in the west and overseas and, among other things, the exchange with Spain and Italy. This group also took care of the naval sites in Hamburg, Bremen, Kiel, Wilhelmshaven, Cologne and Stuttgart. The Unit I / M West / North was respect for marine exploration. England including the British Overseas Territories and the United States responsible. The work in the Scandinavian countries excluding Finland went through this unit. Naval explorations of France including the French territories and the work in the Benelux countries was assigned to Unit I / M West / South of the first subgroup. In the second subgroup, the I / M East unit followed for naval explorations in the east and the supervision of the naval bases in Stettin, Königsberg and Vienna. Contact exchanges were assigned to the unit on Finland, Estonia, Bulgaria, Japan and Hungary. The I / M East / North unit had to undertake naval explorations to Russia and Poland via the northern route and to carry out the work in Lithuania and Latvia. The I / M East / South department had been assigned the southern route to Russia and Poland . This was followed by Romania, Greece, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. The M / t unit had to research the technology and economy in relation to naval issues.

From the Nazi seizure of power to the Second World War (1933–1939)

With the seizure of power in 1933, the organization of the military intelligence services changed again. The B service was relocated back to Berlin and assigned to the naval command office A.

On October 1, 1937, the Naval Intelligence Service (3 / Skl) was integrated into the Naval War Command within the High Command of the Navy . At the same time the naval intelligence inspection emerged as an independent department of the Baltic Sea naval station from the torpedo inspection. In the General Naval Office (B), the Technical Intelligence Department was established at the same time . At the beginning of the war it was affiliated to the Naval Weapons Main Office as the NWa office group .

Until the end of 1939, the sea captain Theodor Arps was head of the naval intelligence department (3 / Skl). The radio reconnaissance , which was assigned to the department, operated the central control center in Berlin and three other control centers ( north : Neumünster, center : Soest, south : Langenargen) in 1937/38 . In addition, there were four main DF stations (Wilhelmshaven, Flensburg, Swinemünde, Pillau) and eight secondary DF stations along the North and Baltic Sea coasts (Borkum, Cuxhaven, Arkona , Darss, Falshöft, Stolpmünde, Memel, Windau).

During the Second World War (1940–1945)

Naval Intelligence Service (2 / Skl and 4 / Skl)

In January 1940 there was a division into the naval intelligence department (2 / Skl) and the intelligence evaluation department (as the new 3 / Skl under Captain Paul Wever ). 2 / Skl was then headed by frigate captain Ludwig Stummel until it was regrouped again . The task of 2 / Skl consisted of collecting and evaluating information about foreign naval forces and naval bases, setting up and assembling combat groups (task forces), ship identification, technical data, etc. In Department 3 / Skl, the area of foreign navies and radio reconnaissance was combined . The radio reconnaissance area was to be reassigned to 2 / Skl in June 1941.

With June 1941 a separate office group was created Marine Intelligence Service (2 / Skl) under the direction of Vice Admiral Erhard Maertens. At the same time the naval intelligence inspection was dissolved and assigned to the new office group. The former Department 2 / Skl became the new Central Department (MND I). The new office Group 2 / Skl divided into a central section (MND I), a General Unit messaging service (MND II) and a General Unit Radio reconnaissance (MND III, also known as B-service and allocated by 3 / kl).

The following general or department heads existed at 2 / Skl and the successor organization 4 / Skl:

  • for MND I: from the establishment until April 1943, Captain Ludwig Stummel, then until September 1944 Captain Johannes Möller
  • for MND II: from the establishment to April 1943, Captain Johannes Möller, from April 1943 to January 1944 under Captain Max Kupfer and until the dissolution, Captain Henno Lucan
  • for MND III: from the establishment until January 1944 Captain Heinz Bonatz and until the dissolution of Captain Max Kupfer

In November 1941, MND III was enlarged to become the radio reconnaissance department , and in May 1942 MND II was expanded to become the intelligence service department .

In March 1943, with the incorporation of the new submarine command department (as 2 / Skl BdU op), a renewed conversion took place and the naval intelligence service was newly formed as 4 / Skl. In addition, the newly formed radio measurement service department (MND IV) was later assigned to the official group, which was dissolved in June 1944 with the establishment of the location service department (5 / Skl). Instead, in September 1944, the wire intelligence service (new MND IV) was incorporated under Captain Willy Thiel and the central department (MND I) was reduced to a general department. The new office group Marine Intelligence Service (4 / Skl) was headed by the former head of the central department and current Rear Admiral Ludwig Stummel until mid-August 1944 . Subsequently, until the end of July 1945, the captain at sea / rear admiral Fritz Krauss took over the management.

In the course of the submarine war, so-called submarine groups were formed based on the findings of the naval intelligence service , which were to attack the enemy convoys using pack tactics . In the course of the war, the B-Dienst lost its supremacy and so no suitable information could be made about the imminent landing of the Allies in Normandy. In contrast, the British Operational Intelligence Center (OIC) even succeeded in luring the German defense service on the wrong track with a cleverly designed radio deception (" Operation Fortitude ").

On May 1, 1945 the naval intelligence service was relocated to Mürwik , where the last Reich President Karl Dönitz and the last Reich government also settled in the newly established Mürwik special area . After the unconditional surrender on May 8, 1945 , the last Reich government was arrested on May 23, 1945 in Mürwik.

News evaluation department (3 / Skl)

In addition to the Department Naval Intelligence (2 / SKL) was created in January 1940 from the division of the former Department Naval Intelligence (3 / kl), the Department news analysis (as new 3 / kl). It comprised the groups, later general units, foreign navies and radio reconnaissance . The radio reconnaissance was outsourced again in June 1941.

Until mid-1940, the department was headed by Captain Paul Wever. He was succeeded by Gottfried Krüger as director until mid-1942. From 1942 to mid-1944, first the sea captain Norbert von Baumbach and then the rear admiral Otto Schulz were head of the department until the end of the war.

Initiated sea actions (selection)

After the end of the war

After the war, the British journalist Sefton Delmer was commissioned to set up the first news agency in the British zone. He recruited 63 former employees of the naval intelligence service in Flensburg-Mürwik, because they knew how to collect and distribute information. The sea ​​captain Max Kupfer and Heinrich Böx were among the mathematicians, physicists and intelligence workers recruited . In August 1945 the recruited employees moved to Hamburg, where, with their help, the German News Service, Germany's first news agency, was set up. The German Press Service emerged from this in early 1947 .

There was no continuation of an independent naval intelligence service in Germany . For example, the last head of the Marine Intelligence Service (4 / Skl), Fritz Krauss, became head of the German mine clearance service after the war .

A general military intelligence service was continued in the Gehlen organization from 1947 and this was transferred to the Federal Intelligence Service in April 1956 . In the Gehlen organization there was a military evaluation department for the army and navy under Hans Hinrichs until 1952 . Subsequently, the marine evaluation became an independent presentation under Alfred Schulze-Hinrichs .

Famous pepole

  • Eugen Kalau vom Hofe : from 1899 to 1901 head of the central department of the Reichsmarineamt, from 1915 in the rank of rear admiral naval writer on behalf of the intelligence office in the Reichsmarineamt
  • Friedrich Gädecke : 1900 in the message office of the Reichsmarineamte, later vice admiral
  • Eduard Varrentrapp : from 1901 to 1905 in the message office of the Reichsmarinamt, later rear admiral
  • Waldemar Vollerthun : from 1903 to 1906 in the message office of the Reichsmarinamt, later rear admiral
  • Erich Raeder : from 1906 to 1908 in the intelligence office of the Reichsmarineamte, appointed head of the naval command in the course of the Lohmann affair and later Grand Admiral
  • Armgaard Karl Graves : 1911/1912 worked as a spy for the intelligence department N in the admiral staff, later revealed as a double agent

literature

  • Friedrich L Bauer: The comedy of errors in the competition of cryptologists . Lecture on December 14, 2007. Bavarian Academy of Sciences: Munich 2008 (Treatises, New Series, Issue 176)
  • Thomas Boghardt: Spies of the Kaiser. German Covert Operations in Great Britain during the First World War Era , Houndmills / New York (Palgrave Macmillian) 2004. ISBN 1-4039-3248-4 .
  • Heinz Bonatz: The German naval radio reconnaissance 1914-1945. Defense and knowledge: Darmstadt 1970. (Series Articles on Defense Research, Volume 20/21. ISSN  0067-5253 )
  • Heinz Bonatz: Sea warfare in the ether. The services of naval radio reconnaissance 1939–1945. ES Mittler: Herford 1981. ISBN 3-8132-0120-1 .
  • Ralph Erskine : Enigma's Security: What the Germans Really Knew. In: Michael Smith and Ralph Erskine (Eds.): Action this day . Bantam Press: London 2001, pp. 370-385. ISBN 0-593-04910-1 .
  • Helmuth Giessler: The naval news and location service. Technical development and war experience. JF Lehmanns: Munich 1971, (series of military science reports, volume 10. ISSN  0083-7822 )
  • Max Gunzenhäuser: History of the secret intelligence service (espionage, sabotage and defense). Literature report and bibliography , Frankfurt am Main (Bernard & Graefe) 1968.
  • Hans H. Hildebrand, Walther Lohmann: The German Navy. 1939-1945. Structure, commitment, staffing. Podzun: Bad Nauheim 1956, chapter 32.
  • Hans H. Hildebrand: The organizational development of the navy together with staffing 1848 to 1945. 3 parts. Biblio-Verlag: Osnabrück 2000 (series formation history and staffing of the German armed forces 1815–1990 volume 2). ISBN 3-7648-2541-3 .
  • Markus Pöhlmann : German Intelligence at War, 1914-1918 , in: The Journal of Intelligence History , 5 (Winter 2005), pp. 33–62.
  • Werner Rahn : Warning signs and self-assurance. The German naval intelligence service and the supposed security of the key M ("Enigma") 1943/44. In: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 61 (2002), pp. 141–154.
  • Werner Rahn: The influence of radio reconnaissance on German naval warfare in the First and Second World War. In: Winfried Heinemann (Ed.): Leadership and means of leadership. Military History Research Office, Potsdam 2011 pp. 15–56.
  • Rebecca Ratcliff: Searching for Security. The German Investigations into Enigma's Security. In: Intelligence and National Security 14 (1999) Issue 1 (Special Issue) pp. 146-167.
  • Rebecca Ratcliff: How Statistics led the Germans to believe Enigma Secure and why they were wrong: neglecting the practical mathematics of ciper machines. In: Brian J. Winkel (Ed.) The German Enigma Cipher Machine . Artech House: Boston, London 2005.
  • Jürgen W. Schmidt (Ed.): Secret services, military and politics in Germany . Ludwigsfelder Verlags-Haus: Ludwigsfelde 2008. (Series Secret Service History Volume 2). ISBN 978-3-933022-55-4 .
  • Nigel West: Historical dictionary of World War I intelligence , Lanham u. a. (Rowman & Littlefield) 2014. ISBN 978-0-8108-8001-6 .

Web links

  • Reichsmarineamt in the archive of the German digital libraries
  • Gerhard Wiechmann: The transmission of German naval files on the history of Latin America in the Federal Archives-Military Archives (BAMA) in Freiburg i. Br. In: Thomas Duve, Silke Hensel, Ulrich Mücke, Renate Pieper, Barbara Potthast (Hrsg.): Yearbook for the History of Latin America - Anuario de Historia de America Latina . Publisher = Böhlau Verlag. Cologne, Weimar, Vienna December 18, 2013, p. 399-420 , doi : 10.7767 / jbla.2004.41.1.399 .

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Walter Hubatsch: The Admiral's Staff and the Supreme Naval Authorities in Germany 1848-1945, Annex 19. Bernard & Graefe: Frankfurt / M. 1958, pp. 241/242
  2. ^ Wilhelm Deist: Fleet Policy and Fleet Propaganda, Stuttgart, 1976.
  3. ^ Werner Rahn: German Marines in Transition: From the Symbol of National Unity to the Instrument of International Security . Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59464-5 , p. 129 ( google.de [accessed on May 1, 2020]).
  4. ↑ Marcus König: Agitation-Censorship-Propaganda. The submarine war and the German public in World War I, ibidem Verlag, Munich, 2014, p. 46 ff. And cf. Wilhelm Deist: Fleet Policy and Fleet Propaganda, Stuttgart, 1976, p. 81ff.
  5. ↑ a b Christian Götter: The power of assumptions about effects: media work by the British and German military in the first half of the 20th century . Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2015, ISBN 978-3-11-045220-4 , p. 106 ( google.de [accessed on May 1, 2020]).
  6. ^ A b c Sebastian Rojek: Sunken Hopes: The German Navy in Dealing with Expectations and Disappointments 1871-1930 . Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2017, ISBN 978-3-11-053254-8 , p. 117 ( google.de [accessed on May 1, 2020]).
  7. ↑ a b Thomas Boghardt: Spies of the Kaiser , St Antony's Series, ISBN 0–333–71109–2, page 16 [1]
  8. ↑ Thomas Boghardt: Spies of the Kaiser , St Antony's Series, ISBN 0–333–71109–2, page 16 [2]
  9. ^ Bernard Porter: Plots and paranoia: a history of political espionage in Britain, 1790–1988
  10. ↑ Federal Archives-Military Archives (BArch-MA) Department RM 5
  11. ↑ Volker Schult: Desire and Reality: German-Filipino Relations
  12. ↑ Thomas Boghardt: Spies of the Kaiser , St Antony's Series, ISBN 0–333–71109–2, Appendix 3 [3]
  13. ^ Werner Rahn: German Marines in Transition: From the Symbol of National Unity to the Instrument of International Security . Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59464-5 , p. 334 ( google.de [accessed on May 1, 2020]).
  14. ↑ Berndt Remmele, Lohmann Affair. Secret armaments projects of the Reichswehr in the twenties, master's thesis at the University of Freiburg / Breisgau, 1995
  15. ↑ Helmut R. Hammerich: "Always at the enemy!": The Military Shield Service (MAD) 1956–1990 . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019, ISBN 978-3-647-36392-9 , pp. 41 ( google.de [accessed on May 2, 2020]).
  16. ↑ Percy E. Schramm (Ed.): War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht , 8th volumes, Volume II: 1940–1941, Part II, Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, Frankfurt am Main 1965, pp. 901 + 902, pp. 919 ff.
  17. ↑ Percy E. Schramm (Ed.): War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht , 8th volumes, Volume II: 1940-1941, Part II, Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, Frankfurt am Main 1965, p. 920.
  18. ^ Walter Lohmann, Hans H. Hildebrand: The German Navy 1939–1945. Structure, commitment, staffing. tape 1 . Podzun, Bad Nauheim 1964, main chapter III, chapter 2 Naval Warfare 32, p. 3 , radio reconnaissance department (Skl Chef MND III) (loose-leaf collection, deliveries 1–27, 1956–1964).
  19. ↑ Booklet VI: Comments on the naval intelligence service and the radio reconnaissance service: 1st Skl War Diary Part B VI , accessed on: June 13, 2017
  20. ↑ Andreas Kristionat: From the German News Service (GNS) to the German Press Agency (dpa) . In: Jürgen Wilke (Hrsg.): Telegraph offices and news agencies in Germany . Investigations into their history up to 1949 (=  communication and politics . Volume 24 ). KG Saur Verlag, Munich New York London Paris 1991, ISBN 3-598-20554-6 , pp. 290-295 .
  21. ↑ Sefton Delmer: The Germans and I . Nannen-Verlag, Hamburg 1962, p. 653–654 (English: Trail Sinister (1961) / Black Boomerang (1962) . Martin Secker & Warburg, London. Translated by Gerda v. Uslar (authorized translation)).
  22. ^ Marc Jan Eumann: The German press service. News agency in the British zone 1945–1949 . The history of a media institution in post-war Germany (=  public and history . Volume 5 ). Herbert von Halem Verlag, Cologne 2011, ISBN 978-3-86962-055-8 , p. 56–62 (Dissertation, Institute for Journalism, Faculty of Cultural Studies, Technical University of Dortmund, 2011).
  23. ↑ Tim Tolsdorff: New career for the code breaker . In: Spiegel Online EINESTAGES . November 26, 2010 ( spiegel.de [accessed November 26, 2016]).