Convoy SC 122
| date | October 5-24, 1943 |
|---|---|
| place | North Atlantic |
| output | Loss of 53,094 GRT Allied shipping space - success of the Navy |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
SN White ( convoy commodore ) |
|
| Troop strength | |
| up to 13 submarines | approx. 50 cargo ships 9 escort ships |
| losses | |
|
no |
9 cargo ships with 53,094 GRT |
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The convoy SC 122 was an Allied convoy in the Second World War , which in March 1943 the Atlantic crossing to the east. Destinations were Liverpool as well as other British ports. The convoy was the 122nd of the consecutively numbered SC convoys, which were formed from slower cargo ships with an average speed of 7 knots . During his Atlantic crossing he was the target of German submarines , which in Wolf Packs ( Engl .: Wolfpack ) attacked and could sink cargo ships in the course of the three-day-long attack without loss a number.
The battles for the convoy SC 122 , together with the battles for the convoy HX 229 , which was also sent from New York a short time later and which moved as a fast convoy on a parallel course in the same sea area and finally caught up with SC 122 , was considered the "largest and for the German side most successful convoy battle ".
From compilation to Newfoundland
The convoy was initially composed of 50 cargo ships in the port of New York in early March 1943. Despite this place of assembly, as with the other SC convoys, the naming after the original port of departure, the Canadian Sydney ( Nova Scotia ), was retained . Most ships were destined for Liverpool, but some ships were also supposed to go to Iceland . Responsible for putting together the convoy was "Convoy and Routing", the operations department for the Atlantic convoys going east to sea in Washington, DC Captain SN White (Royal Navy Reserve) on the freighter Glenapp as convoy commodore took over command of the convoy . The convoy left New York on March 5th and was to be escorted by the four escort ships of the “Western Local Escort Force” to the “WOMP” (Western Ocean Meeting Point) in Newfoundland . The escort ships were the corvettes of the Canadian Navy The Pas , Rimouski , New Westminster and Blairmore . The commander of the escort ships was Corvette Captain EG Old (Royal Canadian Navy) on The Pas .
On the afternoon of March 5, the convoy was arranged in eleven columns. The average speed was just under 7 knots. On March 7th a storm broke out that pulled the columns wide apart. A total of eleven ships lost contact with the convoy, including the freighter Clarissa Radcliffe , which then continued its journey east as a lone driver. Only two freighters were able to catch up with the convoy later. On March 9, the convoy reached the "HOMP" (Halifax Ocean Meeting Point). At this point, which was ordered alternately for each convoy, changes were made to the composition of the convoy during daylight. In the case of SC 122, 13 freighters from Halifax and the rescue ship Zamalek , which was manned by officers and crews from the British merchant navy, joined the convoy. The Zamalek had a military doctor and high-quality radio equipment on board, on the one hand to rescue the crews of previously sunk ships and on the other hand to be able to follow the radio traffic of German submarines. The ships from Halifax are guarded by three escorts, the destroyer Leamingon and the two Canadian corvettes Cowichan and Dunvegan .
Escort Group B5
For the Atlantic crossing, SC 122 was assigned the British escort group B5 as protection. The group had been deployed in the North Atlantic since the end of 1940 and was considered a veteran of the British convoy leaders. She had been on loan to the United States since the spring of 1942 and was used for some time on the east coast and in the Caribbean . The lead ship was the destroyer Havelock (group leader ship of the Havant class ), and the group's captain and commander was Corvette Captain Richard C. Boyle. The group also consisted of the V-class destroyer Volunteer , the new frigate Swale and the five corvettes Godetia and Buttercup (manned by crews from the Royal Navy Section Belge ) as well as Pimpernel , Lavender and Saxifrage . Shortly before, B5 had led the convoy ON 168 from England to Canada and was then located in St. Johns .
At the time the group left for SC 122 , however , the volunteer was lying in dry dock and was supposed to leave a day later and catch up with the convoy. The destroyer was then assigned to the following convoy HX 229 . Instead, SC 122 received the American destroyer Upshur and the Campobello , a new submarine hunting trawler built in Canada , which was to be transferred to England. B5 left St. Johns on March 11th - the Upshur set sail from Argentia. The expiry of B5 was cleared up by the German B service through decrypted radio messages.
On March 12, both convoy SC 122 and escort group B5 reached the “WOMP”, which was located east of Newfoundland and was intended as a meeting point for the Atlantic escorts . Here the Western Local Escort Force was released and Group B5 took over the convoy.
The following convoy HX 229 followed, now only one day apart.
Location of the German submarines
In early 1943, the Navy deployed a large number of submarines in the Atlantic to counteract the constant convoy activity. The boats were operating in Wolf Packs and attacked the Allied convoys mostly in groups that directly from the commander of submarines (BdU) Karl Doenitz of Berlin were named and commanded. Through the radio reconnaissance of the B-Dienst of the Kriegsmarine, Dönitz was aware of the departure of a convoy. In the war diary of the commander of the submarines, the entry on March 12, 1943 read:
"On the basis of the BX messages received, the management decides to operate on the HX.229 recorded."
German submarines, which at the time were still in action against convoys SC 121 and HX 228 and had sufficient torpedoes and fuel on board, were ordered to go west on the evening of March 12 in order to set up new search chains running from north to south form. Furthermore, these submarines were to be reinforced by fresh submarines brought in from Germany and occupied France . Two new groups of strikers and pushers with a total of 28 submarines were formed from these boats . Striker should have reached the operational area by the 14th evening, while Dränger should position himself south of it at the same time.
Another Raubgraf submarine group (13 submarines) was already located northeast between Newfoundland and Greenland to operate there against convoys running in a westerly direction. This group was closer to SC 122 , but was already known to the Allies through radio reconnaissance.
Later on March 12, the Allied leadership sent another radio message, which ordered HX 229 to change course slightly. This radio message was also immediately decrypted by the German B service and the information it contained on position, course and speed was evaluated.
The convoy from March 12th to 16th
On March 12th, “Convoy and Routing” also changed the direction of travel from SC 122 to a northward course. On the original course, the Allied leadership assumed that the convoy would be discovered by the well-known Raubgraf submarine group , but this was probably wrong, since Raubgraf did not extend as far to the southwest as the Allies suspected. They were probably fooled by position reports from submarines on their way back to France.
On the afternoon of March 13, the BdU received the message from one of the Raubgraf submarines that convoy ON 170 had been sighted to the west. In the battle that developed, the Germans sank nine cargo ships in this convoy, but thereby also revealed their real position, and then lost touch with ON 170 . This made it clear to the Allies that both the SC 122 and the HX 229 on their current course would directly cross the area of the identified Raubgraf group. As a result, both convoys were ordered to change course again on March 13th - this time to the east and thus on a more direct route to England. The radio messages from these course changes were in turn intercepted by the German B service and could be decrypted. The Germans thus again had a clear picture of the convoy routes to the east. When the Raubgraf group was unsuccessful in their renewed attempt to find ON 170 , the group received the order on the afternoon of March 14th to stop the search and to run southeast to find a new reconnaissance patrol in the presumed direction of travel of SC 122 and HX 229 . The Raubgraf group did not form until SC 122 had already passed the group's sea area.
On March 15, SC 122 had established itself on the eastern course. A severe storm broke out during which the Icelandic freighter Selfoss and Campobello were separated from SC 122 on the night of March 15-16 . The Selfoss continued her voyage to Iceland alone and arrived in Reykjavík on March 22nd . The Campobello, however, struck a leak and Boyle was forced to send the Corvette Godetia to help. Since the commander of the Campobello lost the ship, the crew was rescued and the ship was then sunk by a depth charge. The Campobello was the first loss of a ship by SC 122 . On the morning of March 16, the storm subsided and Boyle asked the destroyer Babbitt and the coastal protection cutter Ingham from Reykjavik to replace the Campobello and the Godetia, which had been left to rescue the crew, to reinforce the convoy leaders. The request was granted and both ships left on the evening of the 16th. In the course of further events, the Babbitt was later assigned to HX 229 .
On the same day, on Doenitz's orders, eleven boats of the striker group broke out of the reconnaissance strip to set off in the direction of the assumed position of HX 229 . Her course apparently took her very close to SC 122 . This was known to the Allies through radio reconnaissance, so SC 122 was reported on the evening of the 16th that the convoy was probably being shadowed by submarines, which was not the case at that time. Instead, the German U-boats sighted HX 229 on March 16 and kept in contact.
The attacks on March 17th
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On March 17, shortly after midnight, U 338 ( Kapitänleutnant Manfred Kinzel), one of the boats of the Striker group, which was on its first patrol and was supposed to be approaching HX 229 , unexpectedly spotted SC 122 . At that time, the convoy was 120 nautical miles northeast of HX 229 and was on a roughly parallel course to it. Kinzel ordered an immediate surface attack as he saw no escort vehicles. Presumably he had simply passed undetected between the escort vehicles, which at that time had been reduced by the loss of the Campobello and the absence of the Godetia and consisted of only two destroyers, one frigate and four corvettes.
Kinzel unleashed two double torpedoes and shortly afterwards also his stern torpedo on various columns of the convoy and hit a total of four ships, although the boat crew only reported two explosions. The British cargo ship Kingsbury and the Dutch cargo ship Alderamin were hit directly. A torpedo missed the Kingsbury and more accidentally hit the old British steamer King Gruffydd behind the Kingsbury . The stern torpedo finally hit the new Fort Cedar Lake , which should have been in HX 229 , but was then assigned to SC 122 . The rescue ship Zamalek took the survivors of the crews of Kingsbury , King Gruffydd and Fort Cedar Lake on board one after the other . On all three ships there had been crew losses due to torpedoing and the capsizing of lifeboats.
The crew of the Alderamin should be rescued by the corvette Saxifrage , but two of their lifeboats were destroyed by the torpedo explosion and another capsized when being launched in the heavy swell. The last remaining lifeboat was steered away from the sinking freighter by the first engineer without picking up other crew members who only floated nearby with life rafts. The Saxifrage was able to save 37 men, 15 remained missing and three more died shortly afterwards of exhaustion. Because of this incident, there was a case against the First Engineer before the Extraordinary Maritime Court in London in October 1943, but this was finally set.
The Fort Cedar Lake was left burning. U 439 sighted the burning ship on the morning of March 17, but was then attacked by a B-24 Liberator of the 86th Squadron, a machine equipped for extremely long ranges that had taken off from Aldergrove to support the convoys from the air . The boat was able to dive in time. The B-24 then also sighted U 338 and flew another attack on this boat. This attack was also unsuccessful.
In total, the torpedoing of the four ships claimed 40 lives on the British and Dutch sides. Kinzel had sunk 24,000 gross tons of shipping space. The convoy now consisted of 44 ships, which were protected by six escorts. He was still shadowed by U 338 .
On the German side, they were surprised by Kinzel's visual report, as the convoy HX 229, which had been cleared up by the radio messages , had been suspected (correctly) further west. SC 122 was previously unknown to the German leadership. After the contact report and the attack by U 338 , it was then assumed that Kinzel must have met either another convoy or a group of faster ships that had split off from the main convoy. The German leadership changed the plan of attack accordingly. The six Striker boats to the north were ordered to attack this forward group (the actual convoy SC 122 ), which they should have found by the afternoon. If this does not succeed, the suspected main convoy ( i.e. HX 229 ) should be attacked as an alternative target . All other Striker and Dränger boats should continue to attack the main convoy ( HX 229 ). Through the shadowing by Kinzel's U 338 , the German leadership finally found out in the afternoon that the group in front was actually slower than the main group and was able to conclude the correct convoy allocation. In spite of this, only one convoy was mentioned in the BdU's war diary, which was given the number 19.
On the morning of March 17, two other boats, U 305 (Kapitänleutnant Rudolf Bahr - first patrol) and U 666 ( Oberleutnant zur See Herbert Engel - first patrol) had contact with SC 122 . The attack by the B-24 in the morning initially pushed U 338 away. However, since the Liberator soon ran out of fuel and was forced to return to her base without being replaced by another aircraft, Kinzel came up again and dared another attack with four torpedoes around noon on March 17th. The freighter Granville from Panama was hit, while the other torpedoes were missed or missed by the convoy waving the alarm. The survivors of the Granville's crew were taken on board by the corvette Lavender , which happened quickly in calm seas. Twelve men of the crew remained missing.
Of the escorts, the now returned Godetia and the Upshur searched for the submarine, established Asdic contact and threw a total of 37 depth charges. U 338 and the nearby U 666 were pushed aside by these attacks. U 305 was driven by another Liberator of 190 Sqn. surprised and also forced to dive. However, the boat was able to maintain contact with SC 122 .
At nightfall, the boats of the striker and urge groups operated in groups of roughly the same size on HX 229 and SC 122 . At about 8:00 p.m. the lookout spotted the corvette Pimpernel U 305 , which at that moment was attacking the convoy with four torpedoes. The British Port Auckland and the freighter Zouave were hit. Since the Zamalek had not yet returned from the rescue missions of the previous night, the Corvette Godetia was again deployed to rescue the crews. A total of 21 crew members were killed and 140 men were rescued. The attack by U 305 remained the only one that night, as U 439 , the only other boat still in contact with the convoy, gave its position via a radio message and was pushed aside by a search of the Havelock .
The convoy from March 18th to 19th
On the morning of March 18, U 305 was able to make out SC 122 again after its attack the previous night and sent the visual report to the BdU. The transmission of the visual report enabled further submarines to catch up with the convoy's position. On the other hand, SC 122 had support all day long from B-24 Liberator aircraft with a long range, which, together with the escorts, effectively protected the convoy and were able to push away submarines through several attacks. On the evening of March 18, a total of five boats were in contact with SC 122 , but the effective defensive measures prevented an attack on that day.
U 642 was responsible for shading the convoy . From the evening of March 18 until the arrival in England, the SC 122 and HX 229 drove parallel courses. HX 229 now ran north of SC 122 and finally overtook it. A total of 24 boats were used against the two convoys. For the Germans, who viewed the operations against the two convoys as one company from the start, it was no longer possible to distinguish which convoy the individual submarine was currently in use against.
At nightfall, U 338 and U 642 were in contact with SC 122 . Around midnight, U 666 was added again. At about 11:17 p.m. Engel launched an attack with four long-range shots from the bow and one torpedo from the stern tube on SC 122 . No ship was hit and the attack was not noticed by the convoy. As a result, U 666 also remained undetected and was able to reload in peace and prepare for another attack. At 4:48 a.m. Engel unloaded three torpedoes on the convoy again. This time he met the Greek freighter Carras . The entire crew of 34 men was rescued by the rescue ship Zamalek . The Carras did not sink, however, and a command from the Corvette Buttercup went on board again to destroy the code books. The Buttercup then fired a few more shots at the freighter and threw a depth charge on the assumption that this would finally sink the ship. However, the Buttercup left the ship without waiting to sink. Twelve hours later, U 333 sighted the drifting wreck and sank it with another torpedo. Shortly after dawn on March 19, the US coast guard cutter Ingham , which had started from Iceland, reached the convoy and thus reinforced the escort vehicles. The Ingham was then used when the Mathew Luckenbach , a fast American freighter that had left HX 229 and was trying to get to England alone at its high speed, was torpedoed by U 527 within sight of SC 122 . The Ingham hid the crew under cover from the Upshur . The abandoned wreck was sunk a short time later by U 523 with a catch shot .
On March 19, SC 122 had come so close to the English coast that seven squadrons of the RAF Coastal Command could permanently send out aircraft to protect the convoy. A B-17 U 666 attacked that morning and damaged the submarine so badly that it had to be withdrawn from the convoy. A Sunderland flying boat of the 228th Squadron attacked the boat U 608 lying near SC 122 and another Sunderland of the 423rd (Canadian) Squadron attacked U 338 , which was also damaged.
Also on March 19, sank U 663 (Heinrich Schmid - the second war patrol) the Clarissa Radcliffe , the stragglers from SC 122 , which during the storm on March 7 of SC 122 had been separated. The entire crew of 53 men were killed when the ship went down.
Since the visibility was also good at night , SC 122 was also protected by a B-24 Liberator when night fell on March 19-20. The plane made several attacks against surfaced boats but was unsuccessful. That night U 642 kept in touch with the convoy, but no further attacks took place.
End of the convoy journey
Also on the morning of March 20, aircraft of the Coastal Command were in use over SC 122 . Now U 642 had also lost contact and the use of the German submarines against SC 122 was over. SC 122 continued the voyage for the 450 remaining nautical miles and sighted the Inishtrahull Island lighthouse on March 22nd . The Atlantic leaders were dismissed and started at the bases assigned to them. The merchant ships also set course for their ports or were put together in coastal convoys to call at more distant ports. Another SC 122 ship was lost within one such coastal convoy . It was the Swedish freighter Atland , which had rammed the formerly Italian freighter Carso off the Scottish coast and immediately sank with its heavy load of iron ore. Some crew members were also killed. Captain White reached Liverpool with the Glenapp on March 24th, whereby his authority over the cargo ships of SC 122 ended after 18 days, 10 hours and 10 minutes since the anchor was lifted in New York.
Summary
SC 122 had lost nine ships with 53,094 GRT during its Atlantic crossing, the submarines required 30 torpedoes for these successes. Together with HX 229 , the Allies lost 22 ships with 146,600 GRT. In their victory report, however, the Germans declared that they had sunk 32 merchant ships with 186,000 GRT, as well as one destroyer. A German radio broadcast therefore said that the success against the Allied convoys in those days was the largest convoy battle in history . This representation is still in use today.
literature
- Martin Middlebrook: Convoy - German submarines chasing Allied convoys. Moewig Taschenbuchverlag. Rastatt. ISBN 3-8118-4342-7 .
Web links
- Convoy SC-122 on: uboat.net (in English).
- Ship list of SC 122 on the website: convoyweb (in English)
Footnotes
- ↑ Hanno Ballhausen (ed.): Chronicle of the Second World War. knowledgemedia publishing house. ISBN 978-3-577-14367-7 . Page 273. ( online )
- ↑ Middlebrook p. 108
- ↑ Middlebrook p. 135
- ↑ Middlebrook p. 183
- ↑ U 666 CV of the boat on: uboat.net (in English).
- ^ U 663 CV of the boat on: uboat.net (in English).
- ↑ Clarissa Radcliffe - British Steam merchant resume of the ship on: uboat.net (in English).
- ↑ Middlebrook p. 262
- ↑ Middlebrook p. 270
- ↑ Jak Mallmann Showell: Hitler's Navy: A Reference Guide to the Kriegsmarine 1935-1945 . Seaforth Publishing, March 19, 2009, ISBN 978-1-78346-917-8 . Page 84.