Michel Crozier

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Michel Crozier (born November 6, 1922 in Sainte-Menehould ; † May 24, 2013 in Paris ) was a French sociologist specializing in bureaucratic organization .

Career

Crozier founded the Center de sociologie des Organizations in 1962 and published his work in 1963 on the basis of empirical studies in the field of organizational sociology : Le phénomène bureaucratique . First from 1959 to 1960, and then again from 1973 to 1974, he was a research fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University .

From 1967 to 1968, Crozier was Professor of Sociology at the University of Paris-Nanterre , from 1970 to 1972 he was President of the Société française de sociologie , and in 1973 founding member of the European Group for Organizational Studies . In 1975 he founded the DEA de sociologie des Institut d'études politiques (IEP) in Paris and headed it until 1982.

Routine as a strategy to maintain a balance of power

This bureaucracy analysis is based on two empirical studies. The first concerns a large public administration (4,500 employees) in Paris, which is subordinate to and supports a national ministry. Due to their extremely simple organizational structure, manageable laboratory conditions are almost achieved. The second concerns a state industrial organization in France, which by law has a monopoly on a simple good of everyday consumption and sells it through another state institution. This means that this organization is freed to a large extent from the pressure of the outside world, and the internal forces of the social system can develop relatively freely.

For the Paris administration (first case) the survey showed: no connection of the staff with the organizational goal, instead apathetic adaptation, isolation of the individual within every level of the formal hierarchy, shifting of conflict relationships away from personal "face-to-face" relationships to the next higher hierarchical level: In the supervisor-subordinate interaction, the supervisor shifts responsibility to the superordinate position and takes his subordinates' point of view in order to maintain their loyalty.

The industrial monopoly (second case) is characterized by: 1. the egalitarian principle, guaranteed by the anciency and exchangeability of the staff in the individual functions; 2. the hierarchical principle with communication barriers between the individual levels of the hierarchy, combined with recruiting through external competitions; 3. the impersonality of rules and procedures. The combined occurrence of the egalitarian with the hierarchical principle leads to isolation and rigidity of the individual roles.

The source of the conflict is the struggle of individuals and groups for power, which in turn results in the need to control the corresponding conflicts. The bureaucratic system is characterized by the fact that many forces that would otherwise exclude the permanent smoldering of conflicts do not exist in the organizations examined. A complex balance of power , prestige and commitment is built up between the opposing groups , which makes them prefer conflict to compromise. In the case of the industrial monopoly, this is favored by three structural characteristics: 1. The complete security of the employees with regard to their job and their opportunities for advancement; 2. no unplanned rewards; 3. Because of the isolation of the roles , no cooperation is required. The rigid organizational structure enables conflicts to be managed, while the frustration of the individual that this creates ensures sufficient motivation.

Since the elimination of any dependency relationship is impossible, the rationalization of role relationships, their manageability and predictability leads again to informal power structures, since sources of uncertainty always remain, over which power struggles arise. In the industrial monopoly, for example, the workers in production are dependent on the maintenance workers, as they are relocated in the event of a long machine failure. The frustration this creates is not directed against the repair workers, but discharges itself against the norms imposed and against the work overload. Because the entire company and union system is based on the alliance of all workers against the system of working conditions imposed by the management.

The system of routines required to maintain cooperation also grants employees protection through compliant behavior, provided that the management can determine the rules that have been issued. Since both management and employees have their own interests in adhering to rules once they have been implemented, rigidity or a lack of adaptability is stipulated so that in emergencies there is little room for independent initiatives. The bureaucratic ritualist's faithfulness to the letter is not the result of a deformed personality, but is to be understood from this game against the superior. The ritualist prefers the protection that the literal fulfillment of the rules offers against the superior to the perhaps more factually correct, but for him personally risky interpretation of the rule. Ritualism is therefore the outflow of an organizational structure which strives to produce conformity in a certain rationalistic way.

Ritualism, however, is not the only strategy available within a bureaucratic organization. The workshop managers practice retreating; the directors shift to innovation. There is also identification and submission, rebellion and strike. What the bureaucracy gains in behavioral security, it loses in realism. Dysfunction is an essential element of one's inner balance, as the system is unable to learn from mistakes. In order for the necessary adjustments to be made, an obvious crisis is required.

The actor and the system

This essay in social theory generalizes the insights gained from empirical access to organized action.

The structural-functionalist organizational model of Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton with its role-theoretical foundation is rejected because it stamps the actors into appendages of the social structure and the norms of society. Instead, one should start from power relations , as they mutually construct individuals within situations that are perceived as organizational and social constraints and use them to create strategies within contexts of action that are to be understood as "games". In contrast to the formal models of game theory , these "games" are also intersubjective constructs based on the perceptions and decisions of the actors involved.

Reception and criticism

As Wolfgang Schluchter noted, Crozier transferred the type of bureaucratic personality characterized by Robert K. Merton to the bureaucratic organizational structure itself. Contrary to the ideal type set up by Max Weber , the bureaucracy is not a bundle of organizational rationality and expediency, but rather a dynamic, thoroughly rationalized environment worst adapted.

Andreas Anter criticized a narrow-gauge and falsified Weber interpretation, which Max Weber did not receive directly, but ran through US sociology.

Works

  • Le Monde des employés de bureau , 1964
  • Petits Fonctionnaires au travail , Paris, ED. du CNRS, 1955
  • Le Phénomène bureaucratique , Paris, Le Seuil, 1963; Translated from it by Hanne Herkommer: The bureaucratic vicious circle and the problem of change. In: Renate Mayntz , (Ed.): Bureaucratic organization. Kiepenheuer & Witsch: Cologne Berlin 1968. pp. 277–288
  • La Société bloquée , Paris, Le Seuil, 1971
  • Power and Organization: The Constraints of Collective Action , with Erhard Friedberg . Athenäum Verlag, Königstein im Taunus 1979, ISBN 3-7610-8211-8 (new edition 1993, ISBN 3-445-07019-9 ).
    • French: L'Acteur et le système (en collaboration avec Erhard Friedberg), Paris, Le Seuil, 1977.
  • The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, with Samuel Huntington and Joji Watanuki , New York University Press, 1975.
  • On ne change pas la société par décret , Paris, Fayard, 1972.
  • Le Mal américain , Paris, Fayard, 1980.
  • État modeste, État modern. Stratégies pour un autre changement , Paris, Fayard, 1986
  • L'Entreprise à l'écoute , Paris, Interéditions, 1989.
  • La Crise de l'intelligence , Paris, Interéditions, 1995.
  • A quoi sert la sociologie des organizations? , Paris, Arslan, 2000.
  • Ma belle époque: mémoires. 1, 1947-1969 , Paris, Fayard, 2002.
  • A contre-courant: mémoires. 2, 1969-2000 , Paris, Fayard, 2004.

Honors

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Cornelis J. Lammers (1998) An Inside Story: The Birth and Infancy of EGOS: Memories in Tribute to Franco Ferraresi ; Organization Studies 1998 19: 883; doi : 10.1177 / 017084069801900508 .
  2. Michel Crozier: Le phénomène bureaucratique. Paris 1963. pp. 70f
  3. Michel Crozier: Le phénomène bureaucratique. Paris 1963. p. 187
  4. Michel Crozier: Le phénomène bureaucratique. Paris 1963. p. 186
  5. Michel Crozier: Le phénomène bureaucratique. Paris 1963. p. 188
  6. Michel Crozier: Le phénomène bureaucratique. Paris 1963. p. 245
  7. Michel Crozier, Erhard Friedberg: L'acteur et le système. Les contraintes de l'action collective . Editions du Seuil. 1977. ISBN 2-02005839-1 . P. 115f
  8. ^ Robert K. Merton: Bureaucratic Structure and Personality. In: Renate Mayntz, (Ed.): Bureaucratic organization. Cologne Berlin 1968.
  9. ^ Renate Mayntz: Max Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy and organizational sociology. In: Renate Mayntz Hg: Bureaucratic organization. Cologne 1968.
  10. ^ Wolfgang Schluchter: Aspects of bureaucratic rule. Paul List, Munich 1972. ISBN 3-471-61601-2 . P. 124
  11. In: Trivium, Zs. For the humanities and social sciences (bilingual), # 7. His introductory essay is also only available online in a French version , here in German
  12. ^ American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Book of Members ( PDF ). Retrieved April 15, 2016
  13. Member History: Michel Crozier. American Philosophical Society, accessed July 2, 2018 .