Septimius Odaenathus

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Bust attributed to Odaenathus

Septimius Odaenathus (also called Odainathos or Od [a] enath ; † 267 in Herakleia Pontike or [less likely] in Emesa ) was prince and finally king of Palmyra . At times he also acted as a Roman general and deputy to the Emperor Gallienus in the Orient.

After the capture of Emperor Valerian by the Persians in 260, there was initially unrest in Rome's oriental provinces in the 1960s. Odaenathus finally succeeded in stabilizing the Roman eastern border again. At the same time the circumstances of the imperial crisis of the 3rd century favored his own political goals. He gained increasing influence in the Roman Orient, from which Palmyra profited considerably.

Life

The early years and the rise to rulers of Palmyra

Septimius Odaenathus belonged to a respected family and came from the Syrian oasis city of Palmyra, which had become rich mainly through its caravan trade with Persia and Arabia. The city belonged to since the late 1st century BC. BC to the Roman sphere of influence, but had had the status of a free city since the time of Hadrian .

In the middle of the 3rd century, the city fell into a crisis when the political situation in Rome's Orient provinces deteriorated noticeably due to the wars with Persia . In the second half of the 240s and due to the defeat of Emperor Gordian III. , the Palmyren raised Septimius Odaenathus as one of the leading men of the city to exarchus ; this office was apparently created specifically because of the critical political situation. Rome sanctioned this move, Odaenathus was inducted into the Roman Senate around 250. Emperor Valerian 257/58 made Odaenathus governor in Syria Phoenice ; In 258 he was also appointed consul, which underlines the prestige he has gained.

Odaenathus as an ally of the Romans and as a Persian winner

After the devastating defeat and the capture of Valerian in the battle of Edessa in the summer of 260, Odaenathus fought successfully against the Persian king of kings Shapur I on the Euphrates. Before that, however, he had apparently tried unsuccessfully to come to an agreement with the Persian king. Only after this failed did he turn entirely to the Roman side.

In 261 Odaenathus defeated the usurper Quietus at Emesa and also eliminated Ballista . Valerian's son Gallienus then appointed Odaenathus dux Romanorum and corrector totius Orientis , with which Odaenathus had in fact risen to become the emperor's representative in the Roman Orient. He was therefore responsible for the provinces of the Orient and the remnants of the Roman army in the east, after a power vacuum had developed after the defeat of 260 and the Roman eastern provinces were de facto defenseless. Further advance of the Persians could be prevented, whereby the Palmyrener also used archers and armored riders . In the meantime Gallienus took care of the defense of the western areas.

The sources do not contain any detailed descriptions of the Persian War of Odaenathus, but apparently he was able to re-conquer the Roman province of Mesopotamia with his army in 262/63 and advance to the Persian residence of Ctesiphon (see also the Imperial Crisis of the 3rd Century ). It is controversial whether there was one campaign or two campaigns, although there is some evidence in favor of the latter assumption: One campaign took place in 261/62 and a second in 267 shortly before he was murdered. From 262 onwards, the previously lost areas were largely reclaimed.

After his Persian victory, he and his heir to the throne Herodianus (Hairan) rose to the rank of King of Kings in 263 , apparently based on the titulature of the Persian kings. Most likely the triumph over the Sassanids should be emphasized in this way. However, Odaenathus hardly strived to openly usurp the Roman rights to rule. Whether Odaenathus acted out of loyalty to Rome is more than questionable. Odaenathus owed his position of power not only to his personal skills, but not least to the legitimation by Emperor Gallienus. If Odaenathus wanted to expand, however, he could advance to the east, so that his and Gallienus' goals remained congruent, at least for the time being. His main interest was probably to protect the Roman Orient (and thus Palmyra itself) from attacks by the Persians and to secure Palmyra's trade. Under his reign, Palmyra and, due to the tense situation in the empire, his oriental sphere of power developed into a quasi-autonomous part of the Roman Empire, without a special empire developing. However, it cannot be ruled out that there might have been a conflict later, as was the case between Zenobia and Emperor Aurelian .

The murder of Odaenathus

In 267, as already mentioned, Odaenathus again moved against Ctesiphon and was probably quite successful when news of a Goth invasion of Asia Minor forced him to return. With regard to the subsequent assassination of Odaenathus and his heir to the throne Herodianus, the late ancient and Byzantine sources contradict each other , so that both the process and the background are difficult to reconstruct. The place and chronology are not known beyond doubt: some of the events are dated to the beginning of the year 267, but often to autumn 267 or winter 267/68.

The historian Zosimos , who wrote around 500, gives personal motives, while the often rather unreliable Historia Augusta , which, however, drew from relatively good sources with regard to Palmyras, names an alleged nephew by the name of Maeonius as the perpetrator ; envy is mentioned as a motif, with Maeonius allegedly being animated to murder by Zenobia (Odaenathus' second wife). The Anonymous post Dionem, on the other hand, mentions a certain Rufinus as the perpetrator, who killed Odaenathus because of his political ambitions, which Emperor Gallienus later legitimized. The Byzantine Georgios Synkellos speaks of a conspiracy whose originator was a man also named Odaenathus. The Byzantine Johannes Zonaras names partly different backgrounds for the murder, whereby it was a matter of personal motives. What is significant is that the later authors were able to fall back on sources lost today, but the details are uncertain. But mostly personal motives are mentioned. According to the explanations of John of Antioch, however, Gallienus himself organized the murder of the general who had become too powerful.

The place should have been Herakleia Pontike; Zosimos gives Emesa, but his information is often imprecise, while the report of Georgios Synkellos seems to be based on a good source. However, it is less clear who the perpetrator was. Udo Hartmann assumes, however, that the various reports reflect parts of the lost original sources. Accordingly, one could assume that a nephew (who might actually be called Maeonius) was responsible for the murder. The motives for the murder are hardly transparent; both personal and political come into play here, with no clear answer possible.

After the murder of Odaenathus, Zenobia took over the reign of the still underage son Vaballathus over the sphere of influence of her husband and Palmyra. Under their responsibility, the Palmyrenian partial kingdom emerges, which finally openly challenged Rome; however, she did not succeed in maintaining Palmyra's position of power.

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Nikostratus of Trebizond wrote a history about this period in which Odaenathus was perhaps glorified, but the work has not survived to us. This also applies to the corresponding passages at Dexippos .

Relevant information is preserved in various late antique breviaries , in the (very controversial) Historia Augusta , at Zosimos , the Anonymus post Dionem , Johannes Malalas , Johannes von Antioch , Georgios Synkellos and Johannes Zonaras . There are also inscriptions and coins.

literature

Remarks

  1. ↑ On this in general Udo Hartmann: Das Palmyrenische Teilreich. Stuttgart 2001, p. 65 ff.
  2. Udo Hartmann: The Palmyrene Partial Kingdom. Stuttgart 2001, p. 92.
  3. ^ Petros Patrikios , fragment 10.
  4. See the discussion of research in Udo Hartmann: Das palmyrenische Teilreich. Stuttgart 2001, p. 146 ff.
  5. On the Persian War see Udo Hartmann: Das Palmyrenische Teilreich. Stuttgart 2001, p. 162 ff.
  6. On the date see Udo Hartmann: Das Palmyrenische Teilreich. Stuttgart 2001, p. 178.
  7. Michael Sommer: The Lion of Tadmor. In: Historische Zeitschrift 287, 2008, here p. 314 f.
  8. Detailed presentation by Udo Hartmann: Das Palmyrenische Teilreich. Stuttgart 2001, p. 218 ff.
  9. Zosimos 1.39.
  10. See in the Vita des Gallienus (13.1) and the thirty tyrants (15.5 and ff.) Of the Historia Augusta .
  11. ^ Anonymus post Dionem , fragment 7.
  12. Synkellos, p. 467 [page reference according to the edition Alden A. Mosshammer (ed.): Georgii Syncelli Ecloga chronographica. Teubner, Leipzig 1984; this can also be found in the English translation by William Adler, Paul Tuffin: The Chronography of George Synkellos. A Byzantine Chronicle of Universal History from the Creation. Oxford University Press, Oxford et al. 2002, ISBN 0-19-924190-2 ].
  13. Zonaras 12:24.
  14. Johannes von Antiochia, fragment 176 [based on the edition Sergei Mariev (ed.): Ioannis Antiocheni fragmenta quae supersunt (= Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae . Vol. 47). de Gruyter, Berlin et al. 2008, ISBN 978-3-11-020402-5 (At the same time: Munich, University, dissertation, 2005)].
  15. Udo Hartmann: The Palmyrene Partial Kingdom. Stuttgart 2001, pp. 222-224.