Operation Halmazag
date | End of October - November 2010 |
---|---|
place | Afghanistan , Kunduz Province |
output | Expulsion of insurgents from southern Chahar Darreh; Establishment of a permanent outpost in Quatliam |
Parties to the conflict | |
---|---|
Commander | |
|
|
Troop strength | |
480 soldiers
|
unknown number |
losses | |
12 dead 15 wounded |
Operation Halmazag ( Dari for "lightning") was an offensive operation led by the German Armed Forces by troops of the Afghan security forces ( army , police , secret service) in close cooperation with ISAF in Kunduz province in 2010. Operation Halmazag was intended to establish an ISAF Prepare outpost near the village of Quatliam in Char Darah district . Halmazag was successful in establishing the outposts. It was the first German offensive since World War II . Media reports speak of up to 27 civilian victims.
background
Two of Afghanistan's main trade routes, running from north to south and west to south-east, connect in the river valley-shaped province of Baghlan before running through the Salang Pass as part of the “ ring road ” that spans the whole of Afghanistan . One of these two roads runs from the Afghan-Uzbek border town of Shir Khan Bandah in a southerly direction along the Kunduz River through the city of Kunduz and on through the Baghlan Province to Pol-e Chomri . This infrastructural significance as an important supply corridor ensured that the region around Chahar Darreh was constantly contested during the Afghan-Soviet war.
The area around Chahar Darreh, southwest of Kunduz, has been one of the most dangerous districts in the Bundeswehr's operational area since 2009. On Good Friday in 2010, three German soldiers were killed in an ambush in the village of Isa Khel.
Change of strategy
With the dissolution of the Quick Reaction Force and the establishment of so-called training and protection battalions (ASB), the Bundeswehr has been pursuing a new strategy since August 2010. Referred to as partnering in NATO jargon , the ASBs trained the Afghan army in practice with two 800-man battle groups. This training mainly took place during ongoing operations.
Training and protection battalions
The Bundeswehr set up one training and one protection battalion each for its area of responsibility, the north of Afghanistan. The training and protection battalion in Kunduz was fully operational by the end of August and in Mazar-e Sharif by the end of October 2010.
Together with the Afghan armed forces, these battalions were to gradually gain control of key districts in order to subsequently hand them over to the responsibility of the Afghan police. A “safety vacuum” should not be able to arise.
Counterinsurgency
→ Main article: FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency
Operations were to follow a four-phase counterinsurgency strategy previously deployed in Iraq . The phases can flow smoothly into one another:
- Shape - intelligence gathering and education
- Clear - taking space
- Hold - holding the room
- Build - ensuring security through Afghan forces and civil construction
The training and protection battalions were appropriately robustly equipped: each comprised two infantry companies, a pioneer company and a reconnaissance company. Marder armored personnel carriers were also part of the armament . In addition, the battalions could fall back on the firepower of the three self-propelled howitzers 2000 in the Kunduz field camp and on mortars .
Regional reconstruction teams
The training and protection battalions should enable the two Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Kunduz and Feyzabad that existed at the time to concentrate on reconstruction and sustainable stabilization.
Led by a "double leadership", i. H. an officer of the German Armed Forces and an official of the Foreign Office, the ASBs had numerous military components from security forces to explosive ordnance disposal and medical personnel. The PRT Kunduz also had three self-propelled howitzers 2000 and guided missiles of the TOW type on Wiesel airborne tanks.
Further training support
In addition to the training and protection battalions, the Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) are another pillar of the training of the Afghan army. By the end of 2010, around 200 soldiers from the Bundeswehr had participated in eight OMLTs for the 209th Afghan Corps. One mentoring and one liaison team was assigned to an Afghan association and went into action with them.
In addition, there were around 120 Bundeswehr soldiers at military schools, in police training and at other Afghan institutions. Together with the training and protection battalions, the Bundeswehr contributed more than 1,500 soldiers to the development of the Afghan security forces.
Operation plan
The operation in the southern part of the Char Darah district was to be carried out with two ISAF units attacking parallel to each other from the main district road ("chimneys"), starting from north to south. The task force deployed in the west was to attack Kunduz (ASB) along a connecting road starting from height 432 to the south and reach the village of Quatliam. The troops of the 1-87 US Infantry Battalion deployed in the east were supposed to take the towns of Isa Khel and Haji Amanullah from the Kunduz River to the south from the insurgents. It was known from all three locations that they had been mined very heavily and systematically by the insurgents using IEDs , so that ordnance disposal forces (EOD and Route Clearance Package) had been integrated into both task forces in advance .
Course on October 31
On October 31, during the approach phase of the ASB, there were firefights with insurgents who used handguns and anti-tank weapons. Before the area around the town of Quatliam was taken, there were three bomb attacks (IED) against US reconnaissance forces and two German Marder armored personnel carriers. The armored personnel carriers were damaged in the process and then brought back to the Kunduz PRT. Contrary to initial reports from Kunduz, during the fighting there were two slightly wounded German soldiers who were able to continue their mission after being treated by a medical troop. As a result, there were no staff shortages to complain about.
During the day there was another shelling in the vicinity of the town of Quatliam without consequences. The artillery provided direct fire support for its own troops with the self-propelled howitzer 2000. According to available information from the military intelligence service, two insurgents were killed in the action on October 31. No further confirmations are available. According to statements from the local population, which were reproduced in a radio report, the Bundeswehr must have become aware of at least two civilian victims on the first day.
Due to the intensity of the fighting, a limited damage assessment could only be carried out in the contested area using KZO drones . Ground troops could not be used.
The night of November 1st passed quietly. The self-propelled howitzer 2000 in Kunduz fired flare ammunition to illuminate the area west of Isa Khel.
Course on November 1st
On November 1st, opposing forces attacked in the Quatliam area, initially with small arms and anti-tank weapons. There were several firefights to the west and south of the village, in which the insurgents also used mortars. No German soldiers were wounded in the attacks. The positions could be held. The armored howitzer 2000 was used against the insurgents' enlightened mortar positions. In addition, Close Air Support (CAS) was deployed once during the day.
At the same time, the first "Key Leader Engagement", a meeting of the tactical leaders of the operation with local leaders, took place in Quatliam. In the context of this meeting, even after explicit inquiries, there was no evidence of civilian victims or other damage. Since the most important district leader was not present at this meeting, only later research by the ARD magazine Monitor revealed that up to 27 civilians are said to have died.
According to the information available from the military intelligence service, one insurgent was killed in the action on November 1. No further confirmations are available.
Due to the intensity of the fighting, damage assessment in the contested area could only be carried out with drones on this day. Preparations for setting up the outpost on the “LOC Little Pluto” road took place, but could not be completed because of the insurgents' shelling.
During the night, the operations room was monitored from the air by ISAF forces and a show of force was demonstrated.
Course on November 2nd
On November 2nd, a second "Key Leader Engagement" took place in Quatliam, also with local leaders from the neighboring villages. The area around Quatliam was secured by ISAF soldiers and ANSF forces. The soldiers of the international protection force continued to block enemy forces from the direction of Isa Khel. Insurgents attacked again with hand weapons, anti-tank weapons and mortars. Recognized enemy positions south of the town of Quatliam were fought by ground troops in cooperation with the Panzerhaubitze 2000 and through repeated use of close air support. The own positions could be held.
As part of the second "Key Leader Engagement", no civilian losses or damage were reported. According to available information from the military intelligence system, five insurgents were killed in the action on November 2. No further confirmations are available.
Due to the intensity of the fighting, a damage assessment in the contested area could not be carried out that day with either drones or ground troops.
Course on November 3rd
On November 3, there were firefights between insurgents and deployed ISAF forces. The Panzerhaubitze 2000 from Kunduz was used for fire support. Close air support with F15 aircraft was used against a spotted enemy mortar production supporting the enemy attack.
At the same time, the Taliban tried to attack the police headquarters in Chahar Darrah. However, this attack was repulsed and therefore had no consequences for its own forces. According to available information from the military intelligence system, four insurgents were killed in the action on November 3.
Course from November 4th
On November 4th, the police headquarters in Chahar Darreh were reinforced by additional forces from the training and protection battalion from Kunduz in order to be able to react to possible attacks. It was quiet in this room. When two insurgents tried to hijack a civilian truck, the civilian Afghan driver broke through and was able to escape. He suffered gunshot wounds and was treated by the mobile medical team on site . The driver could continue his journey.
The attacks by the rebels became much weaker and subsided completely towards evening. During the night, a unit of the training and protection battalion Masar-e Sharif moved from Baghlan to Quatliam and was thus able to initially strengthen and later relieve the troops deployed.
The construction of the outpost by German pioneers was pushed ahead. The previously selected civil reconstruction measures in the Quatliam area were started by civil-military cooperation teams (CIMIC). The town of Quatliam was to be supplied with electricity across the board.
To reduce the threat from booby traps to both civilians and military forces, troops cleared up and cleared makeshift explosive devices (IED) on the streets. The references to such explosive devices mostly came from the population. Ammunition that could or was processed into explosive devices was detonated on the spot by the engineers in a controlled manner.
"Hold phase"
After the end of the main fighting operations, it was the further intention of the ISAF troops in Kunduz to initially occupy the established outpost ("Combat Outpost") in the village of Quatliam on the supply route "Little Pluto" with ISAF forces and then to become the responsibility of the surrender to Afghan security forces. According to the ISAF operational doctrine, the “hold phase” should begin, in which the conquered area is held and gradually rebuilt with the permanent presence of security forces with the support of development aid organizations.
Talks were held with the elders from the surrounding villages and construction work to connect Quatliam and the surrounding villages to the power grid was resumed. This development project of the Federal Foreign Ministry was repeatedly disrupted by the presence of the insurgents until it was completely stopped.
The success of the offensive operation was a prerequisite for the Bundeswehr in 2011 to be able to bring the southern part of the troubled district of Chahar Darreh almost completely under their control and to continuously expand the safety radius to the north.
Visit of the Minister of Defense
The then Federal Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg arrived on November 4th for an unannounced short visit to Afghanistan. There he also went to the Chahar Darreh area west of Kunduz City.
See also
literature
- Christian von Blumröder: Shape, Clear, Hold, Build - Operation HALMAZAG of the Kunduz Training and Protection Battalion . In: Robin Schroeder, Stefan Hansen (eds.): Stabilization missions as a national task. Experiences and lessons from the German operation in Afghanistan between state building and countering insurgency (COIN) . Nomos, Baden-Baden 2015, ISBN 978-3-8487-0690-7 , pp. 233–244.
- Johannes Clair : Four days in November . Econ-Verlag, 2012, ISBN 3-430-20138-1 .
Web links
- ISAF deployment in Afghanistan. Official announcements from the Bundeswehr about the operation
- Article in the Stuttgarter Zeitung from November 4, 2010
- Guttenberg visits dangerous district in Afghanistan ( Memento from November 7th 2010 in the Internet Archive ), article of the world with current casualty figures
- Article about partnering
- Detailed article by the WAZ group on Operation Halmazag
- deutschlandfunk.de , Das Feature , November 29, 2016, Marc Thörner : Operation Halmazag - War Made in Germany
Individual evidence
- ↑ Michael Renz, Christian Deick: Our War (1/2) - Combat Mission Afghanistan. (Documentary), 2013, shown on October 8, 2013 at 8:15 p.m. on ZDF (45 min, video on YouTube ).
- ↑ Marc Thorner : Afghanistan: The winners of Kunduz , feature of SWR / WDR / Germany Funk, sent on 29 July 2014 Germany radio ( mp3 ( Memento of 21 August 2014 Internet Archive ), about 40 min. Manuscript of Broadcast (PDF, 26 pages, on Operation Halmazag from p. 15ff.))
- ↑ http://www.swr.de/landesschau-aktuell/deutschland-welt/monitor-bundeswehr-verschweigt-zivile-opfer-in-afghanistan/-/id=1884346/did=13747694/nid=1884346/1gappx3/index .html Does the Bundeswehr withhold civilian victims? swr.de from July 10, 2014
- ↑ Stephan Löwenstein: This time no Taliban on a burning dingo. FAZ , November 12, 2010, accessed December 19, 2011 .
- ↑ Marcel Bohnert : COIN at the base: To implement the concept in a combat company of the Kunduz Task Force . In: R. Schroeder & S. Hansen (eds.) (2015): Stabilization deployments as a national task. Nomos: Baden-Baden, p. 247ff.