Operation Komodo
The operation Komodo ( Indonesian Operasi Komodo ) was from mid-1974, an operation of the Indonesian military intelligence Bakin . The aim was to annex the Portuguese Timor colony , which was in preparation for independence at the time. The Indonesian government presented annexation as a necessity to secure its own national security. In times of the Cold War and the US defeat in the Vietnam War , Indonesia warned of a communist East Timor in the middle of its territory. The operation was named after the Komodo dragon .
The Bakin initially worked with East Timorese who favored the connection to Indonesia. For example, with the APODETI , the Timorese party that advocated affiliation with Indonesia. Although it was financially supported by Indonesia and later with arming and training of militiamen, it had little support from the population of the colony. Radio broadcasts to Portuguese Timor from Kupang, Indonesia claimed that Portugal was leaving early and that unsubstantiated rumors were spread that Vietnamese and Chinese were infiltrating the territory. “Integration” in Indonesia is the only viable option. In addition, the programs promoted distrust between the East Timorese parties.
When the two big parties of the colony and supporters of an independent East Timor, FRETILIN and União Democrática Timorense (UDT) , formed an alliance in January 1975 , Jakarta was alarmed, which is why anti-communist propaganda against FRETILIN was increased. From this point on, the military occupation of Portuguese Timor was planned. In addition, the camouflaged nature of the operation was increasingly abandoned.
The Bakin had a functioning network in Portuguese Timor, which was reflected in regular, well-informed news broadcasts on the situation. The Bakin portrayed the FRETILIN as communist and painted a specter of a socialist East Timor. The Bakin agent Louis Taolin regularly visited the colonial capital Dili from West Timor . Taolin also accompanied Colonel Sugianto and Colonel Suharto Pitut's official mission to Dili in April 1975. They acted as a delegation with business interests. They met the Portuguese governor Mário Lemos Pires and representatives of the parties FRETILIN, UDT and APODETI. In the same month General Ali Murtopo invited UDT and FRETILIN envoys to Jakarta . Immediately after the party representatives returned to Timor, the central commission of the UDT met and decided to end the coalition with FRETILIN. In May the Bakin again invited UDT members for talks and made it clear that Indonesia would never accept an independent government with the participation of the “communist” FRETILIN. The “communist threat” served the UDT leaders as the final justification for leaving the coalition with FRETILIN on May 27th.
On June 6th, Indonesian troops disguised as UDT fighters occupied the enclave of Oe-Cusse Ambeno . The lack of a reaction from Portugal confirmed the Indonesian assessment that there was no longer any need to fear interventions from the colonial power. On July 25, UDT leaders Domingos de Oliveira and João Viegas Carrascalão met representatives of the Indonesian secret service again. Here General Ali Murtopo explained to the East Timorese that FRETILIN was planning a violent seizure of power on August 15th and that if measures were not taken to get FRETILIN out of the way, Indonesia would invade East Timor. But if the UDT were to clean up their “backyard”, Indonesia would recognize East Timor's right to self-determination. In view of this threat and the expected defeat in free elections, the UDT decided on a coup (Operaçao Sakonar) on August 11th. A civil war broke out between UDT and FRETILIN . Portugal practically gave up its colony. Governor Pires withdrew on August 27 on the island of Atauro off Dili .
The FRETILIN emerged victorious in the three-week civil war. UDT and APODETI supporters had to flee to the Indonesian West Timor . They were now working directly with the Indonesians. Indonesia presented the civil war as a threat to regional stability, although FRETILIN quickly restored peace and order and had the support of the population after its victory. On August 31, 1975, Operation Komodo from Bakin was handed over to the specially established military command of Komando Tugas Gabungan (Kogasgab, German command of the joint special unit ) and Operation Komodo was replaced by Operation Flamboyan , which now included large-scale military operations.
See also
Individual evidence
- ^ A b c Nations Encyclopedia: East Timor - History , accessed November 4, 2017.
- ↑ a b c d e "Part 3: The History of the Conflict" (PDF; 1.4 MB) from the "Chega!" Report of the CAVR (English)
- ^ Bill Nicol: Timor: A Nation Reborn. Equinox Publishing, 2002, p. 263 limited preview in Google Book search.