Operation Flamboyan
The operation Flamboyan ( Indonesian Operasi Flamboyan , German flame tree ) was 1975, a joint military operation of various parts of the Indonesian National Armed Forces with aim of annexing the colony Portuguese Timor . The operation was planned by Major General Benny Moerdani on behalf of the Indonesian Ministry of Defense.
prehistory
With Operation Komodo , the Indonesian military intelligence service Bakin had destabilized the neighboring colony of Portuguese Timor , which was supposed to be prepared for independence, and triggered a civil war between FRETILIN and União Democrática Timorense (UDT) in 1974/75 . The FRETILIN emerged victorious in the three-week civil war. UDT and APODETI supporters had to flee to the Indonesian West Timor . They were now working directly with the Indonesians. Indonesia presented the civil war as a threat to regional stability, although FRETILIN quickly restored peace and order and had the support of the population after its victory. On August 31, 1975, the Bakin's supreme command was handed over to the specially established military command of the Komando Tugas Gabungan (Kogasgab, German command of the joint special unit ) and Operation Komodo was replaced by Operation Flamboyan, which now included large-scale military operations.
The operation
Already after the formation of the short-lived coalition of UDT and FRETILIN on January 21, 1975, Indonesia began major military exercises in southern Sumatra , with which an invasion of East Timor was practiced. On the border with Portuguese Timor, the troops were reinforced on a small scale.
Between December 1974 and February 1975, under the leadership of Colonel Dading Kalbuadi, an eight-person team of special forces ( Kopassandha ) arrived in the Indonesian border town of Atambua and did the preparatory work for Operation Flamboyan. The team took over the agent network of Operation Komodo and the 216 partisans of the APODETI, which were led by Tomás Gonçalves and had been trained by the Indonesian military in Atambua since August 1974. The Portuguese administration sent a delegation to Atambua in January 1975 to persuade the partisans to return to Portuguese Timor, but this was unsuccessful. The Indonesian captain Yunus Yosfiah recruited and in the meantime trained new recruits for the Kopassandha in West Java . At the end of April, the team in Atambua was reinforced by 80 men.
From the end of August / beginning of September 1975 Indonesian special forces, called Tim Susi , began incursions into Portuguese territory. The first attack was led by Captain Yunus Yosfiah and assisted by East Timorese partisans trained by the Indonesians. It led to Atsabe . The aim was terror and intimidation. On September 14, there was a battle with FRETILIN fighters on the border near Atsabe. On the same day, the Indonesians launched similar attacks on Bobonaro and Suai . However, high losses initially forced the Indonesians to stop operations.
On October 8th, Indonesian troops disguised as UDT fighters occupied the East Timorese border town of Batugade and drove the FALINTIL units there to Balibo . The headquarters of the operation was set up here. Until mid-October, Bobonaro and Cova Lima , the districts on the border, were largely in Indonesian hands. On October 15, Tim Susi and battalions of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the Indonesian Army began the attack on Balibo. Indonesian warships shelled the coast. East Timorese militias were hardly involved in the attack. Two British, one New Zealand and two Australian television journalists (the Balibo Five ), who witnessed the capture of the border town on October 16, were deliberately murdered by Indonesian soldiers. In addition to Balibo, Maliana was taken on October 16 . Indonesian planes had landed here. Despite these clear, large-scale offensive measures, Indonesia still denied having troops in East Timor or even wanting to occupy the country by force. UDT and APODETI fighters would only repel attacks by FRETILIN on Indonesian territory and were also responsible for the deaths of the journalists.
Another attempt to advance further into Portuguese Timor with an attack in October failed due to the resistance of FRETILIN. According to a CIA report from October 20, the Indonesians did not manage to “secure” the border town of Lebos . There was no support from the naval artillery here. An Indonesian attack also got stuck in Lela (Suco Holpilat ) in mid-October. The Indonesians had problems with their weapons and difficulties with the beginning of the rainy season. After a break in the fight, the offensive was resumed on November 20. The goal was now Atabae on the coast. For the first time, naval and air force units were used together against the East Timorese defenders, who were commanded by Aquiles Freitas Soares . They were mostly former East Timorese soldiers of the 6th Portuguese Cavalry Company. On November 26th the East Timorese stopped the resistance and the Indonesians occupied the main town of Aidabaleten on the morning of November 28th.
On the same day FRETILIN tried to get international support with the unilateral declaration of independence . Indonesia responded by announcing that the leaders of UDT, APODETI, KOTA and the Labor Party signed the so-called Balibo Declaration on November 30, calling for East Timor to join Indonesia. The signatories were more or less prisoners of Indonesia who were forced to sign. The text was written by the Bakin agent Louis Taolin , among others . From December 7, 1975, Indonesia began, with reference to the Balibo Declaration, the Operasi Seroja (Operation Lotus) and thus the open invasion of the rest of East Timor with the occupation of the capital Dili.
See also
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i j "Part 3: The History of the Conflict" (PDF; 1.4 MB) from the "Chega!" Report of the CAVR (English)
- ^ History and Politics: 2. b. Portuguese contact and historical experience - Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University
- ^ Sarasota Herald Tribune, October 16, 1975, Fighting unabated in Portuguese Timor
- ↑ Jolliffe, Jill. East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism . Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1978. OCLC 4833990
- ^ East Timor Government: History
- ^ David Hicks: Rhetoric and the Decolonization and Recolonization of East Timor. Routledge, 2015, limited preview in Google Book Search.
- ^ Durand: Three Centuries of Violence and Struggle in East Timor (1726-2008) .