Operation Seroja

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The Indonesian Colonel Dading Kalbuadi in East Timor

The operation Seroja ( Operasi Seroja , German  Lotus ) was a Indonesian military operation that the invasion and occupation of East Timor served. It began on December 7, 1975 and was declared successful on March 26, 1979 . The period between 1977 and 1979 is known as the "greatest humanitarian tragedy in the history of East Timor ". It was marked by famine caused by the Indonesian military operations intended to break the East Timorese resistance. Operation Seroja was one of the largest Indonesian military operations ever.

prehistory

After the Carnation Revolution in 1974 Portuguese Timor was supposed to be prepared for independence, but with Operation Komodo the Indonesian military secret service Bakin destabilized the colony in 1974/75 and triggered a civil war between FRETILIN and the União Democrática Timorense (UDT). The Portuguese colonial government then withdrew to the island of Atauro off the colonial capital Dili . The FRETILIN emerged victorious from the three-week civil war and effectively took control of the colony. UDT and APODETI supporters had to flee to the Indonesian West Timor . They were now working directly with the Indonesians. Indonesia presented the civil war as a threat to regional stability, although FRETILIN quickly restored peace and order and had the support of the population after its victory. On August 31, 1975, Operation Komodo was replaced by Operation Flamboyan , which now included large-scale military operations. Indonesian soldiers began to occupy the border areas disguised as East Timorese militiamen, but encountered fierce resistance from FRETILIN and their military arm, the FALINTIL .

Indonesian soldiers pose with a captured Portuguese flag in Batugade, East Timor, in November 1975

The FALINTIL could rely on about 10,000 men. 2,500 of them were trained East Timorese soldiers in the Portuguese army , the others trained civilians. Their armament came from the inventory of the Portuguese army, so that sufficient Mauser rifles and ammunition were available. In Fernando do Carmo , Vice Minister for Information, Home Affairs and Security, a former NCO of the Portuguese army was also available as a competent military leader. Where the Indonesians lacked the support of naval artillery , the FALINTIL retained the upper hand and was able to gain combat experience. This prompted the Indonesians to found Operation Seroja Joint Task Force Command ( Indonesian Komando Tugas Gabungan Operasi Seroja ) in October 1975 and to increase the number of soldiers deployed to 3,200 men. This reinforcement also included the Kopassandha Army Special Unit (Secret Special Command for Warfare) 2nd Combat Detachment, the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion from Surabaya (later name: Pasmar 1 ), the Ratulangi submarine , two air force transport planes and three battalions of the 2nd Infantry Brigade from East Java . Brigadier General Chamid Soeweno, commander of the Kopassandha Intelligence Center, was appointed as the commander of the task force . Operation Flamboyan, Colonel Dading Kalbuadi , became the reconnaissance assistant .

The Oecusse exclave had been in Indonesian hands since June 1975. Finally, with the help of units of the Air Force and the Navy, Batugade , Balibo and Aidabaleten (also called Atabae ) and other parts of the districts of Bobonaro and Cova Lima were occupied.

After the occupation of Aidabaleten by the Indonesian special unit Tim Susi and the 2nd Infantry Brigade on November 28th, FRETILIN tried to get international support by unilaterally proclaiming independence .

Political preparations

US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Gerald Ford with Indonesia's President Suharto the day before the invasion of East Timor
The Suharto - Whitlam House ( Dieng Plateau , Indonesia). The two politicians discussed East Timor here in 1974.

Indonesia reacted to the declaration of independence by announcing that the leaders of the other East Timorese parties had signed the so-called Balibo Declaration on November 30, calling for East Timor to join Indonesia. The signatories were more or less prisoners of Indonesia who were forced to sign. The text was written by the Bakin agent Louis Taolin , among others .

The closest allies, Australia and the United States , let Indonesia go. The intelligence services of the two states observed the Indonesian troop deployment in advance. Both countries had been shown to have been informed of the plans before the invasion and had given their consent. This is evidenced by previously secret government documents published by the US National Security Archive in December 2001 . Just one day before the occupation of East Timor, US President Gerald Ford and US Foreign Minister Henry Kissinger met with Indonesian President Suharto in the Indonesian capital Jakarta . East Timor was only briefly addressed and the Americans took a clear position:

Suharto:

"We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action."

"We would like your understanding if we consider it necessary to take quick or drastic measures."

Ford:

“We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have. "

“We understand and will not press you on this matter. We understand your problem and your intentions. "

Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam had given a free hand to Indonesia on September 6, 1974 on the Dieng Plateau , near Wonosobo , and on April 4, 1975 in Townsville in his meetings with Suharto, regarding East Timor. Whitlam stated that an independent East Timor would be easy prey for China or the Soviet Union and would therefore be "a thorn in the side of Australia and a thorn in the back of Indonesia." In 2020, an Australian court ruled that government documents such as diplomatic news and cabinet papers on Australia's role during the Indonesian invasion would have to remain a secret, as disclosure could endanger Australia's security or international relations. Documents that have already become public show that Australia's interest in the oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea had a decisive influence on its actions.

The Indonesian Parliament (MPR) gave the government the green light on December 6th "to solve the East Timor problem." The Representative Council of the People (DPR) also gave its consent on the same day.

"There is a desire from the people of Portuguese Timor to join the Republic of Indonesia that must be acknowledged by the DPR."

"There is a desire of the people of Portuguese Timor to join the Republic of Indonesia, which has to be recognized by the DPR."

The invasion of Dili

See: overview map of East Timor and map of the course of the invasion

On the eve of the invasion

The FRETILIN leadership now constantly expected the Indonesians to attack Dili. Members of the FRETILIN Central Committee (CCF) patrolled every night. On December 2nd, the International Red Cross delegation received a telegram from the Australian government requesting all Australian citizens to leave the country for their own safety. FRETILIN had recognized the neutrality of the Red Cross, but not UDT and APODETI, which is why the employees were evacuated to Atauro on the same day, from where they wanted to keep the clinic in Dili running. The Defense FRETILIN Rogerio Lobato said it expected a full-scale invasion and an attack on Dili, but you urge the world to stop this "criminal aggession" because it would cause a "never-ending bloodbath". The East Timorese people will resist. On December 4th, he and the ministers Marí Alkatiri and José Ramos-Horta left East Timor to promote East Timor with a delegation through diplomatic channels.

On December 6th, the last Red Cross employees left Dili for Atauro. The population began to flee to the mountains. In 1975 Dili had a population of 28,000. Those of the population who could fled to the mountains behind the city, the FRETILIN leadership and the government were evacuated in the direction of Aileu . The UDT and APODETI members who had been captured in the civil war were also taken away. FALINTIL combat units remained, who wanted to offer resistance to the expected attackers. The last foreign correspondent remaining in Dili was the Australian Roger East , who noted that evening:

“With the deterioration of the security situation, people started quietly to leave for the hills. Tonight Dili is quiet and almost empty, abandoned by its people. A curfew was applied on the fourth day and armed soldiers guarded the beach and the streets. "

“As the security situation deteriorated, people began to leave the city for the mountains. Tonight Dili is quiet and almost empty, deserted by its people. A curfew was imposed on the fourth day and armed soldiers guarded the beach and the streets. "

With reference to the Balibo Declaration, Operation Seroja began a large-scale open military offensive, including sea and air support. There was no official declaration of war in advance. On the afternoon of December 6th, several hundred UDT and APODETI fighters allied with Indonesia and soldiers of the 1st Marine Infantry Unit on the warship KRI Teluk Bone Aidabaleten left for Dili. You should be the first to land in Dili under cover of darkness. The small number of East Timorese militiamen served to preserve the Indonesian myth that the attack was primarily carried out by them and Indonesian volunteers. For this purpose, the markings were also removed from landing vehicles. The soldiers were armed with Soviet AK-47 rifles , Yugoslav RPG-2 anti-tank weapons, and other light weapons from non-Western production that had been specially purchased for the attack. The weapons should not have come from the US, the main supplier of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI). During his visit, US Secretary of State Kissinger pointed out that the use of American weapons could lead to problems. The majority of the heavy military equipment such as aircraft, several ships and landing units came from the USA. The elite units and paratroopers deployed had also been trained by Americans. Military mistakes by the Indonesians nonetheless resulted in a significant number of additional deaths among the attackers.

The attack

At 2 a.m., five more Indonesian warships arrived off Dili's coast. The FRETILIN then switched off the power supply to the city at 3 o'clock, so that Dili fell into darkness. Contrary to the plan, the warships KRI Ratulangi , KRI Barakuda , KRI Martadinata and KRI Jayawijaya opened fire on the city. According to other sources, 20 warships and 13 aircraft were involved in the bombing of East Timor's capital. According to the Indonesian journalist Subroto, who accompanied the invasion troops, Soeweno had given the order to fire because the element of surprise had been lost. At 4:30 a.m., 400 marines landed in the western part of Kampung Alor , together with light floating tanks and armored personnel carriers . The defense was weak. At 7 o'clock the Indonesians had secured the area. The Indonesian Navy then took fire on the eastern and western parts of Dilis because it was wrongly suspected that FALINTIL artillery was here.

Hercules of the Indonesian Air Force

Just before dawn, nine C-130B Hercules flew over Atauro in formation towards the Wetar Strait , then headed for Dili from the east. At 5:45 a.m., the first 555 paratroopers of Group 1 of the Kopassandha and the Kostrad (Yonif 501) were dropped over the city. Most of them landed in the northeast of Dili, along Rua José Maria Marques (now Rua 30 de Agosto), where they immediately encountered strong resistance because the Indonesians had done poor educational work. There were several FALINTIL posts here, including one in the Centro de Saúde da Formosa , from where a fierce battle with the paratroopers broke out. Some of the paratroopers came under enemy fire while they were still in the air, while others were injured or died while landing on buildings or on power lines. A Hercules was also hit. Due to the lack of air support, 78 paratroopers of the first wave could not be dropped. A plane dropped its paratroopers over the sea, where they drowned. Another dropped his behind enemy lines.

Shortly before 8 a.m., a second wave of paratroopers was dropped over the Comoro district , only five Hercules left. The other four machines were damaged. The landing created such confusion that Indonesian units fought each other. Because of this disaster, a scheduled jump by the Joint Task Force Command in the afternoon was called off. The exact size of the invading army is not known. Several thousand Indonesian soldiers landed on the coast of East Timor between December 7 and 10. 10,000 to 20,000 were added in the following weeks, including a large number on Christmas Day. In addition to the Hercules, the Indonesian Air Force also used other machines in the operation.

The defenders were initially able to achieve success. When two Hercules planes with 38 soldiers from the special forces wanted to land at the airport in Comoro, one was repelled. Due to the greater firepower, the Indonesian army was soon able to gain the upper hand. Around noon, the Indonesians had taken the governor's seat (Palácio das Repartições) in the city center and posted troops on the arteries. The East Timorese still had control of both Taibesi, with the Portuguese army headquarters, and Lahane , the governor's residence , as well as the hills south of Fatuhada and above the airport.

With the help of the Portuguese corvettes João Roby and Afonso Cerqueira , Governor Pires and the last members of the colonial administration left their place of refuge on Atauro on December 8th. On the same day, Major General Moerdani , one of the main planners of the invasion, arrived in Dili and was led through the city by Colonel Kalbuadi.

War crimes

In addition to arbitrary executions of civilians, a number of mass murders were committed by Indonesian soldiers in the first days of the invasion. Members of the Chinese community in Dili were targeted victims of the soldiers.

Numerous people murdered during the invasion and the subsequent occupation were buried in Tasitolu , west of Dili. The area was considered a "well-known killing place" (generally known place where killing occurs) . People were dragged here by Indonesian soldiers, executed and buried. At the monument to Henry the Navigator in front of the government palace was discovered a mass grave containing at least 72 bodies from June to July 2012th It was unclear whether they were victims of the Indonesian invasion and subsequent executions or those who died in World War II . Since the dead were relatively large, it was assumed that the victims were members of the Chinese minority.

On the ninth day of the invasion, the East Timorese Minister of Information, Alarico Fernandes, sent a telegram to the United Nations Security Council reporting massive looting and pillage in Dili. 19 ships and their crews were involved in the crimes in the port of Dili .

There were no disciplinary consequences for the Indonesian soldiers due to the massive violations of human rights. This also corresponded to incidents in the following years of the occupation.

Reactions

Even after the attack on Dili, Indonesia tried to hold on to the myth that the invasion was carried out by fighters from the four opposition East Timorese parties APODETI, UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista , together with Indonesian volunteers. The day after the invasion, the official Indonesian press reported the Dilis case to the combined forces of the four parties. On the third page of the report, the "volunteers" were also mentioned. Indonesian journalists repeated and spread the hoax so that it became deeply anchored in Indonesian society.

Australia suffered a domestic political crisis at the end of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's term in office. Although the Australian government protested loudly after the occupation of East Timor was almost complete, it had already secretly promised not to intervene actively. With the annexation by Indonesia, Australia now had the opportunity to set a sea border to its advantage in the east of Timor, with considerable shares of the oil reserves in the Timor Trench on the Australian side. As early as 1972, Australia and Indonesia had defined the border course in the Timor Sea near West Timor. A corresponding agreement was not reached with Portugal, so that the so-called Timor Gap ( German  Timor gap ' ) remained in the border . Previously secret documents from the Australian archives released in 2018 demonstrate the mainly economic background of the Australian accommodation towards Indonesia. In 1979, Australia was finally the only country that recognized the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia. The policy was not popular with the Australian public as they remembered the Timorese fight on the side of the Australians, seen as heroic during World War II (see Battle of Timor ). There were violent protests, but the government ignored them.

Session room of the United Nations General Assembly

José Ramos-Horta traveled to New York three days after the invasion began as Foreign Minister of the independent state of Timor-Leste to brief the United Nations Security Council on the Indonesian military's actions. He was recognized by the United Nations as a representative of the East Timorese people. Although the United Nations had turned a blind eye to the annexation of Western New Guinea (Irian Jaya) a few years earlier , it did not recognize the occupation of East Timor. Several states exerted pressure here, above all Portugal. Pro-Indonesian states such as India , Japan and Malaysia submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly of the United Nations accusing Portugal and the Timorese parties of responsibility for the dead, but this was in favor of a motion by Algeria , Cuba, the Senegal , Guyana and others rejected. On December 12, 1975, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 3485, which confirmed that ...

“… The opinion of the representative of Portugal as the administrative power regarding the developments in Portuguese Timor was heard. […] [The General Assembly] deplores the military intervention by Indonesia's armed forces in Portuguese Timor and calls on the Indonesian government to withdraw its troops immediately from the territory […] [and] calls on the UN Security Council to take urgent action to protect the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and the inalienable right of its residents to self-determination. "

On December 22, 1975, the UN Security Council passed UN resolution 384 , which followed the resolution of the General Assembly. On April 22, 1976, the call for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor was repeated in UN resolution 389 . The special envoy Vittorio Winspeare-Guicciardi sent by the UN Secretary General visited East Timor for two days at the end of January. His attempts to also meet representatives of FRETILIN were sabotaged. The FRETILIN transmitted coordinates on the south coast for a meeting via Radio Ma 2500 , but the area was bombed by the Indonesians. Indonesia even threatened to sink the Portuguese corvette that Winspeare-Guicciardi was supposed to bring to the meeting on the south coast.

On July 17, 1976, Indonesia officially declared the annexation of East Timor. Internationally, however, East Timor was still regarded as a "dependent territory under Portuguese administration" .

In mid-1976 the first East Timorese refugees arrived in Portugal via camps in West Timor. They brought the first eyewitness accounts of the extent of the violence of the invasion to the western world.

The further course of the invasion

Course of the Indonesian invasion (1975–1979)

On December 9th, Indonesian marines, along with 1,500 East Timorese militiamen on board four warships, left Dili for Baucau , the second largest city in East Timor. They were accompanied by two frigates from Soviet production. The following day at about 6 a.m., a unit of the marine infantry landed under the fire protection of the warships near Laga in the Baucau district . They were led by UDT member Manuel Carrascalão , and Colonel Dading Kalbuadi was in command. 493 paratroopers jumped out of seven Hercules planes in a first wave over Baucau Airport . This time a Douglas A-26 Invader flew as air defense. A second wave with six Hercules followed. The attack on Baucau met no armed resistance, so the city was quickly under the control of the Indonesians. Another 4,000 soldiers were flown into Baucau at the end of December and began operations in the east of the country. Several battalions moved west to Manatuto , a second unit moved south and united with units of the marine infantry that had landed in Uato-Lari , on the south coast, and a third thrust went south from Laga to the hills at the foot of the mountain Matebian , where a FRETILIN stronghold was.

On December 25th, three days after UN resolution 384, a large increase in troops called for the withdrawal. An estimated 10,000 (one source suggests 15,000 to 20,000) Indonesian soldiers landed in Dili. Tilomar was captured in the south . On December 30th, the Indonesians landed on Atauro, where shortly afterwards the last sign of Portugal's claim to power over its colony was obtained in an official ceremony; a Portuguese flag that Governor Pires had left behind. On December 31st, Manatuto fell, from where the Indonesians advanced south towards Soibada . On the same day, Aileu was overrun. The FRETILIN tour first left after Maubisse and then further south. The Indonesians continued to advance towards Maubisse until there was fighting over the Fleixa Pass in late January . It was not until February 23 that the Indonesians reached Ainaro , where they joined forces that had landed in Betano .

At the end of January 1976 the East Javanese 18th Infantry Brigade pushed through Bobonaro to Atsabe and Letefoho and reached Ermera on March 27th. On February 2, soldiers of the 2nd Battalion of the Indonesian Marines landed on the coast of Lautém and six Hercules dropped paratroopers from Battalions 330 and 501 near the district capital Lospalos at the Fuiloro airfield . There was no resistance because the FRETILIN had moved south.

On February 5, before sunrise, paratroopers from the Kopassandha landed at the Suai airfield with six Hercules planes and advanced towards the city of Suai . Here the fighting lasted until the following night. To avoid attacks by the Indonesian army, the people of Suai either fled to Maucatar or hid in their plantings for a few days before surrendering to the invaders. From Suai, the invaders moved east towards Zumalai .

In June, the Indonesians turned to the area west of Dili that had so far remained undisturbed. The places Liquiçá and Maubara were attacked and in July we introduced a number of small operations in the district Ermera by: Operation Shinta against Fatubessi ( Hatulia ) operation Tulada 1 against Hatolia , operation Tulada 2 against Railaco Subdistrict and operation Tulada 3 against Leorema . In the same month, six Hercules landed on the deserted airfield of Same with troops of the Brigade Raiders Kostrad. The FRETILIN had withdrawn here before. The next town was Viqueque . Troops of Kostrad and Kopasgat Dalpur (combat controller) were supported from the air by A-26 Invander and AC-47 Gunship , which attacked the area around the airfield and FRETILIN positions suspected in the forest.

Stalemate 1976/77

Replica of a FALINTIL shelter in the Archive & Museum of the Timorese Resistance

In August 1976, the East Timor Defense and Security Command (Kodahankam) was established by the Indonesian Armed Forces and the territory was divided into four sectors of operation. Sector A consisted of Dili , the east of Liquiçá and Oecusse. Sector B included the west of Liquiçá and the districts of Bobonaro, Ermera and Cova Lima. Ten battalions were stationed here. Sector C had eight battalions in the center of the Aileu , Ainaro, Manufahi and Manatuto districts . In the east, the sector D joined with the east of the districts of Baucau, Viqueque and Lautém and with twelve battalions. The Indonesians had now taken control of all the cities of East Timor and pushed FRETILIN into guerrilla warfare. But only strategically important towns and connecting roads were occupied. From Dili to Ainaro and Betano, from Baucau to Viqueque, from Manatuto to Laclubar and from Lospalos to Lautém and Tutuala . The hinterland was still unoccupied. The Indonesians were surprised by the fierce resistance of the well-trained FALINTIL fighters. According to their own propaganda, when the invasion began, the Indonesians only expected a fight of 15 days.

According to a report by the US Embassy in Jakarta, the Indonesian military had problems with supplies of ammunition as early as April 1976. In early 1977, ABRI discovered that it had overused its resources. They were forced to withdraw troops from East Timor again to deploy them in West New Guinea, West Kalimantan (Kalimantan Barat) and Aceh . In addition, one had to protect the Indonesian parliamentary elections in May 1977, which tied a nationwide troop capacity of 100 battalions accordingly. Only a third of the previous troop strength remained in use in East Timor. Alarico Fernandes used this situation for success reports on Radio Maupe, which spoke of the victories of FRETILIN and the low morale and high losses of the Indonesian soldiers. The propaganda was a little puffed up, but the situation in the first half of 1977 was not bad for the resistance.

In many villages at the end of 1976 people were still living undisturbed by the invaders and FRETILIN had control over large parts of East Timor (zonas libertadas) . Possibly 300,000 East Timorese fled to the interior of the island during this phase (partly voluntarily, partly the FRETILIN ordered the evacuation) without adequate accommodation or food. Whole towns were practically deserted. There had been violent internal power struggles within FRETILIN, also because of the question of how to deal properly with the thousands of refugees. Finally, the refugees were gathered in resistance centers (base de apoio) , where they were able to build small settlements and practice agriculture. The population could still grow different crops according to the season, so the food supply was not so bad. FRETILIN was also able to provide elementary health care and education for the children in the bases.

In the spring of 1977 a delegation from a sub-committee of the US Congress traveled to East Timor. The Indonesian military planned the trip, which was limited to the area controlled by the ABRI. Neither meetings with the FRETILIN nor with civilians from the interior of the island were planned. There was little fighting during the visit to East Timor. The conclusion of the delegation was that “no firm conclusions” are being drawn about the war. 1978 ordered Zbigniew Brzezinski , the national security adviser of US President Jimmy Carter that they should return the "heatedness" ( "heat") concerning human rights in Indonesia. The United States and other governments then provided Indonesia with extensive military assistance. In January, the US announced the sale of 16 F-5 fighter jets , a squadron A-4 aircraft and a manufacturing facility for the construction of M-16 assault rifles . In the same year, Britain announced the planned delivery of Hawk ground attack aircraft and Australia supplied helicopters and transport aircraft. The western states sent a clear signal to Indonesia that they would not oppose the military operations in East Timor.

Encirclement and destruction

See: overview map of East Timor and map of the course of the invasion

Indonesian troop reinforcements

OV-10 Bronco of the Indonesian Air Force

From September 1977 the Indonesian army began the campaign "Encirclement and annihilation" against the Bases de apoio and with the expansion of the controlled area beyond the cities and corridors along the major roads. For this, the troops were significantly reinforced. Between July and August 17, 1977, between three and five additional battalions arrived in East Timor. The ground troops received crucial support from the Air Force, through a T-33 Bird and an OV-10 Bronco , which were stationed at Baucau Airport. As a rule, the target area was initially massively bombed. Napalm should defoliate the forest. This was followed by artillery fire and the attack of the ground forces. The target village was surrounded and the inhabitants were deported to transit camps. FRETILIN members and sympathizers were executed and their houses burned down. The campaign “encirclement and destruction” was directed not only against the bases of FRETILIN, but also against their production of food. Fields were also bombed or burned down by ground troops. Farm animals were robbed or killed. According to witness statements, planes also shot at civilians, schools and cattle. The actions also resulted in large numbers of civilians being killed. Partly due to the effects of fighting, partly due to famine and diseases after the destruction of the basis of life. Children and the elderly in particular died in large numbers. While the destruction of fields and the killing or robbing of domestic animals by the Indonesian troops occurred frequently, there were also isolated cases where the FALINTIL were the perpetrators. One wanted to force the population to plant their fields further away from the villages so that the resistance fighters could also benefit from it. Compared to the numerous documented destruction by the Indonesians, these were individual cases, but in any case this meant suffering and hunger for the affected population.

Withdrawal of the FRETILIN and flight of the civilian population

As the supply of the civilian population in the resistance bases became more and more a burden for the FRETILIN, political and military members of the CCF argued how to deal with the civilians and who had the leadership competence in the fight. As the Indonesians advanced, FRETILIN urged the population to retreat with the fighters further into the mountains instead of surrendering. The protection of the numerous civilians, however, limited the possibilities of the FALINTIL to go on the offensive effectively. President Francisco Xavier do Amaral proposed allowing civilians to surrender in order to save them from annihilation and to create space for military resistance. Amaral therefore negotiated a truce for his homeland Turiscai , which earned him the charge of high treason. He was arrested on September 7, 1977 and on September 14, he was declared deposed for treason via Radio Ma Brille. Nicolau dos Reis Lobato succeeded him as president, which led to a radicalization of FRETILIN. They now confessed to Marxism and there were purges in their own ranks.

FALINTIL resistance sectors in East Timor 1975–1998

The first offensive ran over the rainy season until mid-1978, initially until December 1977 in the west. The headquarters of the Fronteira Norte resistance sector were in Fatubessi . When the attack on Fatubessi by the Indonesian Battalion 611 began, the population was to be evacuated in two directions. Once to the southwest to the Taroman mountain , the other to the southeast towards Beco and then on to the Ucecai mountain in the Suco of the same name ( Zumalai administrative office ). The first group was picked up by the Indonesian military in the Ermera administrative office and interned in Fatubessi. The second group crossed the Loumea River at Beco and reached the lowlands to the south of Zumalai. But in January 1978 they came under fire from Indonesians on the Mola River , resulting in many deaths. The survivors withdrew to Halic , which was not yet occupied. There they were shot at and bombed by planes and ships of the Indonesian Navy attacked the place. After two days under fire, the surviving refugees were captured by the Indonesians.

At the beginning of 1978 the offensive was extended to the central region. Under the command of Combat Regiment Team (RTP) 11, the troops attacked the region around Same, Mount Cabalaki and Fatuberlio . In the east, the Indonesian units continued to be weakly represented with only four or five battalions. Only in the rainy season were FRETILIN bases on the border between Baucau and Viqueque between Monte Mundo Perdido and Ossuala attacked, as were the hills north of the Matebians. As the pressure increased, so did the flow of people who surrendered to the Indonesian military. On April 6, 1978, Lieutenant General Mohammad Yusuf became Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, taking personal control of operations in East Timor from Moerdani and Kalbuadi. In May 1978 he prepared Operation Skylight , with which the FRETILIN leadership and the civilians who remained with them were to be moved to surrender.

See: overview map of East Timor and map of the course of the invasion

Last base of the FRETILIN at Matebian

Bastion FRETILIN to 1978
, the two summits of Mate Bians of Aha B Uu seen from

One resistance base after another fell to the Indonesians. The last zona libertadas of FALINTIL was on Matebian. From 1977 evacuated civilians were settled in new villages around the Matebian according to their origin. They came from Tequinaumata , Samalari , Boleha , Guruça , Afaçá and Namanei (Baucau municipality) and Benamauc , Camea and Fatuahi . The political commissioner Abel Larisina and his adjutant Xanana Gusmão were able to organize the supply of the population with food. The situation worsened in mid-1977 when refugees arrived from Builo on Matebian. There have been victims of hunger and disease. Food was reserved for the population for the benefit of the FALINTIL fighters. In mid-1978 the Indonesian troops were reinforced in the far east of Timor. Under the command of Kostrad RTP 18, 13 combat battalions were relocated to the region. The population was purposefully pushed closer together in the area around the Matebian through the cooperation of units of the Kostrad, infantry, marine infantry and air force. The attacks were coordinated from different sides in an L-formation to avoid soldiers coming under self- fire. In September 1978 Alarico Fernandes surrendered to the Indonesians and presumably provided them with a lot of information about the resistance. It is speculated that he had already started to work for the Indonesians within FRETILIN. He is said to have propagated surrender in the spirit of Operation Skylight.

In October 1978 the attacks on the base at Matebian began. The resistance fighters and civilians were bombed from the air until mid-November. The air strikes by the OV-10 Bronco, F-5 and A-4 were critical to the Indonesians' success (an Indonesian source speaks of only one T-33 Bird aircraft). Eyewitnesses describe the use of napalm bombs against civilians, or the Soviet variant opalm. While Indonesia denies the mission, documents show that the OV-10 Bronco was loaded with opalm at Baucau Airport in the late 1970s. In 1999, Philippine UN soldiers found four napalm bombs in a bunker there. Government documents show that Australia and the United States were aware of the Indonesian use of napalm. The bombardment was also carried out from sea while the army slowly advanced. 20 to 30 people were killed every day. In mid-November it was clear to the FRETILIN leadership that the civilians had to be allowed to surrender. On November 22nd, the decision was made to give up completely and to “descent from Matebian”. The civilians who came from the peaks of Matebian Mane and Matebian Feto and from the long valley in between were received by the Indonesian soldiers below. On November 24, 1978, the FALINTIL was overrun by the Indonesian invaders. On November 25, the fighters surrendered. The prisoners were interned in a transit camp and separated into FALINTIL fighters and civilians. Many disappeared without a trace, the others were later moved to larger camps such as in Quelicai . Some of the internees were interrogated, others were instructed to return to their home regions (some with guard). You can still visit caves on the mountain today, which the resistance fighters used to hide.

Final smashing of the resistance

Burial of the remains of freedom fighters in the Heroes' Cemetery in Metinaro , on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Indonesian invasion (2019)

Xanana Gusmão and other FALINTIL leaders escaped, but the structure of the FALINTIL was largely destroyed. Skylight also showed its effect. After Fernandes, four other members of the CCF surrendered to Remexio . Fernandes' defection in December also resulted in the loss of the radio station for Radio Ma 2500 and thus an important means of coordination for the resistance. On December 31, Nicolau Lobato was killed in a fight with the Indonesians. After the fall of the Matebians, the Indonesian army took action against remaining FALINTIL fighters in the border area of ​​Ainaro and Manufahi on the Cabalaki and in the valleys of the Dilors . Here, too, there was support from the air. At the Cabalaki the last large groups of civilians were forced to surrender. In the south of the Manatutos district, Indonesian marines, supported by airplanes, carried out the "Operation Cleanup" ( Indonesian Pembersihan ), while other units were relocated from Matebian to Lautém to hunt down FRETILIN and FALINTIL leaders who had escaped from the mountain. In February 1979, Mau Lear  - the commander of the FALINTIL in the Eastern Sector - was captured and killed in Manatuto. On March 26, 1979, Operation Seroja was concluded and East Timor was declared pacified territory.

At the end of the “encirclement and destruction” campaign, FRETILIN was on the verge of defeat. Over 80% of the FRETILIN fighters had died, 85% of the members of the high command had been killed and 90% of their weapons had been destroyed.

Transit camps

The people who surrendered to the invaders in late 1978 were severely weakened after months of constant attack and lack of food. Many FRETILIN members who were captured or surrendered were executed or disappeared despite the announced amnesty. Among them, for example, Sera Key , a member of the CCF. Political prisoners who were sent to military prisons did not receive a formal trial until December 1983. Some places became "killing grounds" for the Indonesian military, such as Quelicai after the fall of the Matebians, or the outskirts of Dilis near Areia Branca and Tasitolu.

A large number of the civilians captured were placed in transit camps. Likewise, entire villages from remote areas that should be relocated in order to better control the inhabitants. In December 1978, according to the Indonesian military, 372,900 Timorese, about 60% of the population, lived in the camps. The camps were supposed to cut ties between the internees and the armed resistance, thereby ending their support. In 1979, based on current knowledge, there were such camps in at least 139 places; the real number of camps was probably higher. While the Indonesians referred to the camps as resettlement camps, East Timorese survivors described them as “concentration camps”. The length of the internment depended on how unsafe the area was, as well as the individual inmates and the ABRI's perception of their security risk.

At the beginning, people were interned wherever the opportunity arose: schools, military barracks or simply outdoors. In some cases, the camps created completely new towns, especially in the unsafe regions. The guard was carried out by soldiers or civil security forces from the Hansip . As a rule, freedom of movement was limited to a radius of around 300 meters, which limited the possibilities for self-sufficiency with food. The supply of food and medical help was inadequate. The suffering intensified because Indonesian aid deliveries only took place under the control of the military and international aid organizations were initially denied access to East Timor. Hunger and numerous deaths were the result. It was not until the end of 1979 that the International Red Cross and the American non-governmental organization Catholic Relief Services (CRS) received access to East Timor.

From 1980 onwards, thousands of FRETILIN sympathizers and family members were isolated from members on the island of Atauro, where they suffered from illness and hunger.

The inhabitants of the normal villages were also regulated. Anyone wanting to leave their village needed a pass (surat jalan) . Anyone who came to a village had to register. Fields and gardens were not allowed to be laid out too far from the settlements.

consequences

Memorial to fallen
FALINTIL fighters in Laleia

The names of over 3,600 Indonesian soldiers are written on the monument to commemorate the Indonesian fallen in Operation Seroja. Most of the casualties occurred in the first years of the occupation. In East Timor there are still twelve Indonesian military cemeteries with a total of 1124 graves.

The CAVR spoke to 8,000 witnesses and concluded that between 1975 and 1999 between 102,800 and 183,000 East Timorese civilians were killed - out of a total of 800,000 residents. 18,600 died violently or disappeared, a further 84,200 starved to death or died of disease (especially between 1977 and 1979). Seventy percent of all murders were committed by Indonesian security forces. The rest is due to East Timorese collaborators, but freedom fighters have also killed.

The US's silence on the use of US equipment in East Timor was justified in 1979 with the fact that the war was practically over and the weapons were therefore rarely used. The source of this assessment was the Indonesian military itself.

East Timor remained under Indonesian occupation for 24 years, even if the FALINTIL regained strength in the 1980s. In 1999, due to international pressure, Indonesia withdrew from East Timor after a successful independence referendum and the United Nations took control of East Timor for three years. On May 20, 2002, East Timor was given independence.

Overview map

Note: The administrative boundaries in East Timor on the map reflect the current borders. They only roughly match those from the time of Operation Seroja.

See also

literature

  • José Ramos-Horta: Funu - East Timor's struggle for freedom is not over! Ahriman, Freiburg 1997, ISBN 3-89484-556-2 .
  • Brad Simpson: Indonesia's Colonial War in East Timor 1975–1999. In: Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller, Dierk Walter (eds.): Hot wars in the cold war. Hamburg 2006, ISBN 3-936096-61-9 , pp. 339-375. ( Review by H. Hoff , Review by I. Küpeli )

Filmography

Web links

supporting documents

Main evidence

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Surrender, resettlement and famine - Overview , p. 83.
  2. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”, Invasion of Dili and Baucau , pp. 62–67.
  3. ↑ a b c “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”.
  4. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Dili prepares its defense strategy , p. 61.
  5. ^ Ernest Chamberlain: The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in rural East Timor Iliomar Sub-District. P. 60, 2017.
  6. ↑ a b "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Indonesian military preparations: Operation Seroja (Lotus) , p. 62.
  7. ↑ Jolliffe, Jill. East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism. University of Queensland Press, Queensland 1978, OCLC 4833990 .
  8. ^ A b East Timor Government: History .
  9. ^ David Hicks: Rhetoric and the Decolonization and Recolonization of East Timor. Routledge, 2015, limited preview in Google Book Search.
  10. ↑ a b c d e f “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”, Indonesia's decision to invade and conduct open warfare , pp. 60–61.
  11. ^ The National Security Archive: Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian invasion, 1975-76 .
  12. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", p. 36.
  13. ↑ The Guardian: Timor-Leste: court upholds Australian government refusal to release documents on Indonesia's invasion , July 3, 2020 , accessed July 4, 2020.
  14. ↑ a b c d e f “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”, pp. 58–59.
  15. ↑ a b c d “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”, Information control: seeking to conceal ABRI involvement , pp. 63–64.
  16. ↑ a b c d e Frédéric Durand: Three centuries of violence and struggle in East Timor (1726-2008). 2011.
  17. ↑ a b c d Ervanda et al. 2017, p. 47.
  18. ^ "Chega!": "Chapter 7.2 Unlawful Killings and Enforced Disappearances", Unlawful killings by Indonesian military during the invasion in Dili 7–8 December 1975 , p. 34.
  19. ↑ Geoffrey C. Gunn: History of Timor , pp. 160 & 161, available from Centro de Estudos sobre África, Ásia e América Latina , CEsA of the TU Lisbon (PDF; 805 kB).
  20. ↑ Vaudine England: Chinese legacy of fear in Dili , South China Morning Post, August 30, 1999 , accessed on 19 March 2018th
  21. ^ Rei, Naldo (2007). Resistance: A Childhood Fighting for East Timor. Univ. of Queensland Press. P. 62 ff. ISBN 978-0-7022-3632-7 .
  22. ↑ Jakarta Globo: Mysterious mass grave at East Timor PM's office , June 26, 2012 ( July 18, 2012 memento in the Internet Archive ), accessed June 27, 2012.
  23. ↑ Channel News Asia: Bodies in Timor Leste mass grave likely Chinese: police , July 13, 2012 , accessed July 14, 2012.
  24. ↑ a b "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", The cost of full-scale invasion , pp. 65–66.
  25. ↑ Northeast Asia peace and ECURITY network: East Timor Analysis # 18 ( Memento of 14 August 2004 at the Internet Archive ) September 21, 1999.
  26. ↑ The Guardian: United Nations response to the full-scale invasion , May 7, 2018 , accessed October 13, 2018.
  27. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Mass violence against civilians , pp. 66-67.
  28. ↑ a b José Ramos-Horta: Funu - East Timor's struggle for freedom is not over! Ahriman, Freiburg 1997, ISBN 3-89484-556-2 .
  29. ↑ a b Resolution 3485 of the United Nations General Assembly (English).
  30. ↑ Resolution 384 and 389 of the UN Security Council (English).
  31. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", United Nations response to the full-scale invasion. Pp. 66-67.
  32. ^ Frédéric B. Durand: History of Timor-Leste. P. 112.
  33. ↑ a b “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”, East Timorese experience of the early occupation , pp. 70–71.
  34. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Invading forces occupy Baucau , p. 65.
  35. ↑ a b c d e Ervanda et al. 2017, p. 48.
  36. ↑ a b c d e f g h i "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", ABRI advances, early 1976 , p. 70.
  37. ↑ Carmel Budiardjo, Soei Liong Liem: The war against East Timor. P. 15, 1984, limited preview in Google Book search.
  38. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", ABRI consolidates; Indonesia installs “Provisional Government” , pp. 68–69.
  39. ↑ Expresso: Última bandeira portuguesa de Timor está em Jacarta , June 27, 2015 , accessed on July 23, 2015.
  40. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Fretilin in retreat, the massacres of prisoners , pp. 69-70.
  41. ↑ a b "Chega!": "Chapter 7.3 Forced Displacement and Famine", Capture or surrender , p. 19.
  42. ↑ a b "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Military stalemate, late 1976 , pp. 73-74.
  43. ^ Frédéric B. Durand: History of Timor-Leste. P. 113.
  44. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", ABRI capacity stretched and early Fretilin confidence , p. 76.
  45. ↑ "Chega!": "Chapter 7.3 Forced Displacement and Famine", p. 20.
  46. ↑ a b c "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", 3.12 "Encirclement and annihilation": the final stages of Operation Seroja 1977-79 - Overview , p. 77.
  47. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Civilian population in the mountains , pp. 75-76.
  48. ↑ a b c “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”, US leads re-arming of the Indonesian military , pp. 76-77.
  49. ↑ a b c d "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Destructoin of food sources, FRETILIN retreats higher into mountains with civilian population , p. 79.
  50. ^ Taylor, John G. The Indonesian Occupation of East Timor 1974-1989. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1990, ISBN 1-85287-051-6 .
  51. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", ABRI intensifies military operations: encirclement and annihilation, August 1977 to August 1978 , p. 78.
  52. ↑ a b Lydia M. Beuman: Political Institutions in East Timor: semi-presidentialism and Democratization. (2016).
  53. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Operation Seroja continues — US-supplied OV-10 Bronco aircraft introduced , p. 73.
  54. ^ "Chega!": "Chapter 7.3 Forced Displacement and Famine".
  55. ↑ a b “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”, Fretilin: internal divisions and violent purge , pp. 77-78.
  56. ↑ Pat Walsh : Winter of East Timor's Patriarchs , accessed December 25, 2018.
  57. ↑ Monika Schlicher: East Timor faces its past. ( Memento of November 7, 2017 in the Internet Archive ) missio 2005, ISSN  1618-6222 (PDF; 304 kB).
  58. ^ Yale East Timor Project: Map of East Timor's Districts and Resistance Sectors, 1975-99 ( Memento of January 8, 2012 in the Internet Archive )
  59. ↑ Ben Kiernan (Ed.): Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia: Documentation, Denial, & Justice in Cambodia & East Timor. 2007, p. 182.
  60. ↑ a b c d e f g h "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Indonesian military operations against the center and east, late 1978: the fall of Matebian , p. 81.
  61. ^ "Chega!": "Chapter 7.3 Forced Displacement and Famine", Driven by hunger and bombardment from the air , pp. 37-42.
  62. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Attacks in the central region , pp. 79-80.
  63. ↑ a b “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”, Operation (or Movement) Skylight: targeting the Fretilin leadership , p. 80.
  64. ↑ a b c d e “Chega!”: “Chapter 7.3 Forced Displacement and Famine”, Mount Matebian , pp. 41-44.
  65. ↑ a b c Ervanda et al. 2017, p. 49.
  66. ↑ Ernest Chamberlain 2017, p. 81.
  67. ^ East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin: Australian Documents: Indonesia Planned to Bomb East Timor with Napalm. July 13, 2019 , accessed July 13, 2019.
  68. ↑ a b c "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", After Matebian: ABRI attacks in central region and the east , p. 82.
  69. ^ Frédéric B. Durand: History of Timor-Leste. P. 117.
  70. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Surrender and excecution of prisoners , pp. 83-84.
  71. ↑ a b c “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”, Longer-Term detention camps and ABRI's security strategy , pp. 84–85.
  72. ↑ a b c d "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Transit camps , p. 84.
  73. ^ "Chega!": "Chapter 7.3 Forced Displacement and Famine", Location of resettlement camps , pp. 61–64.
  74. ^ Peter Carey: East Timor under Indonesian Occupation, 1975-99. P. 14 ff., Accessed on December 6, 2018.
  75. ↑ Ernest Chamberlain 2017, pp. 119 ff.
  76. ^ Justice and reconciliation in East Timor by CAVR , p. 10, December 2006.
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on January 25, 2019 .