East Timor Civil War 1975

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The 1975 civil war in East Timor was a conflict between the conservative União Democrática Timorense UDT and the left-wing FRETILIN . The then colony of Portuguese Timor was being prepared for independence at this time. Since trial elections showed signs of a government under FRETILIN, the UDT attempted an armed coup on August 11th . From the ensuing three-week battles, FRETILIN came out on top as the winner. According to estimates by the Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of East Timor (CAVR), 1,500 to 3,000 people were killed in the conflict. The commission also recorded 787 non-combat deaths as a result of the civil war. Most of the violence there was in the districts Liquiçá , Ermera , Ainaro , Manufahi and Manatuto .

background

After the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, the colonial empire should be dissolved and the countries given independence. In Portuguese Timor, the UDT and FRETILIN had developed as large parties, which initially worked together with the Portuguese colonial administration. In addition, there were small parties like the funded Indonesia and its consulate in Dili supported APODETI who propagated the connection to the neighboring country, but little popular support had. In the spring of 1975 FRETILIN was able to rely on a majority of the population in all of East Timor. On March 13, 1975, elections were held in the Lautém district as part of the decolonization program. The aim was to replace the traditional ruling systems. There were no party lists or candidates in this local election pilot. The voters simply threw pebbles into the candidates' baskets to cast their votes. Candidates close to FRETILIN were able to prevail clearly against UDT candidates.

While the other Portuguese colonies were gradually granted independence, implementation in East Timor was delayed. In the meantime, the Indonesian military intelligence service Bakin under General Ali Murtopo intrigued with Operation Komodo ( Indonesian Operasi Komodo , after the Komodo dragon ) and stirred up the conflict between the various political camps. Indonesian officers visited Portuguese Timor. In April 1975 a delegation led by Colonel Sugianto and Colonel Suharto Pitut met in Dili the Portuguese governor Mário Lemos Pires and representatives of the parties FRETILIN, UDT and APODETI. In the same month General Ali Murtopo invited UDT and FRETILIN envoys to Jakarta . Immediately after the party representatives returned to Timor, the central commission of the UDT met and decided to end the coalition with FRETILIN. In May the Indonesian secret service again invited UDT members for talks and made it clear that Indonesia would never accept an independent government with the participation of the communist FRETILIN. The alleged "communist threat" during the Cold War and shortly after the Vietnam War served as a reason for those UDT leaders to leave the coalition with FRETILIN on May 27, 1975. On June 6th, Indonesian troops disguised as UDT fighters occupied the enclave of Oe-Cusse Ambeno . The lack of a reaction from Portugal confirmed the Indonesian assessment that there was no longer any need to fear interventions from the colonial power.

On July 25, UDT leaders Domingos de Oliveira and João Viegas Carrascalão met representatives from Bakin again. Here General Murtopo told the East Timorese that FRETILIN was planning a violent seizure of power on August 15th and that if measures were not taken to get FRETILIN out of the way, Indonesia would invade East Timor. But if the UDT were to clean up their “backyard”, Indonesia would recognize East Timor's right to self-determination. In view of this threat and the expected defeat in free elections, the UDT decided on a coup (Operaçao Sakonar) . El Tari , the Indonesian governor in Kupang Carrascalão , warned on his way back from Jakarta that the annexation of East Timor was already a done deal, but Indonesia wanted to take any pretext for invading it. The then member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN and later Prime Minister of East Timor Marí Alkatiri said in retrospect:

"Without outside interference, there would have been no civil war."

course

On August 11, UDT members took guns from the police and declared they had come to power. They occupied the sea and the airport , the state radio station, Rádio Marconi, the telephone exchange, the central power station and the water reservoir. Only the navy radio station remained in the hands of the colonial government. Then the Portuguese administration was given a list of claims. The UDT emphasized that the operation only served to remove extremist elements in order to prevent Indonesian intervention. From Dili the armed actions extended to the whole colony. 80 members of FRETILIN were held captive by the UDT in their headquarters on Rua de Palapaço , among them Xanana Gusmão , who later became the first President of East Timor after the Indonesian occupation. Another dozen FRETILIN supporters were murdered, including José Lobato , Nicolau Lobato's younger brother . The UDT held several hundred political opponents prisoner in the entire colony. Many prisoners died under unexplained circumstances. The UDT initially had fewer than 200 men at its disposal, but Governor Pires did nothing, although he had more than 1,700 soldiers at his disposal.

On August 13, the UDT formed the movement for the unity and independence of Timor-Dili ( Portuguese Movimento para Unidade e Independência de Timor-Dili MUITD ) with sympathizers from the Portuguese colonial army . She planned to dissolve all pro-independence parties and integrate their members into the MUITD. In the first days after the coup, the UDT was able to win over police chief Rui Alberto Maggiolo Gouveia and various units of the military, such as the companies in Baucau and Lospalos . UDT President Lopes da Cruz was arrested by UDT leaders João Viegas Carrascalão and Domingos de Oliveira on suspicion of collaborating with Indonesia. The suspicion was later confirmed.

On August 16, the UDT called for the expulsion of all communists from the territory, including "those in the Portuguese governor's office". She called for the repeal of Decree 7/75, which set the schedule for the independence of Portuguese Timor by 1978 and the resumption of negotiations on the independence of the colony. On August 17th, Major Mota, Head of the Political Affairs Bureau, and Major Jónatas were sent back to Lisbon. The two representatives of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) were accused of being the communist wing in the colonial government.

The FRETILIN initially withdrew to its stronghold in Aileu , south of Dili. The army training center (Centro de Instrução) was also located here . In a few days, the party managed to mobilize the majority of the population shocked by the coup. Most Timorese who served in the Portuguese army deserted and joined the Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste FALINTIL ( German  Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor ), the military arm of FRETILIN, which was founded on August 20 . The UDT received support from the police and only a few army units. Ultimately, around 1,500 UDT supporters faced 2,000 FRETILIN fighters. Both parties had armed themselves with weapons from military stocks. The FRETILIN also used 81 mm mortars.

On August 20, FALINTIL fighters occupied the Portuguese military headquarters in Taibesi and captured the Portuguese soldiers, including the deputy commander in chief of the troops in Timor. In Dili there was street fighting between UDT and FRETILIN. However, the fronts were very confused. While APODETI and UDT fought against FRETILIN in Same , FRETILIN and UDT were allies against APODETI in Atsabe and FRETILIN and APODETI in Dili against UDT. On August 27th, FRETILIN took control of Dili. The UDT initially withdrew to the airport and then westward through Liquiçá towards Indonesia in early September. FRETILIN dominated most of the colony until mid-September. On the night of August 26th to 27th, Pires had evacuated the last Portuguese administrative and military personnel to the island of Atauro off Dili . The reason for this was a telegram from Lisbon warning of the risk of hostage-taking and advising people to flee to the safe island. More than 1,700 civilians were shipped to Darwin in August. From here Pires tried unsuccessfully to mediate between the conflicting parties. He was urged by FRETILIN to return and go ahead with decolonization, but he insisted on waiting for instructions from Lisbon . In this way he wanted to avoid a guerrilla war against the Portuguese government in East Timor. However, Pires received support from the motherland in the form of the corvette Afonso Cerqueira only in early October . UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim unsuccessfully called on the conflicting parties to a ceasefire.

By the end of the fighting, 10,000 to 20,000 East Timorese fled to the Indonesian West Timor , mainly supporters of the UDT, APODETI and the monarchist party KOTA , which had supported the UDT in the civil war. The official Indonesian number of 40,000 is generally considered too high. Fled East Timorese estimated it at 10,000 to 30,000. In West Timor, the refugees were caught up in Indonesia's policy of annexation. Investigations have shown that some civilians were also forced by the UDT to "flee" to West Timor in order to be recruited by the Indonesian army. From Ermera alone , this is said to have been 1,000 people. Between 1500 and 3000 people died. Western journalists, Australian and Japanese politicians and representatives of the International Red Cross who visited the country confirmed to the representatives of FRETILIN that from September to the beginning of December they were seriously concerned with the social and economic problems in order to keep the administration of the territory going hold.

FRETILIN and UDT later had to admit that both had committed human rights abuses during the civil war. A large part of the murders can be attributed to FRETILIN, but UDT supporters also murdered. For example, captured opponents were murdered. The mass graves of UDT and APODETI members were found in Aileu and Same in early 1976. On August 27, 1975, fighters of the UDT killed eleven supporters of FRETILIN on the beach of Meti Oan near Wedauberek (Manufahi). The FRETILIN supporters were captured on August 11th, some belonged to the FRETILIN youth organization UNETIM. When it was learned that fighters from the FRETILIN were advancing, the prisoners from Same were brought to the coast and killed there. A victim of the Wedauberek massacre was Domingos Lobato , another brother of Nicolau Lobato and President of UNETIM. On September 1, around 30 people died from UDT fighters in the Klaek Reman and Aifu massacres . Most of the murders had less political background; the conflict was more likely to be used to settle old scores. According to later interviews with the party leaders, there was never a specific policy of murdering the opponents. The violence came primarily from the cadres. The parties let the crimes happen without criticism. José Ramos-Horta , a FRETILIN leader who was abroad for negotiations during the civil war, tried unsuccessfully after his return to persuade the extreme forces of the party, with the victory behind them, to re-alliance with the defeated UDT. He also tried to stop the mistreatment of the UDT prisoners and arranged for the repatriation of Portuguese soldiers who had been detained by FRETILIN. He also arranged for Timorese children who had been separated from their parents to leave for Australia.

During the civil war, Indonesia tried to persuade Portugal to surrender the colony or at least to get permission to send the Indonesian army . Portugal refused, but the talks and the associated hopes for a peaceful settlement prevented the ailing colonial power from taking direct action against the Indonesian infiltration. The Indonesian capture of 23 Portuguese officers and three civilians created further potential for conflict. The Indonesian army had given them permission to cross the border in August, but then interned them in camps. Portugal refused any concession without the hostages being released. While the civilians were released relatively quickly, the military remained in captivity until the official annexation of East Timor by Indonesia on July 17, 1976.

consequences

After the defeat of the UDT, Indonesia began to invade and occupy the border areas of East Timor with soldiers disguised as UDT fighters. Five Western journalists who witnessed the invasion in Balibo (the so-called Balibo Five ) were murdered by Indonesian soldiers. In the hope of international support, FRETILIN unilaterally proclaimed independence on November 28th . Indonesia responded by reporting that the leaders of UDT, APODETI, KOTA and the Labor Party had signed the so-called Balibo Declaration on November 30, 1975 , calling for East Timor to join Indonesia. The declaration, a draft of the Indonesian secret service, was signed in Bali and not in Balibo, probably under pressure from the Indonesian government. The signatories were more or less prisoners of Indonesia. Xanana Gusmão called the paper the “Balibohong Declaration”, a play on words with the Indonesian word for “lie”.

On December 7th, Indonesia began open invasion and occupation of the country with Operation Seroja . During the retreat from Dili, there were mass executions of prisoners from the civil war by FRETILIN. Although there was no official order from the FRETILIN leadership to kill the prisoners, there was consensus that they hindered the mobility of the FRETILIN, but posed a threat to the resistance against Indonesia. In 1976 the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia was declared. As a result of the occupation and the fighting with the FALINTIL, an estimated 183,000 of a total of 800,000 inhabitants of East Timor were killed until the departure of Indonesia in 1999.

The UDT leader João Viegas Carrascalão assumed full responsibility for the coup and the consequences of the coup in 2003 when he gave evidence before the Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of East Timor.

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l Frédéric B. Durand: History of Timor-Leste , pp. 105-106, ISBN 978-616-215-124-8 .
  2. ↑ a b c "Chapter 7.2 Unlawful Killings and Enforced Disappearances" (PDF; 2.5 MB) from the "Chega!" Report of the CAVR (English)
  3. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q "Part 3: The History of the Conflict" (PDF; 1.4 MB) from the "Chega!" Report by CAVR (English)
  4. ^ Official government website of East Timor: History. Retrieved December 29, 2015 .
  5. ↑ a b c d e f g Geoffrey C. Gunn: History of Timor , pp. 149–156 ( Memento of the original of March 24, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Technical University of Lisbon (PDF file; 805 kB) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / pascal.iseg.utl.pt
  6. ^ Nations Encyclopedia: East Timor - History , accessed November 4, 2017.
  7. ↑ a b c Monika Schlicher: East Timor faces its past , missio-hilft.de , accessed on January 28, 2019.
  8. ↑ Academia de Marinha: Timor 1973/75 - Recordações de um Marinheiro , July 2012 , accessed on October 15, 2018.
  9. ↑ a b Frédéric B. Durand: Three centuries of violence and struggle in East Timor (1726-2008). (PDF; 243 kB) Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, (online), June 7, 2011, accessed on May 28, 2012, ISSN  1961-9898
  10. ↑ Rodney Stafford Nixon: The Case of Justice and Conflict Resolution in East Timor , p. 106, accessed October 10, 2018.
  11. ↑ Hamish McDonald: Instigator of civil war later reconciled with his foes, Sydney Morning Herald, March 9, 2012.
  12. ↑ a b José Luís Leiria Pinto: Timor 1973/75 - Recordações de um Marinheiro , Academia de Marinha, July 2012, p. 26 , accessed on October 15, 2018.
  13. ^ Bill Nicol: Timor: A Nation Reborn , 2002, ISBN 9789799589866 .
  14. ↑ a b "Chapter 7.3 Forced Displacement and Famine" (PDF; 1.3 MB) from the "Chega!" Report of the CAVR (English)
  15. ^ History and Politics: 2. b. Portuguese contact and historical experience - Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University
  16. ^ East Timor Government: History
  17. ↑ a b Pat Walsh : Winter of East Timor's Patriarchs , accessed December 25, 2018.