End of Portuguese rule on Timor

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Indonesian soldiers pose with a captured Portuguese flag in Batugade, East Timor, in November 1975

After more than 400 years, Portuguese rule on Timor came to an end in 1975 . As a result of a destabilization campaign in Indonesia , a civil war broke out during the decolonization phase , which forced the Portuguese colonial administration to withdraw and Portuguese Timor to fend for itself. After East Timor unilaterally declared itself independent on November 28, 1975, Indonesia occupied its neighbor nine days later.

prehistory

Map of Portuguese Timor between Indonesia and Australia

In 1515 the Portuguese, who wanted to participate in the lucrative Indian trade , landed on Timor . In 1556 the Dominicans founded the first European settlement. In 1586 large parts of the island were declared a Portuguese colony . The final limits were set in 1916. In October 1973 there were around 600,000 Timorese as well as 21,000 people of Chinese origin , 6,000 Europeans and Mestiços and 1,000 people of Arab origin . Compared to the colonial war in Africa , service in Portuguese Timor was much more pleasant for Portuguese conscripts. While the sons of simple rural dwellers and workers fought in Africa, members of the middle class and influential families sometimes even took their wives and children with them to the “tropical paradise”.

On April 25, 1974, the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon ended the Portuguese dictatorship . Lieutenant Captain José Luís Leiria Pinto, from October 1973 the naval commander, captain of the colony's ports and chief of the Serviços de Transportes Marítimos (STM) in Portuguese Timor, was the first member of the colonial administration to receive official news about the revolution. In the early morning hours of April 26th, local time (Lisbon and the colonial capital Dili have a time difference of nine hours), a message to this effect was received by the naval radio station where he was on duty . As a result of the Carnation Revolution, the Portuguese colonial empire , the last existing one with larger territories, was to be dissolved and the colonies granted independence.

In Portuguese Timor, only a few forces worked for independence from Portugal in the period before the Carnation Revolution. Among the Portuguese conscripts there were also intellectuals who did not speak well about the Portuguese dictatorship. The news magazine of the armed forces, the Revista do Comando Autonómo Provincial , became the medium of the first national-Timorese ideas, also for local authors. After the colony had been converted into the autonomous region of Portugal in 1972 and the inhabitants had received limited Portuguese citizenship, some Timorese from the assimilated urban population, Mestiços and sons of noble families were also given the opportunity to study at the University of Lisbon . The offspring of the local ruling families were trained to become political leaders with solid values ​​who advocated education, national pride and also equality. These privileged people met in secret to discuss their ideas on topics ranging from education to agriculture to traditional weddings. In January 1970 a group of such young East Timorese began to forge plans for the colony's independence. From the well-educated young Timorese elite came the founders of the first political parties after the Carnation Revolution. The Catholic newspapers, such as SEARA , were also a mouthpiece for such ideas. Politically, however, the young activists were inexperienced and therefore very naive despite their ambition.

Struggle for the future of the colony

Oath of oath of Timorese colonial soldiers in Marobo (1968)

Unlike in the African colonies of Portugal (in Portuguese Guinea, for example, Governor José Manuel Bettencourt Rodrigues lost his office the day after the revolution), the previous Governor of Portuguese Timor, Fernando Alves Aldeia, was not immediately removed. When he asked for instructions on the new colonial policy in May, he was only instructed to act according to the principles of the program of the revolutionary Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA), taking into account local conditions, in order to avoid a deterioration in relations with Indonesia. On May 13th, Aldeia founded the Timorese Self-Determination Commission. At the end of the month the commander of the local high command, Major Arnão Metello, was appointed the official representative of the MFA. It was not until July 15, 1974 that Aldeia handed over the official duties to Lieutenant Colonel Níveo Herdade , who now headed the administration as Deputy Governor (Governador delegado) . Herdade had been a close associate of General António de Spínola , who led the Portuguese interim government, in Portuguese Guinea . Herdade had introduced Spinola's social integration policy from Guinea in Portuguese Timor.

Several parties were formed and preparations for elections were made. While the left-wing Associação Social Democrática Timorense (ASDT) strived for the complete independence of East Timor , the União Democrática Timorense (UDT) preferred a close relationship with the colonial power "in the shadow of the Portuguese flag ". Initially only with internal autonomy, from August 1, 1974, taking into account the growing Timorese nationalism, in a temporary federation with Portugal, which was in agreement with the prevailing opinion in Portugal. In contrast to the African colonies, which had to be accepted as lost, in the motherland of Portuguese Timor no one believed in the viability of an independent state and saw a federation with Portugal as a realistic possibility. The APODETI aimed to join the neighboring Indonesia . The APODETI was financed from Jakarta , but it found little support in the population and clearly only represented a minority in the colony. There were also a few other small parties. The majority of East Timorese wanted at least a symbolic connection to Portugal, which was also shown when António de Almeida Santos , the Portuguese Minister for Coordination of Inter-Territorial Affairs, visited Dili in October 1974. 10,000 people cheered him and saluted the flag of Portugal. This enthusiasm was hardly reflected in the politics of Portugal, which wanted to withdraw from its colonies as quickly as possible. They feared the problems that would arise.

Herdade had received an order from Spinola to bring Portuguese Timor into a federation with Portugal. Herdade was thus close to the ideas of the UDT party. For Herdade, the ASDT was a rebel movement that had to be neutralized. Political leaders have been arrested and tried. But the UDT was not satisfied with Herdade either. She criticized Herdade's "undemocratic appointment", which had taken place without consulting the local parties. Herdade was also in constant conflict with Major Metello. About 25 officers opposed the governor on duty. During a visit to the Indonesian Atambua in West Timor in September, during which he met El Tari , the governor of the Indonesian province of Nusa Tenggara Timur , Herdade emphasized the East Timorese's right to self-determination over their future.

On November 18, 1974, Colonel Mário Lemos Pires arrived in Dili, who was to be the last governor of Portuguese Timor. Before leaving, he asked the President of Portugal, Francisco da Costa Gomes , whether they intended to cede the colony to Indonesia. Gomes denied this, but stated that Indonesia was of course part of the reality. According to his own statements, Pires did not expect much support from Portugal even before the start of his mission. Later he found himself confirmed in this assessment. After all, communication with Portugal was only through him. Previously, the responsibility was shared between Herdade and Metello.

Pires proposed to the three big parties to form a coalition, which was taken up by UDT and FRETILIN (the former ASDT), while APODETI refused. The coalition was concluded on January 21, 1975 and in mid-March, UDT and FRETILIN formed a joint transitional government for East Timor with the Portuguese colonial administration, which was to remain in office for three years until a constituent assembly was elected. On March 14, the Portuguese ambassador in Jakarta informed his foreign ministry that Indonesian President Suharto was being pressured by the military to "authorize" the military invasion of Timor. In March 1975 the Portuguese administration invited an Australian delegation to Timor. It included parliamentarians, students, trade unionists, and Aboriginal representatives . Politicians included Ken Fry and John Kerin of the House of Representatives and Gordon McIntosh , Richie Gunn , Neville Bonner and Arthur Gietzelt of the Senate . Bonner, the first Aboriginal to enter the Australian Parliament, was a member of the Liberal Party , the others all from the Australian Labor Party . Then there were the unionists Keith Wilson and Jim Roulston, John Birch from the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, the Aboriginal representative Bill Williams and from the Australian Union of Students Jill Jolliffe and Tim Rowse . The journalist Mark Aarons of ABC accompanied the delegation. The membership of Aarons and Rowse in the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) meant that the later Australian support movement for East Timor was observed by the ASIO , the Australian secret service.

The Portuguese 6th Cavalry Squadron in Bobonaro (1970)

Pires faced several acute problems. The military was demoralized. While most Portuguese prepared to return to the motherland, Timorese military members openly joined the various parties, leading to the division of the armed forces and increasing lack of control by the governor. In 1974 Portugal still had 2,500 soldiers in the colony. The troops consisted of three companies from the motherland, six Timorese infantry companies (caçadores de guarnição) , two cavalry squadrons in Bobonaro and Atabae and a training center in Aileu . In addition, there were 52 companies of the "second line" (second line) , Timorese auxiliaries with antiquated weapons and 70 police officers with ten percent Portuguese personnel. In January 1975 it was decided in Lisbon that the armed forces on Timor should be restructured. The aim was "Timorization", but the need for qualified officers from Portugal for the command structure and training was overlooked. The three Portuguese companies were withdrawn earlier this year. The two cavalry squadrons were disbanded and only a small cavalry unit was stationed in Bobonaro, which still had a few local branches. The Timorese company from Ermera was moved to Maubisse . The result was that control of the border with Indonesia and the ability to defend against outside attacks were practically given up. Governor Pire's complaints were dismissed. He received only two elite companies from paratroopers to protect the colonial administration. The warship requested was refused. They don't want to provoke Indonesia. At the beginning of August 1975, only 200 Portuguese soldiers were stationed in the colony, of which only 70 were paratroopers who belonged to the combat force.

The administration was also politically divided. Pires had to build a functioning state administration without Portuguese relatives in order to enable the Timorese to administer themselves later. To this end, an educational reform was hastily carried out. Despite the request to the mother country, no guidelines, guidelines or assistance came from there for Pires. The commission for the decolonization of Timor ( Portuguese Comissão de Descolonização de Timor CDT ), founded in April 1975, could no longer overcome the differences between the parties. FRETILIN and UDT refused to cooperate with APODETI and APODETI refused to consider independence of East Timor as an option.

Since in the spring of 1975 there was a growing majority for FRETILIN in the population, there was more and more unrest in the UDT. With Operation Komodo, the Indonesian military intelligence service Bakin fueled fear of communist elements in FRETILIN among UDT members. On May 27, 1975, the UDT left the coalition.

In Indonesia, Australia and the United States , the idea of ​​an independent East Timor state found little support. While an independent small state in the Malay Archipelago as a model for its own breakaway provinces was a nightmare for Indonesia , there was fear in the USA and Australia of a second Cuba due to some left-wing extremist forces in FRETILIN in Southeast Asia . Especially in the final phase of the Vietnam War , the West felt itself to be massively threatened by the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. Australia and the United States secretly gave Indonesia a free hand in its plan to annex East Timor. The Portuguese government was already fully aware of the Indonesian efforts to “integrate” Portuguese Timor into its national territory and the Australian benevolence for this. The United Nations was more preoccupied with the situation in the African colonies of Portugal, so that even later events hardly led to any reactions from the world organization.

On June 6, 1975, Indonesian troops disguised as UDT fighters occupied the enclave of Oe-Cusse Ambeno . From June 26th to 28th, Minister António de Almeida Santos held talks with UDT and APODETI representatives as well as Indonesian diplomats in Macau . FRETILIN boycotted the meeting because of the participation of Indonesia and APODETI. The conference saw a Portuguese attempt to surrender East Timor to Indonesia. With this conference, Indonesia was finally recognized by Portugal as a participating party on the East Timor question. The result of the conference was Decree 7/75 of July 17th. It laid down the structure of a provisional government, with the participation of all parties, and a timetable for the election of a constituent assembly in October 1976. The transitional government should consist of elected representatives and appointed Portuguese. There should be an advisory government council and local councils at the district level. Portuguese rule was to end for good in 1978. This created a legal basis that prevented a direct transfer of Portuguese Timor from Portugal to Indonesia. The decree only stipulated a right to self-determination, not the independence of East Timor.

Putsch of the UDT

UDT logo

On August 11, 1975, the UDT tried to take power with 200 armed men. Indonesia had threatened the party to do away with the communist threat posed by FRETILIN if the UDT did not remove it. FRETILIN supporters were arrested or murdered. The UDT fighters occupied the sea and airport, the state radio station, Rádio Marconi, the telephone exchange, the central power station and the water reservoir in Dili . Only the navy radio station remained in the hands of the colonial government. Governor Pires was at that time in Lospalos in the east of the colony. He did nothing against the putschists. Pires actually still had 1,700 soldiers under his command, but the Timorese and some Portuguese soldiers deserted over time and joined the various sides. Both FRETILIN and UDT actively campaigned for the colonial soldiers. Pires found himself unable to regain control. In the absence of further reinforcements from Portugal, he could only rely on the paratroopers who had arrived in the colony on April 7, 1975. Pires also had the boats of the STM Loes (the boat was defective for repair in the port), Comoro , Lifau and Laga as well as the naval service boat Tibar , the former NRP Albufeira (P1157). In 1973 the Tibar was transferred to the Comando da Defesa Marítima de Timor by the Navy.

On August 13, the UDT formed the movement for the unity and independence of Timor-Dili ( Portuguese Movimento para Unidade e Independência de Timor-Dili MUITD ) with sympathizers from the Portuguese colonial army . She planned to dissolve all pro-independence parties and integrate their members into the MUITD. In the first days after the coup, the UDT was able to win over police chief Rui Alberto Maggiolo Gouveia and various units of the military such as the companies in Baucau and Lospalos . On August 16, the UDT called for the expulsion of all communists from the territory, including "those in the Portuguese governor's office". She called for the repeal of Decree 7/75, which set the schedule for the independence of Portuguese Timor by 1978, and for the resumption of negotiations on the independence of the colony. On August 17th, Major Mota, Head of the Political Affairs Bureau, and Major Jónatas were sent back to Lisbon. The two MFA representatives have been accused of being the communist wing in the colonial government.

In just a few days, the FRETILIN managed to mobilize the majority of the population that was shocked by the coup. Most of the Timorese who served in the Portuguese army deserted and joined the Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (FALINTIL) , the military arm of FRETILIN , founded on August 20 . Ultimately, around 1,500 UDT supporters faced 2,000 FRETILIN fighters. On August 20, the FRETILIN occupied the Portuguese military headquarters in Taibesi and captured the Portuguese soldiers, including the deputy commander in chief of the troops on Timor.

In Dili there was street fighting between UDT and FRETILIN. Attempts at mediation by Governor Pires failed because he could not offer any security guarantees. It was now confined to a neutral zone in Farol , where the Portuguese civilian population gathered from August 18th.

Evacuation of the Portuguese

The governor's seat
(around 1970)

The Dutch freighter MV MacDili, under the command of Fred Dagger, had just been recruited by a Chinese businessman to operate the Macau – Dili route (hence the name). But hardly having arrived in Dili for the first time, the MacDili was chartered with the help of the Macau government and used to evacuate civilians and the military. The freighter left Dili on August 12 with 272 people on board. 249 of them were members of the colonial administration or the Portuguese armed forces, as well as Chinese families and tourists. On August 15, the ship reached Darwin, Australia. The Norwegian SS Lloyd Bakke was off the coast of East Timor when she received an emergency call from Governor Pires. Chartered by the government of Macau, refugees were embarked on it from August 23. Depending on the information, the SS Lloyd Bakke brought between 1,115 and 1,170 people to Darwin. This time mainly Timorese, but also Portuguese and Chinese.

On August 13, the UDT allowed the colonial government to regain control of the seaport and the radio station, but not the airport and the Marconi Stadium. In spite of this, the Portuguese paratroopers brought the two air force helicopters under their control in a commando operation and threatened by UDT fighters and brought them to safety. On August 15th, the Musi began to be unloaded in order to also use it for evacuation. The former KPM ship of a Singapore company had a capacity of 1000 GRT.

At around 1 p.m. on August 26, Governor Pires announced that he would bring the colonial government and administration to the island of Atauro off Dili as soon as the last Portuguese civilians had been brought to the MacDili . The reason for this was a telegram from Lisbon warning Pires of the risk of hostage-taking and advising them to flee to the safe island. In the afternoon two mortar shells hit the harbor. There were dead and injured. Two Portuguese paratroopers were among the injured. The paratroopers then occupied the army headquarters and the UDT camp, which had been captured by FRETILIN, and threatened punitive measures if the fighting did not stop. In fact, the conflicting parties in the city followed the instructions and silence fell. The truce was broken only once at dusk. The tibar was hit by light weapons and the engine started burning. The two crew members on board were rescued by the Laleia . At 8:15 p.m., the Navy's radio station sent its final report to its counterpart in Macau. The flag of Portugal was hoisted and at 8:45 p.m. Captain Leiria Pinto and his men left the station to go to port after they turned off the transmitter and removed three tubes from the device to make it unusable.

About 700 people had gathered on the beach and were waiting to be taken to the MacDili in the small boats , which anchored off the coast for safety. Members of the Chinese community were among those waiting. About 500 people could be accommodated on the freighter. At 9:40 p.m. Laleia , Lifau and Comoro left the port. At 3:30 am on the morning of 27 August, the left MacDili the Bay of Dili ; in tow the defective landing craft Loes , under the command of Frederico Almeida Santos da Costa and with Governor Pires and the last members of the colonial administration on board. The radio station crew left the capital at the same time on board the Lifau tug . Among other things , the soldier Fernando Cavaterra remained behind , who had been off duty that evening and so missed the withdrawal order. He wasn't supposed to return to Portugal until 1999. On this day the FRETILIN took control of Dili.

The “Manatuto” CR-TAG of the Transportes Aéreos de Timor was one of the planes that brought refugees from Timor to Darwin. Today it stands there in the Aviation Heritage Museum.

During the crossing, the Indonesian Navy tried to contact the Navy radio station in Dili. Captain Leiria Pinto informed the Indonesians from aboard the Lifau that the naval station was "temporarily closed". The Indonesians replied that they were ready to evacuate the Portuguese governor and administration from Dili and take them to a safe place, but the Portuguese rejected the offer. The governor is on board a Portuguese ship and will cross over to the island of Atauro. The Indonesian warship, which has since been sighted, remained in international waters. After a two-hour journey, they reached the coast of Atauro near Maumeta , but had to wait until low tide at 2:30 p.m. to leave the ships. Only the governor, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the naval commander drove ahead with the Comoro landing craft and landed at 1:00 p.m. The Loes was abandoned on the island's beach.

The MacDili drove to Darwin with the refugees on board. It was a burden for the Australian city as Darwin had been destroyed by Cyclone Tracy only eight months earlier . A total of 2581 refugees are reported in Darwin. 1647 of them were born in Timor , most of them Mestiços or Timorese, but also 672 Timor Chinese. Refugees also came to Darwin from Baucau on four planes.

Exile on Atauro

Atauro seen from Dili

Atauro became the new headquarters of Governor Pires. From the island he tried unsuccessfully to mediate between the conflicting parties. Pires was urged by FRETILIN to return and go ahead with decolonization, but he insisted on waiting for instructions from Lisbon. In this way, Pires wanted to avoid a guerrilla war against the Portuguese government in East Timor. However, there were no instructions from the motherland.

Pires now had only 12 soldiers in the army, 27 seamen and 64 paratroopers. There was a lack of infrastructure to effectively set up the administration. The naval commander noted that the staff were poorly housed and the food was very poor. In addition, it was initially not possible to establish a radio link with the outside world.

On August 28, Minister António de Almeida reached Santos Atauro. Attempts to contact the UDT failed because their leaders were already on the run. With FRETILIN it was at least possible to agree on the release of Portuguese prisoners, but the Minister spoke to Lisbon against recognizing FRETILIN as the sole representative of the East Timorese. On the same day, the Comoro was sent to Timor to evacuate Portuguese from the western parts of the colony. Some military and civilians were saved in Oecusse . In Batugade , the UDT flag was waving at the fort . The boat was met on the bank by armed men who pointed their weapons at the Comoro . Europeans who wanted to be evacuated were not to be seen, whereupon the boat continued without landing. On August 30th they returned to Atauro.

On August 29th, Pires was forced to fetch fuel for the boats and food from Kupang , West Timor. The Tibar and Lifau remained under the command of Leiria Pinto from August 30 to September 4 in the Indonesian port city. Before leaving, the lieutenant captain brought a private letter from Lemos Pires to his colleague, Colonel El Tari. At the meeting, Tari expressed concern about the situation in Dili and his disconcertment with Portugal that Indonesia was not being allowed to pacify the conflict. The Indonesian capture of 23 Portuguese officers and three civilians created further potential for conflict. The Indonesian army approved them to cross the border in August, but then interned them in camps. Portugal refused any concession without the hostages being released. While the civilians were released relatively quickly, the military remained in captivity until the official annexation of East Timor by Indonesia on July 17, 1976.

A naval transmitter was stationed on the MacDili , who had returned from Darwin, and maintained contact with the Australian city, while a radio set on Atauro provided the connection with the freighter. On September 8, the Laleia was supposed to collect the 25 Portuguese soldiers from Dili, as agreed, who had been held as prisoners by FRETILIN. In Dili the mood of the FRETILIN fighters, who meanwhile controlled the port, was hostile and irritable towards the Portuguese. Finally it was agreed that with the help of the International Red Cross the Portuguese prisoners should be handed over to the Portuguese consul in Darwin, from where they could return to Lisbon. On the way back, the Laleia noticed an Indonesian destroyer in the waters between Atauro and Dili.

When the UDT's defeat in the civil war became apparent, 10,000 to 20,000 people fled to the Indonesian West Timor, where they found themselves under the control of the Indonesian military. A total of 1,500 to 3,000 people died in the fighting. Two groups in Maliana and Suai drafted proclamations calling for the integration of the colony in Indonesia, and the refugee leaders of UDT and smaller parties also drafted a petition in Batugade calling on Indonesia to do so. The UDT leader Mário Viegas Carrascalão later stated that the signature had been obtained under pressure from the Indonesians, sometimes by force of arms.

After the de facto takeover, FRETILIN quickly ensured peace and order again thanks to the great support in the population. The food supply for the population was also secured. Former UDT supporters who had stayed now worked with FRETILIN. However, the party also had to bear responsibility for the numerous prisoners from the civil war and had difficulties in preventing its own cadres from ill-treatment. The FRETILIN officially recognized the Portuguese sovereignty over the colony. The flag of Portugal was still flying at the seat of government and the governor's office was not used. Its administration only existed on Atauro. The FRETILIN stressed the authority of Portugal over the colony several times and called for negotiations to continue the decolonization. Indonesia began incursions into the border area and from October onwards with the occupation of border towns. On September 16, FRETILIN repeated its call for negotiations with Portugal. In addition, a conference with Portugal, East Timor, Indonesia and Australia was supposed to "clear up rumors and misunderstandings".

Minister António de Almeida Santos left Atauro on September 22nd. He spoke out in favor of negotiations with all three East Timorese parties, but FRETILIN was no longer ready for four-way talks because it already controlled the colony. FRETILIN only wanted to negotiate with Portugal and Indonesia did not allow the UDT and APODETI leaders who had fled to negotiate with Portugal. Pires accompanied the minister to Lisbon and tried again to get the Portuguese government to intervene, but after nine days he returned to Atauro unsuccessfully. Only after the arrival of the corvette Afonso Cerqueira on October 6th was it possible to communicate directly with Lisbon again. It was the first military support from Portugal in two months. At this point, Australia was already sabotaging Portuguese actions in order to support Indonesia in its ambitions for East Timor. The corvette had been refused permission to stash fuel in Darwin. This was justified with own naval exercises, which prevented the use of the port. Portugal's Foreign Minister Ernesto Melo Antunes therefore appointed the Australian Ambassador to Lisbon to the Foreign Ministry.

On October 11th, the MacDili left Atauro for Macau, with the Lifau and the Tibar in tow. The last attempt by FRETILIN to persuade Portugal to negotiate took place on October 25th. The Portuguese were asked to send a delegation to Atauro to monitor the situation on site. The border town of Balibo had been taken by the Indonesians nine days earlier . There was no response from Portugal to FRETILIN's invitation.

The end

On November 1 and 2, the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugal met again in Rome , but nothing more than a general statement emerged. There was renewed support for orderly decolonization under Portuguese leadership and with the participation of all parties. The reality that Indonesia was already occupying parts of the colony was ignored. Attempts by Portugal to seek help from other states given the situation in Portuguese Timor were unsuccessful. When a domestic political crisis broke out in Portugal, the country was without a functioning government in early December.

Pressed by the Indonesian infiltration into the border areas, FRETILIN started another attempt to obtain international aid and on November 28 unilaterally proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor . Portugal refused to recognize the new state. Indonesia responded by reporting that the leaders of the other four East Timorese parties, UDT, APODETI, KOTA and Labor Party, had signed the so-called Balibo Declaration on November 30, 1975 . It also declared independence from Portugal and the country's annexation to Indonesia. The declaration was probably signed by the East Timorese representatives under pressure from the Indonesian government. The signatories were more or less prisoners of Indonesia.

On December 7th, the Indonesians began Operation Seroja . Indonesian troops openly attacked Dili. The city was shelled by Indonesian navy warships in the early hours of the morning, then paratroopers and boats landed on the beaches. There were public executions at the Dilis shipyard. With the help of the Portuguese corvettes João Roby and Afonso Cerqueira , Governor Pires left his refuge on Atauro with the last members of the colonial administration on December 8th. On December 30th, the Indonesians landed on Atauro, where shortly afterwards the last symbol of Portugal's claim to power over its colony was obtained in an official ceremony; the last Portuguese flag over the colony that Governor Pires had left behind.

In a retrospective report, Pires concluded that Portugal had failed to prepare the colony for independence. Political forces led to instability and the Portuguese armed forces failed to protect the decolonization process.

On July 17, 1976, Indonesia officially declared the annexation of East Timor, but this was not recognized by any other country apart from Australia. Internationally, East Timor continued to be regarded as a "dependent territory under Portuguese administration" . Only after the end of the Indonesian occupation and the takeover of control by the United Nations in 1999 did Portuguese sovereignty officially end. In 2002, East Timor was granted independence by the United Nations.

See also

literature

Web links

supporting documents

Main evidence

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ José Luís Leiria Pinto: Timor 1973/75. Recordações de um marinheiro , Academia Marinha, May 22, 2012 ( Memento of the original from May 25, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , accessed May 25, 2016. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / academia.marinha.pt
  2. ↑ a b Ivo Carneiro de SOUSA, Lusotopie 2001: 183–194, The Portuguese Colonization and the Problem of East Timorese Nationalism ( RTF ; 63 kB)
  3. ↑ a b c d José Luís Leiria Pinto: Timor 1973/75 - Recordações de um Marinheiro. P. 25.
  4. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Rapid decolonization, turmoil in Portugal , pp. 13-14.
  5. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", The dawning of political consciousness. Pp. 23-24.
  6. ^ History and Politics: 2. b. Portuguese contact and historical experience - Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University
  7. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", The impact of the Carnation Revolution in Portuguese Timor , pp. 14-15.
  8. ↑ a b c d Timor-Leste Memória: East-Timorese Resistance Archive & Museum, Chronology ( Memento of the original dated February 6, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (English), accessed on November 1, 2018 @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / amrtimor.org
  9. ↑ Cronologia do ano de 1974-XXXI
  10. ↑ a b c d Dagmar Janevová: A descolonização de Timor Longo caminho para a independência , Bakalářská diplomová práce, 2011 , accessed on November 27, 2018.
  11. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", The formation of political parties in Portuguese Timor , pp. 15-16.
  12. ^ Robert Lawless: The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor. P. 949 , Asian Survey Vol. 16, No. 10 (Oct. 1976), pp. 948-964.
  13. ^ Frédéric B. Durand: History of Timor-Leste. P. 103.
  14. ↑ Cronologia do ano de 1974-XXXI
  15. ↑ a b c J. Chrys Chrystello: Timor Leste - The Secret Files 1973–1975. accessed on November 27, 2018.
  16. ↑ a b c d e “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”, Governor Lemos Pires's “mission impossible”. Pp. 29-31.
  17. ↑ a b José Ramos-Horta: Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor. The Red Sea Press, 1987, limited preview in Google Book search
  18. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Moisés Silva Fernandes: O Processo de Descolonização do Timor Português nos Arquivos Portugueses, 1974–1975. Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa , accessed on November 1, 2018.
  19. ^ Jill Jolliffe: Run for Your Life. 2014, limited preview in Google Book Search
  20. ↑ Bob Boughton , Deborah Durnanand Antero Benedito da Silva: [1] , TL Studies, accessed November 5, 2019.
  21. ↑ Ruth Elizabeth Nuttall: The Origins and Onset of the 2006 Crisis in Timor-Leste. Pp. 17-18, PhD Thesis, The Australian National University, February 2017 , accessed July 31, 2019.
  22. ^ A b Nations Encyclopedia: East Timor - History. Retrieved November 4, 2017.
  23. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Indonesia and the international community , pp. 18-19.
  24. ^ East Timor Government: History. Retrieved August 5, 2012.
  25. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", The United Nations and Portuguese Timor. P. 17.
  26. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", The Macau Meeting, June 26-28, 1975. pp. 37-38.
  27. ↑ a b c d Frédéric B. Durand: History of Timor-Leste. Pp. 105-106.
  28. ↑ a b c d Frédéric B. Durand: Three centuries of violence and struggle in East Timor (1726-2008). (PDF; 243 kB) Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, (online), June 7, 2011, accessed on May 28, 2012, ISSN  1961-9898
  29. ^ A b "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", UDT launches its 11 August armed movement. Pp. 40-42.
  30. ↑ a b Amandio Lopes: East Timor Secret , October 29, 2012 , accessed November 1, 2018.
  31. ^ Frédéric B. Durand: History of Timor-Leste. P. 104.
  32. ↑ a b c “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”, The failure to negotiate: internal armed conflict. Pp. 42-43.
  33. ↑ a b Monika Schlicher: East Timor faces its past. accessed on September 10, 2018.
  34. ↑ a b c d e f g David Hicks: Rhetoric and the Decolonization and Recolonization of East Timor. Routledge, 2015, pp. 147 & 155 limited preview in the Google book search.
  35. ^ A b c Amanda Wise: Exile and Return Among the East Timorese. Routledge, 2015, p. 41 limited preview in Google Book search
  36. ^ New York Times: Timor Refugees, in Australia, Tell of Killings. August 26, 1975 , Retrieved September 12, 21.
  37. ↑ José Luís Leiria Pinto: Timor 1973/75 - Recordações de um Marinheiro. P. 26.
  38. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k José Luís Leiria Pinto: Timor 1973/75 - Recordações de um Marinheiro. P. 27.
  39. ↑ a b c d Geoffrey C. Gunn: History of Timor , pp. 149–156 ( Memento of the original from March 24, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Technical University of Lisbon (PDF; 805 kB) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / pascal.iseg.utl.pt
  40. ^ Jean A. Berlie: East Timor's Independence, Indonesia and ASEAN. Springer, 2017, p. 6 restricted preview in the Google book search
  41. ↑ Scan from the book Timor, Antes do Futuro by Mário Viegas Carrascalão (Dili: Livraria Mau Huran, 2006), accessed on September 10, 2018.
  42. ↑ VISÃO: O último fantasma de Timor. October 25, 2001 .
  43. ↑ Mário Viegas Carrascalão : Timor, Antes do Futuro. Livraria Mau Huran, Dili 2006.
  44. ↑ Mula de Física: MacDili 18 September, 2009 .
  45. ↑ a b c “Chega!”: “Part 3: The History of the Conflict”, Portugal's response to the internal conflict. P. 44.
  46. ↑ "Chapter 7.2 Unlawful Killings and Enforced Disappearances" (PDF; 2.5 MB), p. 8, from the "Chega!" Report of the CAVR (English)
  47. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", The East Timorese political parties come under Indonesian sway. Pp. 44-45.
  48. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Fretilin fills the vacuum. P. 46.
  49. ^ David Hicks: Rhetoric and the Decolonization and Recolonization of East Timor. P. 166, limited preview in Google Book search
  50. ^ A b "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Background to Fretilin's unilateral declaration of independence. Pp. 53-55.
  51. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", Portugal. P. 57.
  52. ^ "Chega!": "Part 3: The History of the Conflict", The Balibo Declaration. Pp. 56-57.
  53. ↑ Expresso: Última bandeira portuguesa de Timor está em Jacarta. June 27, 2015 , accessed July 23, 2015.
  54. ↑ Resolution 3485 of the United Nations General Assembly. (English).
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on January 25, 2019 .