Portuguese colonial war
| date | 1961 to 1975 |
|---|---|
| place | Angola , Guinea-Bissau , Mozambique |
| output | End of the fighting after the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, independence of the colonies |
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The Portuguese Colonial War (Pt. Guerra Colonial ), also known as the Overseas War (Pt. Guerra do Ultramar ) in Portugal , was a military, political and ideological conflict between Portugal and the emerging independence movements in the Portuguese colonies in Africa between 1961 and 1974.
Unlike other European nations in the 1950s and 1960s, the Portuguese regime of the time was authoritarian - corporatist - not ready to give up its African colonies. It went on to designate these as overseas provinces ( províncias ultramarinas ) and stipulate in the constitution that it regarded them as part of Portugal.
During the same period, various armed independence movements emerged, especially in Angola , Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea . Most of them were close to socialist ideas with their politics and formed the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP). The CONCP also included independence movements from Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe , although they refrained from armed struggle.
prehistory
After the Second World War, the two remaining great powers, the USA and the Soviet Union , tried to expand their spheres of influence worldwide. Resistance groups received political, financial, logistical and military support from both great powers. For example, the US supported in Angola , the FNLA - which will also help from China got - and later the UNITA , while the Soviet Union (and other countries with a socialist orientation) behind the MPLA presented.
The Portuguese regime was unable to maintain control of the overseas provinces. The Portuguese leadership, including Salazar , defended the policy of lusotropicalism as the way to tie the Portuguese colonies and their people closer to Portugal.
The Assimilado rule , which applied until 1962, theoretically allowed a few black Africans to become citizens of Portugal with equal rights . "Assimilated" black Africans in Portuguese Africa were allowed to hold high positions in the military, administration, faculty, health care, and other civil or private sector posts. Also in this phase - as since the beginning of the Portuguese presence in Africa - it was not uncommon for (mostly informal) mixed marriages between Portuguese and Africans, more often still between Portuguese and mixed race (mestiços), who represented a socially and administratively demarcated population group.
The Portuguese founded two large state universities in the 1960s, the Universidade de Luanda in Angola and the Estudos Gerais Universitários de Moçambique in Mozambique. In Portugal there were only four state universities at the same time, two of them in Lisbon (today there are over 20 universities in Portugal ). Access to higher education was expanded in the colonies for whites and blacks, but a significant part of the population remained illiterate (as did a not insignificant proportion of the inhabitants of the Portuguese mainland). Some of the few Assimilados who studied during the Portuguese rule became well-known personalities during and after the war. This group of people includes Samora Machel , Eduardo Mondlane , Agostinho Neto , Amílcar Cabral , Joaquim Chissano and Graça Machel . One of the greatest sports stars in Portuguese history, the black soccer player Eusébio , is another example of assimilation in the Portuguese colonies.
War 1961 to 1973
The Portuguese Army
When the first fighting broke out in 1961, the Portuguese were poorly equipped and not prepared for a guerrilla war . Until then, it had been customary to send obsolete and obsolete material to the colonies. The Portuguese soldiers in the colonies initially had to use radio equipment and weapons from the time of the Second World War, such as outdated Mauser carbines . The Portuguese army was quickly forced to buy or produce modern weapons.
Most of the weapons in the Portuguese army came from France , West Germany , South Africa , Belgium and Israel . However, this had to - in violation of the United Nations - arms embargo against Portugal - are bought expensive by the Portuguese.
Portugal was internationally isolated and both great powers were openly hostile to Portugal's presence in Africa. The USA supported the FNLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique, the Soviet Union and China supported the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and UNITA in Angola. Then there were the sanctions of the UN and most of the African states. Only Rhodesia and South Africa stood by the Portuguese for reasons of their regional political interests.
From 1961 the HK G3 became the standard rifle of the Portuguese troops, which was produced under license in Portugal. The FN FAL was used by the elite troops such as the Caçadores Especiais . Officers often used machine guns such as the MP 34 or the Uzi type . The MG 42 was the standard machine gun of the Portuguese colonial troops until 1968 , after which Portugal was able to acquire the HK21 . Due to the difficult terrain, the Portuguese preferred to use light armored vehicles and reconnaissance tanks such as the Panhard AML or the EBR-75 instead of heavy tanks .
In contrast to the Americans in the Vietnam War , Portugal could not afford large-scale use of helicopters . Only the troops that were involved in the attacks, mainly command troops and paratroopers , were transported by helicopters. Most of the troop movements took place either on foot or by truck. The helicopters were reserved for fire support for the ground forces and the evacuation of the injured. Alouette III were used as the standard helicopter . Of these, 142 were deployed in Africa, 30 of which were destroyed. Furthermore, were Aerospatiale SA 330 Puma used helicopters. The typical Portuguese tactic within the African conflicts was to summarize 6 or 7 Alouette III. 5 or 6 acted as troop transporters, so-called canibais (cannibals), while a helicopter, the so-called lobo mau (bad wolf), was used for fire support. After the start of the mission, the "canibais" withdrew, while the "lobo mau" supported the troops in the attack with a 20 mm MG 151 . After the end of the mission, the soldiers were picked up by the "canibais".
air force
The Portuguese Air Force suffered most from the lack of material. The embargo meant that the necessary spare parts were not available. In Guinea-Bissau, the Portuguese only had one combat-ready aircraft in 1966 when they succeeded in purchasing 40 Fiat G-91 aircraft from the German Air Force in 1966 . The Fiat G.91 subsequently became the standard aircraft of the Portuguese Air Force in the colonial wars.
In addition to the Fiat-G-91, more than 100 T-6s were used for air support in all conflicts and 16 F-86 Sabers in Guinea-Bissau. Initially 42 Lockheed Ventura were used as bombers , which were used in Angola and Mozambique. 1966 succeeded in purchasing 20 Douglas A-26 bombers, which were supplied by the USA despite the existing arms embargoes. These aircraft were used in Angola and Guinea-Bissau. Dornier Do 27 were used as reconnaissance aircraft, and Junkers Ju 52 / 3m , Nord Noratlas , Douglas C-54 and Douglas DC-3 as transport aircraft . From 1970 the Portuguese Air Force, like the American Air Force during the parallel Vietnam War , increasingly used napalm and defoliants .
The small Portuguese arms industry was never able to meet the needs of the army. Throughout the colonial war only equipment for the ground troops and boats for the coast guard were supplied.
marine
The Portuguese Navy was also out of date. There was a lack of patrol boats to control the coasts of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, and of frigates to protect freight or troop transports between colonies.
Use of indigenous troops
Since 1961 the Portuguese have been using more and more black soldiers; this also in order to underline the multi-ethnic aspect of the state. The role of Africans during the war ranged from subordinate functions to elite units. During the war, the importance of the Africans for the Portuguese increased more and more. In 1974 the Africans made up 50% of the fighting troops in the colonies.
Special forces
In addition to the regular units established also came mostly from African special forces for counterinsurgency used as the intelligence service PIDE established Flechas or out by the army Grupos Especiais . From 1961 onwards, the comandos , which were set up and trained based on the French model, were used, in which the experiences of the Indochina War and the Algerian War were evaluated.
The guerrilla movements
Despite the regional differences between the various liberation movements, there are great overlaps and developments in terms of tactics and materials. At the beginning of the conflict, the guerrilla movements used Western material supplied by friendly neighboring states (which themselves had only recently become independent). As the conflict progressed, however, the African liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies mainly used material and weapons from the USSR, the People's Republic of China, Cuba and Eastern Europe and thus the same types of weapons in the various countries. The Mosin-Nagant and Simonow SKS-45 rifles were used. Over time, however, the AK 47 assault rifle became the standard weapon of the rebels . This was then used by many Portuguese soldiers as it was lighter and better suited for the often difficult surroundings such as swamps and jungles. The typical tactic of the rebels was to use a mixture of booby traps , anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines against patrolling Portuguese units , which claimed heavy casualties among the Portuguese units. Mainly PMN mines were used here. A common tactic of all movements was to lay heavy anti-tank mines on the streets, to place anti-personnel mines on the edges of the streets and then to fire the Portuguese units on the street with a mix of automatic weapons. Various types from Soviet production were used here. The following types were mainly used: DP , PPSch-41 , RPD , Gorjunow SG-43 , heavy DSchK machine guns and PPS-43 submachine guns. Tank rifles such as RPG-2 and RPG-7 were often used for this purpose. The ZPU-4 was used for air defense, and towards the end of the war also Strela-2 anti - aircraft missiles, which ended the Portuguese air superiority there, with great success in Guinea .
Angola
At the beginning of the 1950s, the Portuguese, spurred on by the António de Oliveira Salazar regime , began to settle in Angola. At the same time, the first underground groups were formed, which aimed at the African resistance against Portuguese colonial rule. In 1958 the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) (German: "People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola") was founded, which arose from groups in Luanda. At the same time, groups formed among the Bakongo of the Northeast, which united to form União das Populações de Angola (UPA, German: "Union of the Peoples of Angola").
In the provinces of Zaire , Uíge and Cuanza Norte in northern Angola , there was an unorganized uprising against the Portuguese in the early 1960s. The Portuguese called the area Zona Sublevada do Norte (ZSN or German: "Rebellious Northern Zone"). In the ZSN region was the UPA, which changed its name in 1962 to Frente Nacional da Libertação de Angola (FNLA). The US-backed FNLA originally wanted the historical kingdom of the Congo to be reborn , and later Angola's national self-determination, while the Portuguese believed in an assimilating, multiethnic overseas empire, the preservation of which justified waging war.
In January 1961, Angolan cotton pickers revolted in the Malanje province . They burned their ID cards and attacked Portuguese traders in Maria's War . As a result, the Portuguese army bombed twenty villages with napalm , killing around 7,000. On February 4, 1961, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) attacked the São Paulo prison in Luanda with around 250 fighters, killing seven policemen and 40 prisoners. At the funeral of the killed police officers on February 5, 1961, there was a riot among the Portuguese and clashes against Angolans.
On February 10, 1961, the MPLA again attacked a prison and in response, Portuguese civilians, with the help of police, again attacked Angolans. In the weeks that followed, the Portuguese managed to drive the MPLA out of Luanda. The MPLA withdrew to the Dembos region.
On March 15, 1961, the Frente Nacional da Libertação de Angola (FNLA), under its leader Holden Roberto and with 4,000 to 5,000 fighters, attacked targets in northern Angola. The FNLA attacked farms, government outposts and trading posts. In its advance, the FNLA killed over 1,000 whites and an unknown number of Angolans. The photos of these atrocities, including pictures of beheaded European and African women and children, later came into the disposal of the UN. Shortly after the photos became known, US President Kennedy sent a message to Salazar, in which he ultimately asked Salazar to leave the colonies immediately. Salazar, who had recently weathered a US-backed coup ( Abrilada ) against him, immediately sent reinforcements and the war began. Similar events took place in the other Portuguese colonies.
After a short time the Portuguese took military action against the FNLA and expelled them from all areas originally conquered by them. On September 20, 1961, the Portuguese took Pedra Verde , the last FNLA base in northern Angola. At this point around 2,000 Portuguese and 50,000 Angolans had lost their lives and around 400,000 to 500,000 were on the run to and in Zaire . The FNLA fighters mingled with the refugees and then continued their commando operations from Zaire. The Portuguese could not prevent the guerrilla actions from spreading to other regions of Angola, such as Cabinda , the east, southeast and the central plateau.
In May 1966 , the MPLA, led by Daniel Chipenda, opened a front in the east. The MPLA managed to advance far into the country, but when the Portuguese went over to the counter-offensive, the resistance of the MPLA quickly collapsed.
On December 25, 1966, UNITA launched its first attack on the Benguela Railway near Teixeira de Sousa , on the border with Zambia . In 1967 UNITA derailed trains on this line twice. The government of Zambia was dependent on this train connection because of the copper exports that took place on it. President Kenneth Kaunda then had the 500 UNITA fighters in Zambia deported. Savimbi first fled to Cairo , then returned to Angola a year later, where he and the Portuguese army took action against the MPLA.
In the late 1960s, the FNLA and MPLA fought as fiercely as the FNLA did against the Portuguese.
In 1971 the MPLA began to set up units with 100 to 150 men. These units, equipped with 60 mm and 81 mm mortars, now attacked Portuguese outposts. From 1972 the Portuguese began counter-operations and destroyed the MPLA bases.
South Africa supported the Portuguese efforts to restore the colonial power structures in Angola, as it was able to pursue its own geostrategic interests in southern Africa at the same time. The Portuguese then called their South African allies primos (cousins). In February 1973 the South African army attacked the MPLA positions in Moxico , and destroyed it. a. the bases of the liberation movement and expelled them from the east of the country. The then defeated leader of the MPLA, Agostinho Neto, withdrew to the Republic of Congo with 800 remaining fighters .
During the war, Portugal rapidly increased the mobilization of its troops. The Portuguese regime had long since introduced a three-year compulsory service for all male Portuguese. By the end of the war in 1974, the number of blacks in the army had increased so much that almost half of the colonial troops were Africans.
The Portuguese had been in Africa for so long that strong ties existed between them and the local people. The Portuguese managed to get parts of the local population to their side. As a result, the rebels lost their popular support and soon afterwards also the support of the USA.
In Angola, the military situation for the Portuguese was more favorable than in the other colonial theaters of war. The geography of the country and the enormous distances prevented the rebels, supported by Zaire and Zambia , from advancing into the population centers. The Portuguese also called eastern Angola Terras do Fim do Mundo (German: “Land at the end of the world”). In addition, the three national groups, the FNLA , the MPLA and the UNITA , were at odds with each other and spent at least as much effort fighting each other as the Portuguese.
The commander in chief of the Portuguese troops in Angola was General Costa Gomes . His strategy of involving not only the military, but also civil organizations in the conflict, led to a successful campaign and tipped the population on the side of the Portuguese. In 1974 the war had reached a military stalemate.
When the Carnation Revolution broke out in Portugal on April 25, 1974 , the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA individually negotiated ceasefire agreements with the new Portuguese government and began fighting for control of Luanda and the country.
In July 1974, the leaders of the three movements Holden Roberto , Agostinho Neto and Jonas Savimbi met in Bukavu , Zaire, and agreed to negotiate independence with the Portuguese. Between January 10 and 15, 1975, all parties met in the Algarve in Portugal and signed the Alvor Convention , which set the date of independence for the former colony on November 11. From January 31, 1975 until Independence Day, the interim government was headed by the Portuguese High Commissioner Rosa Coutinho.
The Portuguese interim government tried everything to prevent the massive exodus of the white Angolans. However, these were practically excluded from political life.
Soon the various factions of the civil war had more fighters than the Portuguese military. At the beginning of July 1975 an open civil war began . The Portuguese soldiers still stationed in the country were outnumbered, poorly equipped and demoralized and could no longer stop the fighting. The last Portuguese soldiers and officials left the country on November 10th.
Many new military units emerged during the war in Angola:
- The Special Operations Forces Center ( Caçadores Especiais ) was already in Angola when the war began in 1961.
- The Faithful ( Fiéis ) were a unit consisting of displaced blacks from the Katanga region who fought against the rule of Mobutu .
- The Loyals ( Leais ) were a unit consisting of displaced blacks from the Zambian region who fought against the rule of Kenneth Kaunda .
- The special groups ( Grupos Especiais ) were units that consisted of voluntary black soldiers and had command training and were also deployed in Mozambique.
- The Special Forces ( Tropas Especiais ) was the name of special forces in Cabinda
- The arrows ( Flechas ) was a unit under the command of the PIDE and consisted of San . The unit specialized in tracking, reconnaissance and pseudo-terrorist operations . The unit was the origin for the Rhodesian Selous Scouts and was also used in Mozambique.
- The 1st Cavalry Group ( Grupo de Cavalaria Nº1 ) was a mounted unit which was armed with Heckler & Koch G3 rifles and was tasked with reconnaissance and patrol . The unit was also known as the "Angolan Dragoons " ( Dragões de Angola ). The Rhodesians adopted this concept and founded the Grey's Scouts .
- The 1927 Cavalry Battalion ( Batalhão de Cavalaria 1927 ) was a tank unit equipped with M5A1 tanks designed to support either the infantry or rapid reaction forces. This concept was also adopted by the Rhodesians (Rhodesian Armored Car Regiment).
Portuguese Guinea
Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde had been owned by the Portuguese since 1446 and became Portuguese overseas provinces from 1952.
The war in Portuguese Guinea was the "Vietnam" of Portugal. The PAIGC (African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde) was well equipped and trained, and the neighboring states of Senegal and especially Guinea were excellent bases for the guerrillas.
Furthermore, Guinea-Bissau was economically completely unimportant for Portugal. The colony made no profits and was a financial burden for the Portuguese even before the outbreak of war, as they had to finance the infrastructure, medical care and administration. During the war, spending soared and many Portuguese officers and soldiers questioned Portuguese politics. The proportion of the population of "whites" was also negligible.
The Portuguese government justified the war with several arguments:
- Portugal is the neutral guarantor for a peaceful coexistence of the different ethnic groups.
- The PAIGC communists' takeover of power must be prevented.
- Without Portugal, the standard of living (medical care, etc.) would drop rapidly.
In addition, Guinea-Bissau had been of great strategic importance to the Portuguese since the 1960s. When many of the former French and British colonies gained independence in the 1960s and these new states prevented the Portuguese from landing airplanes or berthing ships, Guinea-Bissau had become an important stopover for the journey to the colonies of Angola and Mozambique .
The Portuguese also feared that a withdrawal could have a signal effect on the other colonies. Especially the Cape Verde Islands, populated by numerous Portuguese, appeared to be in immediate danger, as the PAIGC was also active there.
On August 3, 1959, the Marxist PAIGC organized a dock workers' strike in Bissau . The colonial administration brutally suppressed the strike. This led to broad popular support for the PAIGC.
In 1960, the PAIGC moved its headquarters to Conakry in neighboring Guinea and set up several training camps there to prepare for the armed struggle. In Portuguese Guinea, the fighting began in January 1963 under the leadership of the PAIGC. The PAIGC fighters attacked the Portuguese headquarters in Tite in the south of Bissau . Similar attacks subsequently took place across the province.
In January 1964 the Portuguese army was able to drive the PAIGC out of the southern islands in Operation Tridente . It was the largest amphibious operation by the Portuguese until then . 1,200 infantry, marines and parachutists, supported by air- and sea-based bombing, attacked the 300 or so PAIGC fighters and drove them off the islands.
In 1965 the war spread to the eastern part of the country and in the same year the PAIGC carried out several attacks in the north. Until then, only the small guerrilla organization Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional da Guiné (FLING) was active there. The PAIGC received military support from the Eastern Bloc , mainly from Cuba , until the end of the war . Cuban military advisors have been in the PAIGC camps since 1965 and trained the fighters.
In Guinea, the Portuguese army was mainly defensive. It was limited to defending the areas held. This practice was devastating to the troops exposed to constant attacks by the PAIGC. In addition, the influence of independence advocates in the population grew steadily and the PAIGC was able to recruit them in large numbers. Guinea-Bissau is relatively small (36,125 km²) and the Portuguese army lacked the strategic depth to be able to react effectively to the attacks of the independence fighters. The surrounding states of Guinea and Senegal were hostile to the Portuguese and supported the PAIGC. The geography of the country did not make it easy for the Portuguese to master the situation in their favor. The country is crossed by rivers and there was practically no infrastructure outside of the big cities. Much of the coast is swampy and very flat. This made the transport of troops much more difficult.
At the beginning of 1968 the approximately 25,000 Portuguese soldiers were confronted with around 8,000 to 10,000 PAIGC fighters. The PAIGC began to set up its own administration in the areas under its control and the situation became more and more difficult for the Portuguese. The commander in chief of the Portuguese army in Guinea-Bissau and governor since 1964, General Arnaldo Schultz , was not up to the situation and it was feared that the Portuguese army would be defeated militarily. Portuguese President Salazar was forced to respond. In 1968 he deposed General Arnaldo Schultz and General António de Spínola took over command. From then on, the war was also a direct conflict between the leader of the PAIGC, Amílcar Cabral , and Spínola.
There was a change of strategy under Spínola. The Portuguese were now increasingly on the offensive. Helicopters and search-and-destroy missions were also used more frequently , as the Americans did in Vietnam. Since Marcelo Caetano came to power, Spínola also had greater financial means at its disposal. The Portuguese troop strength was increased by 10,000 men to about 35,000 men. Spínola often visited the troops, sometimes even when they were under enemy fire, and tried to raise their morale. He dismissed some older officers and replaced them with young officers.
Spínola also tried to involve the country's various ethnic groups in the political decision-making process. With the help of the Portuguese secret service, he also tried to infiltrate the PAIGC and to conclude special agreements with the various population groups (for example with the Fulbe ). He also tried to revise the poor image of the Portuguese in the international media.
The Portuguese achieved some success and again completely controlled the cities and most of the population. However, it soon became clear that Portugal could only end the war if it succeeded in destroying the PAIGC in their bases in Guinea.
The Portuguese secret service learned that most of the PAIGC's supplies came into the country via the sea and rivers. The PAIGC had a whole fleet of ships, such as gunboats, assault boats (from Soviet production) and motor boats, with which they organized the transport of troops, material and weapons. The unit for commando operations of the Portuguese army under the direction of First Lieutenant Guilherme Alpoim Calvão began operations against the PAIGC supply routes. The Portuguese ambushed the PAIGC supply convoys and attacked them with inflatable boats .
In August 1969, the Portuguese carried out Operation Nebulosa . They managed to sink the PAIGC's speedboat Patrice Lumumba . In February 1970 the Portuguese carried out Operation Gata Brava in Guinea . They sank the PAIGC ship Bandim . The PAIGC's supplies stalled, but the PAIGC's small boats and the attacks from the Guinea area continued to pose a threat to Portuguese ships.
In 1970 the Portuguese tried to overthrow the President of Guinea, Sékou Touré , with the help of Guinean exiles in Operation Mar Verde (Green Sea) . However, the operation was unsuccessful; it did not succeed in ousting Sékou Touré from power. However, the Portuguese prisoners of war were freed and the ships of the PAIGC destroyed. Nigeria and Algeria then supported Guinea, and the Soviet Union sent warships of the future 7th Squadron to the region.
In the same year, the Portuguese tried unsuccessfully to capture Amílcar Cabral and then deploy agents in the PAIGC to eliminate Cabral with their support. When Salazar died in 1970 and Marcello Caetano became the new Prime Minister of Portugal, General Spínola was allowed to explore the possibility of starting negotiations with the rebels, and in 1972 negotiations were abandoned.
Between 1968 and 1972 the Portuguese army succeeded in stabilizing the colonial power by increasing its attacks on the PAIGC. At this time, the Portuguese began to use subversive methods to fight the insurgents by attacking the political structures of the PAIGC. On January 20, 1973, a Portuguese agent succeeded in killing Amílcar Cabral in Conakry .
However, the PAIGC continued the fight and again put the Portuguese in a difficult position. The situation worsened when the PAIGC received Soviet anti-aircraft weapons. Above all, the Strela-2 one-man anti-aircraft missiles impaired and subsequently destroyed Portuguese air sovereignty. At the end of March 1973, 2 Fiat G.91 missiles were shot down by the Strela missiles , and 2 other aircraft of this type were lost in PAIGC ground offensives. Furthermore, 2 Dornier Do 27 reconnaissance aircraft and a North American T-6 aircraft were shot down by the missiles in the same year . Between 1966 and 1973 the Portuguese Air Force lost only 2 aircraft in comparison. Gradually the PAIGC conquered more and more areas.
On September 24, 1973, Guinea-Bissau unilaterally declared its independence from Portugal; the year before, a government-in-exile had been formed in Conakry . At this point the PAIGC rebels controlled 70 to 80 percent of the colony. The provisional capital was Madina do Boé . This step was supported by the UN General Assembly with 93 votes to 7.
In 1974 the successes of the resistance fighters stagnated in Angola and Mozambique, only ambushes worried the Portuguese. In Portuguese Guinea, however, they did not succeed at all in bringing the guerrilla movement backed by neighboring countries under control.
António de Spínola, who was Portuguese governor and commander in chief from 1968 to 1972, published his book Portugal eo Futuro (Portugal and the Future), in which he also dealt with the colonial wars. In his book, he emphasized that the colonial war for Portugal could not be won militarily. In doing so, he started the movement that culminated in the Carnation Revolution on April 25, 1974 . After the Carnation Revolution, both sides quickly agreed to end the war and Portugal recognized Guinea-Bissau's independence on October 10, 1974.
During the war in Portuguese Guinea, the following special units of the Portuguese army were deployed:
- The Comandos Africanos (about: African remote scouts) were commando units that consisted only of black soldiers and officers.
- The Fuzileiros Especiais Africanos (African Marine Infantry) was a unit of the Portuguese Navy , which consisted of black crews. The officers were from both the colonies and the metropolis.
Mozambique
Mozambique was the last colony where fighting broke out. The uprising was organized by the Marxist-Leninist Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), led by Eduardo Mondlane.
The Portuguese army was under the command of General António Augusto dos Santos. He was a proponent of resolute anti-guerrilla tactics. Augusto dos Santos promoted the collaboration with Rhodesia in order to set up reconnaissance troops from locals and to carry out military operations together with Rhodesia.
At the beginning of the war, FRELIMO had little chance of winning it. It had about 7,000 fighters, while the Portuguese increased their troops from 8,000 to 24,000 men between 1964 and 1967. The Portuguese also evacuated 23,000 locals, and from 1969 860 commandos were trained.
On September 24, 1964, FRELIMO started the armed uprising from its bases in Tanzania with an attack on the post office in the city of Chai in the province of Cabo Delgado .
The FRELIMO waged a classic guerrilla war, with raids on military patrols, sabotage of communication and transport routes and raids on colonial outposts and subsequent escape into the hinterland. The insurgents were mostly armed with rifles and machine guns and often used the monsoon season for their attacks. Because of the bad weather, it was difficult for the Portuguese Air Force to track down or pursue the insurgents. It was also difficult for the Portuguese ground forces to move over long distances during the rainy season. The rebels had only light equipment and it was easy for them to go into hiding in the bushland (the mato ) and among the local population.
The fighting spread rapidly and soon reached Niassa Province and the city of Tete , in the center of the country. However, a military report by the 558th Battalion of the Portuguese Army mentioned heavy fighting in Cabo Delgado on August 21, 1964.
At the beginning of the conflict, FRELIMO only deployed small troop units (10–15 men) and only attacked little or no defended Portuguese outposts. The aim was to fragment the Portuguese troops. On November 16, 1964, the Portuguese suffered their first casualties in the Xilama region . During this time FRELIMO was able to strengthen its forces with the help of the local population and benefited from the small number of Portuguese soldiers and settlers. She began to advance south, towards Meponda and Mandimba .
FRELIMO tried to penetrate the province of Tete with the help of the Republic of Malawi . Although the area in which the FRELIMO was active became larger and larger, it retained its tactics of attacking small administrative outposts of the Portuguese with a small number of fighters and using the Rovuma River and Lake Malawi as transport and communication routes .
In 1965 FRELIMO succeeded in increasing its troop strength. She opened agencies in neighboring Tanzania to look after the Mozambicans who had fled the fighting. This enabled her to significantly improve her popularity among the population.
The FRELIMO units now consisted of 100 men and more, and the FRELIMO began to include women in its ranks.
On October 10 or 11, 1966, Filipe Samuel Magaia, who was returning from the front, was shot by Lourenço Matola (also a member of FRELIMO). It is still not clear whether Matola was in the service of the Portuguese.
FRELIMO was not active in the Tete region until 1967, as it concentrated its efforts in the two northernmost provinces. In the north, landmines were used extensively on both sides . In the Niassa region, FRELIMO tried to conquer a corridor to Zambia .
At the end of 1967 FRELIMO controlled about 15 percent of the population and 20 percent of the country's area. It had about 8,000 fighters.
Overall, however, Mondlane was dissatisfied with the success of the FRELIMO and therefore asked the support of the Soviet Union and China. These supplied the FRELIMO with large-caliber machine guns, anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers.
In 1968 the FRELIMO held its second congress, which was subsequently used for a propaganda case, as the Portuguese bombed the conference venue but could not prevent the congress.
In response to the increasing military threat posed by FRELIMO, the Portuguese started a large infrastructure program. New roads, railway lines, schools and hospitals were built. The program was intended to stimulate the country's economy and strengthen the support of the Portuguese colonial policy among the population.
An important part of the program was the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam (today: Cahora Bassa Dam ), which began after a contract was signed with an international consortium led by South Africa ( ZAMCO ). Construction since 1969 soon became a touchstone for Portugal's ability to provide security in the country. The Portuguese saw the construction of the dam as their "civilizing mission" and hoped that it would improve the people's belief in the strength and ability of Portugal. The Portuguese sent 3,000 new troops and over a million land mines to protect the dam project, which later supplied almost 100 percent of South Africa with its electrical power generation. FRELIMO quickly understood the symbolic meaning of the project and tried to prevent completion. All direct attacks on the dam were repulsed by the Portuguese, but the FRELIMO attacks on the supply convoys delayed construction considerably.
FRELIMO also protested against the project through diplomatic channels and when a large part of the foreign funds were not available, the construction progress was even more delayed. The dam could only be completed in December 1974.
Eduardo Mondlane died on February 3, 1969 from a letter bomb . To date there is no evidence of who exactly was behind the attack. The internal investigation of FRELIMO came to the conclusion that its member Silverio Nungo was responsible for the crime. He was later executed . Lazaro Kavandame, the commander of FRELIMO in the Cabo Delgado region, was also accused. It was known that he and Mondlane were falling out. In addition, the Tanzanian police accused Kavandame of collaborating with the Portuguese secret service. In April 1969, Kavandame defected to the Portuguese.
Until April 1970, FRELIMO's military activity increased steadily, especially under the leadership of Samora Machel in the Cabo Delgado region. FRELIMO increasingly relied on the use of landmines and from 1970 to 1974 three out of four Portuguese failures were due to landmines. The Portuguese soldiers suffered greatly from the fear of mines. This fear and frustration of never seeing the enemy undermined the troops' morale.
In 1970 the Portuguese carried out Operation Nó Górdio (Gordian Knot) for 7 months. The conventional military operation aimed to destroy the guerrilla bases in the north along the Tanzanian border. A total of 35,000 Portuguese soldiers took part in the operation. The Portuguese used US tactics in the Vietnam War by deploying smaller units of troops in FRELIMO areas, then supporting them with heavy bombardments while the ground forces tried to encircle and eliminate the FRELIMO fighters. The Portuguese also use cavalry units to cover the flanks of patrols or where the terrain does not allow the use of motorized units. Units were also deployed that consisted of captured or deserted rebels and that had internal FRELIMO knowledge.
However, when the monsoon season set in, the operation stalled. The Portuguese soldiers were poorly equipped and there was a lack of coordination between the ground forces and the air force. Above all, there was a lack of air support for the ground troops. When the losses on the Portuguese side equaled those of FRELIMO, Lisbon intervened.
At the end of the offensive, the Portuguese counted 651 rebels killed (440 dead is more likely) and 1,840 prisoners, with 132 casualties themselves. 61 FRELIMO bases and 165 camps were also destroyed. Furthermore, 40 tons of ammunition were seized in the first two months alone. However, the operation was a failure as it failed to incapacitate the FRELIMO.
The construction of the Cabora Bassa dam tied about half of all Portuguese troops in Mozambique and allowed FRELIMO to advance into the province of Tete in the south and thus to get closer to the cities and the densely populated regions.
In March 1970, General António Augusto was replaced by General Kaúlza Oliveira de Arriaga . Kaúlza de Arriaga preferred a more direct method to fight the insurgents and also relied on the increased combat deployment of Portuguese troops. His tactics were also influenced by a meeting with the American Vietnam General William Westmoreland .
In 1972, the Portuguese changed their tactics and, following the British-American model, switched to “search and destroy” operations. The Portuguese also started the “Aldeamentos” program. This should turn the mood in the population in favor of the Portuguese. However, it was more of a forced relocation of the population from certain areas. Many officers and Kaúlza de Arriaga's deputy, General Francisco da Costa Gomes, demanded an increased use of local troops, such as the Flechas units. Costa Gomes assumed that the local units were cheaper and better able to establish good contact with the population.
On November 9, 1972, FRELIMO launched an offensive in the Tete province. The Portuguese responded with retaliatory attacks to finally break support for FRELIMO among the local population. On December 16, 1972, the Portuguese committed the Wiriyamu massacre , which affected a group of villages 25-30 kilometers southeast of the city of Tete. The exact number of victims is not available and these vary between 60 and 500 killed villagers who were accused of collaborating with FRELIMO.
From 1973 FRELIMO also began to mine villages and cities, hoping to undermine the civilian population's trust in the Portuguese to ensure security.
Under its new commander Machel, FRELIMO also gave up Mondlane's policy of sparing the Portuguese settlers. Many settlers panic and there were demonstrations against the government in Lisbon. The protests, the Wiriyamu massacre and the resurgent FRELIMO between 1973 and spring 1974 were one reason for the overthrow of the government in Lisbon.
Towards the end of the conflict, FRELIMO succeeded in procuring a limited number of HN-5A anti-aircraft missiles from China. However, she never succeeded in shooting down a Portuguese plane. The only Portuguese plane that crashed was a Fiat G.91 owned by Lieutenant Emilio Lourenço, which crashed after its own weapons exploded.
During the war, Rhodesia supported the Portuguese and even carried out its own military operations. In 1973 the country was largely under the control of the Portuguese. At the beginning of 1974 the FRELIMO began with mortar attacks on Vila Pery (today Chimoio ).
With the exception of the contested areas in the northwest and some regions of the center, the Portuguese initially had the situation under control in the other regions, and all cities and most of the villages were under their control.
On April 25, 1974, the Carnation Revolution broke out in Portugal and shortly afterwards European settlers began to leave Mozambique. The new head of state, General António de Spínola , declared a ceasefire . The elections carried out by the Portuguese only led to more violent attacks by FRELIMO and the Portuguese army abandoned their northern positions and withdrew to the south. Many soldiers also refused to work and stayed in the barracks. At the same time, the FRELIMO extended their struggle to the south of the country. On June 24, 1974 FRELIMO rebels interrupted the strategically important railway line from Beira to Tete at 28 points, on July 17 they captured the strategically important city of Morrumbala in the Zambezia region .
On September 8, 1974, an armistice was signed and in it the country's formal independence from Portugal was signed on June 25, 1975.
During the war in Mozambique, special units of the Portuguese army were also deployed:
- The special groups ( Grupos Especiais ) were units that consisted of volunteer black soldiers and had command training and were also deployed in Angola.
- Special parachute groups ( Grupos Especiais Pára-Quedistas ): African volunteers who have received parachute training.
- Special reconnaissance groups ( Grupos Especiais de Pisteiros de Combate ) were specially trained for reconnaissance.
- The arrows ( flechas ) were a similar unit to the one in Angola.
Role of the Organization for African Unity
The Organization for African Unity (OAU) supported the international recognition of the Revolutionary Government of Angola (GRAE) in exile, consisting of members of the Frente Nacional da Libertação de Angola (FNLA). In 1964, the OAU recognized the PAIGC as the legitimate representative of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. In 1965 the OAU recognized FRELIMO as the official representative of Mozambique. From 1967 the OAU also supported the MPLA , with its leader, Agostinho Neto . In November 1972 both organizations were officially recognized by the OAU.
Inner Portuguese resistance
The government presented the fact that the colonies were an integral part of Portugal as a general consensus. The Communists were the first party to publicly contradict government views and to emphasize the colonies' right to self-determination. During the 5th Congress of the illegal Partido Comunista Português (PCP) they demanded the total independence of the colonies from Portugal.
Other opposition members outside the PCP also had anti-colonial positions. These included some candidates for the presidential elections, such as Norton de Matos (1949), Quintão Meireles (1951) and Humberto Delgado (1958).
After Salazar's death in 1968, there was no decisive change in Portugal's colonial policy. For many young Portuguese, the protracted war led to political radicalization. The universities played a key role in this. Several newspapers and magazines were founded, such as Cadernos Circunstância , Cadernos Necessários , Tempo e Modo and Polémica .
It was in this climate that the Acção Revolucionária Armada (ARA) (Armed Revolutionary Action) came into being in the late 1960s . The organization was the armed arm of the Portuguese Communist Party. The ARA began its operations in October 1970 and continued until August 1972. On March 8, 1971, the ARA attacked the Tanco military airfield and destroyed several helicopters. In October of the same year she reached the NATO - Headquarters in Oeiras on.
The Revolutionary Brigades ( Brigadas Revolucionárias , BR), a left-wing extremist organization that carried out many sabotage and bomb attacks on military targets, also emerged. The BR began its armed actions on November 7, 1971 with a sabotage attack on the Pinhal de Armeiro NATO base . The last action took place on April 9, 1974, when the BR attacked a troop transport in Lisbon that was supposed to bring troops. The BR was even active in the colonies. On February 22, 1974, she detonated a bomb at Bissau Army Headquarters .
Economic consequences of the war
Since the beginning of the war in 1961, government spending on warfare increased sharply. Under Marcelo Caetano these expenses increased even further.
The extent to which the war in the colonies burdened Portugal's national budget is controversial. On the one hand, there are the enormous war costs compared to the country's economic output. On the other hand, the colonies' mineral resources were a great source of income. Angola, for example, was one of the largest oil producers in Africa at the time . The income from the sale of oil alone covered the entire cost of the war. There were also other natural resources such as diamonds . The colonies' mineral resources also played a key role in the civil wars that broke out in the former colonies after their independence.
Portugal's economic growth during the war years was around six percent. After the Carnation Revolution, the annual growth was 2.3 percent.
The Carnation Revolution had a negative impact on many areas of the Portuguese economy, such as shipbuilding, the chemical industry, finance, agriculture, etc. The sudden loss of the colonies caused the country greater economic damage than the war itself. The economic situation also deteriorated for the former colonies after their independence, as Portugal lost its importance as a sales market.
1974
In the early 1970s, Portugal reached the limits of its military capabilities. At this point, however, the war had already been won and the military threat from the rebels was very small. Due to the improved economic and security situation in the colonies, immigration from the mother country to Angola and Mozambique even increased again.
In the motherland the mood was at its lowest. The loss of people and the financial expenditures of the state for the war were enormous. Many officers were driven by ideals but were ignorant of the military and economic situation in the colonies.
On April 25, 1974, the Carnation Revolution broke out in Portugal . The provinces of Mozambique and Angola gained independence on June 25 and November 11, 1975, respectively.
consequences
When the war ended in April 1974 and the colonies became independent, thousands of Portuguese civilians, military officials, whites and blacks fled the colonies. The flow of refugees was intensified by the outbreak of civil wars in Angola and Mozambique .
Portugal had to take in hundreds of thousands of people, the so-called " retornados ", from the colonies, who could only be integrated over the course of several years. In both countries, however, remained a minority of Portuguese who took Angolan and Mozambican citizenship. Since the 1990s, due to the economic boom in Angola, a growing number of Portuguese have emigrated to this country in search of work; Estimates range from 130,000 to 200,000.
With the withdrawal of the Portuguese, the two last “white” governed states in Africa, Rhodesia and South Africa, were confronted with new neighboring governments that were politically controversial towards them.
In 1994 the Monumento aos Combatentes do Ultramar was inaugurated in Lisbon .
Losses on the Portuguese side
- Losses of the Portuguese army in Angola, Guinea and Mozambique from 1961 to 1974: 8,290 dead
- Of these, 4027 were killed in fighting
- Died in accidents involving the use of weapons: 785
- Perished in traffic accidents: 1480
- Perished for other reasons: 1998
- Injured and wounded in the Portuguese armed forces (apparently including the navy and air forces): 15507
- Of these injured during training: 2,743
- Mental Illnesses ( Doenças mentais ): 1183
According to estimates by the Associação dos Deficientes das Forças Armadas (ADFA), founded in 1974, the number of members of the armed forces evacuated from the combat area due to mental illness in the broadest sense was around 25,000. The ADFA therefore doubts the official statistics on the number of mentally ill people.
- The losses of the Portuguese naval infantry ( fuzileiros navais and fuzileiros especiais ) totaled 155 men, including:
- Guinea: 86, 55 of them in combat operations
- Angola: 44, including 13 in combat operations
- Mozambique: 23, including 13 in combat operations
- Cape Verde: 2, including 0 in combat operations
Fiction
- Lídia Jorge : The Coast of Whispers , Frankfurt a. M. 1993
- Pepetela : Mayombe , Berlin 1983.
- Manuel Alegre : Jornada de África , 1989.
- António Lobo Antunes : Life, described on paper. Letters from the war , Munich 2007.
- Antonio Lobo Antunes: Elephant Memory. Munich 2004.
- Antonio Lobo Antunes: The Judas Kiss . Munich 2006.
- João Vieira: Os Anos da Guerra, 1961–1975. Os Portugueses in África. Crónica, Ficção e História.
- (José) Luandino Vieira : A Vida Verdadeira de Domingos Xavier ( The true life of Domingos Xavier , Frankfurt a. M. 1981).
- José Luandino Vieira: Nós, os do Maculusu.
- Manuel dos Santos Lima: As Lágrimas eo Vento.
- Arlindo Barbeitos: Angola, Angolé, Angolema.
- Luís Bernardo Honwana: Nós Matámos o Cão-Tinhoso.
- José Manuel Mendes: Ombro, Arma!
- Mario de Carvalho: Era Uma Vez Um Alferes (1984).
- Mario de Carvalho: Os Alferes (1989).
- Carlos Coutinho: Uma Noite na Guerra (1978).
- Christóvão de Aguiar: Ciclone de Setembro.
- Reis Ventura: Sangue no Capim. Cenas there was in Angola. 7th edition. Braga 1972.
- António S. Viana: Primeira Coluna de Napainor.
- João de Melo: Autópsia de Um Mar de Ruínas.
- Fernando Dacosta: To Jeep de Segunda Mão.
- Liberto Cruz: Jornal de Campanha.
- Álvaro Guerra: O Capitao Nemo e Eu. 1973.
- José Martins Garcia: Lugar de Massacre.
- Rui de Azevedo Teixeira: A Guerra Colonial eo Romance Português. Lisbon 1998.
- Isabel Moutinho: The colonial wars in contemporary Portuguese fiction. Woodbridge et al. a. 2008.
swell
- Estado-Maior do Exército, Comissão para o Estudo das Campanhas de África (1961–1974) (Ed.): Resenha histórico-militar das campanhas de África (1961–1974). Vols. 1-8, Lisbon 1988-2008.
- Aniceto Afonso, Carlos de Matos Gomes: Guerra Colonial. Lisbon 2000.
- Kaúlza De Arriaga: Published works by General Kaúlza de Arriaga
- Ian Becket: A Guerra no Mundo - Guerras e Guerrilhas desde 1945. Verbo, Lisbon 1983.
- Borges Coelho, João Paulo: Troops in the Portuguese Colonial Army, 1961–1974: Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. In: Portuguese Studies Review. 2002.
- José Brandão: Cronologia da guerra colonial. Angola, Guiné, Mozambique, 1961-1974. Lisbon 2008.
- John P. Cann: Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974. Hailer Publishing, 2005.
- Tom Cooper: Central, Eastern and South African Database, Mozambique 1962-1992. ACIG, 2003
- Brendan F. Jundanian: The Mozambique Liberation Front. Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva 1970.
- Kenneth W. Grundy: Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview. Grossman Publishers, New York 1971, ISBN 0-670-35649-2 .
- FX Maier: Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique. American Affairs Association, New York 1974.
- AH de Oliveira Marques : História de Portugal. Vol. III, 6th edition. Palas Editora, Lisbon 1981.
- Moita Marques: As duas faces da guerra colonial. Lisbon 2007.
- Dalila Cabrita Mateus: A PIDE / DGS na guerra colonial (1961–1974). Lisbon 2004.
- Dalila Cabrita Mateus & Álvaro Mateus, Angola 61: Guerra Colonial, Causas e Consequências. O 4 de Fevereiro eo 15 de Março , Alfragida: Texto Editores, 2011.
- José Mattoso: História Contemporânea de Portugal. Lisbon, Amigos do Livro, 1985 volumes Estado Novo and "25 de Abril",
- José Mattoso: História de Portugal. Ediclube, Lisbon 1993.
- R. Maxwell: The Making of Portuguese Democracy. 1995.
- Isabel Moutinho: The colonial wars in contemporary Portuguese fiction , Woodbridge u. a. (Tamesis) 2008. ISBN 978-1-85566-158-5
- Walter C. Opello Jr .: A Journal of Opinion. Vol. 4, No. 2, 1974,
- Thomas Pakenham: The Scramble for Africa. Abacus, 1991, ISBN 0-349-10449-2 .
- René Pélissier: As Campanhas Coloniais de Portugal 1841-1941. Lisbon 2006.
- René Pélissier: Le naufrage des caravelles. Études sur la fin de l'Empire portugais (1961–1975). Orgeval 1979.
- António Reis: Portugal Contemporâneo. Alfa, Lisbon 1989.
- Fernando Rosas, JM Brandão Brito: Dicionário de História do Estado Novo. Bertrand Editora, Venda Nova 1996.
- Al J. Venter: Portugal's guerrilla wars in Africa. Lisbon's three wars in Angola, Mozambique and Portugese Guinea, 1961–74 , Solihull (Helion) 2013. ISBN 978-1-909384-57-6
- John Frederick Walker: A Certain Curve of Horn: The Hundred-Year Quest for the Giant Sable Antelope of Angola. 2004.
- William C. Westfall, Jr .: Mozambique-Insurgency Against Portugal, 1963–1975.
- Douglas L. Wheeler: A Document for the History of African Nationalism. 1970.
- Various authors: Guerra Colonial. edição do Diário de Notícias.
- Jornal do Exército. Estado-Maior do Exército, Lisbon.
Movies
- Os Demonios de Alcacer-Quibir (Portugal 1977, directed by José Fonseca e Costa ).
- La Vitta e Bella ( Life is wonderful , Portugal / Italy / USSR 1979, director: Grigori Naumowitsch Tschuchrai ).
- Sorte que tal Morte (Portugal 1981, directed by João Matos Silva ).
- Acto dos Feitos da Guine (German title: Report on the events in Guinea, Portugal 1980, directed by Fernando Matos Silva ).
- Gestos & Fragmentos - Ensaio sobre os Militares eo Poder (Portugal 1982, directed by Alberto Seixas Santos ).
- Um Adeus Português (German title: A Portuguese farewell, Portugal 1985, director: João Botelho ).
- Era Uma Vez Um Alferes (Portugal 1987, directed by Luís Filipe Rocha ).
- Matar Saudades (Portugal 1987, directed by Fernando Lopes )
- A Idade Maior ( At the end of a childhood , Portugal 1991, directed by Teresa Villaverde ).
- "Non", ou A Vã Glória de Mandar ( Non or The Ephemeral Glory of Dominion , Portugal / France / Spain 1990, directed by Manoel de Oliveira ).
- Ao Sul (Portugal 1993, directed by Fernando Matos Silva).
- A Tempestade da Terra (Portugal 1998, directed by Fernando d´Almeida e Silva ).
- Capitães de Abril (literally: Captains of April. German version: Carnations for freedom , Portugal 2000, director: Maria de Medeiros , broadcast on ARTE April 21, 2003, 8.45pm-10.45pm).
- Natal 71 (doc., Portugal 2000, director: Margarida Cardoso )
- O Gotejar da Luz (Portugal / Mozambique 2002, director: Fernando Vendrell ).
- Preto e Branco (Portugal 2003, directed by José Carlos de Oliveira ).
- Once upon a time in Africa ( A Costa dos Murmúrios , Portugal 2004, directed by Margarida Cardoso)
- Assalto ao Santa Maria ( Assault on Santa Maria , Portugal 2010, directed by Francisco Manso ).
- A Guerra (TV documentary series and DVD editions, Portugal 2007–2010, director: Joaquim Furtado )
- Quem Vai à Guerra (Portugal 2011, directed by Marta Pessoa ).
- Guerra ou Paz (Doc., Portugal 2012, director: Rui Simões )
Web links
- Rodrigues, Luís Nuno: "Orgulhosamente Sós"? Portugal e os Estados Unidos no início da década de 1960
- Lusotropicalismo: Colorblind Colonialism? Lusotropicalismo and Portugal's 20th. Century Empire in Africa.
See also
- History of Angola
- History of Mozambique
- History of Zimbabwe
- History of Guinea-Bissau
- Carnation Revolution
- Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado
- Portuguese colonial history
Individual evidence
- ↑ In 1972 the official name for Angola and Mozambique became "Estado", which was modeled on the Brazilian name for the federal states there and was intended to express the fact that a federal form of government had been adopted.
- ↑ Vietnam in Africa In: Der Spiegel. May 6, 1968
- ^ John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution , Vol. I, The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950–1962) , Cambridge / Maa. & London, MIT Press, 1969
- ↑ However, many Portuguese settlers from Angola and Mozambique went to South Africa, and from Angola also to Brazil
- ↑ Information from: Aniceto Afonso, Carlos de Matos Gomes: Guerra Colonial. Lisbon 2000, p. 528.
- ↑ Information from: Humberto Sertório Fonseca Rodrigues: Feridas de guerra. In: Aniceto Afonso, Carlos de Matos Gomes: Guerra Colonial. Lisbon 2000, pp. 566–569, here p. 568.
- ↑ Information according to: "Gente mais ousada". Fuzileiros. In: Aniceto Afonso, Carlos de Matos Gomes: Guerra Colonial. Lisbon 2000, pp. 220–227, here p. 227.