Independence referendum in East Timor in 1999

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Symbols on the ballot for the autonomy within Indonesia and for the complete independence of East Timor with the flag of the CNRT Symbols on the ballot for the autonomy within Indonesia and for the complete independence of East Timor with the flag of the CNRT
Symbols on the ballot for the autonomy within Indonesia
and for the complete independence of East Timor with the flag of the CNRT

When independence referendum in East Timor on the thirtieth August 1999 the population should East Timor between the full independence of the country and the remaining with Indonesia as a Special Autonomous Region of East Timor SARET choose. Despite violence and massive attempts at intimidation on the part of Indonesian forces, the clear majority of voters decided in favor of independence. The result was followed by a final punitive action by the Indonesian military (TNI) and pro-Indonesian militias ( Wanra ), which damaged the country. The late dispatch of international troops to protect the population caused widespread criticism. East Timor came under the administration of the United Nations and was granted independence on May 20, 2002, according to the result of the referendum.

August 30 is a national holiday in commemoration of the East Timor referendum.

prehistory

Demonstration for East Timor in Perth, Australia

Indonesia had occupied the former Portuguese colony in Operation Seroja , citing the Balibo Declaration , nine days after its declaration of independence on November 28, 1975 . Indonesia declared East Timor annexed in 1976 , which was generally not recognized internationally. This was followed by a guerrilla war between the Indonesian army and the FRETILIN independence movement and their armed arm, the Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor , FALINTIL for short). At least 183,000 people died as a result of the occupation. The umbrella organization of the Timorese movement was the Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense CNRT (National Council of the Timorese Resistance) . It was formed from various groups and parties in Portugal in 1998 .

Resignation of Indonesia's President Suharto (1998)

After the invasion of East Timor by Indonesia, the conflict received little attention in international politics and the media. It played only a minor role in the United States and major European countries, and probably even less in Japan , one of the major development aid donors to Indonesia. The People's Republic of China probably saw no need for action at all in this conflict since attempts to supply the East Timorese resistance with weapons had failed. In 1978, the People's Republic's commitment to East Timor came to an almost complete end, apart from unofficial contacts through individuals. However, East Timorese independence enjoyed a lot of support in the small countries of Ireland and New Zealand . After all, resolutions of the UN Security Council repeatedly pointed to the illegal occupation of East Timor by Indonesia. In 1982 the General Assembly of the United Nations called on the UN Secretary-General to “initiate consultations with all directly involved states in order to find ways of finding a comprehensive solution to the problem,” but Indonesia blocked any approach.

With the visit of the Pope in 1989 , the Santa Cruz massacre filmed by Max Stahl in 1991 and the Nobel Peace Prize for the East Timorese José Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the East Timor conflict was brought back to the world's attention. Public participation increased sharply in Portugal and Australia . The politicians of these countries became aware that the issue united the most diverse groups of voters: left and right, young students and old soldiers. In Australia there were solidarity rallies with a number of participants that had not happened since the Vietnam War . Accordingly, the governments of these countries took up East Timor again as an issue. Portugal managed to win some allies, first in the European Union and later in other parts of the world, who urged Indonesia to find a solution to the conflict.

In Indonesia, the regime under President Suharto was shaken by the 1997 economic crisis. On May 21, 1998, Suharto had to resign. As early as June 6th, the new President Habibie's Political and Security Committee proposed an autonomy solution for East Timor within Indonesia. Habibie was bothered by the fact that foreign politicians repeatedly deviated from topics that were important to him on the occasion of visits and came up with East Timor. In the Indonesian leadership, thanks to the diplomatic front and the international solidarity movement for East Timor, a certain "East Timor fatigue" spread, comparable to the annoyance of the Americans at the end of the Vietnam War. Habibie had also long been offended by the costs that the occupation of East Timor and its development caused. The President later stated that a letter dated December 19, 1998 from Australia's Prime Minister John Howard calling for a solution to the East Timor conflict was the final trigger for the referendum. The letter represented a complete U-turn in the Australian position, as the country had so far been the only one in the world to de facto recognize the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia by establishing the sea border between Australia and occupied East Timor in favor of Australia with the occupying power in the Timor Gap Treaty . The Australian government has now pushed for the East Timorese people's right to self-determination. Howard followed the position of the opposition Australian Labor Party and the opinion of 90 percent of Australians who viewed their country's previous behavior as a mistake. Habibie was annoyed and found Howard's suggestion to immediately deploy peacekeepers in East Timor an insult. In addition, Howard compared the actions of Indonesia with the colonial policy of France in New Caledonia , which Habibie rejected.

Indonesian decision for referendum

On January 27, 1999, Habibie finally declared, due to strong international pressure, that his government could now consider an independence of East Timor if the East Timorese rejected the autonomy solution. Habibie went even further than Howard had requested in his letter to suggest an immediate decision. Like the CNRT, the Australian had proposed that East Timor should be granted autonomy and that a referendum should be held after a ten-year probationary period. But Habibie was not prepared to continue investing politically and financially in the province under the sword of Damocles of possible independence for East Timor after ten years.

Indonesia initially preferred a UN mission as a solution, which would pick up the mood in the country and then make a decision, possibly in combination with the election of a representative council to vote on the question. The United Nations, however, pushed for a direct referendum, also after its experience in West Papua with the 1969 Act of Free Choice , in which 1,000 electors had unanimously voted for membership in Indonesia. Financial influence and the threat of torture had led to this result. On March 11, 1999, the United Nations, Portugal and Indonesia agreed at ministerial level to hold a referendum on the future of East Timor. On April 21st, the parties to the conflict agreed to end the violence. The United Nations Mission in East Timor UNAMET organized the referendum . At that time there were about 85,000 immigrants from Indonesia living in East Timor.

The Indonesian cabinet backed Habibie's decision. Most members of the government expected that “measures” would be able to convince a clear majority of East Timorese of the autonomy solution or that there would only be such a narrow majority in favor of the independence solution that the result could be questioned. Faith was strengthened by the result of the national election in July 1999, in which the candidates of the ruling Golkar party in East Timor received strong support. But this was thanks to a campaign by the CNRT to dispel Jakarta's fears that a referendum against Indonesia could be canceled. Even Francisco Lopes da Cruz , the former president of the União Democrática Timorense (UDT) and former Indonesian governor of East Timor, reported to Jakarta that a referendum would be won. In the absence of experience with democratic votes under international observation, the Indonesian government also thought that it could correct the result if necessary, as in West Papua. Generals said in interviews that they believed they could intimidate the number of registered voters below 60 percent, a low turnout that the Indonesian parliament, the People's Consultative Assembly , would never accept. The Minister of Economic Affairs, however, saw advantages if the expenditure for East Timor were to be eliminated. Defense minister and military chief General Wiranto presumably saw a mistake in Habibie's decision, but remained silent in order to be able to accuse Habibie of a fatal error in future battles for power. Only Foreign Minister Ali Alatas vigorously objected to a referendum, even if, thanks to the CNRT ruse, he believed in a possible victory for the autonomy solution.

Manuel Carrascalão at the CNRT campaign in Dili

Pro-Indonesian militias, trained and equipped by the Indonesian army and police, reacted to the referendum announcement with considerable intimidation and threats to the population. The militias regularly threatened that a sea of ​​fire would descend on East Timor if the inhabitants opted for independence. These threats were not just empty words. On April 6, 1999, Wanras and the Indonesian military committed the church massacre in Liquiçá , in which between 61 and over 200 people died. On April 17, there was a massacre in the house of the politician Manuel Carrascalão , in which at least 14 people were killed. There were also numerous other murders with a smaller number of victims, which underscored the military's strategy of intimidating the referendum. Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson expressed great concern about the tense situation.

The reports of the Australian secret service about the church massacre in Liquiçá worried Prime Minister Howard so much that he asked President Habibie for a one-on-one interview. On April 27, in Bali , Howard again called for a promise to send an international peacekeeping force to East Timor. Habibie refused again and threatened with the immediate abandonment of East Timor and the cancellation of the referendum if a peacekeeping force was dispatched, which would lead to a civil war between integrationists and separatists. Experts today doubt the likelihood of a civil war, since the militias could only operate with the help of the Indonesian military and after its withdrawal quickly ceased their activities. The FALINTIL militias were also clearly inferior. Eurico Guterres , one of the most prominent militia leaders, once complained that even his people would take the Indonesians' money, but would still vote for independence. Despite Wiranto's objection, Habibie finally agreed to the dispatch of 300 unarmed UN police officers.

The content of the referendum

The ballot paper was marked with symbols for the illiterate

According to the agreement between Portugal and Indonesia of May 5, 1999, which was signed in the presence of Kofi Annan , the Secretary General of the United Nations, the people of East Timor should decide in the referendum for or against a special autonomy solution within Indonesia. For illiterate people , the alternatives were shown on the ballot with the flags of Indonesia (“pro-autonomy”) and the CNRT (“contra”). In case of adoption of the proposed autonomy, Indonesia should initialize the new constitution for the Special Autonomous Region of East Timor SARET according to the proposed text. Portugal committed itself to ensuring that East Timor would be removed from the list of non-self-governing territories of the UN General Assembly and from the agenda of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly.

In the event of the rejection of the autonomy solution, Indonesia should initiate the separation from East Timor. The situation before the annexation of July 17, 1976 should be restored, sovereignty over the country should be transferred to the United Nations. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was then to lead East Timor into independence. Regardless of the decision in the referendum, the United Nations should show an adequate presence in East Timor in the transition phase to the final status.

The SARET government should be given extensive powers, but East Timor should be clearly defined as part of Indonesian territory. The government of the autonomous region should be consulted before central government decisions affecting East Timor. Indonesia should be responsible for external defense, which is why Indonesia's armed forces should continue to be present in East Timor.

The monetary and customs union was to remain in place, and Indonesia pledged to support SARET in its economic development. Foreign aid should be channeled through the central government. The decision on national taxes should also remain in the hands of the central government, while local taxes in SARET should have been decided within the legal requirements. Natural resources of East Timor should remain under the control of SARET unless they are classified as strategic or vital under national law. For the economic use of resources, cooperation between national and local governments should be possible.

The SARET government should be given responsibility for the areas not mentioned. Statutory Indonesian workers' rights should not, however, be restricted and offices and posts in government and administration should not be reserved for East Timorese. The jurisdiction of the SARET was limited to crimes committed in East Timor, with the exception of treason, terrorism, drugs and international crime.

Preparations

CNRT campaign rally on August 25, 1999 in Dili

On May 5th, Indonesia and Portugal signed an agreement to hold the referendum. The contractual partners initially aimed for August 8th as the date for the vote. The voting should be direct, secret and general. Indonesia should be responsible for security in East Timor during the referendum. According to the agreement, the atmosphere during the referendum should be “free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side”. Both Indonesia and Portugal were banned from running advertising campaigns for a result. The UNAMET was allowed to carry out an information campaign for the voters. The information was disseminated through television and radio broadcasts as well as with printed material.

At the end of May, the establishment of UNAMET began in East Timor. On June 4, she opened the UN base in Dili, the capital of East Timor . The staff consisted of eight regional UN officials, 28 other permanent UN employees, around 500 UN volunteers, 290 police officers, nine press officers, 271 administrators and 16 security officers from over 70 countries. The approximately 50 military liaison officers did not follow until later in June. About 4,000 East Timorese played an important role as local helpers for election day as translators, in administration and logistics as well as election workers. The head of UNAMET was the UN special envoy for East Timor Ian Martin . In the same month, the UN personnel were distributed to all 13 districts of East Timor. The violence, which began in April, eased somewhat after the arrival of international observers and media, but the threat remained. Even before UNAMET arrived, up to 40,000 people had been forcibly evicted from their homes, especially in the western districts. The number continued to increase due to the activities of the militias up until the referendum. The Wanras continued to receive support from the Indonesian army and police. In addition, they were increasingly integrated into the military system and thus legitimized. Disarming the militias shortly before the vote was more ceremonial than real. Efforts to create peace between the conflicting parties also failed because they did not take the role of the TNI into account.

From June 25th to 30th, the East Timorese bishops Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and Basílio do Nascimento organized the Dare II peace and reconciliation meeting in Indonesia's capital Jakarta to bring the two conflicting parties together. FALINTIL boss Xanana Gusmão , who was still under house arrest in Salemba , a district of Jakarta, was also a participant. For the first time since 1975 he met his colleague José Ramos-Horta on this occasion. Other independence activists were also able to travel to the meeting from their exile abroad. Despite a “warm atmosphere”, the meeting's participants did not decide on a plan to reduce hostilities between the two sides. A series of attacks by militias followed shortly after the Dare II meeting.

CNRT campaign rally on August 25, 1999 in Dili

Due to the tense security situation, voter registration ran three days later than planned, from July 16 to August 5. Anyone who was at least 17 years old, was born in East Timor or had a parent who was born there was admitted to the referendum. Their spouses were also entitled to vote. Within 22 days, 451,792 voters were recorded, both in East Timor and overseas. The planned voting date of August 8th had to be postponed to August 30th. The schedule was very tight, as the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly would meet in September and only this had the legitimacy to implement the result of the referendum into Indonesian law. In preparation, Indonesia created the Task Force for the implementation of the People's Consultation in East Timor ( Indonesian Satuan Tugas Pelaksanaan Penentuan Pendapat di Timor Timur, Satgas P3TT ), which was subordinate to the Ministry for the Coordination of Political Affairs and Security. The military representative was Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim , the highest officer in East Timor during the referendum. The task force served as a liaison with UNAMET. Meetings with representatives of the two organizations took place almost daily. The independent electoral commission created on the basis of the May 5 agreement arrived in Dili shortly after the start of voter registration. It consisted of three recognized international experts who had been appointed by the UN Secretary General. The chairman was Johann Kriegler , member of the South African Electoral Commission . The assessors were Pat Bradley , senior electoral officer for Northern Ireland and Bong-Suk Son , commissioner of the National Electoral Commission of South Korea .

The referendum met with great interest in the world. Around 600 journalists have been accredited by UNAMET. The United States created a consular offshoot of the Jakarta embassy in Dili and a delegation from the US Congress visited East Timor in August. Australia opened a very well staffed consulate in Dili. Portugal and Indonesia both sent observation teams with a total of 50 members who traveled through East Timor by election day. UNAMET accredited a further 2,000 observers who committed themselves to a code of conduct that encouraged them to behave neutrally. Almost 500 observers traveled with government delegations from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ireland, New Zealand and Spain as well as the European Union. A large number of representatives from international non-governmental organizations in cooperation with church aid agencies were also present, including ten election observers from the German human rights organization Watch Indonesia !; Representatives also came from Indonesia and East Timor itself. UNAMET accredited around 1,700 observers from non-governmental organizations from the two countries concerned. Many came from student organizations or were political activists, but also had to sign the neutrality obligation. The Carter Center and the International Federation for East Timor (IFET) had observation teams at the district level. Since the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia in 1975 there had never been such intensive international monitoring. In addition to the neutral observers, UNAMET also allowed so-called “party agents”, accredited observers of the CNRT and the umbrella organization of the militias, the United Front for East Timor (UNIF). They were allowed to be present at the vote and the vote count.

Election campaign

independence movement

CNRT flag ceremony at the campaign event

The official election campaign time was set between August 14th and 26th. Together with UNAMET, timetables were drawn up nationwide in order to coordinate the events of the two sides and thus avoid clashes.

On July 20, Kofi Annan reported to the UN Security Council that militias were continuing to evict East Timorese from their homes. Therefore, security and freedom are not guaranteed. It is clearly trying to influence the result of the referendum. Activities of the CNRT were restricted and access to independent media was restricted for the East Timorese, while the pro-autonomy campaign had already started before the agreed time corridor. Officials would use their offices and budgets to promote the autonomy solution. In addition, administrative employees would be put under pressure in favor of the autonomy solution.

The leadership of the CNRT opted for a small-scale campaign. On the one hand, this happened because of the threat posed by the militias, and on the other, because it was certain that 24 years of occupation would have strengthened East Timorese nationalism anyway. The focus was therefore more on the goal of reconciliation within East Timor in order to create a stable and peaceful environment for the vote. In March 1999, Xanana Gusmão called on East Timorese students to become the driving force behind the campaign, as it seemed too dangerous for the CNRT itself. In April militias destroyed the CNRT office in Dili and the local CNRT leadership had to go into hiding. About 800 East Timorese students returned to East Timor from Indonesian universities to support the pro-independence campaign. Many united in the Presidium Juventude Lorico Asuwain Timor Lorosa'e . The members of the East Timor Students' Solidarity Council (ETSSC), who wanted to distance themselves from the CNRT and its representatives of the generation of politicians from 1975, were an exception . Documents that became known later show that CNRT, ETSSC and the FRETILIN student organization OJETIL were listed as "enemy forces" by the Indonesian military in the operational plan for the referendum.

The students returned to their home villages or went to Dili. They focused on information campaigns and promoting the symbols of the CNRT to be used as a symbol of independence in the referendum. The activists distributed photocopies as local printing companies were reluctant to take the risk of printing material for the pro-independence activists. With Matebian Lian ( German  The Voice of Matebian ), the independence advocates also established a radio program, which, however, had to work underground. On May 20, members of the Aitarak militia killed two ETSSC students in Hera . Soldiers from the Indonesian army are said to have been involved in the murder. In Cova Lima brought Laksaur -Milizionäre to two other students. The CNRT explicitly ordered that the students were not allowed to react to the violence of the militias. One wanted to avoid any escalation so that the Indonesian army could not claim that there was a civil war in East Timor, which the army wanted to pacify.

The CNRT delegation to the Dare II meeting met with Gusmão from July 1st to 4th in the house where he was under house arrest. A campaign team was set up, the Commission for Planning and Coordination of the Campaign ( Portuguese Comissão de Planeamento e Coordenacão de Campanha CPCC ). The CNRT stuck to the small-scale campaign, which was limited to a door-to-door election campaign and the publication of the CNRT symbols, as well as the goal of achieving national unity and stability. The flag of the CNRT (a derivative of the flag of the FALINTIL guerrillas) had only recently been publicly set for the first time in East Timor and was not yet known to all East Timorese. The CPCC began publishing a leaflet newspaper. Every other day 1,300 copies of the Vox Populi were distributed. There was also a radio program under the same name.

In the districts of Bobonaro , Ermera and Liquiçá , the CNRT has not been able to open offices due to the threats. Others were quickly targeted by violence and forced to close, such as Dili on August 17th, Manatuto on August 19th and Ainaro . Supporters of independence were murdered in the period from August 14 to 16, which is why the CNRT finally ceased its election campaign activities in the districts on August 19. On August 25, he held his only major campaign event in Dili, while the pro-autonomy movement had held several major campaign events. The CNRT event with thousands of participants was peaceful.

Pro-autonomy movement

Election event of the pro-Indonesian Mahidi militia in 1999

The political arm for the pro-autonomy movement was formed by a number of organizations founded in early 1999. On January 27, 1999 the Forum for Unity, Democracy and Justice ( Indonesian Forum Persatuan, Demokrasi dan Keadlian FPDK) was launched. Domingos Maria das Dores Soares , the government president (Bupati) of the Dili district, took over the leadership . In April, the East Timor Popular Front ( Indonesian Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur BRTT) was founded with Francisco Lopes da Cruz as its head. The United Front for East Timor (UNIF), which was set up on June 23 as an umbrella organization, brought together the FPDK, BRTT and other pro-Indonesian groups. The new organization was under the joint leadership of Soares, Lopez da Cruz and Armindo Soares Mariano , the chairman of the provincial parliament, the Council of Representatives of the People (DPRD). João da Costa Tavares commanded the UNIF militias, which united old militias and the newly founded ones from 1999 in the "armed forces of the integration struggle" ( Indonesian Pasukan Pro-Integrasi PPI). The organizations were closely linked to the civil administration and were financed by it. They routinely attended military, police and government (muspida) meetings, even though they had no official status. In a campaign, the FPDK denigrated the UNAMET, which was further disseminated in the Indonesian public and through diplomatic channels.

Contrary to the agreement of May 5, the Indonesian civil administration of East Timor led a campaign for the autonomy solution, in which it worked with coercion and incentives. East Timorese were forced by activists and militias to publicly profess Indonesia. This happened both at demonstrations and by setting the flag of Indonesia in front of houses of East Timorese. The target of this coercion were often civil employees of the administration. In a letter to officials (Kepala Instansi Vertical dan Otonomi) dated May 28, 1999, the governor ordered that officials engaged in activities against the Indonesian government should be dismissed. In addition, the civil administration financed the militias and pro-autonomy rallies at which armed militiamen forced residents to be present. In May, the Indonesian governor of East Timor, José Abílio Osório Soares , requested budget proposals for the “civil defense units ” ( Pam Swakarsa in Indonesian ) and for “expenditure in connection with the autonomy plan ” from the district presidents . Each district received part of the state social security fund from the governor, which probably consisted in part of funds provided by the World Bank to promote the pro-autonomy solution.

The security situation before the vote

Under the May 5 agreement, the United Nations dispatched 300 unarmed international police officers to assist the UN election teams. An additional 50 military liaison officers followed later, as it was assumed that they could communicate better with the TNI. East Timor's representative José Ramos-Horta stayed away from the signing of the agreement in protest. He warned of the dangers in a letter to Kofi Annan. Annan was aware of the problem: amid increasing complaints, he warned that he would cancel the vote if the security situation was not acceptable. Indonesia did not respond.

Responsibility for public safety during the referendum was given to the Indonesian police in the agreement. Institutionally, the police had only just been separated from the military and remained under General Wiranto. According to the agreement, the Indonesian army should behave “absolutely neutral”. The UNAMET liaison officers were unable to obtain precise information about the strength and distribution of the Indonesian armed forces. It is estimated that around 15,000 men were represented all over East Timor down to the village level. This made it difficult for the police to act as independent law enforcement officers. Even strengthening the police force for the referendum to 8,700 men did not improve the efficiency of the police. Many of the additional police officers were members of the Brimob , the special unit for unrest. This unit was notorious in East Timor for its violence and its role in numerous serious human rights violations in the 1990s. Ultimately, the police proved unable or unwilling to contain the violence during the referendum. As a rule, she did not arrive in time for attacks and was unable to arrest the attackers. In the case of the murder of the East Timorese Bernadino Agusto Guterres on August 26, it was even members of the Brimob who shot the man in Becora (Dili) while militias were rioting nearby.

Members of the pro-Indonesian Laksaur militia

Because of the large number of international observers in the country, major attacks by the Indonesian army and militias were initially less frequent. The militias remained armed and still very present in the villages. In the May 5 agreement, they were trivialized as civil protection groups. The Aitarak militia in the Dili district alone had 1,521 registered members. The regular troops were not reduced either. After the April massacres, the question of barracking was left to the Commission for Peace and Stability (KPS) under General Wiranto on April 21. It consisted of two representatives from CNRT and FALINTIL, two supporters of integration and members of the Indonesian military, police and local administration. Neither civil society nor the United Nations were involved in the work of the commission. The KPS proved to be ineffective, although its members had signed an agreement on June 18 in which both sides declared that all acts of violence would be abandoned and all weapons would be collected. Those responsible for the April massacre were also not held responsible. The agreement of May 5 then provided for barracking neither for the Indonesian forces nor for the East Timorese guerrillas of the FALINTIL.

In June 1999, Colonel Tono Suratman , the military commander in chief of the Indonesian Army in East Timor, warned in an interview on Australian television:

“I want to give you this message: If the pro-independence side wins, it is not going to be just the government of Indonesia that has to deal with what follows. The UN and Australia are also going to have to solve the problem and well, if this does happen, then there'll be no winners. Everything is going to be destroyed. East Timor won't exist as it does now. It'll be much worse than 23 years ago. "

“I would like to make this message to you: If the pro-independence side wins, it is not only the Indonesian government that will have to deal with the consequences. The United Nations and Australia will also have to solve the problem and if that happens there will be no winners. Everything will be destroyed. East Timor will no longer exist in the form it does today. It will be much worse than it was 23 years ago. "

At the same time, Suratmann emphasized that the Indonesian security forces take their responsibility to maintain peace and order seriously, but that the time available was "too short after 23 years or more of violence within Timorese". Throughout the campaign, the Indonesian military insisted that the armed militias were just a response to the FALINTIL. The military ignored its own role in the violence. However, UNAMET was only able to register two incidents in which pro-independence advocates were responsible. On July 12, one of them killed a pro-integration supporter and a member of the Aitarak militia was killed in Becora on August 29. Xanana Gusmão called for the Indonesian troops in East Timor to be reduced and barracked, while General Wiranto called for the FALINTIL to be disarmed.

On June 29, the Dadarus Merah Putih (DMP) militia attacked the UNAMET office in Maliana , and on July 4, the Besi Merah Putih (BMP) attacked an aid convoy between Liquiçá and Dili, although police were protecting him. The climate of fear had already driven 40,000 people from their homes by June. By mid-July the number rose to 60,000. Some of them were independence activists who had been the target of attacks in their home villages, but many were ordinary people fleeing violence and intimidation. They sought refuge in the larger towns of East Timor and West Timor. Analyzes by the United Nations came to the conclusion that the deliberately triggered mass exodus should also serve “to create the impression that there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the referendum” should it turn out to be in favor of independence. According to the Australian intelligence service DIO , the Indonesian officials hoped that the People's Consultative Assembly would then reject the result. In order to protect the referendum, the UNAMET information campaign pointed to the secret voting and also indicated that the United Nations would remain on the ground after election day.

On July 7, UN Special Envoy Ian Martin flew to Jakarta to tell the government that the UN was aware of the links between the military and militias. Diplomatic pressure pushed Indonesia to improve the security situation. On July 12, the Indonesian Task Force visited East Timor with General Wiranto. The violence decreased in the days that followed. Colonel Suratman, who continued to threaten the independence movement, was replaced as Commander-in-Chief on August 13, 1999 under pressure from UNAMET. However, he was promoted to brigadier general and appointed deputy spokesman for TNI headquarters. Suratman's successor was Colonel Noer Muis .

Although there was no concession from Indonesia on the question of the number of security forces in East Timor, FALINTIL unilaterally agreed to place its fighters in camps under international surveillance. The resistance movement tried to prove that they were not the source of the violence and wanted the Indonesian military to do something in return. On August 12, all 670 FALINTIL fighters had gathered in the camps, but the army did not retreat to the barracks, nor were the militias disarmed. Although militiamen handed over some weapons to UNAMET in ceremonies in four districts between August 16 and 19, the UNAMET found that the quantity represented only part of the total weapons used by the militias.

Transport of the voting papers by helicopter

On August 18, a US Congress delegation witnessed violence in Suai . Major General Makarim, who, in addition to his role in the task force, apparently also led the actions of the militias, was then recalled, as were the Indonesian commanders for Cova Lima and Bobonaro. The excesses of the military were not slowed down. On August 20, another event organized by pro-independence activists was attacked by militias in Suai, and militias even threatened UN workers in Manatuto .

On August 24, General Secretary Kofi Annan quoted a statement by the Independent Electoral Commission that the campaign period had never been "free from intimidation, violence or interference (as required by the May 5 agreement)".

While the CNRT closing event on August 25th in Dili remained peaceful, the next day, the last day of the election campaign, the last march of the advocates of autonomy led to chaos in Dili. In addition to Bernadino Agusto Guterres , who was shot by the Brimob , seven other people were killed. During the night the offices of the CNRT and the RENETIL were burned down.

Attempts at binational meetings between the military from Australia and Indonesia to address the activities of the Indonesian army in East Timor that had become known were not heard by the Australian government: this would jeopardize the good relations with the Indonesian armed forces. UN Secretary-General Annan, who was aware of the Australian intelligence reports, secretly asked Australia to prepare for the worst case scenario. Australia then put 2,000 soldiers on alert in Darwin , the closest to East Timor.

Voting

Transport of the voting papers by helicopter

On August 30, the day of the vote, long queues formed in front of the polling stations across East Timor at sunrise. At sunrise it was already 50 percent of the electorate who waited patiently. Many of the voters wore their best clothes to celebrate the day. Voting time ran from 6:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., but in most places all votes were cast by early afternoon. Those who cast their votes went home quickly. Here, too, the threatening atmosphere made itself felt, even if the situation remained mostly peaceful. In Atsabe , however, militiamen murdered two East Timorese UNAMET employees. In East Timor there were 200 polling stations available (for comparison: in the parliamentary elections in East Timor in 2007 there were 708). There were five polling stations for East Timorese in Australia and Europe . Despite the threat, the turnout was 98.6% of registered voters.

Before the count began, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said the government would accept the vote. He called them free, peaceful and fair. The spokesman for the pro-integration movement Basilio Araújo, on the other hand, listed 37 alleged violations by UNAMET employees and called the referendum unfair. The electoral commission examined for a day and a half, from September 2nd to 3rd, and came to this conclusion:

"Whatever merit there might be in individual complaints regarding alleged misconduct and / or partiality on the part of the electoral staff, none of them, singly or collectively, impaired the process as such."

"Regardless of the merits of individual complaints relating to alleged misconduct and / or bias on the part of the electoral staff, none of them, individually or collectively, impaired the actual process."

Counting

Transport of the voting papers by helicopter

UNAMET brought the ballots that had been handed in to Dili for counting. This measure was intended to protect voting secrecy. A regional evaluation of the voting behavior based on the districts was therefore not possible. On the afternoon of August 30th, UNAMET employees brought the ballots to the district headquarters under observation by the UN police. There they were stored overnight, guarded by the UN police and brought to the counting center in Dili by helicopter or car convoy the next day by UNAMET employees and UN police. The UN helicopter was shot at in Maliana, and violence and intimidation by militias against the UNAMET teams carrying the ballot boxes occurred in Gleno and Atsabe.

Observers from Portugal, Indonesia and other countries monitored both the voting in several locations and the count in Dili. The counting center was located in the Dili Museum in the Comoro district . UNAMET members from all over the country counted continuously around the clock. Most representatives of the well-known media as well as some international observers left East Timor on the day of voting. Meanwhile, the security situation worsened.

On September 1, militias arrived in Dili and attacked independence supporters near the UNAMET base in the Balide district . Foreign cameramen filmed a man who tried to flee was captured by militiamen and hacked to death. Hundreds of East Timorese sought protection in the Colégio de São José next to the UNAMET base. There was further violence in the Ermera district, which is why UNAMET evacuated its personnel to Dili. On September 2, militiamen surrounded the UNAMET office in Maliana, shooting wildly and burning houses. Two UNAMET employees were killed.

Announcement of results

Counting

After consulting the task force, those responsible at the United Nations assumed that the security situation could be better kept under control on the day if the final result of the referendum were announced. Therefore, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York (September 3rd evening) and UN Special Envoy Ian Martin announced the result at the Mahkota Hotel in Dili (September 4th morning at 9:00 a.m.) at the same time. A clear majority of 344,580 votes (78.5%) spoke out in favor of independence. They faced 94,388 votes (21.5%) who had opted for the autonomy solution. The electoral commission stated:

“The Commission was able to conclude that the popular consultation had been procedurally fair and in accordance with the New York Agreements, and consequently provided an accurate reflection of the will of the people of East Timor. There can be no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the people of this troubled land wish to separate from the Republic of Indonesia. "

“The commission came to the conclusion that the referendum was procedurally impeccable, was in line with the New York Agreements and thus accurately reflected the will of the people of East Timor. There is no doubt that the vast majority of the population of this troubled country would like to separate from the Republic of Indonesia. "

consequences

Burned earth

School burned down by pro-Indonesian militias in Wecian / Dotik (2000)

A few hours after the vote was announced, the Indonesian military launched Operation Donner ( Operasi Guntur in Indonesian ) to punish the disloyalty of the East Timorese. The aim was also to show the other independence movements in Aceh , West Papua and the southern Moluccas that independence could only be obtained at too high a price. The United Nations had been warned several times in advance by East Timorese that in the event of a majority in favor of the independence solution, there would be plans for an expulsion of the population and the destruction of East Timor. Such plans were also found in secret documents of the opponents of independence that had been leaked to the other side. Despite the warnings, the United Nations had not developed any strategies for such a case. President Habibie accused the United Nations of having announced the result too early. It was planned to announce the result at a joint press conference on September 7th.

The disappointed opponents of the independence movement, the Wanra and the Indonesian army, massacred people in many parts of the country and left scorched earth behind after their departure . Most of the 1,200 to 1,500 people killed by the Indonesian military and militia were killed after the vote. 70% of the population had to flee their homes or were deported to West Timor , houses and infrastructure were destroyed.

Aerial view of the destruction in Dili
US Secretary of Defense William Cohen talks to Australian soldiers in Darwin who are to be relocated to East Timor (Sept. 1999)

Xanana Gusmão called for restraint in his speech following the announcement of the result:

“I appeal to all the people to hide yourselves, to not go out because the evil people who kill us, within these years still want to continue to do so, seeking to wipe out the Maetze people. I know, I have heard that Indonesian military in all places are shooting indiscriminately. I appeal that all people remain calm or leave their homes. Let them burn our homes, it doesn't matter. Let them rob the things that individually we have sweated for, it doesn't matter. I appeal to all the guerrillas, to commander Ruak , to all regional commanders, all my brothers and sisters to maintain your positions, to not react to all of these things. We starve, we thirst, for 23 years and today I appeal, again to my dear brothers and sisters, to continue to endure. Endure the hunger. In order to save the people. Endure the thirst in order to save our country […] I appeal to the commanders of the militias - João Tavares, Câncio de Carvalho , Eurico Guterres, Joanico , Edmundo , and others as well. I appeal to all brothers and sisters to think properly. We can create a new Timor Lorosa'e in love and peace. "

“I appeal to all people to hide and not go out because the evil people who kill us still want to do so in order to wipe out the people of the dead . I know I heard the Indonesian military are shooting randomly everywhere. I appeal that all people keep calm or leave their homes. Let them burn our houses, it doesn't matter. Let them steal the things that each individual has acquired with their sweat, it doesn't matter. I appeal to all guerrillas , to Commander Ruak , to all regional commanders, to all my brothers and sisters, to stay on the ground and not to react to all these things. We have been hungry and thirsty for 23 years, and today I again appeal to my dear brothers and sisters to continue to endure it. Endure hunger to save people. Endure the thirst to save our country […] I appeal to the commanders of the militias - João Tavares, Câncio de Carvalho , Eurico Guterres, Joanico , Edmundo and the others. I appeal to all brothers and sisters to think carefully. We can create a new East Timor in love and peace. "

On September 6, General Wiranto declared a military emergency for East Timor. That same night, Habibie, by Presidential Decree No. 107 of 1999, declared martial law on the area. Taur Matan Ruak, number two in the FALINTIL after Gusmão, said on September 7th from the FALINTIL assembly center that he could no longer prevent his people from breaking out and protecting their families. However, this would have triggered the civil war that the Indonesian military leadership wanted to prevent international intervention. Australia now took the initiative and massively urged the US to intervene in the conflict. These in turn increased the pressure on the Indonesian government. There was a threat of withdrawing important loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to Indonesia, provided that the Indonesian armed forces did not withdraw from East Timor, and Australia and the international reaction force were guaranteed military support.

Habibie and his cabinet finally gave in to pressure on September 12 and agreed to allow peacekeepers in East Timor. Army chief Wiranto had threatened a coup in this case two days earlier. On September 15, the adopted United Nations Security Council that Resolution 1264 , with the deployment of the international intervention force was made possible.

Australian cabinet records, released for public use by the National Archives in 2019, show that Australia prepared early for a possible military operation. As early as February 9, 1999, the government cabinet decided to put a second army brigade on standby within 28 days "to ensure that the government has the opportunity to respond to the diverse demands that could be placed on our region." A request from the United Nations on June 17 for the deployment of Australian troops in Kosovo was rejected by the Australian government, citing the situation in East Timor, Bougainville and other places. The documents do not mention whether the deteriorating security situation in East Timor was an issue in the Australian Cabinet. Not even whether a military intervention might have been carried out, even if it seems plausible.

On September 20, the first Australian units of the international INTERFET troop landed at Dili Airport . 22 states took part in the task of pacifying the country, including Germany . For Australia, with up to 6,500 men, it was the largest military operation abroad since the Vietnam War. There were no direct clashes between INTERFET and the Indonesian army. She withdrew from East Timor and left a devastated country. There had been 16 or 17 armed clashes with the militias by September 2000. Wounded and dead were the result. In many of these incidents, the militia came across the border from Indonesian West Timor and fled back there.

After the violence

Xanana Gusmão in Aileu after his return to East Timor

On October 19, 1999, the People's Consultative Assembly recognized the result of the referendum and released East Timor from the Indonesian state. East Timor came under UN administration . The loss of East Timor had consequences for Indonesia's President Habibie. If he wanted to present himself as a democrat nationally and internationally, he was ultimately forced to follow the democratic decision of the East Timorese. The release of East Timor into independence was a step too far for most Indonesians. In Surabaya , 400 protesters stormed the Australian consulate. They accused the neighboring state of neocolonialism . There were also demonstrations in front of representations from other countries. Habibie failed to get the military on his line and the allegations from their ranks that Habibie was endangering the unity of the country did the rest. The rejection of Habibie in the population was so great that he decided not to run for re-election in 1999. The new Indonesian president was Abdurrahman Wahid on October 20th .

But Wiranto's ambitions for the presidency were also destroyed for the time being by the behavior of the military in East Timor. The Australian foreign intelligence service DIO came to the conclusion in September 1999 that the Indonesian military had the goal of preserving East Timor as part of Indonesia. In this way the position of Wiranto and the military in the Indonesian political system should be strengthened and Habibie should be blamed for the misery. Wiranto and the supporters of the dismissed Kopassus boss Prabowo Subianto completely misunderstood the situation. They did not understand that, under the observation of the world community, lies that had been taken at face value in the past were no longer successful: they could not lead them to believe that the violence was based on internal strife and that the Indonesian military intervened only marginally when they did Australian intelligence announced the opposite, and cameras from Western broadcasters filmed Indonesian soldiers issuing orders to militiamen to shoot civilians. Indonesian soldiers were also filmed exchanging their uniforms for East Timorese civilian clothes and covering their military haircuts with Che Guevara- style wigs .

Indonesia's President Joko Widodo visits his counterpart Taur Matan Ruak in Dili (2016)

FALINTIL boss Xanana Gusmão was allowed to return to his homeland on October 22, 1999 from captivity in Indonesia. On May 20, 2002, East Timor regained its independence. Gusmão was East Timor's President from 2002 to 2007 and Prime Minister from 2007 to 2015 .

The East Timor Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR), established in 2000 by the United Nations and the East Timorese government , later collected testimony, evidence and reports of human rights violations throughout the East Timor conflict. On October 31, 2005, the CAVR presented President Xanana Gusmão with a 2000-page report called Chega! (enough, stop) on the effects of the Indonesian occupation and human rights violations between 1974 and 1999. Copies of these were given to the East Timorese National Parliament in November and to the United Nations on January 20, 2006.

Contrary to fears, the political leaders of East Timor did not found a communist state, but built democratic structures. In Southeast Asia, East Timor is considered the most democratic country with the greatest political freedom. East Timor and Indonesia have good neighborly relations .

rating

Legal issues

Remains of an Indonesian military post in Metinaro (East Timor)

Alongside the war in Kosovo, the East Timor conflict became one of two cases from 1999, which raised two fundamental questions: When can the international community intervene to prevent human rights violations? When does a people have the right to independence from another state?

East Timor was able to achieve the greatest possible legitimation for independence. The annexation by Indonesia in 1975 was only recognized internationally by Australia. The independence referendum was conducted under the supervision of the United Nations with the consent of Indonesia. The vote was monitored internationally and the population, with an almost 100 percent turnout, opted for independence by a clear majority, although the people were aware of the consequences. Accordingly, the new status of East Timor was recognized worldwide without objection.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said in his address at the celebrations for the restoration of East Timor’s independence on May 20, 2002:

“I salute you people of East Timor for the courage and perseverance you have shown. Yours has not been an easy path to independence. You should be very proud of your achievement. That a small nation is able to inspire the world and be the focus of our attention is the highest tribute I can pay to you. "

“I take my hat off to you, the people of East Timor, for the courage and perseverance you have shown. Their road to independence has not been easy. You can be very proud of your achievement. That a small nation can inspire the world and be the focus of our attention is the highest recognition I can give you. "

The only question that arises here is how quickly the international community should have intervened, even without Indonesia's consent, in order to protect the population.

In the case of Kosovo, from February 28, 1998 to June 10, 1999, NATO carried out air strikes against Yugoslavia , of which Kosovo was generally recognized. A UN mandate did not exist here. The allegations of human rights violations by Yugoslav security forces against the civilian population served as legitimation . Only with the Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council which was Interim Administration Mission to the United Nations in Kosovo set up (UNMIK). The international community was unable to agree on the future status of Kosovo. Still not all UN members have recognized Kosovo as an independent state, including the former mother country Serbia .

Valerie Epps, law professor at Suffolk University Law School, concludes that, given the diverging assessments of the cases, international mechanisms are needed to determine when there are “extreme circumstances” that warrant military intervention and secession . State sovereignty and territorial integrity would then be subordinated as values ​​to equal treatment and the right to self-administration .

Evaluation of the independence of East Timor

“Welcome to the youngest country in the world”. Welcome poster at Dili Airport (2000)

The criticism of overcoming the conflict through the referendum and of building a relatively stable independent state was focused on the economic data of East Timor when it gained independence in 2002. East Timor was the poorest country in Asia by numbers, with 41% of the population living under the Poverty line, 60% of adults were illiterate, 40% of children were moderately or severely malnourished. In 2003 the economy shrank by three percent because part of the international presence withdrew. The problems were not caused by the United Nations. The difficulties had existed for a long time and could not be resolved in the short period of the UN administration. Given the enormous task of building a complete state administration from scratch, the expectations of many critics were too high, criticized the head of the UN interim administration Sérgio Vieira de Mello . From 2000 to 2011, however, East Timor increased its level of development by 20%, more than any other country in the world. The illiteracy rate in 2015 was only 15.7%. In 2008, UNICEF praised East Timor for reducing child mortality by 40% between 1990 and 2006 . From 2004 to 2010 alone, it fell from 80 to 44 deaths in 1,000 births. One reason for falling child mortality rates is increasing medical care.

The majority of commentators see East Timor as an overwhelming success, even if the protection of the population clearly failed before and after the referendum. The ultimately successful establishment of the state was due to the many positive factors for the United Nations after the referendum, on which no other mission could rely. The role of the United Nations was much smaller in other conflicts, such as the reconstruction in Iraq . Here, for example, there was little political will to expand UN measures within the Iraqi government, the population and, due to the security situation, also within the United Nations itself. The East Timorese people themselves voted for “regime change”, so that the United Nations received extensive support from them and their leadership. East Timor was also free of internal conflicts during the UN administration.

Law Enforcement and Importance to Indonesia

Graffito in Dili (2013)

The former chairman of the Indonesian Constitutional Court Mohammad Mahfud MD said in 2019 with a view to the troubled Aceh province that referendums for parts of what is now Indonesia were out of the question. East Timor was originally not part of Indonesia because various colonial powers ruled the areas. Therefore, East Timor was allowed to vote on its status. When in 1969 a referendum was held in West Papua, in which the result was 100% for the connection to Indonesia, the constitution of Indonesia had not yet been consolidated.

The failure of the Indonesian military's plan to keep East Timor in the union through the chaos and to bring General Wiranto to the head of Indonesia has weakened, if not ended, the influence of the military in the country. Indonesia ignored an arrest warrant from 2004 against Wiranto by the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC), which prosecuted human rights violations in East Timor, or it was not forwarded to Interpol by the East Timorese Attorney General Longuinhos Monteiro . Later, Wiranto, like the former Kopassus chief Brigadier General Prabowo, ran several times as a candidate in presidential elections and held important ministerial offices. Nevertheless, due to the weakening of the military, Indonesia is now considered more democratic and stable than if it had come under the Wiranto regime in 1999. In the years after independence, East Timor's government took care not to endanger Habibie's democratic successors through a process of reconciliation.

The lack of criminal prosecution (with the exception of offenders at the lower level) has been criticized from many quarters. Even 20 years after the events, the wounds had not healed. In 2019, the East Timorese television broadcaster GMN TV had to cancel the broadcast of an interview with Eurico Guterres after there had been major protests on social networks when the announcement was made. Guterres, like the other leaders of the militias, had fled to Indonesia. He was sentenced to ten years in prison by an Indonesian court but only served two years in prison. There were also protests when the commission for the celebrations of the twentieth anniversary under Xanana Gusmâo decided that the new park at the bridge of Bidau Lecidere should be named Jardín BJ Habibie .

In 2015, the East Timorese government under Prime Minister Rui Maria de Araújo proclaimed the policy of “mourning the nation” ( tetum dec-lutu nasional ) or “casting off the black”. The memory of the past should now be kept alive in the form of remembrance, no longer in the form of mourning. Critics note that many families have not yet finished mourning because the remains of their relatives have not yet been found. There is no trace of many of the victims of the occupation, including the folk hero Nicolau Lobato , whose death anniversary on December 31, 2015 was supposed to mark the end of the Dec-lutu Nasional .

Criticism of the implementation of the referendum

Destruction in Dili (2000)

Hugh White, Deputy Secretary for Strategy at the Australian Ministry of Defense in 1999, criticized his country's reluctance to call for an international peacekeeping force to be deployed in April 1999 in 2008. Despite the intelligence reports, "the last chance was missed, the September 1999 disaster." to prevent". The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson , also stated in retrospect that UN troops should have been sent before the referendum. Other experts believe that the United States could have prevented the crimes before and after the referendum had it not been for the political, military, and economic pressure it exhibited in September to send the INTERFET went. The red-green German federal government is also accused of failing: it did not use the good contacts with Indonesia.

The general conclusion is that it was a mistake to hold the referendum without a basic international military presence, especially since no East Timorese had any doubts about what would happen. In Maliana, the day before the referendum, the entire population left the city and came to vote from the mountains at 4 a.m., only to disappear again afterwards. Despite knowing the danger, the East Timorese went to the vote. It is difficult to understand why it took so long for the United Nations to recognize this and to send the reaction force. Indonesian politics and the influence of the military should have indicated from the outset that violence would occur. But there was too much resistance internationally to such measures, including from Germany, which traditionally had good relations with Indonesia and whose policies long ignored the East Timor conflict. It was only the public pressure created by reports in the media, non-governmental organizations and the Catholic Church that had an effect.

Lessons learned for future referendums to resolve conflicts were three:

  • Military protection in a referendum can only be dispensed with if cooperation is in the interests of all parties.
  • Where the interests of the conflicting parties clearly diverge, voters are in acute danger.
  • In this case, a neutral police force can prevent large-scale reprisals against voters.

At the beginning of 1999, neither the United Nations nor Australia saw themselves in a position to openly tell the fourth largest country in the world and a respected member of the international community that the government would not be believed if it gave security guarantees, according to a UN official in 2000.

literature

Web links

Commons : Independence referendum in East Timor 1999  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

supporting documents

Main evidence

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Law 10/2005 of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste of August 10, 2005. ( Memento of July 2, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
  2. ^ A b Frédéric Durand: Three centuries of violence and struggle in East Timor (1726-2008) , Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence
  3. ↑ Tirto.id: Mengingat Referendum, Jalan Panjang Kemerdekaan Timor Leste , August 31, 2016 , accessed on August 1, 2019.
  4. ↑ a b c Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, pp. 106-107.
  5. ↑ Loro Horta : Timor-Leste - The Dragon's Newest Friend , 2009 (PDF file; 100 kB)
  6. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Monika Schlicher: Intervention in Asia: The example of East Timor - conflict resolution without adequate prevention , March 2004, In: Prof. Thomas Hoppe (ed.): Protection of human rights, civil interference and military intervention - analyzes and recommendations , Gerechter Friede project group of the German Commission Justitia et Pax, 2004 / Verlag Dr. Köster, Berlin, Chapter 6, pp. 257-300.
  7. ^ A b David Stevens: Strength through diversity: The combined naval role in Operation Stabilize, Working paper No. 20, Sea Power Center - Australia ( Memento of September 10, 2012 in the Internet Archive )
  8. ↑ Ruth Elizabeth Nuttall: The Origins and Onset of the 2006 Crisis in Timor-Leste , p. 85, PhD thesis, The Australian National University, February 2017 , accessed July 31, 2019.
  9. ↑ Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 92.
  10. ↑ a b c Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 93.
  11. ↑ a b ABC: Howard pushed me on E Timor referendum: Habibie , November 15, 2008 , accessed August 2, 2019.
  12. ↑ a b c d Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor, May 5, 1999. ( Memento of September 6, 2011 in the Internet Archive )
  13. ↑ a b c d Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 94.
  14. ↑ Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, pp. 94-95.
  15. ↑ a b c d "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, TNI-militia violence: June-July , pp. 137-138.
  16. ↑ a b c Human Rights Watch : Questions and Answers on East Timor ( Memento of November 14, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) 1999
  17. ↑ a b c Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 95.
  18. ↑ a b c Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 98.
  19. ↑ a b c "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, The Choice , p. 135.
  20. ↑ a b c A Constitutional Framework for a Special Autonomy for East Timor ( Memento from July 31, 2006 in the Internet Archive )
  21. ↑ a b c "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, The 5 May Agreements , p. 132.
  22. ↑ a b c d e f g h "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, Popular Consultation - Overview , p. 134.
  23. ↑ a b c "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, Dare II , p. 138.
  24. ↑ a b c d e f g "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, Voter registration , p. 139.
  25. ↑ İlker Gökhan Şen: Sovereignty Referendums in International and Constitutional Law. Springer 2015, limited preview in Google Book Search.
  26. ^ "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, UNAMET deployment , pp. 134–135.
  27. ^ "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, Indonesian government coordination for the Popular Consultation , pp. 135-136.
  28. ^ "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, Electoral Commission , p. 135.
  29. ↑ a b c d “Chega!” - Report: Part 3, International presence in Timor-Leste , p. 136.
  30. ↑ a b "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, East Timorese and Indonesian observers , p. 136.
  31. ↑ a b c d "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, The campaign - The official campaign period , p. 141.
  32. ↑ a b c “Chega!” - Report: Part 3, The campaign - Pro-independence groups , pp. 139–140.
  33. ↑ a b c “Chega!” - Report: Part 3, The campaign - Active pro-autonomy groups , pp. 140–141.
  34. ↑ Masters of Terror: Domingos Maria das Dores Soares ( Memento of October 9, 2010 in the Internet Archive ).
  35. ↑ a b c "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, The campaign - Indonesian civil administration in Timor-Leste , p. 141.
  36. ↑ a b c "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, Security arrangements under the 5 May Agreements , pp. 132/133.
  37. ↑ a b c d "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, Security for the ballot , pp. 136-137.
  38. ↑ a b c d e “Chega!” - Report: Part 3, Declining security situation: August , pp. 142–143.
  39. ↑ Masters of Terror: Col (Inf) Tono Suratman FX ( Memento from October 9, 2010 in the Internet Archive ).
  40. ↑ a b c "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, The ballot , p. 143.
  41. ^ Vera Simone: The Asian Pacific: Political and Economic Development in a Global Context. Springer 2015, limited preview in Google Book Search.
  42. ↑ STAE press release, June 29, 2007, Timor Leste's Parliamentary Elections: One Day To Go
  43. ↑ a b c d e f "Chega!" - Report: Part 3, The count and the results , pp. 143–144.
  44. ^ Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, Israel W. Charny: Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts , p. 277, ISBN 978-0-415-94430-4 .
  45. ↑ Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 97.
  46. ↑ a b c d e Tirto.id: October 19, 1999 Merdeka dari Pendudukan Indonesia , October 19, 2017 , accessed on August 1, 2019.
  47. ↑ Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 99.
  48. ↑ a b Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 100.
  49. ↑ a b c Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 101.
  50. ^ Arnold Kohen: Benedict Anderson and the independence of Timor-Leste , December 2015, UNSW Canberra , accessed January 6, 2020.
  51. ↑ Kevin O'Rourke: Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia ( en ). Allen & Unwin, 2002, ISBN 9781865087542 .
  52. ↑ Resolution text of Resolution 1264 (English, PDF)
  53. ↑ a b 7news.com: Australia intervenes in East Timor drama , December 31, 2019 , accessed January 6, 2020.
  54. ↑ a b c d Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 104.
  55. ↑ a b Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 108.
  56. ↑ Roma Decade: Biografi BJ Habibie , accessed on August 1, 2019.
  57. ↑ a b Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 109.
  58. ↑ United Nations: PRESS CONFERENCE BY PRESIDENT OF TIMOR-LESTE January 20, 2006
  59. ↑ Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 110.
  60. ↑ Democracy Index 2018 , accessed January 16, 2019.
  61. ↑ Freedom House: Country report: Timor-Leste , accessed January 20, 2018.
  62. ^ A b c Henry J. Richardson: A Critical Thought on Self Determination for East Timor and Kosovo , pp. 101 , 14 Temp. Int'l & Comp. LJ 101 (2000), accessed August 9, 2019.
  63. ↑ Alexandra Poolos: [ Yugoslavia: East Timor Gains Independence, While Kosovo Remains In Nationhood Limbo ], Radio Free Europe, accessed on August 9, 2019.
  64. ↑ a b Valerie Epps: Self-Determination after Kosovo and East Timor , pp. 450 & 454 , accessed on August 9, 2019.
  65. ↑ a b c Markus Benzing: Midwifing a New State: The United Nations in East Timor , pp. 368–371 , 2005, In: A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum, (eds.): Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law , Volume 9, 2005, pp. 295-372, Koninklijke Brill NV Printed in The Netherlands.
  66. ↑ Damien Kingsbury: A glass half-full , The Dili Weekly, July 2, 2012 ( memento of February 4, 2013 in the web archive archive.today ), accessed on July 4, 2012.
  67. ↑ Direcção-Geral de Estatística : Results of the 2015 census , accessed on November 23, 2016.
  68. ^ Boston.com: Child mortality highest in Sierra Leone. January 22, 2008.
  69. ↑ Reuters: TIMOR-LESTE: "Spectacular" reduction in child mortality rates. July 14, 2010.
  70. ↑ UNICEF: Country Information Timor-Leste (English), accessed on May 20, 2012.
  71. ↑ Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey 2009-2010, Preliminary Report, National Statistics Directorate ( Memento of July 7, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 7 MB), accessed on May 20, 2012.
  72. ↑ Tirto.id: Mahfud MD Jelaskan Beda Referendum Timor Leste & Papua dengan Aceh , June 1, 2019 , accessed on August 1, 2019.
  73. ↑ Special Panels for Serious Crimes: Case 05/2003 - Warrant of Arrest for Wiranto , accessed on August 2, 2019.
  74. ↑ Monika Schlicher: East Timor faces its past , accessed on September 10, 2018.
  75. ^ Associated Press: East Timor government survives no-confidence vote , October 12, 2009 , accessed January 1, 2016.
  76. ↑ Mundo ao Minuto: Televisão timorense cancela transmissão de entrevista a Eurico Guterres , August 8, 2019 , accessed on August 9, 2019.
  77. ↑ Tatoli: 25 Agostu, BTK Finaliza Konstrusaun Jardín BJ Habibie , August 7, 2019 , accessed on August 9, 2019.
  78. ↑ Fundasaun Mahein: Nicolau Lobato: A Timorese Hero in Another Country , December 11, 2015 , accessed on December 14, 2015.
  79. ↑ Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, p. 102.
  80. ↑ a b c Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012, pp. 103-104.
This article was added to the list of excellent articles on January 16, 2020 in this version .