Santa Cruz massacre

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A memorial in Dili has been commemorating the massacre since 2011
Re-enactment of the events in November 1998; Photo by Mark Rhomberg / ETAN
Location of East Timor

In Dili , the capital of East Timor , which was then occupied by Indonesia , the Santa Cruz massacre (also known as the Dili massacre ) took place on November 12, 1991 in the cemetery of the same name in Suco Bemori . At least 271 people died and 382 were injured in the attack on demonstrators and the violence that followed immediately by the Indonesian military . 270 people "disappeared" without a trace .

The Santa Cruz massacre marked a decisive turning point in the history of East Timor and brought more international attention to the 16-year conflict. It was the first major demonstration against the Indonesian occupation of the area.

prehistory

The then Indonesian President Suharto

After Indonesian troops marched into the former Portuguese colony in the late autumn of 1975, after previous internal unrest that had cost many human lives, and with the political consent of the USA and Australia, the eastern part of the island of Timor was largely isolated from the rest of the world. FRETILIN rebels attempted to resist the occupiers from the mountains, but were unable to do much to counter the troops armed with American weapons. The civilian population suffered from the violence, there were famines in which tens of thousands of people died.

The UN had not recognized the annexation of the area that followed in mid-1976 and the former colonial power Portugal tried, with little success, to exert diplomatic pressure on Indonesia. By 1983 the issue of East Timor had largely disappeared from the political agenda and many diplomats felt that it was only a matter of time before the incorporation of East Timor would gain international recognition.

The Indonesian military continued to crack down on insurgents and perpetrated numerous atrocities against the civilian population over time. Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo responded to a wave of arrests by security forces shortly before Indonesian President Suharto's visit to East Timor in 1988 with a statement that was read in churches on December 5.

"We disagree with this barbaric system and condemn the lying propaganda according to which human rights abuses do not exist in Timor-Leste."

"We do not agree with this barbaric system and condemn the lying propaganda according to which human rights violations do not exist in East Timor."

This statement was picked up by the international press and quoted on January 22, 1989 by the US newspaper The New York Times . In another significant letter dated February 6th, directly to the UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar , he demanded that an honest and democratic process of decolonizing East Timor be carried out in a referendum.

The visit of Pope John Paul II on October 12, 1989 in East Timor was a historic moment for the predominantly Catholic population. It was the first visit by a head of state since the country was occupied. Despite previous arrests of activists, the first public action took place after the service in Dili in front of 100,000 people, in which a group of young people raised banners, loudly demanded independence and protested against human rights violations.

At this very embarrassing moment for Indonesia, the security forces reacted with numerous arrests, interrogations and torture in order to suppress the burgeoning resistance. John Monjo , the American ambassador to Indonesia, traveled to Dili in January 1990 to investigate alleged allegations of torture and arrest. In front of the Hotel Turismo , where the ambassador was staying, there were renewed protests against the Indonesian occupation.

With the decision of Suharto in December 1988 to equate East Timor with the other 26 provinces, not only journalists, representatives of non-governmental organizations and tourists had the opportunity to enter eight of the 13 districts for the first time from January 1989, but also immigrants from other parts of Indonesia. The opening of the country to foreigners made it possible for the population to spread their concerns about self-determination.

International struggle for a solution

On September 14, 1989, the then UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar proposed a visit to a delegation from the Portuguese Parliament in East Timor in order to find a solution that was acceptable to all concerned. In his report to the 45th session of the UN General Assembly in September 1990, de Cuéllar reported serious and constructive negotiations between the parties under his care. Based on this report, the East Timor issue was not included in the annual agenda, which was interpreted in diplomatic circles as a reduced interest of the world community in the conflict.

In New York, the Portuguese Prime Minister Aníbal Cavaco Silva compared the situation in East Timor with the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq on September 26, 1990. The Indonesian UN Ambassador Nana Sutresna rejected this allegation and described the comparison as misleading. His country supported East Timor in the process of decolonization, helped with the realization of democratic ideals and protected the majority of the population from disturbances or the armed terror of the FRETILIN minority supported and directed by Portugal. Two days earlier, Silva announced that there was agreement on a "fact-finding mission" that should be carried out by the end of the year.

On October 5th, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas confirmed the planned visit of the Portuguese parliamentarians to the press . However, he said the visit was solely to monitor the current situation and was not intended to investigate. Meanwhile, the trip was postponed until the following year because the Indonesian government was expecting protests similar to those during the Pope's visit. Indonesia also demanded that the delegation first come to Jakarta and later travel on to East Timor, which the Portuguese side still refused to do.

"Now they can observe whatever aspects they want to know and we want the UN mission to accompany them in order to guarantee objectivity."

“Now you can observe all aspects that are of interest. However, we would like a UN mission to accompany them to ensure objectivity. "

The AFP news agency published a report on October 7th in which Western diplomats spoke of a planned UN mission to monitor the situation in the annexed area, which Alatas rejected only a few days later.

On November 3rd, Mário Viegas Carrascalão , governor of East Timor since 1983, expressed concern about the planned visit of the Portuguese in an interview with Reuters news agency . He feared further riots if the visit took place, but at the same time admitted that the problem was more economic than political, caused by the lack of jobs and the predominance of non-Timorese in the business world.

“People are going to look at the moment (of the visit) as their last opportunity to show their feelings. Other people are going to counter them, the armed forces have to (crack) down and we are going to have a new civil war here in East Timor. "

“People will see the situation as their last chance to show their feelings. Others will oppose them, the security forces must take action and we will have a new civil war here in East Timor. "

Mário Soares, former President of Portugal

Portuguese President Mário Soares assured in mid-November on the sidelines of the appointment of the Japanese ruler Akihito as Tennō in Tokyo that he would seek independence for the currently occupied area. East Timor also received increased political attention in the United States. In a November 19 letter to US Secretary of State James Baker, signed by 223 Democratic and Republican members of the House of Representatives, MPs called Baker to use American influence to put political pressure on Indonesia and the humanitarian situation of human suffering to improve drawn East Timor.

On December 7th, on the 15th anniversary of the entry of the Indonesian troops, up to 300 mainly young East Timorese demonstrated in front of the Portuguese parliament building in Lisbon and presented the members of parliament with a paper with political demands in which they underlined East Timor’s aspirations for independence. This was the first jointly organized event by UDT and FRETILIN.

Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas spoke in late December of renewed fears by the governor in East Timor that the upcoming visit would cause unrest to the province and said the people would not welcome the visit.

“I understand Carrascalao's views and reasons…. But (Portuguese MPs) say tourists can go in, journalists can go in. Why can't we? It's hard for me to say no. […] They believe decolonization is over and the Portuguese really don't have any business there any more. "

“I understand Governor Carrascalão's views and reasons […] but the Portuguese believe that tourists can travel to the area, journalists can come to the area, why not us? It's not easy for me to say no to that. [...] The people believe that the decolonization is over and the Portuguese have no business there. "

Three weeks later, he stated that the visit would probably not take place in 1991 and would be postponed. Portugal has not yet responded to the proposal to have UN observers accompany the delegation, although the UN ambassadors of both countries have already negotiated details.

In a joint declaration by the twelve EU countries on the occasion of the 47th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights on February 12, 1991, Europeans expressed their concern about the human rights situation in East Timor. Access to certain districts is not permitted and there are reports of arrests, torture and executions. The right to peacefully assemble and freedom of expression were continually disregarded by the Indonesian military. They also welcomed the request of the Special Rapporteur on torture of the UNHCR Pieter H. Kooijmans , to visit the area. The Indonesian delegation rejected the allegations as unsubstantiated allegations. The invitation from Kooijman, who would like to travel to Aceh and East Timor in late autumn , is clear evidence of the accommodating nature of the Indonesian government.

UN Secretary General de Cuéllar told a group of international parliamentarians in March that the people in East Timor had the same right to self-determination as in other parts of the world. A commission of the European Parliament was convinced of the necessity of an arms embargo against Indonesia and approved a corresponding draft. On June 11, Governor Carrascalão rejected the Portuguese demands for a meeting of the delegation with rebel leader Xanana Gusmão or a referendum.

On August 8th of that year a petition was handed over to the UN Committee on Decolonization Issues in New York, in which the Japanese government made it clear that it did not recognize the annexation of East Timor and was concerned about the human rights situation in the area. The petition also contained a message from Xanana Gusmão. He called on the Indonesian government to negotiate peace and expressed optimism about the upcoming visit of the Portuguese parliamentary delegation. A few days later, a new round of negotiations began between the parties involved on the terms of the visit under the care of the UN.

In Geneva, the UNHCR Working Group on Preventing Discrimination and Protection of Minorities had drawn up a draft resolution on human rights in East Timor. Although several experts supported the draft, it was not implemented due to the permission of the Indonesian government for the visit of the Special Rapporteur on Torture Matters Pieter H. Kooijmans. If the Dutch Kooijmans trip could take place in November as planned and his report for the next meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission in February would be on the table, the commission could make a decision on the East Timor question.

On August 24, it was announced that, apart from a few details, the conditions for the visit of the Portuguese parliamentarians had been negotiated. Accordingly, a first group should travel to East Timor and prepare the visit. Furthermore, UN observers should accompany the Portuguese delegation.

The conditions of travel between Indonesia and Portugal were published in a UN paper dated September 13, 1991.

  1. The purpose of the Portuguese parliamentary delegation's visit is to obtain first hand information, not an investigation.
  2. The delegation will be composed of 13 Portuguese parliamentarians, 13 Portuguese officials and 10 Portuguese journalists. A list of the names of the delegation and their accompanying persons will be given by Portugal to Indonesia at least three weeks before the start of the trip.
  3. Indonesia is allowed to choose ten Indonesian journalists who will accompany the delegation.
  4. The delegation is accompanied by twelve international journalists, six of whom are appointed by each side. Each party will provide the other side with a list of the names of the journalists at least three weeks prior to the visit.
  5. The Portuguese parliamentary delegation is accompanied by representatives of the UN Secretary General.
  6. The delegation will make a stopover in Jakarta on their way to Dili and the chairman, together with the representative of the secretary general, will make a courtesy visit to the speaker of the Indonesian House of Representatives.
  7. The Portuguese parliamentary delegation should have unrestricted access to all parts of the territory, in the context of the agreed purpose of the visit.
  8. The delegation should freely meet any person they want to meet and vice versa, without this having negative consequences for that person. The Indonesian authorities must not take any action that could harm potential or actual contact persons. The people who meet with the delegation should not have to fear any negative consequences as a result of these contacts.
  9. The delegation will use its own translators. The discussions should take place confidentially. Indonesia will cooperate with the delegation and their escorts.
  10. The visit will take place during the dry season and last between ten and twelve days.
  11. An advance mission will travel to East Timor under the leadership of a representative of the UN Secretary General and with two representatives from each side to prepare the visit.

The Indonesian intention, after the delegation's visit, to obtain recognition of the area under international law and thus the agreement that East Timor is part of Indonesia, caused new inconsistencies between the two sides in mid-September. António Sousa Lara , the chairman of the East Timor Commission of the Portuguese Parliament, accused Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas of torpedoing the trip with ever new conditions.

“Indonesia is trying to gain time and every time the two parties are close to a solution, they raise another difficulty which brings into question all the preceding negotiations. If Jakarta continued to insist on the recognition of the annexation as a prior condition, we will certainly not take part in the trip. "

“Indonesia is trying to buy time. Every time the two parties approach a solution, new difficulties arise that jeopardize all previous negotiation results. If Jakarta continues to insist on recognizing annexation as a precondition, we will certainly not travel to East Timor. "

Under the leadership of Sharbuland Khan, consisting of two Portuguese and two Indonesian UN diplomats and high-ranking UN officials, the eight-person advance team landed a week late on September 29 in the East Timorese capital Dili and visited the cities of Baucau and Lospalos . The date for the delegation's visit was set for the beginning of November. Parliamentarians should enter without a visa in order to avoid indirect recognition of integration.

In a television interview with Portuguese broadcaster RTP , Ali Alatas insisted that the decolonization process was irreversible and denied as questionable the British organization Amnesty International's allegation that human rights were being violated in East Timor. He hoped that after the Portuguese visit, the time of “disinformation” would finally come to an end. His Portuguese colleague, Foreign Minister João de Deus Pinheiro , reacted negatively to this statement and said that a political solution to the problem in the form of a referendum would be best for him.

November 4th was set as the final date of the visit. The UN ambassadors from Tanzania, Cuba and Norway were to accompany the delegation as representatives of the UN Secretary General, as announced on October 7th. José Ramos-Horta , who was East Timor's Foreign Minister between 1975 and 1977 and who was then representative to the United Nations, expressed optimism that international pressure on Indonesia would increase in the future and that the time had come for negotiations between the Indonesian government and the resistance movement be.

Governor Carrascalão said in an interview with the English-language daily The Jakarta Post in mid-October that the Portuguese should speak to local members of the government in order to obtain information about the province. The population has little knowledge of the Indonesian government's development programs. The members of the delegation were not allowed to leave the group and speak to the people.

In a call by several solidarity groups from Japan, Australia, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, Canada and the UK to five human rights organizations in Indonesia, Asia Watch , Amnesty International, ICJ , Pax Christi , the World Council of Churches and many others, they warned of human rights violations , during and after the visit of the Portuguese parliamentarians. Accordingly, they have observed an increase in repression in East Timor since August.

  • Additional troop contingents, mostly in civilian clothes, from Indonesia were stationed in East Timor.
  • Meetings were held by the military to intimidate the population, to force them to demonstrate for integration and to display Indonesian flags during the visit.
  • Timorese paramilitary forces were formed to intimidate and punish.
  • Other groups should create confrontation and unrest during the visit.
  • There was increased news of arrests and sudden disappearances.
  • Students and other Timorese officials have been sent away from East Timor to weaken the opposition.

In mid-October the names of the 13 parliamentarians and the travel plan were published. Under the leadership of Angelo Correia, a member of the Portuguese Social Democratic Party ( PSD ), who had served in the military in the area between 1969 and 1971 and spoke the local Tetum language , the delegation would also include seven technical assistants, six translators and ten Portuguese journalists. Eduardo Pereira of the Socialists was appointed deputy. The group was scheduled to leave Lisbon for Asia on November 2nd and meet with UN officials in Singapore. After a stopover in Jakarta, where Angelo Correia and Moreira de Andrade were to be received by a representative of the Indonesian parliament, the arrival at the military airfield in Dili was planned for the late evening of November 4th.

The first three days were reserved for meetings with church officials, members of the Red Cross and other regional government officials. Afterwards a visit to a school, a seminary, the Becora prison , a military clinic, the technical college and an orphanage was on the program. On November 11th, the delegation was supposed to leave for the east of the country and visit Manatuto , Baucau , Ossu , Viqueque , Uato-Lari , Lospalos , Tutuala and Lautém . Before leaving, a visit to a prison and a sandalwood perfume factory was planned.

At the end of October, Bishop Belo expressed skepticism about the upcoming visit, saying that it would be better if the Portuguese delegation did not come to East Timor. He feared violence against the population after the parliamentarians left. Only days later, information came out that the Indonesian government would not allow three of the journalists chosen by Portugal to enter East Timor. Rui Araújo from “ Rádio e Televisão de Portugal ”, Mário Robalo from the Expresso newspaper and the Australian journalist Jill Jolliffe should be excluded from the company. Angelo Correia said without the three journalists the delegation's visit would not take place and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, who was also in East Timor between November 11 and 15, could not meet the delegation if Indonesia insisted on this request. Foreign Minister Alatas said in Paris on October 24th that only Jolliffe was on the black list and that his country refused to accompany this person. Portugal then canceled the delegation's trip.

Situation in East Timor

APODETI members and armed militias spread fear in the country, despite the presence of UN observers and journalists who had traveled, and threatened people across the country who were hoping for protection in the churches, the only independent organization in East Timor at the time.

Since the beginning of the occupation, the military special unit KOPASSUS tried to smash the military arm of FRETILIN , the Timorese independence movement, and to subvert the anti-integration movement. Prabowo Subianto , a son-in-law of General Suharto , who had served in the troops in East Timor since 1976 and had founded the Tim Alfa militia two years earlier , met Sjafrie Syamsuddin , the commander-in-chief of KOPASSUS's own secret service Satuan Tugas Intelijen , a few days before the demonstration . in the barracks of the 744 Infantry Battalion . In addition to the regular army units, members of the special police unit Brimob were also stationed in the area.

The events of the fall of 1991

The grave of Sebastião Gomes

The Sebastião Gomes case

On the night of October 27-28, Sebastião Gomes died in an action by Indonesian security forces in the Church of Santo António de Motael . He was shot and bled to death after young independence activists sought refuge in the church to avoid arrest. A rally was planned for November 11th, two weeks after Gomes' murder, the day of the visit of Pieter H. Kooijmans , the UNHCR's then Special Rapporteur on Torture and later Foreign Minister of the Netherlands . The leaders of the freedom movement, with the consent of the rebel leader Xanana Gusmão , then postponed the final date to Wednesday, November 12th, after the morning service.

Course of the demonstration and victims

In the early morning of November 12, 1991, a crowd gathered for a memorial service by parish priest Alberto Ricardo da Silva for the slain Sebastião Gomes at the Motael Catholic Church in Dili. The funeral procession started for the Santa Cruz Cemetery at around 7:00 am . Along the way, many young men, women, children in school uniforms and old people in traditional clothes joined the rally. It was the largest in East Timor since the occupation began. About 3,000 to 4,000 people moved through the city, past the seat of the governor Mário Carrascalão to the cemetery. Some carried the flag of East Timor and the FRETILIN, others shouted the name of the rebel leader Xanana Gusmão or anti-Indonesian slogans.

The few police officers and soldiers who showed up along the route could not stop the people. About a kilometer from the cemetery there was the first confrontation, in which Major Gerhan Lantara and his adjutant Prada Domingus, both in civilian clothes, were injured with a knife. Most of the participants moved on to the cemetery. According to a later testimony, around 75 men from Battalion 700 followed the demonstrators. Another local government official reported the presence of members of the Brimob riot police and units from Battalions 700 and 744. Soldiers armed with M16 assault rifles were already there when the main part of the demonstration arrived at the cemetery and gathered for prayer.

Trucks reached the scene and brought more uniformed soldiers who positioned themselves around the cemetery and got their weapons ready. Despite the presence of international journalists, the soldiers opened fire in front of the cemetery. The wall of the cemetery made it difficult for people to escape. After five to fifteen minutes, the gunfire stopped. The soldiers stabbed and continued to hit the injured with bayonets and other objects. The commander in chief of the troops in East Timor, Rudolf Warouw, was probably in a meeting with UN envoy Kooijmans at the time of the dispute.

Bleeding people fled in panic in all directions and sought shelter. The dead and injured lay in the cemetery, were later taken away in military vehicles and some were buried alive in mass graves or thrown into the sea. Many slightly and seriously injured people gathered at the local hospital, some were arrested by soldiers after treatment and taken to the nearby Wire Husada Military Hospital, which was closed to the public. Witnesses later reported terrible scenes. Girls arrested by soldiers and taken to the military hospital were raped several times at night. The heads of some of the wounded were beaten with stones or they were poisoned with paraformaldehyde capsules .

Max Stahl (2017)

According to research by the Portuguese non-governmental organization A Paz é Possível em Timor-Leste (APPTL), 271 people lost their lives as a result of this bloodbath , including many children and young people. The total number of injuries was therefore 278. There were numerous arrests. There has been no trace of a total of 270 people since the massacre. Journalists Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman watched the action and were themselves the target of attacks. Nairn suffered a skull fracture from the blow with a rifle butt. The British journalist Max Stahl made recordings with a video camera that were smuggled into Europe by the Dutchwoman Saskia Kouwenberg . The 20-year-old New Zealander Kamal Bamadhaj , a student at the University of New South Wales in Sydney , was the only foreigner to die in the massacre.

aftermath

Indonesian investigations

The Indonesian military set up an internal investigative commission ( Dewan Kehormatan Militer , DKM ), according to whose official account only 19 people died as a result of the events in the cemetery. President Suharto authorized another commission ( Komisi Penyelidikan Nasional , KPN ) by Decree No. 53 on November 18 . For the first time in Indonesian history, the commission officially investigated a violation of possible human rights violations in the country. The KPN served in Indonesia as a model for the later Komnas HAM , the National Commission for Human Rights. Three days later, the seven members began their work in Jakarta to collect information. As of November 28, they spoke to 132 eyewitnesses in East Timor, including 26 prisoners, members of the military, members of the Church and 66 wounded in the military hospital on December 4.

A reconstruction of what happened with members of the 303 infantry battalion involved, according to a later report, but without questioning participants in the demonstration, took place on December 10th. The 19 fatalities were still fully clothed in a mass grave and were later exhumed, including the New Zealander Kamal Bamadhaj. On December 14th, the last day in Dili, the commission met with members of the local parliament. With the submission of an initial report on December 26th, the number of dead rose to “over 50”, without precise details of the victims' personal details, and the number of missing persons to 90. Detailed information about the units and orders involved was not published.

Excerpts from the report:

“The November 12, 1991 incident in Dili […] is the culmination of a series of earlier demonstration / incidents perpetrated by the anti-integration group / Fretilin […] was clearly not an act ordered by or reflecting the policy of the Government of the Armed Forces […] was essentially a tragedy which should be deeply regretted. "

“The incident of November 12, 1991 in Dili […] is the culmination of a series of previous demonstrations / events perpetrated by the anti-integration movement Fretilin […] was certainly not an act ordered by the commanders of the military, or theirs Politics reflected [...] was above all a tragedy that should be deeply regretted. "

The report describes a heated mood among the mainly young demonstrators with their anti-Indonesian attitudes and the presence of Western journalists. The trigger for the shots is indicated:

“As the tense atmosphere reached a boiling point, started by the stabbing of an Armed Forces officer and the wounding of a private, and aggravated by the provocative belligerence and aggressive attitude assumed by the crowd which was perceived by the security personnel as posing a threat to their arms and to their safety, a spontaneous reaction took place among the security personnel to defend themselves, without command, resulting in the excessive shooting at the demonstrators, causing deaths and wounded. At the same time, another group of unorganized security personnel, acting outside any control or command, also fired shots and committed beating, causing more casualties. "

“The tension reached the boiling point when a military officer was attacked with a knife and a soldier was injured, and was made worse by the provocative and aggressive behavior of the crowd, which made the security forces perceive their weapons and safety as a threat. This triggered a spontaneous and unordered self-defense response from security personnel and resulted in excessive shooting at demonstrators, resulting in deaths and injuries. At the same time, another group of disorganized security guards began shooting or beating people uncontrollably and without orders, causing even more injuries. "

According to the commission's report, Battalion 303, which was in charge of the city, and a group of disorganized security forces were involved. No information was given about the identity of this group. Six officers were found guilty of misconduct. Brigadier General Rudolf Warouw, the local commanding officer for East Timor, Colonel Binsar Aruan and Colonel Gatot Purwanto were released. The other three received a temporary ban on promotion. Major General Sintong Panjaitan, the commander of the military area Kodam IX / Udayana ( Nusa Tenggara ), also lost his office and was sued in the USA by the mother of the killed New Zealand student.

Four other officers, three non-commissioned officers and one soldier who acted without orders and without observing relevant norms, were brought before a military tribunal. Further investigations into five officers were made. In the spring of 1992, ten men were tried in Denpasar under military criminal law and under press surveillance. None of the soldiers and officers were charged with murder or manslaughter . All defendants received prison terms of between 10 and 18 months for disregarding service regulations. A defendant was found guilty of cutting off a demonstrator's ear.

Protests

The reports of the journalists who had observed the tragic event reached the global public through news agencies and were received with dismay. There were protests in different countries. Even days after the events, Indonesian security guards arrested people who were allegedly involved in East Timor.

During a demonstration in front of a UN building in Jakarta on November 19, 1991, relatives presented a petition to a UN employee. The police broke up the rally and took 70 participants to a local police station. After three days of interrogation lasting up to ten hours, the security forces transported the demonstrators to the main Polda police station in the Indonesian capital. It was not until November 27 that the government confirmed the arrests and released 49 people. The remainder of those arrested, as well as four students from Udayana University in Denpasar who were arrested at their home in Bali , remained in custody.

The UNCHR ( Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances WGEID ), founded in 1980 , began its work and tried to clarify the fate of these people. On December 10th, in an urgent action , it handed over a list of 17 names to the Indonesian government . Max Stahl's recordings were smuggled into Australia and shown in January 1992 on the English television station Yorkshire Television of the independent television network. The pictures confirmed the assumption that it was a planned action by the Indonesian military.

The first convictions began in March 1992. Fernando de Araújo , who among other things because of subversion and "... undermining the Indonesian Government and disgracing the nation in the eyes of the international community" ("... the undermining of the Indonesian government and the dishonoring of the [Indonesian] nation in the eyes of the world community" ) was sentenced to nine years in prison on May 25 for allegedly organizing the Jakarta protest. Other convicts included Gregório Saldanha (life sentence ), Francisco Miranda Branco (15 years), Jacinto das Neves Raimundo Alves (10 years) and Saturnino da Costa Belo (9 years). The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) found that Indonesia violated Articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with regard to the convictions of the East Timorese . In the summer of 1993, the Portuguese government made serious allegations against these trials.

According to reports by the human rights organization Amnesty International in July 1992, intimidation among the population has increased since the massacre. Politically active and Catholic priests have been the targets of house searches, assaults, arrests and death threats.

UN investigations

UN Secretary-General's Special Representative Amos Wako toured East Timor and Indonesia between February 9-14, 1992 and presented his report on February 19. He also investigated allegations that members of the Hasanuddin division consistently executed eyewitnesses after the crime. At the 49th session of the UN Human Rights Commission it was decided to investigate the circumstances more closely.

The Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) presented the government in Jakarta with a second list with 207 names of disappeared people on December 15, which went uncommented by the Indonesian side. On December 17, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas met with his Portuguese colleague in New York to discuss the situation, in the presence of the UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar . They agreed to continue their talks in Rome the following summer .

In a letter dated November 19, 1993 to the Indonesian government, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Collective and Arbitrary Executions, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, stated his interest in visiting East Timor. In doing so, the human rights resolutions 1993/71 ( Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions ) 1993/47 ( Human rights and thematic procedures ) and the special report on the situation in East Timor 1993/97, in which the UN Commission on Human Rights urged the government in Jakarta, was one to carry out your own investigation. The Indonesian government responded with an invitation, citing resolutions 1993/71 and 1993/47, but affirmed that it and other countries had rejected resolution 1993/97.

The government rejected the special rapporteur's request to visit the crisis areas of Aceh and Irian Jaya .

The goals of his visit were as follows:

  1. Gathering information on the tragic circumstances of the November 12, 1991 events in Dili
  2. Assessment of how the Indonesian government is meeting international standards for the use of force
  3. To get justice for the victims
  4. to obtain compensation for the victims
  5. Gather reliable information on the human rights situation in East Timor after the incident

During his ten-day stay in the region in July 1994, Ndiaye visited the Santa Cruz Cemetery, met ministers, members of the military and police, members of national human rights organizations, eyewitnesses and Bishop Belo . Ndiaye sent a messenger to the FRETILIN leader, Xanana Gusmão , who had since been captured .

In the final report of November 1, 1994, Ndiaye criticized, among other things, the arrest and conviction of the organizers of the demonstration and the work of the KPN commission set up by President Suharto. The Indonesian government had withheld important documents from the Commissioner. Ndiaye was unable to confirm reports from the Indonesian side that participants in the demonstration were armed. The wooden sticks were used to hold banners and were not weapons. The cases of injuries reported by the authorities, according to witnesses, occurred an hour before the massacre. There were reports that the security forces in Dili knew about the demonstration in advance. Eyewitnesses reported that trenches had been dug and that possible attendees had been advised against attending the rally the day before the event.

Conclusions:

  1. Appropriate measures to control the amount in advance could have prevented the killings.
  2. It was regular members of the Indonesian army who carried out the killings.
  3. The November 12, 1991 march was a peaceful demonstration by politically dissenting and unarmed civilians; claims by some officials that the security forces fired the shots in self-defense are unfounded.
  4. There are plausible indications that the actions of the security forces were not a spontaneous reaction, but a planned military operation.

The government in Jakarta had violated the following international agreements on the use of gun violence.

  • "Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders" - adopted in Havana in summer 1990
  • "The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials" - adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1979

( Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions Report by the Special Rapporteur on his mission to Indonesia and East Timor )

Reactions abroad

Demonstration for a free East Timor

The massacre was one of the high points of the repression of the East Timorese population by the Indonesian occupiers. Human rights activists were outraged, and some started monitoring programs that collected information about the incidents and published it on a regular basis. The government in Jakarta had to justify itself to the United Nations because of the many dead, missing and cases of torture and was sharply criticized by foreign diplomats.

In the spring after the massacre , the American government temporarily suspended contributions from military support to the Indonesian military ( Tentara Nasional Indonesia ) in the form of the IMET training program at the request of the US Congress . In the mid-1990s, under the Bill Clinton administration , when the situation had "stabilized", Indonesians were officially only allowed to receive theoretical training. Information later became known about a project kept secret by the United States Department of Defense ( Joint Combined Exchange Training ), in which members of the American Green Berets trained the Indonesian elite unit KOPASSUS in various torture and killing techniques.

Under the Australian government of Paul Keating , which came into office only a few weeks after the incident on December 20, 1991, members of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment (ASASR) completed joint training with parts of the KOPASSUS units on Java from 1993 onwards . Indonesian paratrooper associations carried out air exercises with Australians. In 1995, Australia was the Indonesian military's primary partner in training matters.

East Timor today

Santa Cruz Cemetery (2011)

After the massacre, the participants in the demonstration and later members of the new generation of independence activists were called " Lorico Asuwain ".

The anniversary of the massacre on November 12th is a public holiday as Santa Cruz Day in East Timor, which has been independent since 2002 . A memorial in Jardim Motael , which was designed based on a photo by Max Stahl, has been a reminder of the event since 2011. It shows the wounded Leví Bucar Côrte-Real , who is being held in the arms by another man. Côrte-Real survived. The Ordem Lorico Asuwain honors survivors and posthumous victims of the Santa Cruz massacre of November 12, 1991.

The Cup of the Liga Futebol Amadora (LFA) is named in memory of the Taça 12 de Novembro massacre .

attachment

literature

  • Steve Cox, Peter Carey: Generations of Resistance - East Timor , Cassell & Company, London 1995, ISBN 0-304-33252-6 .
  • James Dunn: East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence, Double Bay, Longueville Books, Double Bay, NSW, Australia 2003, ISBN 1-920681-03-5 .

Movies

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. CAVR report; Chapter 3, 448
  2. CAVR report; Chapter 3, 460.
  3. CAVR report; Chapter 3, 463.
  4. CAVR report; Chapter 3, 456.
  5. Antara News : Portugal Slammed at UN , September 28, 1990 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 18, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  6. TAPOL : Jakarta Distortions on Mission , October 19, 1990, online copy ( memento of the original from September 18, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  7. AFP : UN to Mediate on East Timor? , October 7, 1990 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 18, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  8. Reuters: UN-Portugal Joint Timor Mission ( Memento of the original from March 7, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.library.ohiou.edu archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , October 10, 1990
  9. TAPOL: Report from Kompas and The Jakarta Post , October 16, 1990 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 18, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  10. Reuters: East Timor Governor says Portugal visit may trigger civil war ( Memento of the original from March 7, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.library.ohiou.edu archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , November 6, 1990
  11. Kyodo News : Portugal pledges to seek East Timor independence , November 14, 1990 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 18, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  12. Tony Hall , letter to the then American Secretary of State James Baker , November 19, 1990 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 18, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  13. TAPOL: Unprecedented timorese demonstration in Lisbon , December 7, 1990 Online copy ( memento of the original from January 20, 2004 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  14. Reuters: Jakarta says hard to keep portuguese from visiting Timor ( Memento of the original of February 24, 2005 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.library.ohiou.edu archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , December 31, 1990
  15. Kompas: Portugal has not answered yet , January 23, 1991 online copy ( Memento from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive )
  16. TAPOL: E Timor At UN HR Commission , February 1, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  17. Reuters: East Timor human rights group gets assurance from UN chief , March 25, 1991 Online copy ( Memento of the original of September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  18. Diário de Notícias : Arms embargo against Indonesia being called for at council of Europe , April 26, 1991 Online copy ( Memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  19. AFP: Portuguese MPS 'planned visit to East Timor hits new snag , June 11, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  20. Reuters: East Timor Governor Pessimistic over Portuguese Visit , June 11, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from March 9, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.library.ohiou.edu
  21. Japanese Diet Members Forum on East Timor, submitted to the UN Decolonization Committee in New York on August 8, 1991: Japanese MPs petition UN on East Timor , August 10, 1991 Online copy ( Memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  22. Free East Timor Japan Coalition: Xanana Addresses UN On Timor , August 9, 1991 Online copy ( Memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  23. AFP: Jakarta, Lisbon to hold talks on Portugese visit to East Timor , August 7, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  24. TAPOL: UN Sub-Commission chairman makes statement on East Timor , August 24, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  25. Reuters: Indonesia to let portugese Parliamentarians visit East Timor , August 24, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  26. AFP: East Timor governor ready to receive poortugese legislators , August 29, 1991 Online copy ( Memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  27. Annex to a Report by the Secretary General of the United Nations on the Question of East Timor: Terms of reference of the visit to East Timor by a Delegation from the Portuguese Parliament , 23 September 1991 Online copy ( Memento of the original from 17 September 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  28. AFP: Indonesia hopes to end East Timor debate once and for all , September 18, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  29. Portugese deputy threatens to cancel commission trip to East Timor ( Memento of the original from March 7, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.library.ohiou.edu archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , September 19, 1991
  30. Reuters: Indonesia to let Portuguese team visit Timor without visas , September 23, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  31. AFP: Arrival of UN advance team to East Timor delayed , September 27, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  32. AFP: UN advance team ends visit to East Timor , October 5, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  33. a b AFP: Cuba, Tanzania, Norway anemd for UN Mission to East Timor , October 7, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  34. Público : Deus Pinheiro versus Ali Alatas on RTP (Portuguese TV) , October 5, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  35. The Age : Horta On Timor: We Will Win , October 6, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  36. The Jakarta Post: Portugese MPs 'should talk' only to officials , October 12, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  37. Público: From prisons to perfume factory , October 14, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  38. Diário de Notícias: Angelo Correia will lead the parliamentary mission in Timor , October 16, 1991 Online copy ( memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  39. Público: From prisons to perfume factory , October 18, 1991 Online copy ( Memento of the original from September 17, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamline.edu
  40. Genocide Studies Program at Yale University : Subianto Prebowo ( Memento from September 1, 2006 in the Internet Archive )
  41. ^ Genocide Studies Program at Yale University : Syafrie Syamsuddin ( Memento from September 1, 2006 in the Internet Archive )
  42. George W. Bush Institute: Bishop Alberto Ricardo Da Silva: Santa Cruz Massacre , The Freedom Collection , accessed April 3, 2015.
  43. Monika Schlicher: Portugal in East Timor. A critical examination of the Portuguese colonial history in East Timor from 1850 to 1912 . Abera, Hamburg 1996, ISBN 3-931567-08-7 , ( Abera Network Asia-Pacific 4), (also: Heidelberg, Univ., Diss., 1994)
  44. ETAN : 271 killed
  45. Ann Wigglesworth: The Growth of Civil Society in Timor-Leste: Three Moments of Activism , October 24, 2012 , accessed October 23, 2019.
  46. ETAN : 278 wounded
  47. ETAN : 270 disappeared
  48. The 12th November Massacre - A Personal Testimony ( Memento from August 4, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
  49. UNHCHR : Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, on his mission to Indonesia and East Timor from 3 to 13 July 1994 - E / CN.4 / 1995/61 / Add.1 , November 1, 1994
  50. Indonesia Information - September 1992 (East Timor Trials): The 'case' against Francisco Miranda Branco , accessed on February 18, 2014.
  51. ^ EAST TIMOR: Truth, justice and redress
  52. ^ UN : Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in East Timor - E / CN.4 / 1993/49
  53. Zmag : US trained the butchers of Timor (London Observer / The Guardian), Revealed: Proof that Indonesian Army directed the Timor Slaughter (The British Independent) ( Memento of the original from February 17, 2005 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and not yet tested. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.zmag.org
  54. ^ Allan Nairn : Secret US-training for Indonesias killers ( Memento of November 20, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), April 8, 1998.
  55. ^ Dan Nicholson: The Lorikeet Warriors: East Timorese new generation nationalist resistance, 1989-99 , Department of History, Faculty of Arts, The University of Melbourne, October 2001
  56. Picture by Max Stahl ( Memento of the original from November 12, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.unesco-ci.org
  57. ^ East Timor: Monument to the Santa Cruz Massacre
  58. Jornal da República : Edition of December 20, 2006 , accessed April 10, 2018.