wisdom

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Book illustration on wisdom in Orbis sensualium pictus by Johann Amos Comenius
Ceiling fresco : Luca Giordano's Riccardiana Gallery in the Palazzo Medici-Riccardi in Florence , scene 3. virtù : La Prudenza

Cleverness ( Greek φρόνησις phrónesis reason , Latin prudentia ) is the ability to act appropriately in a specific individual case, taking into account all the factors, goals and insights that the agent can know that are relevant to the situation. Plato takes over the idea of ​​the four cardinal virtues from Aeschylus and replaces his piety (εὐσέβεια, eusébeia) with a wise wisdom , which, according to the respective interpretation, can also be understood as wise cleverness. Marcus Tullius Cicero counts prudence in loose connection with wisdom among these cardinal virtues. Kant completely frees prudence from moral function. He considers it a pragmatic knowledge of the means to promote one's own well-being.

Cleverness can be delimited in at least two directions: In contrast to the general knowledge (Greek epistéme ), the cleverness can be directed towards the individual concrete case. In both respects either the intention to be monitored, the moral good to achieve beneficial and ethically Appropriate or, in contrast to the character of a bond to the life of cunning, cunning, guile and cunning are obtained.

History of the wisdom

overview

Since the beginning of Western philosophy, prudence has been regarded as an important virtue, at first even as the most important of the virtues. Plato in particular saw them as a prerequisite for every virtue. Aristotle's considerations , which were later modified by the Stoa , became fundamental to the theory of prudence . In the High Middle Ages, the wisdom of Thomas Aquinas , based on Aristotle, became decisive and was increasingly modified in the early modern period. It was significantly devalued by the empiricists and finally by Kant. In the 20th century, Josef Pieper popularized the Western doctrine of cleverness, while it received hardly any philosophical attention. It recently experienced a renaissance in connection with attempts to reestablish virtue ethics as an alternative to Kant's ethics of duty.

Plato

Plato spoke in his dialogues of wisdom (σοφία, sophía ) and prudence (φρόνησις, phrónēsis ). However, the translations of the latter term vary depending on how the dialogues are interpreted. Schleiermacher translated z. B. phrónēsis with "reasonableness". In his Politeia , Plato distinguished three human soul faculties: desire, affect, and reason. These are assigned as virtues: prudence (σωφροσύνη, sophrosýne ), bravery (ἀνδρεία, andreía ) and wisdom. If the three parts of the soul fulfill their tasks virtuously, there is justice (δικαιοσύνη, dikaiosýne ):

"You remember well, I replied, that after establishing three soul faculties we determined the real essence of justice, prudence, bravery and wisdom."

- Plato: Politeia, VI 504.

Later Aristotle was to distinguish wisdom from prudence. As a result, wisdom was assigned to the cardinal virtues instead of wisdom . In the dialogue Phaedo , Plato has Socrates argue that without the phrónēsis, bravery, justice or prudence would have no value:

"[69a] ... O best Simmias, that just not this is not the right exchange for us in order to preserve virtue, to exchange pleasure for pleasure and displeasure for displeasure and fear for fear and larger things for smaller things, like coin; but that the only real coin against which one has to exchange all this, [69b] reasonableness, and only everything that is sold and bought with and for this is in truth only bravery (ἀνδρεία) and prudence (σωφροσύνη) and [69c] Justice (δικαιοσύνη), and in general true virtue is now with reasonableness (φρόνησις), may or may not include pleasure and fear and everything else of the kind; but if these, separated from reasonableness, are exchanged for one another, then such a virtue is always only a shadow image and is in fact servile, which has nothing healthy and truth in it, but the truth is precisely purification from everything like that, and prudence and Justice and bravery and reason itself are purifications. "

- Plato: Phaedo 69a - 69c.

It is sometimes assumed that Plato in the Charmides dialogue determined prudence in four individual aspects as deliberation, prudence, self-knowledge and finally as knowledge of knowledge.

Aristotle criticized a "Socratic-Platonic intellectualism that apparently believes that the phenomenon of weak will or indecision can be traced back to an epistemic ignorance". According to Aristotle, the Socratic-Platonic phrónēsis term implies that the phrónēsis “as the supreme form of knowledge [...] in the practical syllogism [is] responsible for both major and minor clauses; Hence it is that in this notion, knowledge of the good can actually 'penetrate' directly to the level of action ”.

Aristotle

The explanations of Aristotle in his ethics were decisive for the later development of the doctrine of prudence. The Nicomachean Ethics is in the foreground.

Aristotle uses the term phrónēsis ambiguously in both the Eudemian ethics and the Nicomachean ethics . On the one hand, the expression stands for knowledge in a broad sense, on the other hand for “a certain ability to orientate one's own actions and those of others”. Only the phrónēsis in its second meaning corresponds to prudence.

The translation of the phrónēsis , however, fluctuates and is controversial in German as well as in English and French. The translation with “Klugheit” (corresponding to English and French prudence ) should be correct . The translation with “moral insight” or “wisdom” seems less appropriate, since Aristotle also attributes phrónēsis to preventive animals . The same applies to the English alternatives to prudence such as thought, practical wisdom, practical intelligence, wisdom .

Aristotle treated the phrónēsis in the sense of prudence in detail in the Nicomachean Ethics in Book VI, 5 and VI, 8-13. He saw the phrónēsis systematically as a dianoetic, d. H. Intellectual virtue as "moral-practical judgment".

The phrónēsis was qualified by some as a "meta-virtue" on the one hand, others criticized the lack of a "meta-virtue" in Aristotle's doctrine of wisdom. In the first case it is emphasized that the task of prudence in Aristotelian thought is to determine what is brave, just, etc., “to deliver practically ever”. According to Aristotle, speaking of virtues as such does not lead us further in ethics. Viewed from the opposite point of view, Aristotle would not have considered the situationally conflicting demands of virtues. In this respect, "both a second-level character virtue, a meta-virtue, [...] and a power of judgment responsible for virtue conflicts are missing".

For Aristotle, phrónēsis is neither a science (ἐπιστήμη, epistḗmē ) nor a making (ποίησις, poíēsis ). She is a third:

"All that remains is that it is an action-guiding, true and justified attitude [(hexis meta logou)] in the area of ​​what is good and bad for people."

For Aristotle, prudence is by definition aimed at “the good life as a whole” (NE VI 5, 1140a 27f.). The virtues require the cleverness that ensures that the goals are achieved. “But prudence is therefore not superior to wisdom and to the better part of the soul”.

"Phrónēsis for Aristotle means the optimal form of practical reason and thus the fully valid self-orientation competence in thinking, acting and in the life of a person." It does not consist in following wise rules, but in the fact that a person consults with himself, “weighs up who Sees the peculiarity of the situation and can therefore also judge when the right time and the right place is to become active in a certain way ”.

The reference to the individual is emphasized as essential for the phrónēsis (NE VI 8, 1141b 16):

“Cleverness does not only concern the general, but must also know the individual. Because it is acting, and the acting concerns the individual. "

The phrónēsis also existed in statecraft as well as in the management of the household, the economy. First and foremost, however, it is spoken of when it comes to one's own person, to the individual. Since the phrónēsis focuses on the individual, it requires experience. Experience takes time. This is why young people could not be wise for lack of experience (NE VI 9).

The phrónēsis should be distinguished from the morally indifferent deinotēs (dexterity, “neutral cunning”, “cleverness”, “sagacity”). "It is peculiar to it to be able to do and achieve that which leads to the set goal" (NE VI 12, 1144a). If the goal is bad, dexterity is cunning (also: "cunning"). The phrónēsis requires dexterity, but only exists if the goal is good. Only someone who is virtuous can be wise (NE VI 12, 1144a 36). At the same time, there is no virtue that is not also wise (NE VI 12, 1144b).

The virtue of prudence is endangered by the passions and therefore needs the support of the virtues of character.

Stoa

The phrónēsis conception of the Stoa differs from the Aristotelian one. The phrónēsis of the Stoics is not “the Aristotelian virtue of pragmatic self-orientation, but the Socratic-Platonic maximum form of intellectual activity”, so that some historians of philosophy speak of a “process of the mechanization of prudence” due to the Stoic influence (e.g. on patristicism).

According to the Stoics, prudence turned into “a universally valid transsituative, ie. H. 'Third-person' knowledge ( episteme ) of what is good and what is bad ”. The wisdom “as a mediator between divine world order and human self-realization” is functionalized: the wise man should arrange his actions in such a way that it corresponds to the plan of salvation of the world. The task of prudence is seen primarily in the "liberation from action-initiating affects".

Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas undertook a synthesis of the Aristotelian wisdom doctrine with Christian philosophy. Like Aristotle, he counted prudence ( prudentia ) among the Dianoëtischen virtues ( virtutes intellectuales ). Wisdom does not refer to the ultimate goals (like wisdom, sapientia), but to the ways to the goal. It relates "as practical reason to the realm of the concrete reality of human activity" and is defined accordingly:

"Respondeo dicendum quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, ut supra dictum est."

Prudence occupies a prominent position among the cardinal virtues. She is genitrix virtutum , the creator of virtues: there is no virtue without prudence. The primacy of prudence states that “good intentions” or “good opinions” are not enough for good action.

Specifying Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas distinguishes three phases of prudence:

  • the consilium  - considering and weighing up the options for action;
  • the iudicium  - the judgment of what to do based on deliberation;
  • the praecipium or the applicatio ad operandum  - the "implementation of the judgment in a concrete decision to act and thus in an action".

Thomas Aquinas cites the memoria ("memory that is faithful to being "), intellectus , docilitas , solertia , ratio , providentia (foresight), circumspectio and cautio as integral components of prudence .

Following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas names the virtues of prudentia as well-advisedness ( eubulia ), “right judgment” or “understanding” ( synesis ) and acumen ( gnome ).

In contrast to Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas does not focus on the "ethical ideals of a community of values, given the ethical virtues", but on the syndêrêsis, on conscience. For Thomas, this turns prudence into practical wisdom ( sapientia practica ), "an application of wisdom, albeit self-sufficient, in the area of ​​practical thinking and acting."

For Thomas Aquinas, in a sense, conscience is prudence itself.

Hume

For Hume , cleverness is only a “natural ability”, the task of which is to adapt our actions to general habits and customs.

Kant

Kant rejects an ethics based on bliss (eudaimonia). For him, happiness is no longer a principle of morality. With him, cleverness loses its moral function and becomes a "private matter". If autonomy is the highest principle, it is no longer about the “optimal realization of given goals, but about the justification of purpose setting”. Cleverness is suspected as a mere luck technique.

Kant defines cleverness as

"The skill in choosing the means to his own greatest well-being"

The purely technical part of prudence later passes over into Weber's purposeful rationality.

Quotes

“Wisdom: Allows real good to be recognized in every situation and the right means to be chosen to obtain it; it directly guides the judgment of conscience. "

- Order of Malta

“Only the unfortunate confess to the blessings of happiness; The fortunate attribute all their successes to cleverness and efficiency. "

- Jonathan Swift

“In this practical application, the understanding is called cleverness, and, if it is done by outsmarting others, it is called cunning, even if its purposes are very insignificant, cunning, even if they are connected with the disadvantage of others, mischievousness. In purely theoretical usage, on the other hand, it is simply called understanding, but in higher degrees it is then acumen, insight , sagacity, penetration; its lack, on the other hand, dullness, stupidity, brushwork, etc. s. w. "

- Arthur Schopenhauer

“Wisdom prepares reason to grasp our true happiness in every situation and to choose the right means to realize it. It controls the other virtues by giving them rule and measure. "

- Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church

See also

literature

General representations

Overview of antiquity

Aristotle

  • Theodor Ebert: Phronêsis. Notes on a term in Nicomachean ethics (VI 5, 8-13). In: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Aristoteles. Nicomachean Ethics. 2nd Edition. Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2006, pp. 165–185.
  • Otfried Höffe : Aristotle's universalistic virtue ethics. In: Klaus-Peter Rippe, Peter Schaber: Virtue ethics (RUB 9740). Reclam, Stuttgart 1998, ISBN 3-15-009740-1 , pp. 42-68 (pp. 59-62 on Klugheit).
  • Pierre Aubenque : La prudence chez Aristote . PUF, Paris 1986, ISBN 2-13-039736-0 , Paris 1963; German: The concept of prudence in Aristotle. Meiner, Hamburg 2007, ISBN 978-3-7873-1845-2 .

Web links

Commons : cleverness  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files
Wikiquote: Wisdom  - Quotes
Wiktionary: klug  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Plato: Politeia, VI 504. (translation by Wilhelm Wiegand) http://www.opera-platonis.de/Politeia6.html
  2. ↑ Plato: Phaedo 69a - 69c. (Translation by Schleiermacher), http://www.opera-platonis.de/Phaidon.pdf
  3. ^ F. Wiedmann; G. Biller: Wisdom. In: Joachim Ritter (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy. Schwabe, Basel 1976, column 857; following Andreas Luckner: Wisdom. de Gruyter, Berlin a. a. 2005, p. 77.
  4. ↑ a b Andreas Luckner: Klugheit , p. 91.
  5. ↑ Theodor Ebert: PHRONESIS. Notes on a term in Nicomachean ethics (VI 5, 8-13). In: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Aristoteles. Nicomachean Ethics. Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2nd edition. 2006, p. 165.
  6. ↑ See in detail Theodor Ebert: Phronêsis. Notes on a term in Nicomachean ethics (VI 5, 8-13). In: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Aristoteles. Nicomachean Ethics. Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2nd edition. 2006, p. 165 (172)
  7. ^ A b Otfried Höffe: Aristotle's universalistic virtue ethics. In: Rippe / Schaber (Ed.): Virtue ethics. Reclam, Stuttgart 1998, p. 42 (59)
  8. ↑ Arnim Regenbogen, Uwe Meyer: Dictionary of Philosophical Terms. Meiner, Hamburg 2005: Cleverness.
  9. ↑ a b Otfried Höffe: Aristotle's universalistic virtue ethics. In: Rippe / Schaber (Ed.): Virtue ethics. Reclam, Stuttgart 1998, p. 42 (61)
  10. ^ Andreas Luckner: Wisdom. de Gruyter, Berlin a. a. 2005, p. 90.
  11. ↑ Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics VI 5, 1140b 4-6. quoted from Theodor Ebert: Phronêsis. Notes on a term in Nicomachean ethics (VI 5, 8-13). In: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Aristoteles. Nicomachean Ethics. Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2nd edition. 2006, p. 165 (166 f.); F. Wiedmann; G. Biller: Wisdom. In: Joachim Ritter (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy. Schwabe, Basel 1976, Col. 857 give a lecture as a translation: '' Truthful, reasonable behavior (hexis, habitus) in acting in relation to human good and evil ''
  12. ↑ See Otfried Höffe: Aristotle's universalistic virtue ethics. In: Rippe / Schaber (Ed.): Virtue ethics. Reclam, Stuttgart 1998, p. 42 (60)
  13. ↑ Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics VI 13, 1145a 6. (translation by Olof Gigon, Artemis & Winkler, Düsseldorf et al. 2001, p. 269)
  14. ↑ a b Andreas Luckner: Klugheit , p. 78.
  15. ↑ Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. (Translation by Olof Gigon, Artemis & Winkler, Düsseldorf et al. 2001, p. 251)
  16. ^ So the translation by F. Wiedmann; G. Biller: Wisdom. In: Joachim Ritter (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy. Schwabe, Basel 1976, column 857
  17. ↑ So Theodor Ebert: PHRONESIS. Notes on a term in Nicomachean ethics (VI 5, 8-13). In: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Aristoteles. Nicomachean Ethics. Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2nd edition. 2006, p. 165 (183)
  18. ↑ Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. (Translation by Olof Gigon, Artemis & Winkler, Düsseldorf et al. 2001, p. 265)
  19. ↑ So F. Wiedmann; G. Biller: Wisdom. In: Joachim Ritter (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy. Schwabe, Basel 1976, column 857 (858)
  20. ↑ Critical Theodor Ebert: PHRONESIS. Notes on a term in Nicomachean ethics (VI 5, 8-13). In: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Aristoteles. Nicomachean Ethics. Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2nd edition. 2006, p. 165 (182-184), according to which Aristotle failed to distinguish between cleverness and prudence.
  21. ↑ Otfried Höffe: Aristotle's universalistic virtue ethics. In: Rippe / Schaber (Ed.): Virtue ethics. Reclam, Stuttgart 1998, p. 42 (60 f.)
  22. ^ Andreas Luckner: Wisdom. de Gruyter, Berlin a. a. 2005, p. 103.
  23. ^ So Andreas Luckner: Cleverness. de Gruyter, Berlin a. a. 2005, p. 104.
  24. ↑ a b Andreas Luckner: Klugheit , p. 106.
  25. ↑ a b c F. Wiedmann, G. Biller: Klugheit . In: Joachim Ritter (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy . Schwabe, Basel 1976, p. 857 (858).
  26. ^ Thomas Aquinas: Summa theologica. II-II, q. 47, loc. 8, quoted from http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth3047.html#40981
  27. ↑ Josef Pieper: Treatise on prudence. In: Josef Pieper: Works: in eight volumes. Vol. 4: Writings on philosophical anthropology and ethics: the concept of man in the doctrine of virtue. Meiner, Hamburg 1996, p. 1 (8)
  28. ↑ a b Andreas Luckner: Klugheit , p. 116.
  29. ↑ Josef Pieper: Treatise on prudence. In: Josef Pieper: Works. Vol. 4. Meiner, Hamburg 1996, p. 1 (13)
  30. ↑ Cf. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 49. http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth3047.html#41107
  31. ↑ Cf. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 51 article 1 resp. http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth3047.html#41164 cf. Aristoteles NE VI 8, 1141b 13 (translation by Olof Gigon, Artemis & Winkler, Düsseldorf et al. 2001, p. 251): "The absolutely well-advised (euboulos) is the one who knows how to find the greatest good that can be reached by man through action"
  32. ↑ So Theodor Ebert: PHRONESIS. Notes on a term in Nicomachean ethics (VI 5, 8-13). In: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Aristoteles. Nicomachean Ethics. Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2nd edition. 2006, p. 165 (174) for the Greek expression in Aristotle; also Otfried Höffe: Aristotle's universalistic virtue ethics. In: Rippe, Schaber (Ed.): Virtue ethics. Reclam, Stuttgart 1998, p. 42 (60)
  33. ↑ Cf. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 51 art. 3 resp. http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth3047.html#41180
  34. ↑ Cf. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 51 art. 4 resp. http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth3047.html#41188
  35. ^ Andreas Luckner: Wisdom. de Gruyter, Berlin a. a. 2005, p. 117.
  36. ^ Andreas Luckner: Wisdom. de Gruyter, Berlin a. a. 2005, p. 119.
  37. ↑ Josef Pieper: Treatise on prudence. In: Josef Pieper: Works. Vol. 4. Meiner, Hamburg 1996, p. 1 (31)
  38. ^ F. Wiedmann; G. Biller: Wisdom. In: Joachim Ritter (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy. Schwabe, Basel 1976, column 857 (861 f.)
  39. ↑ a b Andreas Luckner: Klugheit , p. 35.
  40. ↑ Kant, Akademie-Ausgabe 4, 416, quoted from F. Wiedmann; G. Biller: Wisdom. In: Joachim Ritter (Hrsg.): Historical dictionary of philosophy. Schwabe, Basel 1976, column 857 (862)
  41. ^ Frank Grunert: Intelligence. In: Peter Prechtl (Ed.): Philosophy. Metzler, Stuttgart 2005.
  42. ↑ Schopenhauer: About the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason. DB special volume: 100 works of philosophy, p. 40527 (cf. Schopenhauer-ZA vol. 5, p. 95)