Coup in Thailand 2006

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M41 Walker Bulldog tank in front of the Department of Defense . The foremost is adorned with a traditional auspicious flower wreath (phuang malai) .

On 19 September 2006, in Thailand the caretaker government under Thaksin Shinawatra by a coup of the military under General Sonthi Boonyaratglin overthrown. After 14 years of civilian government , the Thai military took over political power in the country again in 1992.

The coup was initiated by armed forces close to the king, who stated that the current government was endangering the unity of the country and the monarchy. The coup was approved by King Bhumibol Adulyadej and presumably co-initiated by the Privy Council and its chairman, Prem Tinsulanonda . It was a setback for democracy in Thailand. The coup was the 18th military coup in Thai history since 1932.

background

Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime Minister from 2001 until the 2006 coup
Prem Tinsulanonda, President of the Privy Council

The democratic development of Thailand in the 20th century was interrupted by numerous coups and long periods of military rule. After the " Black May " of 1992, however, there followed a comparatively long phase of civil governments in which the role of the military was somewhat curbed. In 1997 a largely liberal constitution - the so-called “constitution of the people” - came into force.

The billionaire telecom and IT entrepreneur Thaksin Shinawatra founded the Thai-Rak-Thai party (TRT, "Thais love Thais" or "Thais love Thailand") in 1998 . This was by far the strongest party in the 2001 parliamentary elections and then placed the government under Thaksin as prime minister. The Thaksins and TRT program is often described as populist. It focused on strengthening the domestic economy and reducing the dependence of the Thai economy on exports. They promised universal access to health care, a debt moratorium for farmers and the introduction of village development funds that would distribute microcredit to start-ups and infrastructure projects. These promises were also implemented in Thaksin's first term in office. His government tried to violently fight the drug problem and separatism of Muslim Malays in the southern provinces. In the 2003 "war on drugs" and the conflict in southern Thailand since 2004 , thousands died and serious human rights violations occurred.

Sonthi Boonyaratglin, Commander in Chief of the Army (2005-06) and leader of the coup

The opposition and non-governmental organizations accused Thaksin of an increasingly authoritarian leadership style, and freedom of the press was restricted. When Thaksin had his cousin Chaiyasit Shinawatra appointed as commander in chief of the Thai army in 2003 , he was also accused of nepotism . Nevertheless, the TRT was re-elected in 2005 with 60.7% of the vote and three quarters of the parliamentary seats. Political scientists, however, describe a power struggle taking place behind the scenes between the Thaksin camp and the old elite from the palace-related persons and groups in the Privy Council , politics (especially the opposition Democratic Party ), the military, justice and administration - from Duncan McCargo as a “network -Monarchy "- with the President of the Privy Council Prem Tinsulanonda at the head. Prem succeeded in getting General Sonthi Boonyaratglin , a critic of Thaksin, to become Army Commander-in-Chief in October 2005.

Political crisis

Rally of the People's Alliance for Democracy (“Yellow Shirts”) in February 2006

Initially small, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), initiated by civil rights activists, trade unions and NGOs, grew into a mass movement in early 2006. The stumbling block was the sale of Thaksins Shin Corporation to the Singaporean Temasek Holdings , which was only made possible by a previously amended law and the prime minister and his family did not have to pay taxes for the proceeds of the equivalent of 1.6 billion euros. This was seen by opponents of the government as evidence of his abuse of power and self-interest. The PAD demonstrations in February and March 2006 were attended by over 100,000 people who were identified by yellow shirts and who called for Thaksin's resignation. General Sonthi Boonyaratglin denied rumors that the military might intervene: “Political problems should be solved by politicians. Military coups are a thing of the past. "

Thaksin dissolved parliament, early elections were held on April 2, 2006 and Thaksin left his office, instead his deputy Chitchai Wannasathit temporarily took over the affairs of state. The three main opposition parties, the Democratic Party, Chart Thai Party and Mahachon Party boycotted the election because they felt they did not have a fair chance. In most constituencies, only one candidate from the TRT ran. In 36 constituencies in southern Thailand no MP was elected at all, as the only candidate did not even receive 20% of the vote, while most voters abstained or simply voted “no”.

The "yellow shirts" called on King Bhumibol Adulyadej to appoint a "neutral" head of government. However, the latter declared that it was undemocratic and unconstitutional to appoint a new prime minister without a parliamentary majority. On the other hand, he pointed out that an election in which only one party competes would be undemocratic and abnormal. On May 8, 2006, the Thai Constitutional Court declared the previous election invalid and ordered a retry. On the occasion of the celebrations for King Bhumibol Adulyadej's golden jubilee on the throne, Thaksin Shinawatra took over the government again as interim prime minister on May 23. The new election was scheduled for October 15.

Shortly before the jubilee of the throne, the manager magazine , which is closely related to the “yellow shirts”, published a series of articles about the alleged “ Finland plot ”, which Thaksin accused of wanting to abolish the monarchy and establish a one-party system based on the communist model. Thaksin, in turn, claimed in late June 2006 that “a deserving person outside the Constitution” was overthrowing him. This was generally interpreted as a reference to the President of the Privy Council, Prem Tinsulanonda. He explained to graduates of the Chulachomklao Military Academy and the Naval Academy that the loyalty of the armed forces belonged to the king and the country, but not to the current government.

On August 24, 2006, police stopped a vehicle with 67 kilograms of explosives and a working detonator near Thaksin's home. At the wheel sat the former chauffeur of General Pallop Pinmanee , commander of the Internal Security Operations Command and opponent of Thaksin. While the government spoke of averting the assassination attempt on the interim premier, the opposition claimed that Thaksin had only orchestrated a conspiracy.

Course of the coup

Bangkok residents greet the military.
Tanks with food and soft drinks given by the population

The retired Air Force officer and former Foreign Minister Prasong Soonsiri , according to his own statement, began working out the coup plans in July 2006 together with the Army Commander-in-Chief, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin , and three other active and retired military officials. According to Prasong, however, the President of the Privy Council, Prem Tinsulanonda, was not involved in the specific planning.

Shortly after 6 p.m. Thai time on September 19, 2006, a number of tanks drove towards the government district in Bangkok . The guards of the government building were disarmed by soldiers in uniform, and the military also occupied the radio and media companies. The Prime Minister Thaksin was at the time at the United Nations General Assembly in New York . The television channel 5 operated by the Thai army interrupted its program and broadcast songs composed by the king. On the evening of September 19, General Sonthi announced that Thaksin had been deposed.

Thereupon Thaksin tried in a live TV channel from New York to remove Sonthi from his office and put his confidante General Runjoj Mahasaranond at the head of the army. However, this message could no longer be transmitted because the line was interrupted and Thaksin no longer had any influence on the processes in Thailand.

King Bhumibol Adulyadej blessed the coup the following day. To maintain peace and order, he appointed Sonthi Boonyaratglin as chairman of the newly established "Council for Administrative Reform". The following call was made in the name of the king: "All people should remain peaceful and the officials should from now on listen to General Sonthi's instructions."

The heads of the three armed forces and the police formed the “Council for Administrative Reform in the Democratic System with the King as Head of State” ( Thai คณะ ปฏิรูป การ ปกครอง ใน ระบอบ ประชาธิปไตย อัน มี พระ มหา กษัตริย์ ทรง เป็น ประมุข , RTGS Khana Patirup Kan-Pokkhrong Nai Rabop Prachathipatai An Mi Phra Maha Kasat Song Pen Pramuk , English-speaking name: Council for Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy , CDR for short ), who took over all state authority. This promised to then return power to the Thai people. To this end, however, the constitution should first be revised and elections should be held after one year, i.e. in 2007. After the coup, the state of emergency in Thailand continued for another four weeks, including a ban on gatherings.

The military cited the increasing corruption of Thaksin's government and growing division as the main reasons for the coup. As a result, Thaksin's confidants were also removed from their offices and temporarily arrested. For example, the Deputy Prime Minister Chitchai Wannasathit, the Minister in the Prime Minister's Office Newin Chidchob , the General Secretary of the ruling Thai-Rak-Thai party Prommin Lertsuridej and Thaksin's brother-in-law and confidante Somchai Wongsawat . Thaksin's wife Potjaman Na Pombejra left the country at short notice and went to Singapore.

Reactions

The then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan criticized the coup on the grounds that the country had built a stable democracy over the past few decades. Annan called on the Thai people to remain calm.

According to initial surveys, large parts of the Thai population (up to 80%) welcomed the coup. That doesn't mean they saw him as legitimate. However, they considered the intervention of the military to be inevitable and hoped for an end to the months-long political crisis in which parliament and other constitutional bodies had shown themselves to be incapable of finding solutions. It is noteworthy that intellectuals and members of the middle and upper classes approved the coup, who otherwise rejected undemocratic means.

follow

Surayud Chulanont, Prime Minister after the coup

Two weeks after the coup, the military junta (“Council for Administrative Reform ”) put a transitional constitution into force ( Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Interim), 2549 Buddhist calendar (2006) ; รัฐธรรมนูญ แห่ง ราช อาณาจักร ไทย (ฉบับ ชั่วคราว) พุทธศักราช 2549 , RTGS: Ratthathammanun Haeng Ratcha-anachak Thai (Chabap Chua Khrao) Phutthasakkarat Songphan-haroi-sisip-kao). It was largely worked out by the royalist lawyers Meechai Ruchuphan , Wissanu Krea-ngam and Borwornsak Uwanno .

On October 1, 2006, the junta set up a "civilian" transitional government under the retired General and Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont . Parliament was replaced by a “National Legislative Assembly” with 250 members selected by the junta and Meechai Ruchuphan as chairman. The “Council for Administrative Reform” was renamed the “Council for National Security”, but retained numerous special powers and enjoyed immunity for all measures and orders.

Many intellectuals, including staunch opponents of Thaksin, were disillusioned with the consequences of the coup soon after the coup. On May 30, 2007, the Constitutional Court dissolved the Thai-Rak-Thai party for violating the electoral law and suspended 111 of its officials - including Thaksin Shinawatra and all leading members of the disempowered government - with a five-year ban from political office. The Democratic Party, which was also accused of violations, acquitted it.

Approval and rejection of the 2007 constitution by province

On August 19, 2007, the draft of a new permanent constitution was approved in a referendum by 57.8% of the electorate (with a 57.6% turnout). The degree of approval, however, varied greatly from region to region: in 24 provinces in the north and north-east of the country, a majority rejected the constitution.

The constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2550 Buddhist calendar (2007) ( รัฐธรรมนูญ แห่ง ราช อาณาจักร ไทย พุทธศักราช ๒๕๕๐ , RTGS: Ratthathammanun Haeng Ratcha-anachak Thai Phutthasakkarat Songphan-haroi-hasip) came into force on August 24 and remained in effect until the next military coup in the May 2014 valid. Critics saw it as less democratic than the 1997 constitution. The opponents of the coup and the new constitution - supporters, but also critics of Thaksin - organized themselves in the Democratic Alliance against Dictatorship (DAAD), better known as the "Red Shirts" movement.

Parliamentary elections were held on December 23, 2007. In these was the Party of People's Power , had gathered in the mainly former members of the TRT and trailers Thaksin strongest with 39.6% of the vote and 233 of 500 seats power. They formed a coalition with five smaller parties and Samak Sundaravej became Prime Minister on January 29, 2008. The “Council for National Security” then disbanded.

literature

Web links

Commons : Category Putsch in Thailand 2006 with subcategories  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. a b L.P. Schmid: Background and consequences of the military coup in Thailand. 2007.
  2. a b c Coup in Thailand. Putschists arrest deputy head of government. In: Spiegel Online , September 20, 2006.
  3. a b c d Bünte: Putsch in Thailand. 2006.
  4. ^ Duncan McCargo: Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand. In: The Pacific Review. Volume 18, No. 4, December 2005, pp. 499-519, doi: 10.1080 / 09512740500338937 , especially pp. 499, 506.
  5. Michael H. Nelson: Military coup in Thailand - what now? An assessment of the coup on September 19, 2006. In: Südostasien , Volume 4 (2006), pp. 48–51, on p. 50.
  6. Michael J. Montesano: Political Contests in the Advent of Bangkok's September 19 coup. In: Divided over Thaksin. 2009, pp. 1–26, at pp. 14–16.
  7. Lars Peter Schmid: Background and consequences of the coup in Thailand. In: KAS-Auslandsinformationen , 2/2007, pp. 64–78, on p. 71.
  8. Thaksin refuses to resign despite protests in Bangkok. In: The New York Times (online), March 6, 2006.
  9. Michael J. Montesano: Political Contests in the Advent of Bangkok's September 19 coup. In: Divided over Thaksin. 2009, pp. 1–26, on p. 6.
  10. Michael H. Nelson : Political Turmoil in Thailand. Thaksin, Protests, Elections, and the King. In: Eastasia.at , Volume 5, No. 1, September 2006, pp. 13-14.
  11. Michael J. Montesano: Political Contests in the Advent of Bangkok's September 19 coup. In: Divided over Thaksin. 2009, pp. 1–26, on p. 7.
  12. Michael K. Connors: Liberalism, authoritarianism and the politics of decisionism in Thailand. In: Contemporary Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia. Routledge, Abingdon / New York 2010, p. 168.
  13. Michael J. Montesano: Political Contests in the Advent of Bangkok's September 19 coup. In: Divided over Thaksin. 2009, pp. 1–26, at pp. 7–8.
  14. Michael J. Montesano: Political Contests in the Advent of Bangkok's September 19 coup. In: Divided over Thaksin. 2009, pp. 1–26, on p. 9.
  15. Rodney Tasker: Grumbles, revelations of a Thai coup maker. In: Asia Times , December 22, 2006.
  16. King takes the side of the putschists. In: Welt (online), September 20, 2006.
  17. Hides Hong Thongswasdi: Military intervention in Thai Parliamentary Democracy. In: Parliaments as Peacebuilders in Conflict-Affected Countries. World Bank Institute, Washington DC 2008, p. 168
  18. Thitinan Pongsudhirak: The Tragedy of the 1997 Constitution. In: Divided Over Thaksin. 2009, pp. 27–37, on p. 27.
  19. Lars Peter Schmid: Background and consequences of the coup in Thailand. In: KAS-Auslandsinformationen , 2/2007, pp. 64–78, on p. 75.
  20. ^ Chairat Charoensin-o-larn: Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand. In: Divided Over Thaksin. 2009, pp. 49–79, at p. 58.
  21. ^ Chairat Charoensin-o-larn: Redrawing Thai Political Space. The Red Shirt Movement. In: Tim Bunnell et al .: Cleavage, Connection and Conflict in Rural, Urban and Contemporary Asia. Ari Springer, Dordrecht 2013, pp. 201–222, on p. 203.