Conflict in southern Thailand since 2004

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Conflict in southern Thailand since 2004
Souththailandmap-de.png
date since January 4, 2004
place Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat provinces, parts of Songkhla Province in southern Thailand
output
Parties to the conflict

Government of Thailand
Thai Armed Forces
Thai Police
Paramilitary:

Bersatu , umbrella organization of:

Commander

Thaksin Shinawatra (2004-06)
Gen. Pallop Pinmanee (2004)
Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin (2005-07)
Gen. Anupong Paochinda (2007-10)
Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha (2010–)
Chalerm Yubamrung (2011–13)
Yingluck Shinawatra (2011–14)

Wan Kadir Che Wan u. a.

losses
a total of 6,543 dead, 11,919 injured (as of January 2016)

In southern Thailand there has been a conflict between Islamic and separatist groups and the government of Thailand since 2004 . The insurgents' demands range from more participation to independence with the introduction of Sharia law . A radical Islamic part of the rebels is striving for a state called "Patani Darussalam", which should also include two northern states of Malaysia . The conflict cost the lives of over 6,500 people by January 2016.

The former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra , who ruled from 2001 to 2006, was accused of worsening the conflict. By April 2011, 60,000 members of the armed forces and police were deployed in the region. The insurgents also killed civilians unrelated to security forces, particularly teachers. Police in the area have been charged with brutality. The army has detained Muslims without charge in some cases in the context of the conflict. The following forces are driving the uprising:

background

The population of the scene of the conflict, the provinces of Narathiwat , Yala and Pattani , consists predominantly of Malay-speaking Muslims who have strong ethnic and cultural ties to neighboring Malaysia. Thailand is a predominantly Buddhist country. Many Muslims living there feel treated as second-class citizens.

There have been separatist tendencies in the area of ​​the former Sultanate of Patani since its incorporation into the Thai central state in 1902. The government of Thailand attempted a forced assimilation (" Thaiization ") of the ethnic Malay population . This began at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century and was intensified during the Plaek Phibunsongkhram dictatorship from 1938. As early as the 1940s to 1980s, there were a number of revolts against this central government policy.

General Prem Tinsulanonda , who was Prime Minister in the 1980s, finally ended the practice of assimilation, granted the Islamic population cultural rights and promoted economic development in the traditionally disadvantaged region. In the 1990s, the conflict practically died down. It flared up again after Thaksin Shinawatra came to power in 2001, whose government adopted an aggressive course of action against separatist attacks. According to observers, a number of political mistakes by the Thaksin government fueled the conflict. The Prime Minister dissolved the administrative center established by Prem in 1981 for the southern border provinces , which had served as a link between the central government and Muslim leaders, and the joint conflict resolution task force made up of civilians, police and military.

By July 2006, one tenth of the 360,000 Buddhists living in the three southern provinces had left their homeland.

timeline

Before 2004

From 2001 to 2003 there were isolated shootings, arson and bomb attacks and attacks on arms depots of government troops in the southern provinces. Thaksin Shinawatra's government, however, denied that it had anything to do with the ethno-religious conflict or separatism and instead attributed it to turf wars between criminal organizations. Thaksin, who himself had been a police officer before his political career, expressed his conviction that these problems should be solved by the police and not the army. In 2002 he dissolved the special administrative center for the Southern Border Provinces and the Civil-Police-Military Task Force 43. The “war on drugs” proclaimed by Thaksin in January 2003 led, according to various non-governmental organizations, to serious human rights violations such as extrajudicial executions and killing of innocent people. Many Malay-Muslim villagers felt threatened and disregarded by government forces and joined militant separatists such as the BRN coordinasi.

2004-05

On January 4, 2004, arson attacks were carried out on 20 schools and three police stations in Narathiwat Province. On the same day, more than 50 gunmen who could not be identified stormed the weapons depot of the 4th Engineer Battalion, shot dead four Buddhist soldiers and forced Muslim soldiers to speak the Islamic creed and to desert. They captured numerous assault rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers, bazookas, pistols and ammunition. One of the attackers reportedly called Patani Merdeka! ("Free Patani").

On January 5, the government declared martial law in the three provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala. The army and police carried out mass searches and arrests without a judicial decision. They operated under great pressure as Thaksin had promised to locate and arrest those responsible for the January 4 attack within a week. Those arrested were allowed to be held for seven days without prosecution.

Muslim lawyer and human rights activist Somchai Neelapaijit , chairman of the Thai Muslim Lawyers Association, denounced alleged ill-treatment and torture of detainees in a letter dated March 11, 2004 to the Thai Senate Human Rights Committee. A day later Somchai " disappeared ". His alleged death has never been solved.

On April 28, 2004, on the orders of General Pallop Pinmanee and contrary to the orders of Vice Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who was responsible for security policy , the army stormed the Krue-Se Mosque in Pattani. The soldiers killed all 32 suspected rebels who had holed up in the mosque. According to the military, they had attacked police controls in the early morning hours. A total of five security forces and 106 suspected militant opponents of the government, including numerous young people, died that day.

On October 25 of the same year, police killed 85 demonstrators who were protesting arrests in the border town of Tak Bai . The event gave the militant Islamists further impetus. In November 2005 the government imposed in addition to the three affected provinces in two adjacent counties of the province of Songkhla the state of emergency .

2006

The “National Reconciliation Commission” set up by Prime Minister Thaksin in March 2005 and headed by ex-Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun presented its final report in June 2006 with proposals for resolving the conflict. Among other things, she suggested making Malay the second “working language” in the region. However, the influential President of the Privy Council, Prem Tinsulanonda , rejected the request and it was not pursued any further.

The Army Commander-in-Chief, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin , who is himself a Muslim, proposed negotiations with the insurgents in September 2006. According to Sonthi, this was not what the Thaksin government wanted. A short time later he carried out a coup and overthrew Thaksin . The new Prime Minister appointed by the military, Surayud Chulanont, apologized for the aggressive policies of his predecessor. Nevertheless, in November 2006, rebels burned three schools in Yala Province. A fourth was badly damaged. Schools and teachers were particularly often targets of the rebels, as they see them as the embodiment of central government. The teachers' association then decided to close all schools in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat until the government could guarantee their safety. Over 1000 institutions were affected. In November 2007, the rebels crucified a Muslim who had served as an informant for a militia affiliated with the government and beheaded two Buddhist fishmongers.

2008-11

On November 4, 2008, 62 people were killed in a bomb explosion in Narathiwat Province. In 2009 the head of PULO attended a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference . In May 2011, two Buddhist monks were bombed.

2013

In March 2013, the Thai government began talks with the BRN, mediated by former Malaysian secret service director Ahmad Zamzamin, about a solution to the conflict. The attacks continued, however. Although they had agreed on confidentiality, the BRN published a catalog in a YouTube video in April with five demands that they consider to be prerequisites for peace. The Army Commander in Chief Prayuth Chan-ocha rejected these demands. However, the government promised to look into it and reconsider it. In September, the BRN added a requirement for special administrative status to be included in the Thai constitution for the southernmost provinces . In November, PULO and BIPP also announced that they would take part in informal peace talks with government representatives in future.

See also

literature

  • Canan Atilgan, Patrick Schneider: “Nothing new in the south?” Analytical considerations of the conflict in the southernmost provinces of Thailand. In: KAS foreign information. 8/2010, pp. 143-160.
  • Marco Bünte: Violence in Thailand's South. From ethnic to religious conflict? In: Religion and Identity. Muslims and non-Muslims in Southeast Asia. Harrassowitz-Verlag, Wiesbaden 2008, ISBN 978-3-447-05729-5 .
  • Peter Chalk: The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand. Understanding the Conflict's Evolving Dynamic. RAND National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica CA 2008, ISBN 978-0-8330-4534-8 .
  • Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya: Terrorist Threat from Thailand: Jihad or Quest for Justice? Potomac Books, Washington DC 2013, ISBN 978-1-59797-202-4 .
  • Tyrell Haberkorn: Southern Thailand. Marginalization, injustice and the failure to govern. In: Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific. Why some subside and others don't. Routledge, New York 2012, pp. 189-200.
  • Michael K. Jerryson: Buddhist Fury. Religion and Violence in Southern Thailand. Oxford University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-19-933966-2 .
  • Duncan McCargo : Mapping National Anxieties. Thailand's Southern Conflict. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen 2012, ISBN 978-87-7694-085-0 .
  • Thitinan Pongsudhirak: The Malay-Muslim insurgency in Southern Thailand. In: A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham / Northampton MS 2007, ISBN 978-1-84720-718-0 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Mike Giglio: Thailand Tries to Project Normality . ( Memento of January 19, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Newsweek website , January 14, 2011.
  2. Boonradom Chitradon: Southern extremists learning from bin Laden website of the Bangkok Post
  3. Insurgency claimed 6,543 lives in last 12 years Bomb follows killings in restive southern Thailand. Bangkok Post (online) January 4, 2016.
  4. Bloodshed part of daily life in Thailand's Muslim south ( Memento from March 25, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) AFP on Google, March 19, 2008.
  5. Bomb kills one, wounds 23 in restive Thai south website of The Straits Times , April 18, 2011.
  6. Thailand: Beheadings, Burnings in Renewed Terror Campaign, Human Rights Watch , July 7, 2008.
  7. Strategy based on hopelessness ( Memento from August 1, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 205 kB) Uploaded texts from the Bangkok Post , July 10, 2006 issue.
  8. SOUTHERN CARNAGE: KINGDOM SHAKEN ( Memento from January 19, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Internet site of The Nation newspaper , April 29, 2004.
  9. ^ Muslim Insurgents Confound Military in Thailand website of The New York Times , August 31, 2009.
  10. Mujahideen Pattani Movement (BNP) , GlobalSecurity.org, accessed on March 28, 2017.
  11. Tiffany Kay Hacker, Linda Michaud-Emin: Thailand. In Barry Rubin: Guide to Islamist Movements. ME Sharpe, Armonk (NY) / London, 2010, p. 105, entry The Mujahideen Pattani Movement (BNP) .
  12. ^ Ian Storey: Malaysia's Role in Thailand's Southern Insurgency. In: Terrorism Monitor. Volume 5, No. 5, 2007.
  13. msnbc.msn.com
  14. ^ Nguyen Minh Quang, Mikio Oishi: Spiralling Insurgency in the Deep South. Thailand's Unseen Road to Ethnic Conflict Management. In: Mikio Oishi: Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia. Towards a New ASEAN Way of Conflict Management. Springer, Singapore a. a. 2016, pp. 61–87, on p. 64.
  15. ^ Shane Joshua Barter: Civilian Strategy in Civil War. Insights from Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Palgrave Macmillan, New York / Basingstoke (Hampshire) 2014, p. 130.
  16. Jayshree Bajoria, Carin Zissis: The Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand. Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder, September 10, 2008.
  17. Strategy based on hopelessness ( Memento from August 1, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 205 kB) Scanned article by the Bangkok Post , July 10, 2006.
  18. Joseph Liow Chinyong: Iron Fists without Velvet Gloves. The Krue Se Mosque Incident and Lessons in Counterinsurgeny for the Southern Thai Conflict. In C. Christine Fair, Sumit Ganguly: Treading on Hallowed Ground. Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York 2008, pp. 177–192, at p. 192.
  19. ^ Human Rights Watch (HRW): No One Is Safe. Insurgent Violence Against Civilians in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces. 2007, p. 29.
  20. HRW: No One Is Safe. 2007, pp. 29-32.
  21. HRW: No One Is Safe. 2007, p. 32.
  22. HRW: No One Is Safe. 2007, pp. 33-34.
  23. HRW: No One Is Safe. 2007, pp. 34-35.
  24. ^ Human Rights Watch: "It Was Like Suddenly My Son No Longer Existed." Enforced Disappearances in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces. 2007, pp. 55-61.
  25. Killings At Pattani's Krue Se Mosque And A Cover Up Inquiry achrweb.org, May 6, 2004.
  26. Thai districts impose martial law website of the BBC , November 3, 2005.
  27. ^ Duncan McCargo: Thailand's National Reconciliation Commission. A flawed response to the Southern Conflict. (PDF; 157 kB) In: Global Change, Peace & Security. Volume 22, No. 1, February 2010, pp. 75-91.
  28. Prem disagrees with proposed use of Malay as official language ( Memento from June 5, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Website of the Siamese newspaper The Nation , June 25, 2006.
  29. SOUTHERN INSURGENCY Sonthi calls for talks ( Memento of 18 May 2011 at the Internet Archive ) website of the Thai newspaper The Nation , 2nd September, 2006.
  30. Thailand 'rebels' attack schools Internet site of the British broadcaster BBC, November 4, 2006.
  31. DEEP SOUTH Over 1,000 schools closed ( Memento from March 3, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Internet site of the Thai newspaper The Nation , September 29, 2006.
  32. Muslim crucified, two Buddhists beheaded in Thailand: police ( Memento from December 1, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) AFP at Google, November 28, 2006.
  33. lenta.ru
  34. PULO President invited to speak at OIC Meeting April 18 to 19, 2009 ( Memento from May 30, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Website of the newspaper Pattani Post
  35. ^ Bomb kills two monks in Yala Bangkok Post website , May 17, 2011.
  36. ^ Thailand: Peace talks with Muslim rebels. Deutschlandfunk, March 28, 2013.
  37. Demands by BRN to be discussed. In: The Nation. August 20, 2013.
  38. Pakorn Peungnetr: BRN pushes for special administration. In: The Nation. 17th September 2013.
  39. Pulo, BIPP to join peace talks. In: Bangkok Post. November 6, 2013.