Thaksin Shinawatra

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Thaksin Shinawatra (2005)

Thaksin Shinawatra ( Thai : ทักษิณ ชิน วัตร , RTGS transcription : Thaksin Chinnawat , pronunciation: [ tʰáksǐn ʨʰinnáwát ], listen ? / I ) (born July 26, 1949 in San Kamphaeng , Chiang Mai Province ) is a Thai politician and entrepreneur who also has Montenegrin citizenship. From February 2001 to September 2006 he was Prime Minister of Thailand . Audio file / audio sample

The former police officer and doctor of criminal law founded the IT, telecommunications and media company Shin Corp. in 1987 . that made him one of the richest men in Thailand. In 1994 he went into politics, in 2001 he became prime minister after a landslide victory for the Thai-Rak-Thai party (TRT) he founded.

Thaksin's government reduced poverty, especially in rural areas, introduced universal access to health care and invested in infrastructure. Thaksin declared a "war on drugs" in which over 2,500 people died, and violently fought the Muslim uprising in the southern provinces . Thaksin was the first democratically elected prime minister to serve the full four-year term and was re-elected by an overwhelming majority in 2005. After he sold billions in his company tax-free to foreign investors, there was considerable criticism. A citizens' movement against Thaksin, the People's Alliance for Democracy (“Yellow Shirts”), carried out mass protests, accusing him of corruption, abuse of office and the pursuit of sole rule. Thaksin reacted with new elections in 2006, which the opposition boycotted and which were subsequently declared invalid by the Constitutional Court .

On September 19, 2006, the military staged a coup, the TRT party was banned and Thaksin was banned from politics. In 2008 he was sentenced to a prison term for abuse of office, but he had previously fled abroad and has been outside of Thailand ever since. Thaksin continues to influence Thai politics through the People's Power Party , which ruled from 2007 to 2008, and its successor organization Pheu Thai , as well as through the mass organization United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship ("Red Shirts"), which is closely related to him . From 2011 to 2014, his sister Yingluck Shinawatra was Prime Minister.

Origin and family

Thaksin comes from a Chinese family of wealthy silk and rice traders. His great-grandfather Seng Sae Khu, who belonged to the Hakka ethnic group , immigrated to Siam (now Thailand) from the Chinese province of Guangdong in the 1860s . He became a tax farmer , first in Chanthaburi , then in Chiang Mai. Grandfather Chiang then founded the silk factory around 1932. As part of the government's Thaiization campaign, the family adopted the Thai name Shinawatra in 1938. Thaksin's father was the businessman Lert Shinawatra , his mother Yindee Ramingwong, who came from the royal family of Chiang Mai on his mother's side.

Thaksin has eight siblings. His older sister Yaowalak became the first female mayor of Chiang Mai, his younger sister Yaowapa became a key politician of Thaksin's TRT party and wife of the short-term prime minister Somchai Wongsawat . Thaksin's youngest sister is Yingluck Shinawatra , who became Thailand's first female Prime Minister in 2011. The father was also politically active. He was a member of parliament from 1969 to 1976 and a member of the right-wing, military - affiliated Chart Thai party . The family lived in the small town of San Kamphaeng until Thaksin was 15, then moved to Chiang Mai , where he attended Montfort College , an expensive and prestigious private school.

Training and police career

After graduating from the Armed Forces Preparatory School , Thaksin trained at the Police Cadet Academy of Thailand in Nakhon Pathom . Thaksin won a scholarship to study in the United States , where he earned a master's degree in criminal justice (Criminal Justice) at the Eastern Kentucky University acquired. After returning to Thailand in 1975, Thaksin became Prida Patthanathabut's personal police guard. This was a party colleague of Thaksin's father and had a ministerial office. Thaksin gained his first political experience here. In fact, he worked less as a policeman and more as a secretary to the politician. He wrote speeches for him and, as a messenger, brought payments to MPs whose loyalty was to be ensured. Prida lost his post in January 1976 and Thaksin was sent to a regular Bangkok police station.

In August 1976, Thaksin married Potjaman Damapong, the sister of a friend from the Police Academy, the daughter of a senior police general and a noblewoman. In the course of their marriage they had a son, Panthongtae (* 1978), and two daughters, Pintongtha (* 1982) and Peathongtarn (* 1986). Thaksin received another scholarship to continue his studies in the United States, this time at Sam Houston State University in the state of Texas . His wife went with him. His dissertation examined the question of whether there is a correlation between studying criminal law and students' attitudes towards the rule of law . In 1979 he received his doctorate. He then taught at the police academy and headed the police information center. Thaksin resigned from the police force in 1987 with the rank of lieutenant colonel .

Business career

Thaksin began working as an entrepreneur while he was still in the police force. Thaksin and Potjaman's first company was a silk goods shop in Bangkok's Trocadero Hotel. However, sales were very poor and they had to give up after just a month. Then Thaksin tried his hand at the marketing of cinema films, but this also failed after initial successes. In 1979 he bought an old cinema in central Bangkok. Because this did not generate satisfactory income either, Thaksin had it demolished and apartments built on the site. This project also failed, and Thaksin, being pursued by disgruntled financiers and customers, had to sell it for a loss. At the time, his debt was 200 million baht.

Then Thaksin got into the nascent computer business in 1981. He bought IBM computers and rented them to government offices, initially to the Thai State Railways and Chulalongkorn University . Gradually, he was able to count more and more public authorities and state-owned companies among his customers. He founded the Shinawatra Computer and Communications Group ( Shin Corp. ) in 1983 and Advanced Info Service (AIS) in 1986 . As head of the police information center, he encouraged the purchase of computers in 1986 and then applied for the tender with his own company. This order contributed greatly to the growth of his company.

Thaksin's company was successful in introducing cellular communications and satellite broadcasting in Thailand. Shin Corp. received further preferential rights from the government, such as the license for the country's first cable television station, the first Thai communications satellite ( Thaicom ) and one of two licenses for private wireless operators. In this way, Thaksin became one of the richest men in Thailand. In 1992 he was voted “Businessman of the Year” by the ASEAN Institute in Jakarta ( Indonesia ) .

Start of political career

He joined the Palang Dharma Party in 1994 and was appointed Foreign Minister in November 1994. However, after three months the government broke up. In mid-1995 he was elected party leader. From 1995 to 1997 he was intermittently Deputy Prime Minister under Banharn Silpa-archa and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh .

On July 14, 1998 he founded the Thai-Rak-Thai Party (TRT - "Thais love Thais") and was elected party chairman. In September 2000, the National Anti-Corruption Commission initiated proceedings against Thaksin on allegations that he had not adequately disclosed his assets. Thaksin had transferred blocks of shares in his companies to his domestic helpers and chauffeur. As a result, they appeared in the list of the 50 richest stockholders in Thailand.

In the election campaign in January 2001, after the Asian crisis that hit Thailand hard and the austerity policies of the government of Chuan Leekpai, which was shaped by an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program, Thaksin campaigned for a $ 1 billion rural investment program Dollar. He promised help for ailing banks, lower taxes and the privatization of state-owned companies. Thaksin declared that he wanted to be a “ CEO Prime Minister”, that is to say, to run the country with the same efficiency and the same business acumen as its commercial enterprises.

Term of office as Prime Minister

Thaksin 2002

The TRT was by far the strongest party. On February 9, 2001, Thaksin was appointed the 23rd Prime Minister of Thailand. He led a coalition government with a comfortable majority in parliament. His government gave each village a loan for development and infrastructure projects. She introduced the 30 baht program in health care, which was supposed to make doctor and hospital visits affordable for everyone. In May 2001, Thaksin fired the president of the Thai central bank . In September he forced the board of the state-owned Thai Airways to resign.

In August 2001, the Constitutional Court decided with a majority of 8: 7 judges to acquit Thaksin in the corruption proceedings dating back to before his election victory. The main reason for this was that his term as deputy prime minister predated the 1997 constitution. In the view of the judges, therefore, the stricter transparency requirements for public officials of the new constitution were not yet applicable to him.

Thaksinomics

Thaksin's economic policy concepts were summarized by the Bangkok press from 2001 under the catchphrase Thaksinomics . This was also adopted by renowned scientists from 2002. On the one hand, he pursued Keynesian approaches to strengthen the domestic economy. He wanted to make Thailand more independent from abroad and at the same time to distribute the economic output, which is excessively concentrated on Bangkok, more strongly to the provinces and to relocate it to the local level. To this end, his government invested billions in rural development and infrastructure programs and loans for small and medium-sized enterprises . After experiencing the Asian crisis, Thaksin wanted to steer Thailand away from the so-called East Asian economic model, which is based primarily on export, cheap labor and foreign investment.

A particularly prominent project in this context was the “One Million Baht Village Fund”. Each of the approx. 77,000 Muban (the smallest administrative unit in Thailand) was given a circulation fund of one million baht (approx. 24,000 US dollars). From this, local committees were able to grant short-term micro-credits to villagers on their own initiative, which was intended to promote business start-ups in particular . This was one of the largest government micro-credit initiatives in the world. In the first three years of Thaksin's tenure, 13 million Thai people received loans from village funds that totaled 224 billion baht. Another very high-profile project was the establishment of a program for general health care, whereby the insured only had to pay a deductible of 30 baht (then € 0.64) per treatment. Within three years, 59 million people had health insurance through this program, which increased the proportion of the population with access to health care to 95.5 percent. In doing so, Thaksin's government fulfilled two of the TRT's key election promises. Critics dismissed these programs as mere populist or clientelist election gifts to the poor and rural electorate. The program had a populist effect mainly because of the rhetoric with which Thaksin advertised it and which emphasized the terms “nation”, “Thai-tum” and “the people”.

On the other hand, Thaksin pursued a policy of privatizing state-owned companies. Although this had already been initiated after the Asian crisis under the IMF program for Thailand by the previous government led by the Democrats, Thaksin continued it quickly. The two telecommunications agencies TOT and CAT (competitors of Thaksin's own private companies in this industry) were converted into corporations in 2002 and 2003. The previously state broadcasting organization MCOT went public in 2004. In his next privatization project, the electricity supplier EGAT, Thaksin encountered massive opposition and was unable to implement it. Despite his rhetorical departure from “neoliberalism” and the Washington Consensus , Thaksin's policies were in no way anti-capitalist. Rather, Thaksin wanted to bring market economy principles to areas where they were not yet fully applicable: in state-owned companies and the local economy. His rural development policy was aimed at transforming farmers into a new class of local entrepreneurs and “small capitalists”.

Time and again, Thaksin's policy was not only guided by general concepts and objectives, but also by very own business interests and those of his relatives and allies. A study by US economist Michael E. Porter from 2002, for example , which identified industries that promised Thailand particularly great opportunities for competitiveness , had to be expanded to include those industries in which powerful supporters of the government were active. This although Porter had just criticized the closeness to the government and the position of some companies that was protected from the market in his study. It is also noticeable that Thaksin promoted privatization and deregulation precisely where he benefited from them: in the telecommunications and media sectors.

Nationalist rhetoric and foreign policy

Thaksin with Russian President Vladimir Putin (2003)

Thaksin's policies have been described by some observers as nationalistic. However, this only applied at the beginning of his term of office, if at all. The name of his party (“Thais love Thais”) certainly has a national connotation. The motto “think new, act new, for all Thais” speaks more for inclusive nationalism. Several party foundations in the late 1990s had names that revolved around the issues of national sovereignty and self-assertion. When Thailand was able to repay in full the IMF loans granted after the Asian crisis in 2003, two years before they were due, Thaksin celebrated this as Thailand's “Independence Day”. At the same time, he ordered that government authorities should no longer show the national flag only on special occasions, but always and also encouraged private companies and individuals to do so. Thaksin forbade interference from abroad on several occasions. He said that while Thailand is a member of the United Nations and a partner of the United States, it is not its lackey. In a press conference, he described a critical inquiring American correspondent as a “worthless idiot”.

In fact, Thaksin's relationship with the United States was very close under the administration of George W. Bush . In December 2003, Bush designated Thailand as a major non-NATO ally . Thaksin and Bush agreed to deepen and expand cooperation in the field of security. Thaksin also initiated talks on a bilateral free trade agreement, signed the American Container Security Initiative and pledged not to extradite US citizens to the International Criminal Court . Thailand was also an important US partner in the " war on terror " under Thaksin . Just two months after the Thaksin-Bush meeting, Thai security forces in southern Thailand arrested the leader of Jemaah Islamiyah and extradited him to the United States. On the side of the USA, Thaksin's government sent troops to the Iraq war , so it belonged to the so-called “ coalition of the willing ”.

The apparently conservative-patriotic cultural and social policy under Thaksin was also highly inconsistent. While the Ministry of Culture preached public spirit and declared war on the spread of materialism, Thaksin's companies were active in the industries that flooded the country with the most aggressive marketing campaigns. While promoting language purity, the prime minister apparently loved mixing English expressions in his speeches. While it prescribed “Thai values” and moral rigor, the responsible minister, Pracha Maleenont , had to admit that he himself had visited “massage parlors” (a euphemism for the officially banned brothels in Thailand).

Conflict in southern Thailand and "war on drugs"

Thaksin took a tough line against the separatist movements in the southern provinces, which are predominantly inhabited by Muslim Malays . This led to a resurgence of the armed struggle of the militant Islamists and separatists and equally violent reactions from the police, military and government-affiliated paramilitaries, to which many people fell victim. This procedure earned him an unusually clear reprimand from King Bhumibol Adulyadej .

He also cracked down on drug trafficking. In January 2003 he declared a "war on drugs" with the aim of making the country drug-free. In 2003 alone, almost 2,500 people were shot dead (sometimes indiscriminately) and without trial as part of the drug war. In some cases, it was not possible to determine whether police officers or, as the government claims, rival drug dealers were responsible for the killings. Amnesty International alleged that many of the cases involved extrajudicial executions. In addition, 50,000 mostly young and poor people who were linked to drug trafficking were sent to militarily organized education camps and probably thousands were tortured. The tough approach to the drug problem met with widespread approval in Thai society and contributed to Thaksin's popularity. This was also due to the fact that Thaksin used his media power to portray the killed exclusively as dangerous criminals and largely to ignore the fact that the victims also included men, women and children against whom no allegations could be made. King Bhumibol, who in December 2002 himself suggested more intensive action against the methamphetamine problem and brought the expression “war on drugs” into play, largely justified the government's action, but also demanded more detailed clarification.

Leadership style and relationship to democracy

For the keyword-like description of Thaksin's style of government, political scientists coined neologisms such as “Thaksinization” (Thaksinuwat) , “Thaksinocracy” (Thaksinathippatai) , “Thaksinism” (Thaksin-niyom) and “Thaksin system” (rabop Thaksin) . Several authors describe that Thaksin's leadership style was more like that of a manager in the private sector than that of a classic Thai politician. “Thaksinocracy” is accordingly characterized as a fusion of democratic and autocratic leadership, as is common in the private sector. In 1997 he once said in a speech: “A company is a country, a country is a company. They are the same. ”This saying is often cited as emblematic of his understanding of effective governance, as is his slogan from the“ CEO Prime Minister ”.

Thaksin avowedly wanted a “quiet policy” (kan mueang ning) , in which the government mandated by the people - undisturbed by the opposition, civil society groups and the critical press - could do its work. He saw a system of mutual control between the various political actors (checks and balances) as a hindrance. He found it "strange" that a head of government elected by the majority of the people might have to bow to the judgment of the not directly elected constitutional court. Thaksin was positive about Singapore and Malaysia, which were politically more stable and economically more successful than Thailand, but where a party without effective opposition had ruled for decades. Since he claimed to govern only for the good of the people and to serve their needs, opposition to his politics would have to be guided by self-interest and therefore illegitimate.

Although he repeatedly stressed his immediate democratic legitimacy, Thaksin declared in December 2003 that democracy was "only a tool, not our goal". In an interview he later specified that democracy was “the means to an end [...] to improve life and advance the country”. He tried to overthrow the traditional elite of civil servants, who had previously often influenced political decisions. To this end, he appointed his own confidants in key state positions, including the heads of the bodies provided for by the constitution as non-partisan, such as the Constitutional Court, the National Anti-Corruption Commission and the Election Commission . Probably the most controversial personnel decision was the appointment of his cousin Chaisit Shinawatra as commander in chief of the Thai army in August 2003, which earned him the charge of nepotism . Opponents described Thaksin's idea of ​​democracy as "three-second democracy" (after the time it takes voters to put their ticks on the ballot paper), as "parliamentary dictatorship" or "tyranny of the majority". The political scientist Aurel Croissant classified Thailand under Thaksin as a defective democracy .

The press freedom situation in Thailand deteriorated markedly during Thaksin's reign. The organization Freedom House downgraded Thailand from "free" (2001) to "partially free". There have been reports of government intimidation against the press.

Re-elected in 2005

Poster of the TRT party during the 2005 election campaign

In February 2005, Thaksin was introduced to his second term in office after another election victory. No civil prime minister before him had managed a full four-year term with subsequent re-election. The TRT was able to increase its share of the vote to 60.7% and now controlled 375 of the 500 parliamentary seats. The opposition blamed Thaksin's dominance in the media (both state-owned and owned or allied with private broadcasters) and a much more expensive election campaign. Progressive and liberal NGOs, social and civil society organizations, the majority of which had hoped for Thaksin in 2001 and supported him, now feared the almost unlimited power of the TRT. Thaksin, who had already made the fight against corruption one of his main goals in 2001, was himself increasingly exposed to massive corruption allegations, along with his family, his party and his cabinet. The pressure increased when irregularities in orders for baggage scanners for the new Bangkok Suvarnabhumi Airport became known, so that in 2005 it had to undergo its tenth cabinet reshuffle.

Thaksin had extensive media power as he controlled most of the press and television channels with his companies. During the elections in 2000, he bought iTV, a television broadcaster that had been critical of the government and was not dependent on the army or the government . Instead of controversial political discussions and documentaries, the program then mainly featured soap operas ( Lakhon ) and quiz programs . Nonetheless, this was beneficial for the cost-effectiveness of the station. A weekly political talk show since July 2003 has been banned. He tried several times to prevent critical publications, such as those of the Bangkok Post , with lawsuits for defamation or with accusations of libelous majesty . In September 2005, the Thai government closed several smaller radio stations in Bangkok because they allegedly disrupted air traffic. In the 2005 elections, the opposition no longer had any significant media presence.

Thaksin created a system of dependencies. As a former police officer, he was supported by the police apparatus; the ministers were appointed according to his wishes, and so were many judges who favored him and his friends. He was able to cleverly change laws in his favor, on the one hand to avoid charges against him for entanglement in private business with political power and on the other hand to block ongoing proceedings.

Crisis and new elections

Since May 2006, Thaksin has been linked to a plan to put Thailand under a one-party government, the so-called Finland plot . Background were differences between Thaksin and his former follower Sondhi Limthongkul , the editor of the Thai manager magazine. Sondhi had the alleged plan spread in his media and was sued by Thaksin for it.

The prime minister's real decline began in early 2006 with the sale of his communications group Shin Corporation to the part-state Singapore investment company Temasek Holdings Ltd. Thaksin's family had sold 49.6 percent of the shares to Singapore for 1.88 billion US dollars and, thanks to changes in the law that he directed, did not have to pay taxes on them. Although he had officially ceded his company to family members when he took office, as a businessman and politician he continued to pull the strings in favor of the group. His company had benefited from government perks when setting up the messaging system. Since the deal was done in Thai currency, Singapore had to buy large quantities of the Thai baht , which drove its rate up. Domestic interest rates have also risen since then.

Since the Temasek is majority owned by the state of Singapore and the participation of foreign investors in strategic economic sectors of Thailand is restricted by law, there were violent protests. Since February 2006, the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition organized protests in Bangkok, which soon spread to other large cities. There were even posters that portrayed the prime minister as the new Hitler . Having come under such pressure, Thaksin announced early elections on April 2, 2006. The opposition parties boycotted this election, and protest voters went to the polls to vote “no vote” , that is to say, deliberately not to vote for any party. The turnout was 60%, with Thaksins Thai Rak Thai receiving over 50% of the votes. The “no vote” made up over 30%, and a striking number of ballot papers were invalid, which is actually a criminal offense. In some districts of the capital and in large parts of the south, the “no vote” - and the invalid votes outweighed those for Thaksin's TRT. In Bangkok there were a total of more than 1.32 million abstentions, while just under 1.17 million voted for TRT. In the 2005 election, TRT was able to win 32 of 37 electoral districts, in 2006 only 9 TRT candidates received more votes than abstentions in now 36 electoral districts. Parliament could not meet to elect the prime minister because some seats could not be filled and it was not complete. It also played a not insignificant role that a TRT deputy, following his conscience, refused to follow him and became a temporary monk, which meant that the party lacked a decisive voice.

Gradually it also became apparent to what extent the so-called “ independent electoral commission ” was influenced and dependent on Thaksin's party, and even was bribed. After an audience with the king, Thaksin indicated on April 4, 2006 that he would resign. However, until the new parliament was constituted, it was to remain an interim premier without an existing parliament. By-elections still had to be held in April 2006 (mainly in the south of the country), but they did not change the situation. The opposition said it would continue its protests until Thaksin left office entirely. After a very haunting speech by the King to the politicians, with a clear appeal also to the highest judges to be aware of their independence, the 2006 election (including the by-elections) on May 8, 2006 was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court due to various procedural errors thus declared null and void. New elections were set for October 15, 2006.

The 2006 coup and its aftermath

On September 19, 2006, police and military units occupied the capital. Thaksin Shinawatra, who at that time on the UN - General Assembly in New York was staying, was suspended. Tanks advanced into the city center, several television stations were taken over and a provisional government was established. Sonthi Boonyaratglin was the military commander in chief of the bloodless and unopposed coup , which had been hoped for by many . Thaksin then called from the exile to the state of emergency from which he could however not influence the action more. The junta led by General Sonthi began after an announced period of two weeks a provisional government whose prime minister of the former General Surayud Chulanont was.

On October 2, 2006, Thaksin announced his resignation from the leadership of the TRT from his exile in London . He then stayed several times in the People's Republic of China , Hong Kong and Singapore and apparently tried to organize a political comeback from there . The TRT no longer played a significant role as its members left the party in droves. With several criminal proceedings initiated against him, Thaksin was temporarily unable to return to Thailand as he faced immediate arrest. In May 2007 the “constitutional tribunal” formed after the coup banned the TRT due to serious violations of the right to vote. It imposed a five-year political ban on its 111 leading members, including Thaksin.

Around the same time, Thaksin made an offer to buy Manchester City, England . On June 21, 2007, the association's board of directors recommended that its shareholders accept the £ 81.6 million offer, despite the fact that prosecutors in Thailand formally filed three corruption lawsuits against it on the same day. Investigators concentrated on a five- acre property in Bangkok that Thaksin's wife had bought from a state institution at a price that was then one-third of the usual market price. The Thai military government blocked his accounts in Thailand in June 2007, so it was questioned whether Thaksin would be able to raise the purchase price for the football club. In July 2007, the indictment, based on the results of a committee of inquiry, was presented. After Thaksin announced that he would not appear at the first hearing, the Supreme Court issued arrest warrants for the deposed prime minister and his wife on August 14, 2007, based on evidence that the couple were trying to evade prosecution.

Caricature representation of Thaksin (right) and his supposed straw man Samak Sundaravej as puppets in a shadow theater play

The new constitution , drawn up by a commission set up by the military junta, was put to the vote in a referendum on August 19, 2007 . With a participation of less than 60%, 57% of the voters approved it. When the interim government appointed by the military announced elections for December 2007, politicians close to Thaksin who had not been excluded from political office formed the party of people's power . Thaksin asked the once rival right-wing royalist Samak Sundaravej , who had lost his Senate seat in the coup, to take over the party leadership. One of the party's main goals was to enable Thaksin to return to Thailand without the threat of prosecution. The party won the election and Samak became prime minister. Confidants of Thaksin, including his brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat , held important cabinet positions. The movement of the "yellow shirts" formed again and protested violently against the government, which they perceived as the puppet government of Thaksin.

Flight and self-imposed exile

11 August 2008 returned Thaksin not as promised by his visit to the Olympic Games in Beijing to Bangkok, but flew to Britain. The judicial authorities of Thailand applied for an arrest warrant. In September, the Constitutional Court removed Prime Minister Samak from office. Thaksin's brother-in-law Somchai followed him in office. On October 21, 2008, Thaksin was sentenced in absentia to a two-year prison term for abuse of office by the Thai Supreme Court. The Thai public prosecutor's office asked Great Britain to extradite Thaksin to the authorities. Thaksin himself had previously stated that he would not apply for political asylum in Great Britain. Although he was not extradited, he was refused entry to the UK again. In November 2008, Potjaman and Thaksin divorced at the Thai consulate in Hong Kong. This was not because their relationship had broken down, but to protect assets in the name of Potjamans from confiscation by the authorities.

In December 2008, the Constitutional Court also dissolved the second party closely related to Thaksin, the People's Power Party, for electoral fraud and banned its leading members from political activity. Subsequently, some of their MPs, presumably against payment of money and under pressure from the military leadership, defected to the Democratic Party camp and helped Abhisit Vejjajiva into the office of prime minister. The Thaksin-affiliated movement of the "red shirts" ( United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship , UDD) formed against the new government . Thaksin regularly contributed to their gatherings and protests through video messages.

At the end of December 2008, Thaksin received a one-year residence permit in Bonn , but when the German government found out about it, his title was revoked. The CSU politician Rudolf Kraus and the secret agent Werner Mauss had campaigned for the residence permit . He now has a diplomatic passport from Nicaragua and a passport from Montenegro , where the former prime minister announced that he would acquire the Adriatic island of Sveti Nikola in order to build a hotel on it. Since the end of 2008, Thaksin has had his habitual residence in the Gulf emirate of Dubai , which has no extradition agreement with Thailand.

On 5 November 2009, Thaksin was approved by the Cambodian government for its economic adviser and personal adviser to the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen appointed. Thailand then called back its ambassador from Phnom Penh .

On February 26, 2010, the Supreme Court of Thailand ruled that around 46 billion baht (the equivalent of more than one billion euros) from Shinawatra's frozen assets may be confiscated by the Thai state.

Thaksin also contributed to the “red shirt” protests in April and May 2010 with video messages. When the demonstrations turned into violent unrest, the Thaksin government accused his supporters of inciting violence. On May 25, a court issued an arrest warrant against him on suspicion of terrorism . In October 2013, the prosecution closed the case because of insufficient evidence.

Yingluck government and protests in Thailand 2013/2014

Thaksin's sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, ran as the top candidate of the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) in the 2011 parliamentary elections in Thailand . She made explicit reference to him during the election campaign. Thaksin referred to Yingluck as his "clone". In doing so, he wooed his followers to choose his sister, since they both have the same parentage, Yingluck is also an experienced manager and successful business woman and she learned from him. One of the PTP's slogans was "Thaksin thinks, Pheu Thai acts". The PTP won the election and Yingluck became Prime Minister. Using video conferencing , Thaksin regularly attended meetings of Yingluck's cabinet, the Pheu Thai party and its parliamentary group from Dubai.

The person and the continued influence of Thaksin on government policy - denounced by the opposition movement under the catchphrase "Thaksin system" (rabop Thaksin) - were major themes of the anti -government protests from October 2013 onwards . The opposition at the time, the Democratic Party of Thailand, and its former general secretary and later protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban saw the government under Yingluck, in office from 2011 to 2014, as a puppet government led by their exiled brother Thaksin Shinawatra. The amnesty law, which would also have granted Thaksin impunity and thus made his return from exile possible, was postponed. The protests nevertheless continued and culminated in the military coup in May 2014. This brought General Prayut Chan-o-cha , a bitter opponent of Thaksin, to power.

Thaksin continues to live in exile, mostly in Dubai.

literature

  • Bidhya Bowornwathana: Thaksin's model of government reform. Prime Ministerialization through “a country is my company” approach. In: Asian Journal of Political Science. Volume 12, No. 1, 2004, pp. 135-153, doi: 10.1080 / 02185370408434237 .
  • Marco Bünte : Thailand under Thaksin. A review of the first term of office. In: Current Southeast Asia. November 2004, pp. 539-550.
  • Pavin Chachavalpongpun: Reinventing Thailand. Thaksin and His Foreign Policy. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2010, ISBN 978-616-215-000-5 .
  • John Funston (Ed.): Divided over Thaksin. Thailand's Coup and Problematic Transition. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2009, ISBN 978-981-230-961-7 .
  • Kevin Hewison: Thaksin Shinawatra and the reshaping of Thai politics. In: Contemporary Politics. Volume 16, No. 2, 2010, pp. 119-133, doi: 10.1080 / 13569771003783810 .
  • Duncan McCargo , Ukrist Pathmanand: The Thaksinization of Thailand. NIAS Press, Copenhagen 2005, ISBN 87-91114-46-2 .
  • Pasuk Phongpaichit, Chris Baker : Thaksin's populism. In: Journal of Contemporary Asia. Volume 38, No. 1, 2008, pp. 62-83, doi: 10.1080 / 00472330701651960 .
  • Pasuk Phongpaichit, Chris Baker: Thaksin. 2nd Edition. Silkworm Books, 2009, ISBN 978-974-9511-79-4 .

Web links

Commons : Thaksin Shinawatra  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Funston: Divided over Thaksin. 2009, p. Xviii.
    Aurel Croissant: Welfare Regime in East Asia. Structures, performance profiles and challenges. In: Social Security in Developing Countries. Leske + Budrich, Opladen 2004, p. 136.
    Andrew Walker: Thailand's Political Peasants. Power in the Modern Rural Economy. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 2012, pp. 54, 209, 220.
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