Battle of the Reata Latema Mountains
Map of the deployment and battle of the Reata Latema Mountains (bottom left).
| date | March 11, 1916 to March 12, 1916 |
|---|---|
| place | Reata Latema Mountains, southwest of Taveta , British East Africa (now Kenya ) |
| output | Allied victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
|
|
| Troop strength | |
| 1400 soldiers 3 light artillery 3 machine guns |
5500 soldiers |
| losses | |
|
70 dead and wounded |
270 dead, wounded and missing |
.svg){kind=small}
.svg){kind=small}
1914
Maziua - Nyasa - Karonga - Zanzibar - Rufiji Delta - Kilimanjaro - Tanga
1915
Jassini - Bokuba - Lake Tanganyika
1916
Oldoboro (Salaita) - Reata-Latema - Tabora Offensive ( Tabora ) - Kahe - Kondoa Irangi - Matamondo - Kilosa - Mlali - Dutumi - Kisaki - Kibata
1917
Behobeho - Nambanje - Kiawe Bridge - Rumbo - Mahiwa - Mahenge - Ngomano
1918
Namacurra - Lioma - Pere Hills
The Battle of the Reata Latema Mountains , also known as the Battle of Latema Nek , was a military conflict between troops of the British Empire and the German Empire during the First World War . It took place on March 11 and 12, 1916, southwest of the East African town of Taveta (now in Kenya ) and ended with an Allied victory.
background
Almost a month earlier there had been a battle on the Oldorobo , in which an overwhelming force of Allied troops had failed to drive the Germans out of Taveta because the German positions, well developed and camouflaged, could not be explored sufficiently. In early March 1916, German scouts observed strong enemy columns approaching Taveta from the northeast. As a result of this bypass maneuver, the position on Oldorobo Hill and in Taveta had to be abandoned. Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck , the commander of the protection force , then withdrew his troops to the Raeta-Latema Mountains, which are about 5 kilometers southwest of Taveta. The mountains (rather hills) lie on both sides of the Taveta – Kahe railway line and offered good defensive conditions similar to those of the Oldorobo: a good view of the savanna and little cover for attackers.
For the troops of the Entente , 1916 marked the beginning of their offensives to take German East Africa . The South African Lieutenant General Jan Smuts was in charge of the invasion from the direction of British East Africa and instructed Brigadier General Wilfrid Malleson to take Taveta and then move on. Malleson's offensive on Oldorobo had failed in February 1916 and had to withdraw for the time being. By bypassing the Oldorobo he had gained a tactical advantage, but now found himself exposed to a similar situation with the buried Germans on the Raeta-Latema Mountains.
Lineup
Protection force
Von Lettow-Vorbeck had assigned Major Kraut and his department to defend the range of hills on both sides of the railway line. A department under Captain Schulz was tasked with securing the mountain north of the Latema in order to prevent the British from bypassing it. Between this mountain and Kilimanjaro lies the Mamba Hill, which Captain Stemmermann's department was charged with securing and which represented the extreme left German flank. Although the Germans had the advantage of receiving their opponents from the hills in developed positions, they did not have enough men to effectively defend the 20 km wide front. The bulk of the German defenders (1,400 men) stood on the Reata Latema Mountains, while another 600 covered the left flank north of the hills. Von Lettow-Vorbeck had set up the reserve at Himo 3 km behind the main battle line .
British Empire
Brigadier General Malleson had the following units available: 1st East African Infantry Brigade, consisting of Belfield's mounted scouts, a mounted company of infantry , 6th and 8th field gun batteries , 134th (Cornwall) heavy howitzer battery , 2nd Rhodesian Regiment , 3rd Battalion of the King's African Rifles (KAR), 130th battalion of the King George's Own Baluchis ( British Indian army ) and a machine gun - company , together about 3,000 men.
In the further course of the battle, the 5th and 7th South African infantry regiments as well as the 5th and 9th field gun batteries were added, while the 8th South African infantry regiment, a total of around 2,500 men, served as a reserve.
The battle
On March 10, the British sent several mounted detachments to clear up the German positions. The units of 50 men each approached, dismounted and walked towards the Germans until they received fire. Since this reconnaissance was repeated along the whole front, the Germans expected an attack soon. It was unclear to the Germans at which point the British would attack. From his previous experience with the enemy, von Lettow-Vorbeck decided to strengthen the position on the Reata-Latema heights with two other companies under Captain Koehl.
March 11
First attack
In the early morning, strong enemy forces were moving towards the Reata Latema heights. While the British artillery covered the hills with strong fire from 3000 meters away, the German gunners had to hold back due to a lack of ammunition and wait for favorable targets. At around 11:45 a.m., the British infantry attacked the German positions. In the forefront were the Baluchis and the KAR, behind them the Rhodesians. The German artillery opened fire on the enemy, supported by rifle and machine gun fire. In the unprotected area, British casualties increased rapidly, leading to a general retreat. When a new setback for Malleson became apparent, he gave up his command due to illness. Brigadier General Tighe then took command, confirmed by General Smuts.
Second attack
In the meantime, Lettow-Vorbeck, who was in the rear position, received reports that further north large cavalry masses were moving towards the German left wing. The 11th Company under Stemmermann initially prevented these riders from advancing further.
Around 4 p.m., von Lettow-Vorbeck received a telephone call from Major Kraut that another major British frontal attack on the Reata-Latema heights was looming. Von Lettow-Vorbeck gave Stemmermann orders to retreat to the Taveta-Kahe line, as a breakthrough at Reata-Latema was to be expected and Stemmermann was in danger of being cut off.
Brigadier General Tighe had the 5th South African Infantry Regiment and the 5th and 9th field gun batteries move up and began the next attack on the hills at 5:00 p.m. This time the Rhodesians advanced in the middle, flanked by the Baluchis on the right and the KAR on the left. Again the attack stalled and casualties rose, including the commander of the KAR, Lt. Col. BR Graham. A few attackers were able to establish themselves at the foot of the hill, but got no further. Tighe had the 5th South African Infantry Regiment strengthen the line, but the attack was paralyzed across the board: the British had to withdraw again.
After this renewed retreat, General Smuts reinforced the attackers again and placed Tighe under the command of the 7th South African Infantry Regiment, which arrived at the front line at around 8:00 p.m. Since the two South African regiments had not yet taken part in the fighting, Tighe assigned them to the next, third attack as the lead attack: at the beginning of the night they were to storm the German positions with their bayonets attached.
Third attack
The third attack began at around 9:15 p.m. The 5th South African Infantry Regiment came first, closely followed by the 7th South African Infantry Regiment. The soldiers of the second attack, who had lodged themselves at the foot of the hill but were unable to retreat, took part in the attack of their comrades. In the meantime it was dark and the South Africans were able to establish themselves on the respective east side of both hills. Only in the middle, in the so-called Nek , was there no getting through. Tighe, who knew nothing of the current position of his troops, feared high losses and ordered the retreat around 4:20 a.m. Because of the darkness, the order could not be passed on to all the squads and so the units stayed where they were for the night.
March 12th
Major Kraut and his men had retired to the south-western slope of the Reata Mountain during the night. In the early morning of March 12th, the Germans occupied their positions on the hilltop. Lettow-Vorbeck arrived at Reataberg around 6:00 a.m. and realized that the position on the Reata-Latema mountains could no longer be held because of the unprotected left flank. Furthermore, there was no water source on the Reata Latema Mountains and the same had to be brought in from behind. Lettow-Vorbeck decided to vacate the position and initiated an orderly retreat.
At daybreak, the British discovered that the German positions on both hills were abandoned. The 8th South African Infantry Regiment was sent forward to secure the position. The battle was won for the British.
output
The protection force had suffered losses of around 70 men, while the British complained about 270 dead, wounded and missing. The Germans withdrew in an orderly manner towards Kahe while the British troops followed them steadily on a broad front.
consequences
Lettow-Vorbeck's options became smaller because of the withdrawal from Taveta and the Allied advance from several directions, but he wanted to keep his options open. A few days later the battle for Kahe broke out .
See also
Web links
- Allan Sinclair: Wittness to Salaita Hill February 12, 1916. The South African Military History Society, accessed February 18, 2020 . , English
- 2nd Loyals in East Africa 1914-17. Lancashire Infantry Museum, accessed February 24, 2020 . , English
literature
- According to Col H. Moyse-Bartlett: The King's African Rifles, Naval and Military Press 2016, ISBN 978-1-84734-567-7
Individual evidence
- ^ A b Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck : My memories from East Africa . Koehler, Leipzig 1920, p. 95
- ↑ Forgotten Battlefields: The Battle of Latema Reata Hill. Retrieved February 18, 2020 . , English
- ^ A b Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck : My memories from East Africa . Koehler, Leipzig 1920, p. 96
- ^ Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck : My memories from East Africa . Koehler, Leipzig 1920, p. 99