Battle of Mahiwa

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Battle of Mahiwa
Part of: First World War
March of the main part of the Schutztruppe after the withdrawal from the northern border of the colony from April 1916 to the armistice in November 1918. Mahiwa is three kilometers west of Nyangao in the southeast of the former colony.
March of the main part of the Schutztruppe after the withdrawal from the northern border of the colony from April 1916 to the armistice in November 1918. Mahiwa is three kilometers west of Nyangao in the southeast of the former colony.
date October 16th bis 18th October 1917
place In Mahiwa , German East Africa (now Tanzania )
output German victory
Parties to the conflict

German EmpireThe German Imperium German Empire

United Kingdom 1801United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland United Kingdom

Commander

German EmpireThe German Imperium P. von Lettow-Vorbeck

  • Kurt Wahle

United Kingdom 1801United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Jacob van Deventer

  • PS Beves
Troop strength
1,500 soldiers 6,000 soldiers
losses

600 dead and wounded

2,700 dead and wounded

The Battle of Mahiwa was a military conflict between Great Britain and the German Empire during the First World War . It took place between October 16 and 18, 1917 in the East African town of Mahiwa (now in Tanzania ). In terms of duration, use of force and losses, the battle was the largest battle in the East African theater of war and thus the largest of all German colonial battles during the First World War.

background

The state of war between Germany and Great Britain had existed since the beginning of August 1914, which, despite the neutrality provisions of the Congo Act, extended to the colonies, which also made German East Africa a theater of war. With their few strengths, the protection force was inevitably only geared towards defensive operations. Their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck , succeeded in preventing the invasion of the colony by keeping his troops mobile in order to be able to carry out surprise attacks in the event of local superiority or, conversely, to intervene quickly in Allied operations. So he was able to achieve some initial successes, such as the successful Battle of Tanga . After the other German African colonies had surrendered by 1915, the British began with the forces that had become free in March 1916 with their major offensive to occupy German East Africa. Before the combined attack by the British from Kenya and Rhodesia, as well as the Belgians from the Congo, the protection force evaded south and had to give up both the railway lines and the major cities of the colony by September 1916. By the end of 1916 the Germans had gathered south of the Rufiji . The landing of Allied troops in Kilwa and later Lindi in the east in the course of 1917 tied forces in this area, so that the pressure of the Belgians and British in the north and west had to be given in more and more. Gradually, the protection force was pushed into the impassable southeast of the colony. When the British forced General Kurt Wahle von Lindi's troops to retreat westwards from the beginning of October, the entire protection force threatened to be encircled.

Lineup

The Nigerian Brigade on the march to Mahiwa. In the foreground the unity carriers.

By October 15, Wahle's nine sparsely manned companies had gone back to Nyangao , where they were attacked by three advancing battalions of the King's African Rifles (KAR) under Brigadier General Beves. As a result, Wahle's units had to retreat west to Mahiwa, three kilometers away, where they dug into the confusing terrain. Their positions covered Lindi Street in a sector from east to north. Lettow-Vorbeck marched with five companies in an express march from the north-west and reached the battlefield towards the evening of October 15. In total, the Germans now had five guns, including one from SMS Königsberg .

A converted Königsberg gun on its way through rough terrain.

Up until the same time, the British had brought mainly divisional KAR forces from Lindi, which, after the first reconnaissance battles, took up positions about 100 meters away from the German line. From Kiwa three Nigerian battalions of the Royal West African Frontier Force were on their way to bypass the Germans in the north of Mahiwah while they were tied up by the main British forces in the center. The British artillery was in many ways superior to the Germans and could, among other things, fall back on mine throwers , which could be used effectively in the confusing terrain.

The battle

From the early hours of October 16, the British attacked along the entire front line. This was the first time that tactics from the Western Front were used in the East African theater of war. According to the fire planning, the British artillery prepared the attack with concentrated fire on the German lines and shifted the fire, while the infantry attacked in close columns behind the German lines on their reserves. The Germans were able to repel all attacks and, for their part, undertook counter-attacks, which, however, also remained. Around noon, Lettow-Vorbeck advanced on the left wing, i.e. north of Mahivah, with two companies in order to flank the British on his part and there, surprisingly, came across the advancing Nigerian brigade for both sides. Now the advantage of the now very combat-experienced German Askari troops and officers became apparent , who immediately adapted to the new situation and attacked the Nigerian superior force in one go and fought back. A British supply column got between the fronts and was overwhelmed by the Germans. The chronically undersupplied protection force captured a 7.5 cm gun with ammunition, three machine guns and a large amount of ammunition. In this way, from a German perspective, the situation in the north had been resolved by the evening and pressure had been built on the British right wing.

On October 17, the British, which had since been reinforced, attacked the German center head-on. Again lossy fights relax at the shortest distance. In some places the Germans were thrown from their positions six times, but each time they were able to recapture them by counter-attacks. In order to hold the center, Lettow-Vorbeck had to move his reserves to the center and also withdraw units from his left wing. The battle raged until dark, with heavy casualties on both sides.

Protection force in action, equipped with the Mauser Model 71.

From the experience from the battle at Reata , Lettow-Vorbeck estimated the opponent's approach correctly. General Beves had attacked there with his forces head-on, regardless of his own losses. Therefore Lettow strengthened the center and refrained from further actions on the wings. As expected, the British attacked the German positions head-on on October 18 after artillery preparation, in which the Askaris resisted doggedly and took the British attacking in waves under fire at the closest distance. During the day, the British wore themselves more and more in the loss-making hand-to-hand combat without achieving the decisive breakthrough. The attacks finally stopped. On the German side, too, the reserves were almost exhausted by the afternoon and the ammunition was gradually running out. In this situation, the Germans counterattacked on Lindi-Strasse with the bayonet attached. The front collapsed and the exhausted British fled. Thereupon the remnants of the division also fell back along the line. By evening the majority of the British had gathered again at Nyangao, from where they had started the attack on the 15th.

output

Wounded British soldiers after the battle in Nyangao

The British were forced to withdraw despite multiple superiorities. The Germans also returned to the west of Mahiwa on the 19th, so that many of the dead were not buried. For weeks there was still the smell of corpses in the area. With 2,700 casualties, the British lost half of their troops and thus had the largest Allied losses in the African theater of the First World War. The German losses of almost 600 men amounted to more than thirty percent of the troops and weighed heavier for Lettow-Vorbeck than the British, given the poor supply situation. His supplies were practically exhausted. Without sufficient ammunition for their modern weapons, units were forced to use the old Mauser Model 71 , which still fired black powder cartridges. The British prisoners soon had to be released because they could not be cared for.

consequences

After the defeat became known, General Beves was replaced. It is unclear whether he knew by the 17th that he had both Lettow and Wahle in front of him and thus the majority of the Schutztruppe. Wahles' troops alone could not have stopped the overwhelming power of the British. He was clearly superior even against the entire German troops and probably recognized the chance of ending the war in German East Africa if he won. That is why he used his brave fighting troops so ruthlessly and sent them head-on into the German fire, where they suffered heavy losses.

Lettow-Vorbeck was appointed major general after the success in November, but the victory did not change the strategic situation. The grip remained. A follow-up of the British was not possible with the weak forces, at the same time the important supply posts in Lukuledi, about 60 kilometers to the west, were threatened by the British. Lettow had to go there with six companies on the 19th, fought back the British standing there and thus initially broke away from the clutches. Without supplies and due to the continued offensive of the Allies, Lettow-Vorbeck was forced to retreat with the protection force to Portuguese East Africa in November , whose border they crossed at the Battle of Ngomano and were able to re-equip themselves.

The area experienced a drought in late 1917, which resulted in bush fires repeatedly during the fighting. There were also many refugees in the area from the 1917 uprisings against the Portuguese colonial administration in Portuguese East Africa . The large number of Allied troops and their tens of thousands of porters , who had to supply themselves from the country, then caused a famine in the area, which killed many residents.

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Edward Paice: World War I: The African Front . Pegasus Publications, 2008, ISBN 1-933648-90-2 , p. 330.
  2. a b c d Wolfgang Foerster, Helmuth Greiner, Hans Witte: Fighters on forgotten fronts. Campaign Letters, Diaries and Reports. P. 101ff online via The Digital State Library of Upper Austria
  3. ^ A b Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck : My memories from East Africa . Koehler, Leipzig 1920, pp. 188ff.