Battle of Coulmiers

Battle of Coulmiers

Part of: Franco-German War

date	November 9, 1870
place	Coulmiers , Canton of Meute-sur-Loire, Arrondissement Orléans , Loiret department
output	French victory

Parties to the conflict
Bavaria	France
Commander
Ludwig vd Tann	Louis de Paladines
Troop strength
about 20,000 men	about 70,000 men
losses
1,112 soldiers and 54 officers, approx. 1,000 prisoners	1,500 men in total

The Battle of Coulmiers was a skirmish between a Bavarian corps and French units during the Franco-Prussian War on November 9, 1870 and ended in a French victory.

Starting position

During the siege of Paris it was the task of the army department under General von der Tann to secure the siege troops against the newly established Loire army . The army division consisted of the 1st Bavarian Corps , the 22nd Division and some cavalry units, namely the 2nd, 4th and 6th Cavalry Divisions.

Situation of the Bavarian troops

Ludwig von der Tann-Rathsamhausen

After a Bavarian victory in the battle at Artenay , the French withdrew and the Bavarian troops were able to take Orléans on October 11th . Vanguard advanced far across the Loire. The 22nd Division (General Ludwig von Wittich ) and the 4th Cavalry Division were withdrawn to Paris to support the siege troops and took Châteaudun on October 18 and Chartres on October 21 . General von der Tann's troops in the Orléans area numbered about 26,000 men, for the following battle the Bavarians had 14,543 men, 4,450 horsemen and 110 guns at their disposal.

Situation of the French troops

The German troops standing in and around Orléans faced the newly formed units of the Loire Army on the Loire. These received an uninterrupted influx of war volunteers and by the end of October 1870 had grown to up to 200,000 men, of which 120,000 were basically ready for action. Major problems arose for the French from the insufficient training of the volunteers and the great shortage of NCOs and officers. However, the training of soldiers was pushed ahead with great emphasis. Weapons and equipment were still widely available during this phase of the war.

This battle showed for the first time a change in French tactics, particularly as regards the use of artillery. The French Army of the Rhine had relied almost entirely on the superior fire of the infantry. In an attempt to take over the successful German tactics, existing artillery was deployed much more massive and from a shorter distance. In addition, there was also improved equipment, especially with heavy artillery. The French had a large number of 12 cm cannons that had previously only been used on ships. Field cannons from Great Britain, which had been ordered by the new French government in October, were also used here for the first time. With this artillery heavy losses were inflicted especially on the Bavarians entrenched in the forest of Montapipeau.

As far as the equipment of the infantry was concerned, the French had thousands of Enfield and Springfield rifles from England and the USA in addition to the Chassepot rifle .

The French soldiers wounded in the battle could hardly receive medical care because the Loire Army did not have sufficient medical care.

Deployment to battle

General d'Aurelle de Paladines

At the beginning of November 1870, General d'Aurelle de Paladines had around 75,000 soldiers and 160 guns at his disposal and used them to advance towards Orléans. The aim was to destroy the isolated Bavarian corps in Orléans and then develop the city into a base for the relief of Paris. The units were noticed by German cavalry on November 7th and appropriate measures were taken. On November 8, the advance of the French reached Messas and Meung with the right wing and Ouzuer with the left wing, the XV. Corps under General de La Motte-Rouge should right against the Mauvebach, the XVI. Corps under General Chanzy proceed directly to Coulmiers. Orléans was evacuated by the Bavarians in the night of November 8th to 9th, most of the troops (approx. 23,000 men) took up a position in the Coulmiers area, where the next day in cold and windy weather the battle took place. General von der Tann was certain that his weak corps would maneuver better than the large but poorly trained and inexperienced Loire Army.

Battle of November 9, 1870

The Bavarian troops lined up from Saint-Péravy-la-Colombe along the road to Châteaudun via Coulmiers to La Renardière . The French attacked from the southwest early in the morning and first made contact with their right wing. Immediately after the first contact, large parts of the French army turned and attacked in the center and on the wing. Due to the fact that the marching formation was very broad, it took some time before all units could intervene in the battle.

During the first attack in the center around 1:30 p.m., the French troops managed to get very close to the Bavarians, who had already used up their ammunition. The Bavarians were saved here by the artillery, which came close and repulsed the attack. A second attack took place around 3 p.m. with seven French regiments against a single isolated Bavarian regiment. Admiral Jean Jauréguiberry's division attacked from Gémigny and Cheminiers. Again the French did not succeed in coordinating their attack correctly, this gave their opponents time again and again to provide reinforcements at the crucial points and to drive off the attacking regiments with so-called rapid fire.

After this failed attack, the Mobile Guards withdrew in disorder. It was only with great difficulty and with the help of the few regular units that the French officers managed to restore order and prepare for the next attack.

Despite the numerical superiority, the French could not drive the Bavarians out of their positions. The French cavalry under the command of General Reyau was too far to the west, so that a possible encirclement of the right wing of the Bavarians was not possible for a long time.

When the French infantry finally managed to storm Coulmiers, von der Tann had to withdraw. He had already cleared the place itself before this last attack in order to avoid being encircled here. This was the beginning of the Bavarians' withdrawal. Twilight was already beginning and the retreat succeeded without pursuit. The Bavarians went back to Toury via Saint-Péravy-la-Colombe . The further retreat to Angerville then took place to merge with other German associations .

The garrison still remaining in Orléans with a total strength of around 2,500 men also had to withdraw, and it was no longer possible to take the sick and wounded with them. This led to the high number of prisoners, around 800 to 1,000 men, depending on the source. The French also liberated around 2,000 of their own prisoners of war in Orléans. They also came across an ammunition troop with two guns.

The French refrained from being pursued by the cavalry as well as from advancing further on Paris.

consequences

In Angerville, the Bavarian Corps met on November 12th with the 22nd Division, withdrawn some time ago, and other units that had become free after the capitulations of Toul, Strasbourg and Metz. This newly formed army department was under the command of Friedrich Franz II of Mecklenburg-Schwerin . The association had a total strength of over 65,000 men with 232 guns. For the time being belonged to the army group III. , the IX. and the X. Corps and an additional cavalry division from the Second Army on. General von der Tann was demoted to commander of an army corps.

General d'Aurelle de Paladines refused to advance on Paris until his troops had been trained. He requested that his earnings be doubled for himself after his victory, and Gambetta complied with this request. In Paris, the city was decorated with a tricolor on the news of the victory.

In the days and weeks that followed, Orléans was fortified by thousands of soldiers. The north side of the Loire was thus developed into a bridgehead. This included heavy ship artillery and the fortification of buildings. Along with this fortification work, the French generals tried to strengthen the discipline of their troops. While General de La Motte-Rouge was trying to gain the soldiers' trust - his officers were supposed to learn the names of the soldiers and talk to the soldiers about their families - General Barry sentenced several dozen of death to insubordination.

Treatment of German prisoners of war

The German prisoners were initially not treated as sick and wounded, but as normal prisoners of war. The high number of prisoners of war was used by the French government as a sign of victory. The lack of medical care led to a larger number of deaths, until many of the sick were transferred to hospitals, where better care could be ensured, even after French protests by the camp commanders, local doctors and civil authorities.

swell

• Battles of the World . Compton's Home Library
• Friedrich Engels: About the war , transcription of a text from The Pall Mall Gazette No. 1797 of November 16, 1870

literature

• Geoffrey Wawro: The Franco-Prussian War. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge u. a. 2007, ISBN 978-0-521-61743-7 .
• Coulmiers . In: Meyers Konversations-Lexikon . 4th edition. Volume 4, Verlag des Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig / Vienna 1885–1892, p. 311.
• Franco-German War . In: Encyclopædia Britannica . 11th edition. tape 11 : Franciscans - Gibson . London 1910, section The Orléans Campaign , p. 12–13 (English, full text [ Wikisource ]).

Web links

• Prussia side . Private website.

annotation

1. ↑ The information on the strength of the German troops varies between 20,000 and 26,000 men. However, the garrison that remained in the city must still be deducted from the strength of the troops at Coulmiers.
2. ↑ a peculiarity in fire fighting, which was introduced after 1866
3. ↑ The fact that the fight dragged on for several hours is listed so consistently in the sources and web links mentioned. The English and French Wikipedia describe the battle as a brief artillery raid, followed by a bayonet attack with the Bavarians fleeing.
4. ↑ about 8 km north of Coulmiers, today along the D3
5. ↑ about 30 km north of Orléans, today on the N20
6. ↑ about 15 km northwest of Toury
7. ^ Geoffrey Wawro: The Franco-Prussian War. Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-61743-7 , p. 268.
8. ^ Geoffrey Wawro: The Franco-Prussian War. Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-61743-7 , p. 270 with additional references.
9. ↑ described by Theodor Fontage in POW.